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This work is a study of William Stanley Jevons’s thought. My thesis is: Jev-
ons’s thought needs to be seen in the light of its anthropological foundations to 
enhance the understating of his works. Such study of the anthropological foun-
dations puts emphasis on some aspects of his thought which have been neglect-
ed, such as his religious views. Particular stress is also devoted to historical 
contextualisation, enabling us to understand how a number of Jevons’s con-
cerns are rooted in his cultural background.  
In the first chapter of my thesis, I focus on Jevons’s epistemology and reli-
gious thought. Here I argue that his account of probability and natural laws had 
a theological foundation. I go on to further analyse Jevons’s logic and ontology 
by comparing his work with the tradition of the ars combinatoria. In the sec-
ond chapter, I present Jevons’s moral and political thought. In the first part I 
again consider Jevons’s religious beliefs, focusing on his allegiance to Unitari-
anism. I then consider Jevons’s political thought in the light of a fundamental 
question: how could a society composed of selfish individuals be conceived? In 
the last part of the second chapter, I argue that Jevons appealed to Herbert 
Spencer’s theory of evolution to reconcile individuals and society. In the third 
chapter I address Jevons’s economic theory, arguing that it was strongly influ-
enced by the other spheres of his thought. In the first part of the third chapter, I 
link Jevons’s economic thought to his moral and political philosophy. In the 
second part of this chapter, I focus on the role of mathematics in Jevons’s eco-
nomic works. In the last part of the third chapter, I investigate Jevons’s repre-




Those RULES of old discovered, not devised, 
Are Nature still, but Nature methodized. 
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I seem to have more clearly before me by degrees the position to which 
I would aspire. Accepting the progressive triumphs of physical science I 
would aid in the reform of abstract science and in the establishment of 
moral & political sciences. But I would also join science to morals & 
religion. I would try to show that they are not antagonistic (Jevons, 
1972-1981, Vol. I, 203). 
 
William Stanley Jevons (1835 – 1882) is first and foremost known as an econ-
omist. His revision of the theory of value and the definition of the principle of 
decreasing marginal utility gained Jevons a prominent position in the history of 
economic thought. Together with Léon Walras and Carl Menger, he is tradi-
tionally considered as one of the leading figures of the marginalist school – a 
theory which planted the seeds of contemporary economics. 
Jevons became interested in political economy while he still was a young 
man working at Sydney’s Mint. After coming back to England to pursue his 
studies, in 1866 he was appointed professor of Logic, Mental and Moral Phi-
losophy at Owens College, in Manchester. He continued to teach political 
economy – which at that time was considered part of Mental and Moral Philos-
ophy – until the year preceding his untimely death in 1882. The passage quoted 
above is drawn from Jevons’s journal and is dated 11 March 1866. It was a 
moment of great significance for Jevons’s career as an economist – which fact 
makes the passage quite bewildering. Here Jevons meditated on his endeav-
ours, trying to estimate his prior achievements and the expectations he still nur-
tured for his work. He was determined to establish political economy as an au-
tonomous, scientific subject matter, taking advantage of the method of the 
physical sciences. However, Jevons was far from being solely interested in 




litical economy, he mentioned another aspiration: combining science with mor-
als and religion. 
The above quoted passage of Jevons’s journal buttresses the thesis I sup-
port in this dissertation. My thesis is: Jevons’s thought needs to be seen in the 
light of its anthropological foundations. Such perspective would enhance the 
understating of Jevons’s works and the meaning he attached to it. A study of 
the ‘anthropological foundations’ focuses on the description of the human be-
ing one’s thought, whether such description is explicitly provided or only im-
plied. Investigating the ‘anthropological foundations’ thus means stands here 
for the representation of the human subject involved in the most diverse 
spheres of thought treated by Jevons, such as his logic, epistemology, social 
policy, or economic theory. 
The representation of the human nature is certainly of crucial importance 
in the domain of the social or human sciences, in which the human being is a 
specific object of investigation. However, every intellectual or practical inquiry 
entails an account of the human nature, if only qua representation of the subject 
elaborating a theory. Every time we pursue knowledge, we offer, either unwit-
tingly or not, a representation of conditions which enable us to pursue such 
knowledge. The representation of the agent involved in the theoretical inquiry 
plays a foundational role for the inquiry itself, since the idea of ourselves in 
terms of subjects of knowing directs our investigations. Therefore, a study of 
the anthropological foundations is necessary for comprehending the bases on 
which any theoretical investigation is built. 
Emphasising the anthropological foundations is all the more important in 
Jevons’s case, given his interest in the social sciences. As I have already men-
tioned, the social sciences consider the human being and his behaviour as their 
specific object of study. Therefore, I will focus on those domains where the an-
thropological foundations are more evidently developed, such as the philoso-
phy of morals and religious beliefs. These domains are strictly related to the 
anthropological foundations of Jevons’s thought, entailing a representation of 
the human being in terms of the principles of his action or of his relationship 




sis. I will also show the influence of those spheres of thought, and consequent-
ly of the anthropological foundations of Jevons’s thought, on other domains, 
which at a first glance seem to be untouched by these kind of reflexions. 
Moreover, this perspective puts emphasis on some aspects of his thought 
which have been neglected. This is the case with Jevons’s religious views. This 
aspect of Jevons’s thought has been considerably understudied, and it has often 
been considered to concern his private life alone. However, my focus on the 
anthropological foundations of Jevons’s thought reveals the relevance of his 
theological reflections and religious beliefs for many of the topics which he 
treated. Taking this point of view also enabled me to see the link between top-
ics which would not normally be thought to be related, such as Jevons’s epis-
temology and religious beliefs. We shall see that the representation of the hu-
man mind as finite with respect to the infinite intellect of the Creator sheds 
light on Jevons’s epistemology, as well as on his logical studies. This provides 
further proof of the importance of the studying the anthropological foundations 
of his thought. 
In this dissertation, particular stress is put on the historical context in 
which Jevons lived. Such attention to historical contextualisation is connected 
to the inquiry of the anthropological foundations of Jevons’s thought. Jevons’s 
cultural background, the circles he was acquainted with, the places where he 
lived, couldn’t but inform his thinking and his views of human nature. Hence, 
the study of the Victorian age enables us to understand how a number of Jev-
ons’s concerns are rooted in his cultural background, including his attempt at 
reconciling science and religion, and his ambitions for social reform. 
Along with the inquiry into the religious character of Jevons’s account, I 
pay particular attention to another, more general topic, that is, the relationship 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. This topic is likely to attract much attention in a work 
concerned with the anthropological foundations of one’s thought, since consid-
ering the philosophy of morals is of primary importance for such a study. In-




among moral philosophers1. This debate initially developed through reflections 
on David Hume’s famous passage from the Treatise on Human Nature (1739). 
Here, Hume warned against the tendency of confusing ‘is’ and ‘ought’: 
 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have al-
ways remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary 
way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes the ob-
servations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d 
to find, that instead of usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I 
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or an 
ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last 
consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new rela-
tion or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it should be observ’d and ex-
plain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduc-
tion from others, which are entirely different from it (Hume, [1739] 
1878, Vol. II, 245-246). 
 
These two levels must be kept separate. Moreover, as Hume observed, no 
‘ought’ can be derived from the ‘is’. The level of ‘ought’ and ‘is’ being utterly 
distinct, every attempt to deduce the ‘ought’ from the ‘is’ is absurd and incor-
rect2. 
The realm of ‘is’ could be connected to the concept of description: when 
one is moving at the level of ‘is’, one is providing a description of the world as 
it is (or as one thinks it is). At the level of ‘ought’, instead, one is providing an 
account of how things should be (or how one thinks things should be). This is 
the realm of prescription, where we are not only describing the state of things, 
but expressing a judgement of value, presenting what in our mind would be the 
most desirable state of affairs. At the level of ‘is’, we are dealing with state-
 
1 This topic has been discussed in several papers, which have been collected in Hud-
son, 1969. 
2 For further insight on this passage from Hume’s Treatise, see the very influential pa-




ments of facts, while at the level of ‘ought’ with moral judgements, prescrip-
tions, hypothetical imperatives3. 
Moreover, as I shall point out at several junctures, there are objects to 
which prescriptions simply do not apply. Therefore, speaking in terms of 
‘ought’ is not always reasonable. If we are persuaded that some things could 
not happen any differently, such as a stone falling because of gravity, then it 
would be nonsensical to prescribe anything to such things. The stone has no 
choice: it would fall in any case. As I argue in the second chapter, prescriptions 
have solely a meaning for those subjects who can change themselves. 
It is likely that Jevons knew the above passage from the Treatise, given the 
popularity of this text. Whether he knew it or not, though, Jevons did not give 
this problem the attention it deserved. My study reveals that the polarity be-
tween ‘is’ and ‘ought’ played a fundamental role in Jevons’s work4, but also 
shows the ambiguity with which this theme is treated by him. The tension be-
tween these two levels goes through every aspect of his thought, being found in 
his logic, as well as his moral philosophy and economic theory. 
Furthermore, the ‘is-ought problem’ is deeply intertwined with my investi-
gation of the anthropological foundations of Jevons’s thought, and only in the 
light of this perspective reveals its pre-eminence. The entanglement between 
prescription and description, between what humans are and what they ought to 
be, is one of the most important topics emerging while Jevons depicts his con-
ception of human nature. Studying Jevons’s representation of the human being 
and the on the consequences of that representation on his thought requires a 
treatment of the ‘is-ought question’, which played such a relevant role in many 
of Jevons’s investigations. 
 
3 For a definition of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in terms of statements of facts and normative 
judgements, see Hudson, 1969, 11-35. 
4 This issue had already been addressed, although it hasn’t received the attention it de-
serves. In this regard, see: G. Robertson, 1876 (in Wood, 1988, Vol. I) 12, where Rob-
ertson has touched this topic with reference to Jevons’s logic; Mazlish, 1986, 143; 




In conclusion, this inquiry shows that a study of Jevons’s thought from the 
point of view of its anthropological foundations enable us to shed light on the 
work of the Victorian polymath. This perspective clarifies not only his reli-
gious and moral thought, but also those fields which at first glance seem to be 
unrelated to this topic, such as logic or economic theory, depicting them under 
a different light. Indeed, the representation of the human being enters logic and 
economic theory qua subject of logical investigations or of the economic laws. 
Hence, a consideration of the anthropological foundations of Jevons’s thought 
is of crucial importance to provide further understanding even of those fields 
which had been already studied at length. 
 
William Stanley Jevons’s life and works 
 
William Stanley Jevons, called simply ‘Stanley’ by his family, was born 
on the 1st September 1835, in Liverpool5. Jevons’s father, Thomas Jevons, was 
an iron merchant. Jevons’s mother was Mary Anne Roscoe, daughter of Wil-
liam Roscoe. His maternal grandfather was an outstanding Liverpool citizen: 
he was a banker, an art collector, a poet, a historian, and he had been engaged 
in the struggle for the abolition of slavery. Both the Jevons and the Roscoes 
were wealthy and cultivated. Moreover, they were Dissenters, and specifically 
Unitarians. Jevons’s family was well acquainted with the Unitarian circles in 
Liverpool, where the Unitarian community was flourishing6. 
Mary Anne Roscoe was a well-educated woman, whose interests encom-
passed botany, poetry, logic, chemistry, and political economy. It was she who 
gave the young Stanley, at the age of four, his first lesson in political economy, 
based on Richard Whately’s textbook, i.e. Easy Lessons on Money Matters for 
the Use of Young People. Jevons attended the Mechanics Institution High 
 
5 For a detailed biography, see M. Könekamp, Biographical Introduction (Jevons, 
1972-1981, Vol. I, 1-51). Another extensive biographical account can be found in 
Schabas, 1990. 





School in Liverpool. He was thus given a technical education. His training in 
the hard and technical sciences, as some scholars have noticed, had a long-
lasting influence on his scientific endeavours7. In January 1848, when Stanley 
was twelve, the firm of Jevons’s father failed, due to the railway crisis of 1847. 
Its bankruptcy left Jevons’s family in financial straits. 
In 1851 Jevons left Liverpool and moved to London, to pursue his studies. 
He entered the Junior University College of London for the first time at the age 
of sixteen and became an undergraduate student there in June 1852. As a stu-
dent at UCL, Jevons dedicated himself to the study of chemistry especially, 
taking advantage of the expertise of two exceptional teachers, Professors Gra-
ham and Williamson. Jevons also had the opportunity to study mathematics 
with Augustus De Morgan. One of the most eminent intellectuals of the Victo-
rian age, De Morgan had a deep influence on Jevons’s thought8. During these 
years, Jevons spent a considerable part of his leisure time walking through the 
streets of London. His walks were no mere diversions, but were rather prompt-
ed by a social interest. Jevons liked to wander in the poor and destitute districts 
of the city, “like Dickens before him and like Marshall a few years later” (Jev-
ons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 17), as his grandniece Margaret Könekamp has written. 
It isn’t surprising that Jevons was an avid reader of Henry Mayhew, Charles 
Knight and, like many Victorians, of Charles Dickens, who had devoted them-
selves to describing and denouncing the condition of London’s poor9. 
 
7 Some eminent economists and scholars, John Maynard Keynes for instance, have 
underlined that Jevons’s early technical education informed his approach to political 
economy (see Keynes, [1936] 2010, Vol. X, 111; R. D. C. Black, 1972b, 369). 
8 Concerning Augustus De Morgan’s influence on Jevons, see the first chapter. 
9 In 1851, Henry Mayhew published an influential book, namely London Labour and 
the London Poor, where the problem of working conditions in Victorian London was 
addressed. Charles Knight was the editor of another famous book in six volumes on 
London life, where the wretchedness of the poor’s housing was discussed. As for 
Dickens’s treatment of this issue, we think immediately of Oliver Twist and The Bleak 
House. It is probably no coincidence that Jevons visited Clerkenwell, a district known 




Jevons did not then complete his education at UCL. Still a boy of seven-
teen, he was offered a position as Mint essayer in Sydney. Jevons arrived in 
Sydney on the 6th October 1854. It was the beginning of a very important peri-
od in Jevons’s intellectual life10. While working at the Mint, he cultivated 
many old interests and developed new ones. He focused on meteorology: he 
published several papers on this subject matter, and from September 1856 to 
June 1858 he became Meteorological Observer for the Empire, an Australian 
newspaper. He also studied the geology, topography, and geography of the 
Australian territory. He visited some of the Australian goldfields. 
Moreover, his interests in social issues had not faded during those years. 
He studied the city of Sydney both from the topographical and the sociological 
point of view, elaborating a survey11. During these years, Jevons started to take 
an interest in political economy. This interest was at first triggered by the is-
sues arising from the introduction of a railway system in Australia. Jevons pub-
lished his reflections in three letters in the Empire in 185712. After contributing 
the first of these letters, Jevons began his studies of political economy. Among 
his readings we can find John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political Economy, 
Malthus and Whately’s works, and Lardner’s Railway Economy. 
 
Twist. With regard to Jevons’s walks in those districts, see the following journal en-
tries: Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 67-68, 71-72, 90. On Jevons’s interest in Mayhew’s 
work, see Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 80-81. 
10 The relevance of Jevons’s years in Australia has been underlined by LaNauze and 
Michael White in particular; see: La Nauze, 1941; M. White, 1982. 
11 In this regard, see  La Nauze, 1941, 33-37. 
12 For the first letter, published on 10 February 1857, see Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 
262-268. The second letter was published on 8 April 1857 (see Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. II, 282-287). The third letter was published on 29 December 1857 (see Jevons, 




In the meanwhile, Jevons was pondering whether to keep his position or to 
leave Sydney13. His appointment at the Mint gave him and his family some 
economic stability, but he had a strong desire to complete his education and to 
take part in British intellectual life. The second option prevailed, and Jevons 
left Australia for good in 1859. In the same year he resumed his university 
studies at UCL. In that time, Jevons enhanced his knowledge of mathematics, 
which was still taught by De Morgan. He also continued to study political 
economy, philosophy and logic. While he was a student at UCL, Jevons pur-
sued his personal studies as well, working on statistics, meteorology, and polit-
ical economy. He completed his MA at UCL in June 1862. 
With the end of his studies approaching, Jevons started to make the results 
of his prior efforts known. In June 1862 he published two diagrams, one con-
cerning the Bank of England’s account and the second the price of money 
funds, wheat, the number of bankruptcies and other data. These diagrams 
summed up the statistical work which Jevons had been doing in the previous 
years, being persuaded that “it is only [by] representing large masses of statis-
tics in this manner that any sure foundation can be laid for Poll Economical ar-
guments” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 450). 
In October 1862 Jevons read two papers before the British Association for 
the Advancement of Sciences. The papers were entitled “Notice of a General 
Mathematical Theory of Political Economy” and “On the Study of Periodic 
Commercial Fluctuations, with five diagrams”. The first paper was relevant to 
the development of Jevons’s economic theory, since it already contained all the 
basic principles which would later be the core of his major economic works. 
However, his presentation at the BAAS was quite disappointing: his theory did 
 
13 Concerning this decision, see Maas, 2016, where the author has analysed Jevons’s 
account books, explaining his decision in the light of accounting practices and con-




not elicit any praise, and apparently barely any reaction, as Jevons bitterly not-
ed in his journal (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 188)14. 
The following year Jevons published a work which attracted more atten-
tion than the previous ones. It was a pamphlet entitled A Serious Fall in the 
Value of Gold ascertained and its Social Effects set forth. Jevons touched thus 
a relevant topic for his contemporaries, claiming that there had been a depre-
ciation of gold and investigating its causes. At the end of 1863, Jevons pro-
duced another important work, i.e. Pure Logic, or the Logic of Quality apart 
from Quantity, which constituted a core part of his logical system. Moreover, 
in October of the same year Jevons moved from London to Manchester, where 
he started working as a tutor at Owens College. It was a humble position, but 
this turned out to be the beginning of a long and prestigious career. Jevons 
lived in Manchester thirteen years and became a high esteemed professor at the 
college. 
However, the beginning of his career as a tutor was quite challenging. Jev-
ons’s resolution not to neglect his duties at Owens College while continuing to 
work on his projects led to a deterioration of his health. Despite his health is-
sues, in the second half of 1864 Jevons finished a book which made his name. 
Its title was A Coal Question: an Inquiry concerning the Progress of the Nation 
and the probable Exhaustion of the Coalmines. The book was published in 
April 1865 and in the following year it gained the attention of two eminent fig-
ures: John Stuart Mill and William Gladstone, who was then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. In the spring of 1866 Jevons was eventually appointed professor of 
Logic, Mental and Moral Philosophy at Owens College. This appointment gave 
Jevons enough economic stability to consider getting married. Indeed, on the 
19th December 1867 he married Harriet Ann Taylor. She was the daughter of 
 
14 Here we read: “The year of which only five minutes have now to run [1862] seems 
to have been a long one. It has seen many of my hopes fulfilled, many frustrated. It 
has made me an M.A. It has seen my theory of Economy offered to a Learned Society 




John Edward Taylor, Unitarian and founder of the Manchester Guardian 
newspaper. 
Those years in Manchester, after becoming professor at Owens College, 
were very productive for Jevons. It was then that he published his most im-
portant works: The Theory of Political Economy (1871) and The Principles of 
Science (1874). The latter was a long and complex book, and its composition 
took Jevons almost ten years15. Between 1875 and 1879, he published three pa-
pers concerning the commercial crises and their relation to sunspots. During 
the Manchester years Jevons became more and more interested in social policy: 
he produced many papers on some socially relevant issues – papers which 
would be then collected in the volume Methods of Social Reform (1883). In-
deed, The State in Relation to Labour (1882), the last book Jevons wrote, was 
completely devoted to these issues. 
Despite his productivity, Jevons’s health continued to be fragile. It is likely 
that his health issues were at the basis of his choice to resign his post at Owens 
College. Thus, in 1876, he left Manchester and moved to London, where he ac-
cepted an appointment as professor of Political Economy at UCL. It was a less 
demanding position, since the teaching responsibilities were not as burdensome 
as they were at Owens College. This enabled Jevons to focus on his writings 
and on his health. Yet, his poor health forced him to resign his professorship at 
UCL as well. 
Jevons’s life abruptly ended in the summer of 1882. He was in Galley Hill 
for his holidays with his family. Jevons liked swimming: while in Australia, as 
he wrote in his letters, he took great pleasure in swimming in those clear waters 
(see for example Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 273). His doctor told him, though, 
that he should abstain from it, since bathing in the cold English waters was un-
suited to his heart weakness. Yet, in the last day of the holidays, Jevons 
couldn’t resist and took a swim. It is likely that his heart could not cope with 
the shock of the cold water, and Jevons drowned. He was only forty-six (see 
Jevons, 1886, 449-450). 
 





The reception of Jevons’s work 
 
Jevons has long been considered a figure of primary importance in the his-
tory of economic thought. Here I present the main contributions concerning 
Jevons’s oeuvre, as well as provide evidence of how the present inquiry fills a 
gap in scholarly studies. 
In 1936, John Maynard Keynes and Lionel Robbins each gave an appraisal 
of Jevons’s importance as an economist (see Keynes, [1936] 2010, Vol. X; 
Robbins, 1936). In his biographical essay, Keynes focused on various aspects 
of Jevons’s scientific works, such as his economic theory and statistical works, 
but also his discussion of policy measures. In Keynes’s eyes, Jevons was an in-
ductive scientist, “the first theoretical economist to survey his material with the 
prying eyes and fertile, controlled imagination of the natural scientist” 
(Keynes, [1936] 2010, Vol. X, 119). According to Keynes, Jevons’s contribu-
tion to economics went even beyond his economic theory. Keynes underlined 
the relevance of Jevons’s empirical work, pursued through the collection and 
scrutiny of data. Lionel Robbins’s appraisal focused on Jevons’s economic 
theory. Robbins stressed how ground-breaking his theory was. According to 
Robbins, Jevons’s theory was indeed revolutionary: Jevons’s new emphasis on 
the economic agent and the application of mathematics to political economy 
are changes of the utmost importance in the history of economic thought. 
Nearly thirty years later, thanks to Robert Denis Collison Black, the emi-
nent historian of economic thought, Jevons’s work was given a renewed atten-
tion. While tracking back the correspondence between Cairnes and Jevons, in 
1960 Black discovered that Jevons’s granddaughter, Mrs. Könekamp, had 
many unpublished letters and journals of her grandfather. Black and Könekamp 
worked together for many years. Their partnership resulted in a seven-volume 
book, the Papers and Correspondence of William Stanley Jevons, published 




Moreover, in August 1971, a Bellagio Conference about the marginal 
revolution was held16. In this conference, the question concerning the nature of 
this so-called marginal revolution was addressed. Was there a common core at 
the basis of the work of the three first marginalists, i.e. Léon Walras, Carl 
Menger and Williams Stanley Jevons? Although Schumpeter had argued that 
there was (see Schumpeter, [1954] 1987, 793 especially), not all the contribu-
tors to the Bellagio conference agreed with him. William Jaffé, who six years 
before had published Walras’s correspondence in three volumes, argued that 
the three marginalists were far from having a unitary thought: instead, they had 
to be de-homogenized, as Jaffé suggested in his paper (see Jaffé, 1976)17. 
Mark Blaug, in turn, denied that the three founders of marginalism could 
be considered as such at all (see Blaug, 1972). In Blaug’s eyes, it is a mere co-
incidence that Jevons’s, Walras’s and Menger’s theories were published almost 
in the same year (see Blaug, 1972, 277). According to Blaug, there is no such 
thing as the marginal revolution. In contrast with this account, many lecturers 
stressed the ground-breaking character of Jevons’s and the other marginalists’ 
work with respect to prior economic theories (see R. D. C. Black, 1972b; Bow-
ley, 1972; Coats, 1972; Hutchison, 1972; Donald Winch, 1972). 
Between the 1980s and the 1990s several contributions appeared, touching 
different aspects of Jevons’s scientific production. The 1990s, however, were a 
particularly flourishing decade for the study of Jevons’s thought. Stephen 
Stigler, John Aldrich and Mary Morgan have focused on Jevons’s statistical 
and econometric works (see S. M. Stigler, 1982; Aldrich, 1987; Morgan, 
1990). The relationship between Jevons and the prior and subsequent economic 
theory has been much discussed (see Bostaph, Shieh 1986; Bostaph, 1989; 
Schabas, 1989; 1990; Kim, 1995; Peart, 1993; 1995a; 1995b; 1996; M. White, 
 
16 The papers presented at the Bellagio Conference have been collected in a volume 
edited by Black, A. W. Coats and Craufurd Goodwin (see R. D. C. Black, Coats, 
Goodwin, 1973). 
17 Jaffé’s paper would later on trigger a discussion in the American Journal of Eco-




1989; 1991; 1994a; 1994d; 2004). The issue of Jevons’s views concerning so-
cial policy and social reform has been addressed too (see Paul, 1979; 
Hutchison, 1982; Bowman, 1989; 1997; Peart, 1996; Richiardi, Sigot 2013). 
Considerable attention has also been paid to Jevons’s methodology, with 
respect to both his scientific and economic contributions. Wolfe Mays already 
tackled this issue in a paper published in 1962 (see Mays, 1962; see also 
MacLennan, 1972). Mays had argued that there is consistency between Jev-
ons’s epistemological account and the other subject matters he treated. Accord-
ing to Mays, Jevons’s method is unitary, embracing his economic inquiries as 
well as his philosophy of science. Hence, Mays has the merit of showing the 
continuity between Jevons’s philosophy of science and economic studies. 
However, Mays’s paper was confined to these two main aspects of Jevons’s 
thought, giving latitude for further inquiry. 
The issue of Jevons’s methodology was addressed years later by Philip 
Mirowski in More Heat than Light (see Mirowski, 1989). Mirowski highlight-
ed the influences which thermodynamic theories had on the economic theory of 
the first marginalists, rooting Jevons’s methodological account in physics. 
Margaret Schabas also elaborated this topic in her book A World Ruled by 
Number. Schabas stressed the role that logic played in Jevons’s methodology. 
In Schabas’s eyes, the core of Jevons’s scientific methodology is to be found in 
the hypothetical deductive method. Michael White provided a further contribu-
tion to this topic in 2004. In this paper (White, 2004), White has argued that the 
reference to thermodynamic energy appeared quite late in Jevons’s writings. 
Before relying on logical methods and energetic mechanisms, Jevons appealed 
to mechanical analogies. The same hypothesis has also been suggested by Har-
ro Maas, who elaborated Jevons’s use of mechanical analogies in a detailed 
monographic study (see Maas, 2005). 
Jevons’s thought has been examined in two other monographs: Sandra 
Peart’s, The Economics of William Stanley Jevons, and Bert Mosselmans’s, 
William Stanley Jevons and the Cutting Edge of Economics (see Peart, 1996; 
Mosselmans, 2007). The first work is an extensive investigation of Jevons’s 




Moreover, Peart’s book contains a remarkable treatment of Jevons’s ideas on 
social policy. The second monograph, Mosselmans’s, focuses on various top-
ics. Mosselmans’s most original contributions are to be found in his inquiry 
concerning Jevons’s logic, music, and religious beliefs. 
Mosselmans’s study shows a praiseworthy inclination to take into account 
many aspects of Jevons’s thought. He also has the merit of bringing to attention 
some topics which had been neglected, including Jevons’s religious beliefs. 
However, despite touching many aspects of Jevons’s work, Mosselmans did 
not develop a detailed analysis of some of them. For instance, Mosselmans’s 
elaboration of Jevons’s religious position lacks precise historical contextualisa-
tion. Mosselmans had another remarkable intuition when he argued that Spen-
cer’s philosophy was an important point of reference for Jevons. However, his 
analysis of Spencer’s influence on Jevons could be further developed. 
After Mosselmans’s monograph, no other extensive study on Jevons has 
appeared. Some notable contributions have been published. Motohiro Okada 
elaborated a study of Jevons’s theory of labour (Okada, 2012). In 2013, Richi-
ardi and Sigot, as I have noted above, published their original investigation of 
Jevons’s works on social policy (Richiardi, Sigot 2013). In the same year, an-
other paper appeared, in which the author, Ivan Moscati, explores the problem 
of measurement in the three marginalists (Moscati, 2013). Harro Maas pub-
lished two other papers, one co-authored with Hsiang-Ke Chao, on Jevons: the 
first one (Maas, 2016) considers Jevons’s account books, analysing accounting 
practices in the Victorian age and relating them to Jevons’s theory; the second 
is a study of diagrams and graphs in Jevons’s and Marshall’s work (Chao, 
Maas 2017). 
Scholarly studies are far from being unconcerned with what I called the 
anthropological foundations of Jevons’s thought. Contributions on the agent of 
Jevons’s economic theory, on the depiction of human nature in the context of 
his philosophy of morals and utilitarianism, or on the role of character in his 
social policy indirectly address this topic (Higgings, 1935; Keynes, [1936] 
2010; Mays, 1962; Paul, 1979; Hutchison, 1982; White, 1982, 1994a, 1994b; 




2007; Richiardi, Sigot 2013). However, none of these contributions specifically 
focuses on this problem. This also explains why some of the aspects of Jev-
ons’s thought in which the issue of the anthropological foundations is more ev-
ident, like his religious views, have been neglected. My research thus aims at 
filling this gap in literature, both from a methodological and a thematical point 
of view. On the one hand, from the methodological point of view, I will put 
emphasis on this issue even in relation to these fields in which Jevons’s repre-
sentation of human nature has already been investigated. On the other hand, my 
research will focus on some of the most neglected aspects of Jevons’s thought, 
showing their relevant for the study of the anthropological foundations of his 
inquiry and providing further understanding of his œuvre. 
 
Outline of the dissertation 
 
In the first chapter of my thesis, I focus on Jevons’s epistemology and reli-
gious thought. Here I argue that his account of probability and natural laws had 
a theological foundation. I go on to further analyse Jevons’s logic and ontology 
by comparing his work with the tradition of the ars combinatoria. According to 
this tradition, the world can be seen as a series of combinations, in which natu-
ral phenomena are constantly merging with each other. I paid particular atten-
tion to Jevons’s link to the English context and to Leibniz’s characteristica 
universalis. 
In the second chapter, I present Jevons’s moral and political thought. In the 
first part I again consider Jevons’s religious beliefs, focusing on his allegiance 
to the Dissenting confession of Unitarianism. The purpose of the first part of 
this chapter is to provide a historical contextualisation to Jevons’s religious 
thought. Therefore, I explain the developments of Unitarianism during the Vic-
torian age and link Jevons’s ideas to those of his contemporaries, with particu-
lar attention to William Gaskell and James Martineau. 
I then consider Jevons’s political thought in the light of a fundamental 
question: how could a society composed of selfish individuals be conceived? 




ty and the solutions provided in the context of the utilitarian philosophy, which 
Jevons himself acknowledged as his own. I compare Jevons’s position with 
two relevant utilitarian philosophers: Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. In 
the last part of the second chapter, I argue that Jevons appealed to Herbert 
Spencer’s theory of evolution to reconcile individuals and society. 
In the third chapter I address Jevons’s economic theory, arguing that it was 
strongly influenced by the other spheres of his thought, and consequently by 
the anthropological foundations of his inquiry. In the first part of the third 
chapter, I link Jevons’s economic thought to his moral and political philoso-
phy. I explain how his moral individualism had a counterpart in his economic 
theory. In the second part of this chapter, I focus on the role of mathematics in 
Jevons’s economic works, showing the entanglement of Jevons’s mathematiza-
tion of economics with both his epistemology and his theological ideas. In the 
last part of the third chapter, I investigate Jevons’s representation of the eco-
nomic subject. Continuing with the theme of the previous two chapters, I argue 
that Jevons’s representation of the economic subject was influenced by his 
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SEEING GOD’S MARKS IN NATURE 






1.1. The bridge between science and religion 
 
In ancient Rome, the pontifex maximus was the highest religious office. 
‘Pontifex’ is a compound word, putting together the term ‘pons’ (bridge) and 
the suffix ‘fex’, from ‘facio’ (make). Hence, the pontifex maximus was the su-
preme ‘bridge-maker’, as well as the head of other pontifices. He was in charge 
of constructing the bridge between humans and gods. Such a role shows at 
once their distance and proximity. Their distance, since they need a mediator to 
interact. Their proximity, because such an interaction is nonetheless possible. 
Moreover, this connection also strengthened the unity of society itself, unifying 
it around religion and tradition. Indeed, the bridges are not only needed in the 
heavens. 
In nineteenth century England, both these celestial and earthly bridges 
seemed to fall apart1. Religious beliefs were apparently jeopardized by scien-
tific discoveries and ideas. In The Principles of Geology, published between 
1832 and 1833, Charles Lyell pointed out that the earth was much older than 
the account in Genesis supposed it to be. A further challenge came almost thir-
ty years later with Darwin’s Origin of Species, and then with his Descent of 
Man. Evolutionary theories put at risk the teleological view of religion and 
 
1 About the relationship between science and religion in nineteenth century’s England 




questioned human supremacy over all creatures2. As early as 1828, the Repeal 
of the Test Act suggested that the Church of England had lost its primacy3. 
While subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Anglican Church was still 
required to access the ancient universities, in 1826 a university was founded in 
London where students and professors were welcomed, regardless of faith. In 
such a context, science sometimes became a weapon in the hands of radicals 
and Dissenters4. 
On the one hand, these developments seemed to display an insurmountable 
distance between God and humans. On the other hand, many were persuaded 
that the precepts of Christianity demanded a rearrangement (see Cowling, 
2001, XVI). Several Victorian scientists accepted thus the challenge of bridg-
ing the gap between science and religion. Many chose to use natural theology’s 
conceptual framework. The most striking example of this tendency was the se-
ries of Bridgewater Treatises. The Earl of Bridgewater patronized eight highly 
influential scientists and philosophers, who revitalized the tradition of natural 
theology. Following William Paley, they strove to highlight the signs of God’s 
design in His Creation5. This attempt had so strong an influence that Charles 
Babbage published autonomously a Ninth Bridgewater Treatise in 1837.  
Another example of this bridge-making concern is the so-called Theologi-
cal Declaration of Scientific Men (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. III, 60). On the 20th 
September 1864, The Times reported a debate under the title Science and Scrip-
ture. More than two hundred scientists had signed a declaration concerning the 
 
2 Some influential scholars held that the nineteenth century was the scene of growing 
secularization. According to them, “geology triumphed over Genesis, apes over an-
gels” (see P. White, 2017, 41). In the following decades this interpretation was revised 
though. In fact, new scientific accounts called for a conciliation with religion, not for 
its abandonment.  
3 See Cowling, 1985, XVII, where the author focuses on the correlation between reli-
gious and political reform. 
4 See Desmond, 1989. Adrian Desmond’s contraposition between radicals and elitists 
has been refined by Boyd Hilton (Hilton, 2000). 




interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. According to them, science was not 
meant to cast doubt on the authenticity of the Scriptures: “we conceive that it is 
impossible for the Word of God, as written in the book of nature, and God’s 
Word written in Holy Scriptures, to contradict one another, however much they 
may appear to differ” (VV. AA., 20th September 1864, The Times, 7). They 
continued accordingly: 
 
We believe that it is the duty of every scientific student to investigate 
nature simply for the purpose of elucidating truth, and that if he finds 
that some of his results appear to be in contradiction to the Written 
Word, or, rather, to his own interpretations of it, affirm that his own 
conclusions must be right, and the statements of the Scriptures wrong; 
rather leave the two side by side till it shall please God to allow us to 
see the manner in which they may be reconciled; and instead of insist-
ing upon the seeming differences between science and the Scriptures, it 
would be as well to rest in faith upon the points in which they agree 
(VV. AA., 20th September 1864, The Times, 7). 
 
The endorsers of this declaration considered that science must step back on re-
ligion’s behalf. For them, the only way of reconstructing the bridge was to urge 
scientists to support religious beliefs. 
The responses to the Declaration were not all encouraging. The Times pub-
lished Sir John Herschel’s refusal to sign, together with John Browning’s. Her-
schel, who was one of the most eminent scientists of the time, considered that 
the call to subscribe to a religious manifesto was “an infringement of that social 
forbearance which guards the freedom of religious opinion in this country with 
especial sanctity” (VV. AA., 20th September 1864, The Times, 7). Further-
more, Herschel dissociated himself from any profession of atheism whatsoever. 
He considered this movement to be mischievous, “having a direct tendency 
[…] to add a fresh element of discord to the already discordant relations of the 
Christian world” (VV. AA., 20th September 1864, The Times, 7). 
Seven days later Jevons wrote a letter to Herschel and complimented him 







Permit me to express to you in a few words the extreme satisfaction 
with which I read your answer concerning the Theological Declaration 
of Scientific Men. Such an appropriate statement of the position of an 
inquirer in the present day strikes me as invaluable both to Science and 
True Religion. And I cannot sufficiently express my concurrence in 
your protest against a desire for freedom of inquiry being interpreted as 
a tendency to Irreligion. Is it worthy of Religion to assume that it must 
be discarded by all who freely seek after the Truth (Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. III, 60)? 
 
As a Dissenter, Jevons had first-hand acquaintance with the importance of free 
inquiry in religion. He studied at the new-born University College London6, 
where many of his teachers were Dissenters as well. Some were luminaries, at 
the top of their fields, like the mathematician Augustus De Morgan7. Neverthe-
less, they had no place in Oxford or Cambridge, showing to the young Jevons 
that religious freedom still had a long way to go. 
Moreover, there was a long-lasting connection between scientific inquiry 
and Non-Conformity8. Unitarianism was part of so-called rational Dissent, put-
ting the accent on intellectual features of faith (see Hilton, 2006, 460). They 
had always favoured a liberal interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. The lack of 
references to the Trinity in the Bible pushed them indeed to deny its existence, 
 
6 More details on Jevons’s education are to be found in: Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 13-
18; R. D. C. Black, 1993, 163-166. 
7 For the relevance of De Morgan in Jevons’s education, see R. D. C. Black, 1972a, 
124 especially. 
8 In this regard, see P. Wood, 2004; as Paul Wood has explained in the introduction to 
this volume, there is a long historiographical tradition associating Dissent to interests 
in natural philosophy, mathematics and technology. According to this argument, in the 
eighteenth century, Oxford and Cambridge didn’t provide an extensive education in 
mathematics and natural sciences, so that Dissenting academies started focusing on 
them. With respect to nineteenth century, scholars have highlighted the connection be-
tween educational interests and Unitarianism. Nonconformists had also an essential 
role in the foundation of University College London and of Owens College in Man-




hence the name ‘Unitarians’9. It is not surprising that Jevons argued in favour 
of a liberal reading of the Scriptures, since he came from this tradition. 
His Unitarian background had certainly shown Jevons that science and 
faith were not opposed, nor necessarily in contradiction. He had further en-
couragement in this direction from his studies at University College London, 
from Augustus De Morgan especially. The relation between scientific inquiry 
and religion was of crucial importance in De Morgan’s teaching (see R. D. C. 
Black, 1972a, 127) and works. De Morgan himself couldn’t complete his de-
gree at Cambridge because of his contempt for the subscription to the Thirty-
Nine articles10. De Morgan was indeed a remarkable bridge-maker, willing to 
multiply the earthly bridges connecting different kind of believers. He support-
ed the Catholic Emancipation Bill (see Cohen, 2005, 144) and referred to all 
subscriptions as a “deadly poison”11. In De Morgan’s view, mathematics could 
be a powerful tool to unify the creeds. This idea was thus embodied in the in-
signia he drew for the London Mathematical Society. It was a triangle with at 
each side the Jewish, Christian and Muslim reference to the year of the Socie-
ty’s foundation (1865), according to each calendar. The figure was combined 
with the motto ‘Vis unita fortior’ (a united force is stronger). Mathematics 
must create a “union of races and nations as well as of individuals”12. 
These connections, from Liverpool’s Unitarians to De Morgan, had a 
strong effect on Jevons. He began to think that religion and science were not so 
 
9 On the history of the term ‘Unitarian’, see Holt, 1938, 281; according to Raymond 
Holt, the term first appeared in England in Henry Hedworth’s pamphlet (1672), but it 
was in use in Transylvania even before then. 
10 See Cohen, 2005, 139-158 and 143; this information is drawn from De Morgan’s 
autobiographical sketch, London, British Library, MS 28509, f. 421. On this topic see 
also Cohen, 2007, chap. 4. 
11 For this quotation, see De Morgan to W. R. Hamilton, 27 July 1852, Dublin, Trinity 
College Library, Hamilton Papers, 1493/541, as quoted in Cohen, 2005, 143. 
12 For this description and references, see Cohen, 2007, 119. The quotation is drawn 
from Augustus De Morgan, Notebook, Ms Add. 69, De Morgan Papers, Special Col-




distant. It was a question of fixing a bridge which had been damaged – perhaps 
even reconstructing it. The first part of the first chapter aims thus at investigat-
ing the relationship between Jevons’s scientific reflections and religious be-
liefs. First, I focus on the last chapter of the Principles of Science, where the 
link with religion is particularly apparent. Here Jevons took part in scientific 
debates where a religious concern was involved, like the Uniformitarian and 
Catastrophist controversy or the attack on evolutionary theory. Thereafter I in-
vestigate the foundations of Jevons’s epistemology, paying particular attention 
to the pre-eminence of logic and the psychologistic view of logic itself. Such 
an inquiry will raise a question concerning the nature of the laws of thought. 
I then look at the religious foundations of Jevons’s epistemology, showing 
that his notion of probability relies on a religious idea: the gulf between the fi-
nite mind of human being and the infinite intellect of the Creator. Such idea, 
even though it is not expressed in these terms by Jevons, is a direct conse-
quence of his statements and has a deep influence on his thought, as I shall 
show. Finally, I argue that Jevons’s probabilistic view of scientific knowledge 
coexisted with a firm belief in the order that God imprinted on nature, guaran-
teeing a sound basis for our scientific endeavours. Once again, we find that 
Jevons relied on religious beliefs in his understanding of science and scientific 
reasoning 
 
A lifelong believer 
 
The interest in religion and in its connection to scientific investigation was 
a lifelong one for Jevons13. During his youth he had been a keen student of re-
ligious matters. At the age of fifteen, he reported in his journal a plan to study 
the Gospels, analysing and arranging them chronologically. In fact he intended 
 




to write a “rigorrous history of Christ” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 99)14, 
though he never completed the task. When he was young, he envisaged becom-
ing a minister: 
 
It seemed so serious, & useful, a profession and I entered but little into 
the merits of religion, & the duties of a minister. Every one dissuaded 
me from the notion – & before I had arrived at any age to require a real 
decision science had claimed me (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 99). 
 
However, with the study of natural science Jevons developed a rational 
and critical perspective on religion. This intellectual penchant distinguished 
him from his sister Henrietta, who in his opinion had a warm and sentimental 
faith. In a journal entry dated 28th January 1857, Jevons illustrated this differ-
ence, explaining his doubts on this regard. He then explained his own concep-
tion of religion and of its relationship with the scientific account: 
 
Natural science was my chief study and I may say that I have become 
so impressed with the general character of natural laws of fact and have 
become so accustomed to habits of severe and exact thought, that I must 
have a solid foundation for my religion or I shall have none (Jevons, 
1972-1981, Vol. I, 154). 
 
At that time Jevons was in Australia. Those were years of intense religious re-
flection, as the correspondence with his sister Henrietta shows (Jevons, 1972-
1981, Vol. II, the letters between 1856 and 1859). 
Nonetheless these efforts were not confined to his youth. At the beginning 
of his academic career in Manchester, on the 11th March 1866, Jevons ex-
pressed a genuine bridge-making concern in his journal: 
 
Accepting the progressive triumphs of physical science I would aid in 
the reform of abstract science and in the establishment of moral & polit-
ical sciences. But I would also join science to morals & religion. I 
would try to show that they are not antagonistic (Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. I, 203). 
 
14 Here we read as follows: “the Gospels seemed worth more than reading – they were 
worth analysing & making into a rigorrous history of Christ. And this I actually under-





Even in his old age, his interest in this project did not let up. According to his 
wife, apparently he intended to write another Bridgewater Treatise in 1882 (see 
Jevons, 1886, 451). His sudden and premature death deprived us of this alleged 
Tenth Bridgewater Treatise, although his intention of writing one reveals how 
persistent these thoughts were for him. 
 
Arrogant scientists: the concluding chapter of the Principles of Science 
 
Religious and theological considerations played a considerable role in Jev-
ons’s magnum opus, namely The Principles of Science (1874). They are sum-
marized in its concluding chapter, Reflections on the Results and Limits of Sci-
entific Method. First of all, Jevons extensively underlined that he didn’t want to 
be mistaken for a materialist. As he wrote, scientific progress seemed to hint at 
the possibility of reducing all phenomena to their material mechanisms. Matter 
and mind would be both reduced to a chain of causes and laws, human mind 
being nothing but various amounts of nitrogen and phosphorous (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, 735-736). “Is science, then, essentially atheistic and materialis-
tic?” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 736). Jevons’s answer was negative: “to assume 
[…] that scientific method can take everything within its cold embrace of uni-
formity, is to imply that the Creator cannot outstrip the intelligence of his crea-
tures” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 739). Science is not equivalent to materialism, “as 
true science will not deny the existence of things because they cannot be 
weighed and measured” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 768)15. 
Jevons never questioned God’s existence. He briefly dealt with this in the 
Preface (Jevons, [1874] 1877, XXXI). He was more concerned with the prob-
lem of God’s subordination to natural laws. Hence, Jevons’s position is not un-
derstandable without reference to the debate between Uniformitarians and 
 




Catastrophists16. This debate first originated in geology, with the publication of 
Lyell’s Principles. In that work Lyell held that the universe exhibited substan-
tial uniformity (Lyell, [1832-1833] 2009, Vol. II, 157). Through the universe’s 
life, natural causes had always been acting in the same way, and the quantity of 
energy of the universe had been the same too (see Cannon, 1960, 38; Rudwick, 
1967, 272). From Hutton’s point of view, “the present is the key to the past” 
(Geike, 1905, 486). Moreover, Lyell ruled out every reference to primary caus-
es, that is, to the direct interference of God in the world. According to him, all 
developments were to be explained by means of secondary causes. The so-
called Catastrophists, led by Adam Sedgwick and William Whewell, opposed 
this view. They also argued in favour of divine interference, even in the devel-
opment of new species17. 
Jevons took part in this debate, which was largely concerned with the rela-
tionship between science and religion18. Science had described the natural laws 
as necessary and inexorable. Was then the scientist bound to question God’s 
power? Jevons thought that this was not the case: “laws of nature are uniformi-
ties observed to exist in the action of certain material agents, but it is logically 
impossible to show that all other agents must behave as these do” (Jevons, 
 
16 The term ‘Catastrophism’ was introduced by William Whewell in 1832, in a review 
of Lyell’s Principles (see Whewell, 1832, 126); for the opposition in Whewell’s work, 
see Whewell, (1840) 1847, Vol. II, 420-421. With respect to this debate, see: Cannon, 
1960; Rudwick, 1967; Day, 1975; Ruse, 1976; Rudwick, 2014. I would like to thank 
Andrew Hopkins for his precious suggestions concerning the scholarly debate on this 
topic. 
17 On Whewell’s justification of divine intervention see: Cannon, 1960, 38-39; Ruse, 
1976, 129. 
18 This debate certainly had theological implications. Rudwick, however, has warned 
against a simplistic interpretation of it in terms of opposing factions: “it would be 
wrong to conclude […] that the controversy was simply between, on the one hand, the 
proponents of providential design and providential activity, and, on the other, those 





[1874] 1877, 737). On the basis of these laws we could only assume that simi-
lar beings would be constrained by them. We had no right to extend the infer-
ence to those beings whose nature was unknown or presumably different. 
Therefore, we could not conclude that God would be restricted by the laws of 
His own creation. The Creator is different from his creatures: it follows that He 
could not be bound by the laws of nature. That is why the Uniformitarian posi-
tion was in Jevons’s eyes “superficial and erroneous”, since they considered 
God “as being subject like a human legislator to the laws which he has himself 
enacted” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 737). 
Thus, Jevons assumed a Catastrophist position, clearly stating that “we 
cannot disprove the possibility of Divine Interference in the course of nature” 
(Jevons, [1874] 1877, 766). The habitual uniformity of nature did not imply 
that “extensive alterations or sudden catastrophes are impossible” (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, 746). In fact Jevons used an argument of natural theology to en-
dorse the Catastrophist account. He referred to Babbage’s Ninth Bridgewater 
Treatise. According to Babbage, as Jevons explained, calculating engines were 
perfectly able to variate the laws regulating their mechanisms. Jevons therefore 
argued as follows, in a language peculiarly close to William Paley’s: 
 
If such occurrences can be designed and foreseen by a human artist, it is 
surely within the capacity of the Divine Artist to provide for analogous 
changes of law in the mechanism of the atom, or the construction of the 
heavens (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 744). 
 
The Uniformitarian position was not only logically inconsistent. Jevons 
even depicted it as a moral fault, an act of arrogance. In his view, “the too ex-
clusive study of particular branches of physical science seems to generate an 
over-confident and dogmatic spirit” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 737). Led by this 
spirit, the scientist would therefore deny the finiteness of his intellect and 
would assume that his method could disclose the mysteries of life itself (Jev-
ons, [1874] 1877, 737). With an act of modern hubris, the scientist would 
eventually refuse all the alleged contradictory notions. For example, the attrib-




as the existence of evil would prove him to be “either not perfectly benevolent, 
or not all-powerful” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 768). However, this inconsistency 
was a result of our lack of understanding. As Jevons pointed out, 
 
we perpetually find ourselves in the position of finite minds attempting 
infinite problems, and can we be sure that where we see contradiction, 
an infinite intelligence might not discover perfect logical harmony 
(Jevons, [1874] 1877, 768)? 
 
Many of these contradictions were only illusory. In Jevons’s mind this was 
also the case of the supposed incompatibility between evolutionism and faith. 
According to him, Darwin’s and Spencer’s theories represented the origin of 
mental, moral and social phenomena in a revolutionary way. Their theories 
were indeed so extraordinary as to deserve a place beside Newton’s Principia, 
among those works which utterly changed our beliefs. And yet they didn’t 
jeopardize theology at all19. Darwin and Spencer only clarified what was the 
development of living beings following from their previous conditions. None-
theless, they left aside the problem of determining what originally existed. As 
Jevons argued, “the origin of everything that exists is wrapped up in the past 
history of the universe” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 764). Moreover, “by a different 
distribution of atoms in the primeval world a different series of living forms on 
this earth would have been produced” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 763), so that the 
origin of the universe would still be a matter of theology. Eventually, evolu-




19 Bert Mosselmans has argued that Jevons was influenced by Spencer in showing that 
scientific and religious perspectives are not in conflict (see Mosselmans, 2007, 76-77). 
However, even if Jevons could surely have been influenced by Spencer’s First Princi-
ples, as Mosselmans as argued, here I have shown that Jevons’s conviction of the con-





1.2. The task of knowing 
 
As I have stated above, in this chapter I consider the relationship between 
Jevons’s religious beliefs and his scientific reflections. Therefore, I focus on 
the book in which Jevons elucidated his views on epistemology and science at 
length, that is, The Principles of Science. In this section, I tackle the following 
problem: according to Jevons, what are the foundations of our knowledge? 
How could we secure the success of the task of knowing? As I shall explain, 
Jevons claimed that all the branches of knowledge came from a single source, 
i.e. logic. As we shall see, logic was, in turn, rooted in the powers of the human 
mind. Consequently, Jevons’s position is an example of logical psychologism. 
Moreover, Jevons’s choice to found logic in the human mind arises the ques-
tion of the nature of logic itself. Thus, the ‘is-ought question’ is addressed, by 
means of the analysis of Jevons’s view on logic. 
 
The tyranny of specialism 
 
Perhaps the most appropriate way to approach Jevons’s Principles of Sci-
ence is through its subtitle: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method. Its pur-
pose was to settle the principles of the scientific method. In fact, in Jevons’s 
opinion the material accomplishments of some sciences were not correlated 
with a proper reflection concerning their method. The result was an increasing 
specialization of knowledge at the expense of its unity and consistency (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, XXVII-XXVIII). “We are in danger from the precipitancy and in-
tellectual tyranny of specialism”(Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. IV, 38)20, wrote Wil-
liam Gladstone to Jevons, displaying a similar anxiety. Despite these develop-
ments towards an increasing specialization, Jevons saw knowledge as united21. 
As he wrote: “all the sciences meet somewhere upon common ground. No part 
 
20 In this letter, Gladstone expressed his appreciation of the Principles’ conclusive 
chapter.  
21 Margaret Schabas attached Jevons’s concern for the unity of knowledge to the cul-




of knowledge can stand wholly disconnected from other parts of the great uni-
verse of thought” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 154). 
The scientific method should encompass all branches of knowledge. After 
clarifying its foundations, this method would extend to all the branches of 
knowledge. Thus, from applying it to different domains, “we must sooner or 
later have strict sciences of those mental and social phenomena” (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, XXVII). The social scientist could take as an example the physi-
cal sciences, due to their great record of success. Physical sciences could be the 
veritable “practice ground of the reasoning powers” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
XXVIII). It is not surprising, in the light of this, that Jevons suggested using 
the mathematical language in political economy (Jevons, 1871, 3)22. Indeed he 
had completed his Theory of Political Economy in 1871, while working on the 
Principles of Science. The idea of applying mathematics to moral and political 
sciences preceded his work on scientific method though, dating back to his 
days in Australia23. This continuity shows how cohesive his thought was24. 
From this point of view, the Principles of Science turns out to be a systematiza-
tion of Jevons’s methodological thoughts. 
 
22 This topic will be further investigated in the last chapter. 
23 This idea was presented publicly for the first time in 1862, to the Section F of the 
British Association. The paper was then reprinted in 1866 (see Jevons, 1866). In fact 
this paper already displayed all the fundamental concepts which would be later ex-
pressed in the Theory of Political Economy. Apparently Jevons first conceived these 
thoughts in 1860, as it is shown in a letter of 1st June 1860, to his brother Herbert 
(Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 410). Moreover, according to La Nauze, Jevons was 
struck by this idea in February 1860 (see La Nauze, 1953). For a more extensive 
treatment of this issue, see the section “Mathematics and the world”, in the third chap-
ter. 
24 Several scholars pointed out the continuity of Jevons’s methodological thought. In 
this regard, see: Mays, 1962; S. M. Stigler, 1982, for the application of statistics to the 
social sciences; Aldrich, 1987, for the role of probability in Jevons statistics and scien-
tific thought, as well as for a criticism of Stigler; Schabas, 1990, concerning the priori-





Developing the psychological foundations of logic 
 
All sciences must meet somewhere. In Jevons’s account, they only met be-
cause they came from the same source. To him the common ground which 
bound all sciences together was logic (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, XXVII and 
154-156). The foundation of every science and of thought itself rested in logic, 
the first and the simplest of the sciences (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 40). Jevons’s 
position was evidently a criticism of the system of the logician and mathemati-
cian George Boole, which still inspired much admiration in him25. Boole was 
persuaded that mathematics was suited to provide a method for all sciences, 
since “the ultimate laws of Logic are mathematical in their form” (Boole, 1854, 
11). In Jevons’s view, logic had theoretical primacy over mathematics, as qual-
itative reasoning was prior to quantitative reasoning26. Jevons held that, “if 
numbers rule the world, it is the laws of logic which rule number” (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, 154)27. 
We could nonetheless ask: what rules the laws of logic? Logic is a formal 
science, containing a set of rules. Where do these rules originate? As Jevons 
stated in the Introduction to the Principles of Science, “at the bases of all 
thought and science must lie the laws which express the very nature and condi-
tions of the discriminating and identifying powers of mind” (Jevons, [1874] 
1877, 5, emphasis added). Therefore logic could claim such a priority thanks to 
its foundation in the structure of human mind. Thus Jevons perspective on log-
ic and its laws was psychological28. In this regard, Jevons had much in com-
 
25 On Jevons and Boole, see: G. Robertson, 1876 (in Wood, 1988, Vol. I), 12; Mays, 
1962, 236; Strong, 1976, with regard to probability; Schabas, 1990, 60-65 especially; 
Maas, 2005, 112-117 and 137, concerning the laws of thought. 
26 On this topic, see Jevons, 1890; see also Jevons, (1874) 1877, chap. 8 especially. 
27 Margaret Schabas made an extensive treatment of this subject matter (see Schabas, 
1990, chap. 4). 
28 On this topic, see Higgings, 1935 (in Wood, 1988, Vol. I), 50. Here Higgins affirms 




mon with George Boole. In An Investigation on the Laws of Thought (1854) 
Boole had already stressed that an investigation in logic was in fact an inquiry 
into mental powers (Boole, 1854, 1-2). Jevons was aware of his debt to Boole 
and gladly accepted this position29. 
Established as this position may seem in The Principles, it went through 
different formulations in Jevons’s works. One can reconstruct these changes 
from preceding publications. In this regard, Pure Logic (1864) is of particular 
interest. The full title is Pure Logic, or the Logic of Quality Apart from Quanti-
ty, with Remarks on Boole’s System and on the Relation of Logic and Mathe-
matics30, its purpose being to outline a specific domain for qualitative logical 
reasoning. Hence, Jevons attempted to articulate the laws regulating logic. The 
first one was the law of sameness. Just after formulating it, he tried to clarify 
the meaning of a logical law per se: 
 
Logic proceeds by laws, and is bound by them. For logic must treat 
names as thought treats things. And the laws of logic state certain 
samenesses or uniformities in our ways of thinking, and are of self-
evident truth (Jevons, 1890, 12). 
 
The passage is difficult and the whole text is characterized by a great am-
biguity on this subject matter. From this point of view, logic and thinking were 
separate and parallel things. Logic was only concerned with names, while 
thought with objects. However, logic was still connected with thinking by the 
means of its laws since these laws described some uniformities in thought. 
 
starting point. […] Not that he identified himself with any particular system of psy-
chology”. See also Schabas, 1990. 58. If Higgins’s stated that Jevons did not fit in any 
psychological account in particular, this idea will be criticized by Harro Maas (Maas, 
2005, 171-180). According to him, Jevons’s is strongly influenced by physiology. In 
this regard, see also M. White, 1994a, where Michael White identified Jennings’s 
physiology as Jevons’s source.  
29 Jevons stated that he was indebted to Boole several times. See, for instance, Jevons, 
1890, 4-5. 




Moreover, Jevons suggested that every logical law stated some uniformities in 
the reasoning process. The first one, the law of sameness, would have been a 
principle underlying any kind of reasoning31. 
Yet the text did not tackle the problem of the connection between names 
and things. They remained two separate spheres, albeit concealing an unclari-
fied affinity32. In Pure Logic Jevons chose to introduce every law of thought by 
the very same expression, namely “it is in the nature of thought and things, 
that” (Jevons, 1890, 12, 16, 21, 25, 28, 31 and 34)33. Through this formulation 
he described thought and things as separated, holding though that the laws of 
logic applied to both. That ambiguity was even more apparent in a further pas-
sage, where the laws of logic were enumerated. Jevons at first presented these 
laws as the laws or conditions of logic, except then arguing as follows: “it 
seems likely that these are the primary and sufficient laws of thought” (Jevons, 
1890, 39, emphasis added). 
Thus, the laws of logic and laws of thought overlapped throughout Pure 
Logic. Eventually, their identity was expressed in the opening page of a text 
published in 1869, The Substitution of Similars34. In Jevons’s own words: 
 
Logic is the science of the laws of thought itself, and there is no sphere 
of observation and reflection which is more peculiarly open to any in-
quirer, than the inquirer’s own mind as involved in the process of rea-
soning (Jevons, 1890, 81). 
 
Once logic had been defined accordingly, it also acquired a new feature: self-
evidence. Jevons held that mental processes were primarily disclosed to the in-
 
31 In Pure Logic the formulation of the so-called law of sameness preceded the enun-
ciation of the substitution principle (see Jevons, 1890, 18). In any case, Jevons explic-
itly stated that the law of sameness occupied a fundamental place among the laws of 
reasoning (see Jevons, 1890, 39). 
32 As we shall see, Jevons addressed this same topic in The Principles of Science, ten 
years later. 
33 This expression occurred every time a law of logic is formulated. 




quirer investigating his own mind. The mind was evident to itself. Therefore 
logic was endowed with the character of self-evidence as well. In such a way 
Jevons completed the statement of Pure Logic, where it was written that logical 
laws had a self-evident truth. After reducing logic to the process of reasoning, 
Jevons secured its evidence. Moreover, Jevons’s argument was buttressed by 
George Boole. According to the latter, the laws of thought were endowed with 
evidence as well. They were made apparent in the very moment of their mani-
festation. We had thus an immediate knowledge of our own mind’s functioning 
(Boole, 1854, 4). 
In The Substitution of Similars (1869) the laws of thought were considera-
bly simplified. If they were six in Pure Logic35, in The Substitution of Similars 
they were reduced to three: law of identity, law of non-contradiction, law of 
duality (Jevons, 1890, 111). These are nothing but the fundamental precepts of 
Aristotelian logic, since the law of duality is the law of the excluded middle. 
Jevons certainly was a harsh critic of Aristotelian logic36. Oddly enough, 
though, he relied on Aristotle for the definition of his fundamental logical and 
mental laws. Jevons took these norms from the field of logic and made them 
enter the mental sphere. 
 
Logical psychologism in the Principles of Science 
 
The texts here analysed were completed while Jevons was writing the 
Principles37. They account for a development which took place during the 
 
35 In order: law of sameness, law of simplicity, law of same parts and wholes, law of 
unity, law of contradiction, law of duality (see Jevons, 1890, 39). 
36 George Robertson insisted on this feature in his review of the Principles (see G. 
Robertson, 1876 [in Wood, 1988, Vol. I] 12-13). 
37 The journals and letters of Jevons cast a considerable light on the composition of the 
Principles, corroborating this statement. On 4th December 1866 he wrote in his journal 
that he intended to collect his thought about logic in a comprehensive work (see Jev-
ons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 208-209). Pure Logic was composed some years before, since 




composition of Jevons’s great work. The psychological foundations of the laws 
of thought and logic were no longer questioned in the Principles. In that work, 
Jevons was also more explicit concerning the psychological features of logical 
reasoning. He analysed the mental powers involved in the acquisition of 
knowledge before focusing on the logical laws. Such laws were then deduced 
from these powers. Certainly this change of order in his argument could derive 
from the subject matter of the Principles. The work was concerned with the 
whole of scientific knowledge, rather than logic alone. A larger inquiry on the 
possibilities of mind could have seemed more appropriate. Nonetheless, the 
fact that science and logic were there explicitly derived from mental powers is 
revealing of Jevons’s psychologistic standpoint.  
In the Principles, Jevons only focused on those powers which were in-
volved in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. In order to identify them, he 
relied on Alexander Bain’s theory (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 4). According to Bain, 
there were three laws of that sort: the power of discrimination, the power of de-
tecting identity, the power of retention. In this account, the power of discrimi-
nation was at the basis of every sensory perception. There would be no sensa-
tion without the capacity of discriminating an object from the context in which 
it is situated. 
However, Jevons was very clear in attributing such a power to the lowest 
level of knowledge. As he stated, “we are always engaged in discrimination; 
and the rudiment of thought which exists in the lower animals probably con-
sists in their power of feeling difference and being agitated by it” (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, 4). This power was shared by human beings as well as by other 
 
1981, Vol. III, 48). He was very engaged in logical studies during his first years in 
Manchester, as his works on the logical machine showed (see the letter the Herbert, 
23rd June 1868, in Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. III, 185). He then explained to Alexander 
Macmillan his plan for the publication of the Principles, on 13th September 1872, add-
ing that he had more than three hundred pages ready for press (Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. III, 249). Given this background, it is possible to argue that the composition of 





animals. But science was no matter of simple discrimination. Science wouldn’t 
be born without the power of identification, namely of detecting the similarities 
where no similarity was at first seen. In Jevons’s view, identification was the 
main feature of the intellect. The very term ‘intellect’ was related, explained 
Jevons, with the Latin intelligo, or the Greek legein, both meaning ‘gathering 
together’ (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 5). The three fundamental laws of logic were 
expressions of these mental powers, completing the foundation of logic on psy-
chology (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 5). Although these arguments had already been 
made in 1869, in the Principles some interesting details were added. Jevons 
was strongly drawn towards Herbert Spencer’s thought. He accepted Spencer’s 
depiction of logic as an objective science (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 4 and 7) – a 
science emerging in the course of evolution. Spencer’s views well-suited Jev-
ons’s perspective, as I shall argue in the next chapter. Spencer’s evolutionism 
provided Jevons with a tool for explaining the development of science and log-
ic. In Jevons’s account, a high power of discrimination was a mark of superior 
creatures alone. What he called the ‘lower animals’ were lost among sensory 
impressions, incapable of discerning their similarities. From this point of view, 
the intellect is the result of a higher stage of evolution. 
Such an idea was also mirrored in another passage of the Principles, where 
Jevons defined logical terms. In his own words, “the simplest and most palpa-
ble meaning which can belong to a term consists of some single material ob-
ject, such as Westminster Abbey, Stonehenge, the Sun, Sirius, &c.” (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, 24). This definition was considered to be consistent with the 
powers of the mind. Concrete and simple things must be the first objects of 
human mind, in its early stages of development. Moreover, at those stages, 
humans were comparable to other animals, since Jevons argued as follows: 
 
The dog can recognise his master among a hundred other persons, and 
animals of much lower intelligence know and discriminate their haunts. 
In all such acts there is judgment concerning the likeness of physical 
objects, but there is little or no power of analysing each object and re-





Human beings were certainly not confined to the same stage as animals of 
so-called lower intelligence. Growing up, they entered “the dignity of intellect” 
(Jevons, [1874] 1877, 24). They acquired the power of logic discrimination and 
abstraction (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 24-25). Hence, Jevons did not only con-
sider the laws of logic as founded in the mental powers. He also depicted those 
powers as embedded in an evolutionary process, in accordance with Spencer’s 
view (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 7). 
 
A simple, natural logic, and its opponents 
 
In Jevons’s view, logic proceeded from the laws of thought. However, it 
was distinct from them. Logic had its own laws, like the principle of substitu-
tion (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 17)38 or the rules of symbolic expression (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, 32-35). Logic had a peculiar role in Jevons’s eyes. While it was 
founded in the laws of thought, it involved some additional principles, which 
guaranteed the rigour of its assertions. Owing to these features, logic had the 
task of correcting the ordinary reasoning processes. Therefore its simplicity 
was essential. In this regard, Jevons strongly criticized Boole’s system, which 
in his opinion was anything but simple and natural (see Jevons, 1890, 66-68, 
76-77, 147-148). Such a task was very clearly expressed in The Substitution of 
Similars (Jevons, 1890, 109-110). 
As Jevons explained there, a logical system had to be simple, so that a stu-
dent could learn a few simple rules, and easily apply them to a multitude of 
cases: 
 
The logical student need only acquire a thorough comprehension of the 
principle of substitution and the very primary laws of thought, in order 
to be able to analyse any argument and develop any form of reasoning 
which is possible (Jevons, 1890, 109)39. 
 
 
38 According to this principle, two similar elements can be substituted in a logical in-
ference without changing the meaning of the inference itself. 




Logical rules had to be few in number, and simple in character in order to be 
internalised and applied (Jevons, 1890, 109-110)40. 
Logic should not be confined to school desks. “The most unfortunate fea-
ture of the long history of our present traditional logic has been the divorce ex-
isting between the logic of the schools and the logic of common life” (Jevons, 
1890, 120), argued Jevons. This separation had engendered the view that logic 
was of no help in discovering new truths. In this case, as well as in many oth-
ers, the object of Jevons’s criticism was John Stuart Mill. According to Mill, 
our knowledge came entirely from experience (see, for instance, Mill, [1840] 
1969, 125)41. Therefore, every general truth had been previously derived by 
observation: “a general truth is but an aggregate of particular truths; a compre-
hensive expression, by which an indefinite number of individual facts are af-
firmed or denied at once” (Mill, [1843] 1974, Vol. VII, 186). General proposi-
tions were nothing but a mere compendium, an aid to memory (see Mill, [1843] 
1974, Vol. VII, 186). For Mill the reasoning from general to particular, namely 
deduction, was subordinate with respect to induction (see Mill, [1843] 1974, 
Vol. VII, 162-163). Instead, “all inference is from particular to particular” 
(Mill, [1843] 1974, Vol. VII, 193). 
Although Jevons agreed with Mill concerning the empirical nature of 
knowledge42, he could not accept Mill’s lessening of deduction. Stating the 
 
40 Here we read: “once we lay down the primary laws of thought, and employ them by 
means of the principle of substitution, we find that an unlimited system of forms of in-
direct reasoning develops itself spontaneously”. 
41 Here we read: “There is no knowledge a priori; no truths cognizable by the mind’s 
inward light, and grounded on intuitive evidence. Sensation, and the mind’s con-
sciousness of its own acts, are not only the exclusive sources, but the sole materials of 
our knowledge”. On this topic, see Macleod, Miller 2017, chap. 12. 
42 Jevons stated that neither deduction nor induction could add something fresh to our 
knowledge. They only unfold our previous notions (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 118; a 
similar thought is expressed in Jevons, [1874] 1877, 12, where Jevons argued that all 
knowledge was inductive because it originated from experience, even if deduction was 




primacy of induction over deduction, Mill incurred two errors in Jevons’s opin-
ion. First, Mill’s position was inconsistent. He argued that, when we reason, we 
move from particular to particular, unless that he didn’t elucidate how the pas-
sage from particular to particular took place (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 227). As a 
matter of fact, this lack of explanation was due to the inconsistency of his the-
sis, for, as George Boole had already argued in The Laws of Thought, inductive 
reasoning involved the use of general truths (Boole, 1854, 403-404). Second, 
the primacy of induction implied that deduction had no place in the natural rea-
soning, creating a gulf between logic and ordinary thought. In Jevons’s view 
this was unacceptable. Logic was founded in the laws of thought: how could it 
be unnatural? Hence, “a prime object of any logical reform should be to recon-
cile the strict doctrine with the looser forms of ordinary thought” (Jevons, 
1890, 121). 
 
A logic caught between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ 
 
Logic was meant to correct the imprecisions of common reasoning, and it 
was able to do this only because it was natural itself. And yet in what sense 
was it natural? Had Jevons’s logic a descriptive or a prescriptive nature? Thus, 
Jevons put us in front of a dilemma which was deeply rooted in his thought: the 
tension between is and ought, or description and prescription. Indeed its foun-
dation in mental processes suggested that logic provided a description of some 
mental mechanisms. From this point of view, the laws of thought could be in-
cluded among the laws of nature. They governed human thought – and human 
beings are a part of nature after all. In Jevons’s own words: 
 
The Laws of Thought are the first and most important of all the laws 
which govern the combinations of phenomena, and, though they be 
binding on the mind, they may also be regarded as verified in the exter-





Language, thought and things were three separate, but still analogous se-
ries (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 8-9)43. The laws of thought were both laws of 
thought and of things (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 8)44. However, if the laws of logic 
and of thought were the same thing, logic could only describe the natural chain 
of reasoning. The laws of thought would be natural laws, so that they wouldn’t 
be true nor false: they would simply be. The matter was more complex though, 
because this was only one side of the coin. Jevons explicitly addressed this 
problem in The Principles of Science, writing as follows: 
 
Logicians, indeed, appear to me to have paid insufficient attention to 
the fact that mistakes in reasoning are always possible, and of not un-
frequent occurrence. The Laws of Thought are often called necessary 
laws, that is, laws which cannot but be obeyed. Yet as a matter of fact, 
who is there that does not often fail to obey them? They are the laws 
which the mind ought to obey rather than what it always does obey 
(Jevons, [1874] 1877, 7). 
 
A similar problem had already been addressed by John Stuart Mill in the 
Introduction to his System of Logic (1843). Despite Jevons’s dislike of Mill, 
their position concerning the nature of the laws of logic were very similar. In 
his Logic Mill supported bishop Whately’s assertion, according to which logic 
was the science as well as the art of reasoning: “meaning by the former term, 
the analysis of the mental process which takes place whenever we reason, and 
by the latter, the rules, grounded on that analysis, for conducting the process 
correctly” (Mill, [1843] 1974, Vol. VII, 4). Mill provided a further explanation 
in An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy:  
 
Logic is not the theory of Thought as Thought, but of valid Thought; 
not of thinking, but of correct thinking. It is not a Science distinct from, 
 
43 This passage had been briefly discussed by Bert Mosselmans (Mosselmans, 2007, 
39-40). I shall further analyse this passage while treating the topic of Jevons’s art of 
combinations, as well as in the last chapter. 
44 It is worth mentioning that, with this statement, Jevons provided an answer to the 
problem exposed in Pure Logic, namely the problem of the relation between things 




and coordinate with, Psychology. So far as it is a science at all, it is a 
part, or branch, of Psychology; differing from it, on the one hand as a 
part differs from the whole, and on the other, as an Art differs from a 
Science (Mill, [1865] 1979, Vol. IX, 359). 
 
Jevons endorsed this position: indeed, he considered logic as a branch of 
psychology as well as a set of rules for correct reasoning. However, Jevons’s 
own theory hid a relevant ambiguity. He stated that the laws of thought – the 
law of identity, contradiction and duality – were laws of thought as well as of 
things. As such, they were laws of nature, regulating the order of phenomena. 
These laws, inasmuch as they were natural laws, must be necessary. Yet they 
are violated, as we are often mistaken in our reasonings45. How then could the 
laws of thought be natural laws? 
Furthermore, this problem couldn’t be solved by Mill’s distinction be-
tween the science and the art of reasoning. On the contrary, such a distinction 
only worsens it. Jevons stated that the laws of identity, contradiction and duali-
ty were both laws of thought and laws of logic. Thus, Jevons implied that the 
same laws at once could and could not be violated. On the one hand, qua laws 
of thought, they were natural and therefore necessary. On the other, qua laws 
of logic, they were prescriptive rules and therefore may or may not be fol-
lowed. After identifying the laws of thought and the logical principles, Jevons 
could not account for reasoning errors anymore46. How could these errors 
 
45 George Boole was far more sensitive to this problem than Jevons. See. for example, 
Boole, 1854, 22-23 and 408-410. 
46 Bert Mosselmans had the merit of highlighting this topic in Jevons’s logic. Howev-
er, he didn’t focus on the tension between description and prescription. In fact, he no-
ticed that “Jevons seems to defend Descartes’ (1637) view that everyone possesses the 
same faculty of reasoning, but not everyone always makes proper use of it” 
(Mosselmans, 2007, 40). The impossibility of accounting for these errors persisted 
though, being shared by Descartes. Afterwards, Mosselmans argued as follows: “as 
mistakes in reasoning are always possible, our thoughts cannot be the criterion of 
truth, and the laws of thought govern the ‘events of objective nature’”. Nonetheless, he 




emerge if the laws of thought were necessary? Moreover, how could these mis-
takes be acknowledged, if the laws which stated them and the laws which 
should correct them were the same? Thus, these ambiguities were unavoidable, 
since in Jevons’s theory these laws were at once descriptive and prescriptive. 
Similar positions would be criticized by the antipsychologists, such as 
Frege and Husserl47. However, the psychological foundation of Jevons’s logic 
could not be reduced to a simple inconsistency. It had a relevant role in his 
thought. As argued above, logic gained its evidence thanks to its relationship 
with the laws of thought. Logic also enabled to correct ordinary reasoning, 
since it was a natural habit. Consequently, logic could become the common 
ground where every branch of knowledge meets – providing for the unity of 
knowledge. The alleged evidence of mental process was Jevons’s way to safe-
guard the task of knowing. 
 
1.3. As in a mirror 
 
In Jevons’s eyes, the edifice of knowledge had its foundation in the laws of 
thought and logic. He was confident of the progress of science. Notwithstand-
ing this, he was also aware of its limits. In the following section, I explore the 
limitations of human intellect in relation to the ontological difference between 
the human and the divine mind. Such inquiry casts new light on Jevons’s con-





laws of thought govern nature, they must be a criterion of truth, having thus a prescrip-
tive nature. Therefore, the topic could not be treated without consideration of the rela-
tion between prescription and description.  
47 For those critics, see Centrone, 2013. I am indebted to Davide E. Quadrellaro for 





A finite intellect in an infinite universe 
 
Throughout the Principles of Science, he constantly highlighted the limita-
tions of scientific knowledge, focusing on this topic both in the preface and in 
the conclusion. As we read in the Preface to the First Edition: 
 
The value of science is of course very high, while the conclusions are 
kept well within the limits of the data on which they are founded, but it 
is pointed out that our experience is of the most limited character com-
pared with what there is to learn, while our mental powers seem to fall 
infinitely short of the task of comprehending and explaining fully the 
nature of any one object (Jevons, [1874] 1877, XXXI-XXXII). 
 
The human mind was finite, limited. But if human knowledge was finite, the 
universe was infinite. Consequently, human knowledge would never have a 
complete grasp on the universe. That was why Jevons wrote that “all sciences 
are and will ever remain in their infancy, relatively to the extent and complexi-
ty of the universe which they undertake to investigate” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
238). 
Because of these limitations, our statements concerning nature were – and 
were always meant to be – only probable48. Although this point has already at-
tracted the attention of many scholars (see Hutchison, 1982, 374-376; 
MacLennan, 1972, 61 especially; Aldrich, 1987, 235-236; Schabas, 1984, 136), 
I would like to stress its religious character. In Jevons’s opinion, humans were 
finite beings in an infinite universe. However, an infinite universe could not be 
the creation of a finite being. Its creator must therefore have an infinite intel-
lect. As stated above, Jevons had no intention of questioning the existence of 
such a creator. On the contrary, he struggled to bridge the gap between religion 
and science. Hence, to him, the finiteness of the human intellect had a religious 
meaning, not only an epistemological one. Humans, qua creatures, had a finite 
intellect; God, qua Creator, had an infinite one. This ontological gulf between 
 
48 This statement recurs in the Principles. For a clear expression of it, see Jevons, 




the creature and the Creator, between finite and infinite, set some boundaries to 
scientific investigation. 
In the concluding chapter of the Principles, Jevons referred to this infinite 
intellect and His peculiar ways of knowing. Such infinite understanding con-
trasted the finite one of humans. In this account, humans were only able to 
make inferences as far as they had enough information about the past. Their in-
ferences also had to assume a continuity through the course of nature. Howev-
er, since intervention from unknown variables was always possible, every con-
clusion was only hypothetical. By contrast, “to the view of perfect intelligence 
nothing is uncertain” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 739). Our efforts in scientific in-
quiry approached this perfect power of understanding, but, “nevertheless, as 
Laplace with profound wisdom adds, we must ever remain at an infinite dis-
tance from the goal of our aspirations” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 739). Thus, the 
tension between finite and infinite was necessary, as it depended on an onto-
logical determination of human beings. 
Humans would never see nature clearly; they would never grasp it all at 
once in all respects. They would always see it “as in a mirror”, in Paul’s words 
(Corinthians 1, 13:12). Such a limitation had already been noted by John Her-
schel, a scientist whom Jevons admired. In A Preliminary Discourse on the 
Study of Natural Philosophy Herschel had depicted the human being as “a be-
ing darkly wise” (Herschel, [1830] 2009, 6). This expression was drawn from 
Alexander Pope (Pope, [1733-1734] 2006, Epistle II, 281), echoing at the same 
time Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians. By means of it, Herschel stressed our 
limited powers in scientific inquiry as well as our strengths. Human intellect 
might be dimmed, but it was nonetheless wise. 
 
An unexpected Butlerian 
 
Herschel’s exposition could certainly have had an influence on Jevons. 
Moreover, Jevons’s account displayed a strong affinity with a famous treatise 
of Bishop Butler, The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of 




tures and to highlight their similarities. Consequently, the analogies between 
the two of them were for Butler a sign that they had the same maker, proving 
thus the divine authorship of the Scriptures (Butler, [1736] 1867, XXVII). In 
Butler’s account, analogical reasoning depended on our past experience, since 
observed instances were the basis for conclusions of a more general character. 
Thus, we extend our conclusions from some cases to other similar cases. How-
ever, our conclusions could always be contradicted by future observations. 
That is why for Butler our reasoning wasn’t certain, but only probable: 
 
Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of 
information, and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited 
capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, 
whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite Intelli-
gence; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself, cer-
tainly true, or certainly false. But to us, probability is the very guide of 
life (Butler, [1736] 1867, XXVI). 
 
The similarity with Jevons’s account is remarkable. Indeed, Jevons himself 
referred to the last sentence of this quotation (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 197). 
Butler’s argument pointed to the difference between a finite and an infinite in-
tellect. Jevons also held that the probability was a meaningful concept only for 
a finite mind. He argued thus as follows: 
 
It is impossible to expound the methods of induction in a sound manner, 
without resting them upon the theory of probability. Perfect knowledge 
alone can give certainty, and in nature perfect knowledge would be in-
finite knowledge, which is clearly beyond our capacities (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, 197). 
 
Finite knowledge “admits of degrees”, as Butler wrote (Butler, [1736] 1867, 
XXIV). In the same way, probability was to Jevons the way of estimating the 
degree of our knowledge, that is, measuring the quantity of knowledge that we 
possessed (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 198-199). 
Jevons’s ideas on probability were certainly not exclusively indebted to 
Butler, as the references to many other authors prove. Yet Jevons’s stress on 




theses of Butler. Jevons’s closeness to Butler was in fact highlighted by Glad-
stone in the above mentioned letter concerning the conclusions of the Princi-
ples: “I hope you will not be shocked if I designate it by an epithet which to my 
mind conveys the highest commendation: it seems to me eminently Butlerian” 
(Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. IV, 38)49. 
To Jevons this adjective could have sounded bizarre indeed. Butler was 
highly renowned in the nineteenth century, but mostly in the first part of the 
century – and mostly among Evangelicals. Evangelicals were attracted by But-
ler’s theory of reward and punishment, by his doctrine of atonement, by his 
view of human baseness. For the very same reasons Unitarians were unwilling 
to attach the epithet of ‘Butlerian’ to themselves (see Hilton, 1988, 174-189). 
That is probably why Gladstone thought that such an epithet would have aston-
ished Jevons. Given this background, the quotations from Butler in the Princi-
ples turn out to be even more interesting. By referring to the Butlerian concep-
tion of probability, Jevons recalled an author whose popularity was steadily de-
clining in the second half of the nineteenth century. But his appreciation of 
Butler was even more peculiar, considering his Unitarian background. 
 
The method of inverse probability 
 
Jevons stressed the wisdom as well as the darkness of the human intellect. 
For example, he noticed that it couldn’t help considering objects in temporal 
succession: 
 
The limited power of our minds prevents our grasping many ideas at 
once […]. All life proceeds in the succession of time, and we are 
obliged to write, speak, or even think of things and their qualities one 
after the other (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 33). 
 
On the contrary, a perfect understanding would grasp things as they are, simul-
taneously (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 34). Moreover, in Jevons’s opinion our intel-
 
49 Gladstone admired Butler’s work, so much so that Boyd Hilton called him “the last 




lect was directed towards this perfection, since “compared with the brutes we 
do possess some slight approximation to such power” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
34). Jevons thus expressed his commitment to Spencer’s evolutionism, accord-
ing to which intellectual faculties resulted from the evolutionary process, as I 
shall explain in the next chapter. 
Notwithstanding this increasing perfection of human intellect, in Jevons’s 
eyes human beings were still deficient in many ways. For instance, they tended 
to simplify observed natural phenomena. As he stated, “simplicity is naturally 
agreeable to a mind of limited powers, but to an infinite mind all things are 
simple” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 625). These limitations were particularly rele-
vant while undertaking an inductive study. According to Jevons’s definition, 
induction was nothing but the inverse of deduction (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 12, 
121-122, and chap. 7). Deduction drew the consequences from some premises, 
whereas induction had to infer the premises from the consequences. 
Induction was founded in a religious perspective, since it was described as 
an investigation of God’s hand in nature: “given events obeying certain un-
known laws, we have to discover the laws obeyed. […] We have to interpret 
the will by which the conditions of creation were laid down” (Jevons, [1874] 
1877, 122). Thus, trying to outline the laws of nature, the scientist was really 
determining the conditions that God had impressed on the world. In Jevons’s 
own words, “the laws of nature are the invaluable secrets which God has hid-
den, and it is the kingly prerogative of the philosopher to search them out by 
industry and sagacity” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 126). 
As for the method to use in such an investigation, Jevons relied on Laplace 
and De Morgan, that is, on the so-called method of the inverse probability50. 
The direct method of probability stated that it was possible to calculate the 
probability that an event would happen from the probabilities of a given set of 
premises. But according to these authors the contrary was also possible. The 
 
50 For an analysis of Jevons’s formulation of inverse probability see: Strong, 1976, 





method of inverse probability was an attempt to calculate the probability that a 
given event would have been the result of one cause or another (see De Mor-
gan, [1838] 1841, V-VI). De Morgan expressed the problem of inverse proba-
bility as follows: “an event has happened, such as might have arisen from dif-
ferent causes: what is the probability that any one specified cause did produce 
the event, to the exclusion of the other causes?” (De Morgan, [1838] 1841, 53). 
As Jevons explained, Laplace thought that the probability of an event being 
triggered by a certain cause was proportional to the probability that the cause 
had to produce this event. “In other words”, continued Jevons, “the most prob-
able cause of an event which has happened is that which would most probably 
lead to the event supposing the cause to exist” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 243). 
The problem with the method of the inverse probability was that one had 
to take into account every possible cause of the given event. For instance, let us 
suppose that we want to find out the cause of an event and there are only three 
possible causes, C1, C2 and C3. Each would have a certain probability of being 
the actual cause. Let us then attach the probability p1, p2 and p3 respectively to 




𝑝1 + 𝑝2 + 𝑝3
 
 
According to the formula, the probability of a cause being the actual one 
could be found by dividing its own probability by the sum of the probabilities 
of all the possible causes. In Jevons’s view this system was essential to a cor-
rect understanding of induction. As such, for him the theory of probability was 
a guide to life indeed – the noblest product of the intellect, so that “to eulogise 
the theory ought to be as needless as to eulogise reason itself” (Jevons, [1874] 
1877, 200)51. 
 
51 The sentence also involved a criticism of Mill’s method and his lack of interest for 




In illustrating the application of this method, Jevons recalled Poisson’s ex-
ample of the ballot-box. According to this example, each possible cause of one 
event was represented by a ballot-box, containing an equal number of black 
and white balls (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 244). This was a quite popular image. It 
was used extensively by De Morgan in his Essay on Probabilities (see De 
Morgan, [1838] 1841, chap. 3). However, De Morgan’s use of the urn example 
and Jevons’s differed with respect to a substantial point. De Morgan only used 
it to exemplify practical instances. Jevons, by contrast, followed Laplace in 
comparing the universe itself to an infinite ballot-box. As we read in the Prin-
ciples: 
 
In order that our solution may apply to natural phenomena, we must 
render our hypotheses as little arbitrary as possible. Having no à priori 
knowledge of the conditions of the phenomena in question, there is no 
limit to the variety of hypotheses which might be suggested. Mathema-
ticians have therefore had recourse to the most extensive suppositions 
which can be made, namely, that the ballot-box contains an infinite 
number of balls (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 255). 
 
In Jevons’s account, De Morgan’s example became a metaphor for the world. 
As Strong has pointed out in his paper on inverse probability, Laplace was 
forced to assume that the urn contained an infinite number of balls. This as-
sumption prevented him from sketching an exhaustive list of every possible 
cause of a given event. Such a list would simply be inconceivable. Consequent-
ly, “instead of trying to eliminate all but a finite number of candidates at the 
outset […], we incorporate all the possibilities, assuming a priori that each is 
equiprobable”, as Strong has explained (Strong, 1976, 204)52. George Boole 
had not failed to notice the fallacy in this reasoning: in a condition of igno-
rance, we had no possible basis in attributing an equal probability to each pos-
sible cause (see Boole, 1854, 201-205). Jevons was familiar with Boole’s criti-
cism but nonetheless rejected it. In his opinion, Laplace’s model was in some 
degree arbitrary, but still more appropriate than any other (Jevons, [1874] 
1877, 256-257). 
 




 Jevons had a particular interest in preserving Laplace’s suggestion. Both 
Jevons and De Morgan recognized some potential in this kind of scientific in-
vestigation, and, according to Strong, they opened the way for future research 
(see Strong, 1976, 205-206). Additionally, Laplace’s metaphor was perfect to 
represent the condition of a darkly wise being. As stated above, the human be-
ing was a finite creature facing an infinite universe. Accordingly, in the ballot-
box’s image the number of balls had to be infinite. This would account for the 
darkness surrounding human understanding. Notwithstanding their limitations, 
humans could find a guiding light in their reasoning powers, for example in the 
theory of probability. 
For the most part, inductive reasoning would deal with an infinite number 
of objects. That was what Jevons called “imperfect induction”, in opposition to 
the perfect induction (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 146). Jevons was very attentive 
to this distinction and to the limitation it implies: 
 
There is no fact which I shall more constantly keep before the reader’s 
mind in the following pages than that the results of imperfect induction, 
however well authenticated and verified, are never more than probable. 
We never can be sure that the future will be as the present. We hang ev-
er upon the will of the Creator: and it is only so far as He has created 
two things alike, or maintains the framework of the world unchanged 
from moment to moment, that our most careful inferences can be ful-
filled (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 149). 
 
We remained at the mercy of God, as Jevons remarked, consistent with his 
Catastrophist allegiance. And even supposing that the universe would remain 
unchanged, our inferences would always be uncertain because we were igno-
rant of the universe as a whole (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 150). 
It was while addressing the problem of imperfect induction that Jevons 
first introduced the ballot-box’s metaphor: 
 
Nature is to us like an infinite ballot-box, the contents of which are be-
ing continually drawn, ball after ball, and exhibited to us. Science is but 
the careful observation of the succession in which balls of various char-





The drawn balls stood thus for the past events. Our predictions had to rely on 
the observed combinations of phenomena. Jevons seemed then to suggest that 
we only had knowledge of the actual observed cases – i.e. the drawn balls: 
 
No finite number of casual drawings can give us sure knowledge of the 
contents of the box, so that, even in the absence of all disturbance, our 
inferences are merely the best which can be made, and do not approach 
to infallibility (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 765). 
 
The ballot-box itself remained unfathomable. Human beings would always see 
nature as in mirror, and never clearly. 
 
1.4. The laws of nature 
 
Jevons struggled to show that human knowledge was probabilistic. Some-
times the probability of a hypothesis is so high that the hypothesis’s truth 
seems to be any reasonable doubt (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 251). Yet, our in-
quiry concerning the laws of nature would never reach absolute certainty. 
However, Jevons’s account arises a question: how can we be sure of the very 
existence of these laws?  If we are ignorant of the ballot-box’s inner structure, 
a priori we would not be allowed to assert the existence of any law at all. We 
could not draw such a conclusion on the basis of actual observed events exclu-
sively. In this section I will analyse Jevons’s conception of the laws of nature 
and show its relationship with Jevons’s religious beliefs, paying particular at-




In his study of Jevons’s conception of economic laws, Michael White has 
pointed out that Jevons depicted the laws of nature as “a set of observation 




factual sequences of events” (White, 1989, 428)53. To a certain extent Jevons 
did consider the laws of nature as inessential connections of facts, namely re-
currences merely connecting the drawn balls. He could infer this as he identi-
fied the notions of causality and correlation54. However, Jevons’s arguments 
suggested that the laws of nature were not mere inessential connections of 
facts, but had a strong causal meaning. For example, while considering combi-
nations of phenomena, he wrote as follows: 
 
The most superficial observation shows that some things are constantly 
associated with other things. The more mature our examination, then 
more we become convinced that each event depends upon the prior oc-
currence of some other series of events. Action and reaction are gradu-
ally discovered to underlie the whole scene, and an independent or cas-
ual occurrence does not exist except in appearance. Even dice as they 
fall are surely determined in their course by prior conditions and fixed 
laws (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 174). 
 
Jevons had a deterministic view of the universe. In his mind, even those hap-
penings which most certainly looked fortuitous were in fact regulated by laws. 
In several cases Jevons warned the reader against the temptation of attrib-
uting any flaws to these laws. Chance had no place in his conception of nature, 
and the laws of nature did not admit exceptions. He suggested that when con-
fronted by any allegedly chance event, “everyone sees, after a little reflection, 
that it is in our knowledge the deficiency lies, not in the certainty of nature’s 
laws” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 198). Accordingly, on Jevons’s account, probabil-
ity measured the quantity of our subjective knowledge, as De Morgan and oth-
ers held (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 198-199)55. In the laws of nature there was 
no flaw: they were exact. On this Jevons was positive. For example, he took 
 
53 For Jevons’s depiction of the natural laws as mere sequences of facts, see notably 
the first section of White’s paper (White, 1989, 426-431). 
54 On this subject matter, see: MacLennan, 1972, 60, for a criticism; Peart, 1996, 209, 
where the author defended Jevons from the criticism on this point. 
55 In these pages Jevons referred to many authors who held the idea that probability 
measured the quantity of our knowledge. However, his main point of reference in this 




correlations of natural phenomena to be mathematically expressable. The sci-
entist’s purpose was then to “discover the mathematical equation or law con-
necting a quantitative cause with its quantitative effect” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
335)56. As we know, however precise our measurements may be, we could 
never be certain of our conclusions. And still, as he stated, “it would be a great 
mistake to suppose that there is any inexactness in the laws of nature” (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, 462). 
Before developing this argument, a clarification is needed. By saying that 
Jevons envisioned the existence of exact natural laws, I do not mean to discard 
his probabilistic view. Even the most established of our laws were only proba-
ble: “the law of gravitation itself is only probably true” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
259), as Jevons stated. The point is that Jevons was convinced of the existence 
of natural laws themselves – a belief which he wasn’t willing to consider as 
merely probable. He was sure that nature was regulated by necessary laws. The 
laws of nature really existed, but they belonged in the box: if the scientist could 
not grasp them, it was because of human deficiency. In Jevons’s own words, 
“there is no infallible mode of arriving at the absolute truth, which lies beyond 
the reach of human intellect, and can only be the distant object of our long-
continued and painful approximations” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 358). 
On the one hand, White was certainly right in stating that Jevons consid-
ered laws as mere correlations of events. On the other hand, Jevons’s determin-
istic view of nature entailed a stronger account of causality. Eventually, in his 
opinion the known scientific laws were factual statements because of human’s 
finiteness. Had we an infinite understanding, we could discover the true laws of 
nature. It means that the laws of nature could be seen from two different points 
of view: in themselves, they were exact and flawless, binding natural phenom-
ena in a necessary causal chain; from the perspective of scientific inquiry, 
 




though, they were mere correlations of observed events, since this was as far as 
the human intellect could go57. 
This idea was apparent in some passages of the Principles. Above all, this 
is the case of the section on quantitative induction, especially in relation to the 
concept of empirical law (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 483-503). An empirical law or 
formula was in Jevons’s account a mathematical equation consistent with our 
data (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 487). Given a table displaying the values according 
to the variant and the variable, we could formulate a mathematical relation 
yielding numbers in agreement with the table. The mentioned mathematical 
function would be of this type, being thus a parabola: 
 
𝑦 = A + B𝑥 + C𝑥2 
 
We can use several methods to find these formulas, like interpolation and ex-
trapolation (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 495-499). By means of these techniques, we 
can find the formula best suited to the data. 
However, these empirical laws did not correspond with the actual laws of 
nature. They had a practical validity and were exclusively related to the data of 
the given table. According to Jevons’s own account, our knowledge was re-
stricted to observed events, or the drawn balls. Consequently, every law we 
state should be an empirical one. As Jevons wrote, “these empirical formulae 
do not coincide with natural laws. They are only approximations to the results 
of natural laws” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 489, emphasis added). Jevons implied 
thus that there were objective laws to which we can increasingly approach, but 
never grasp. We might even have guessed what the true law of nature was, ex-
cept that we would never be sure that it really was the true law. Some empirical 
 
57 Consequently, I have no intention of discarding White’s view on this subject matter. 
I think, however, that it is incomplete. As a matter of fact, in the mentioned paper (M. 
White, 1989) White has only considered what Jevons stated concerning our way of 
depicting natural laws. White has not taken into account Jevons’s descriptions of na-




laws provide exceedingly precise results, so that “there is a presumption in fa-
vour of its being the true function, although there is no certainty whatever in 
the matter” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 490). Since we could only state probable 
laws, no function could be called ‘true’. Hence, Jevons expressed himself as if 
in nature itself there were mathematical laws regulating phenomena but never 
disclosing themselves to our gaze. 
This idea was also suggested in the section concerning the mathematical 
principles of approximation (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 471-475). Jevons argued 
there that the mathematical expressions of physical laws were in a state of pro-
gressive approximation. As he explained, “it is a general rule in quantitative 
investigation that we commence by discovering linear, and afterwards proceed 
to elliptic or more complicated laws of variation” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 474). 
At first a mathematical formula expressing a physical law would be of this 
type: 
 
𝑦 = A + B𝑥 
 
This is the formula of a straight line. In Jevons’s opinion our quantitative 
investigations supposed at first a uniform, linear movement. But then, using 
more sophisticated tools of measurement, “it will probably be found that this 
uniformity of motion is only apparent, and that there exists some acceleration 
or retardation” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 473). Consequently, the mentioned for-
mula would admit other terms, like Cx2, Dx3 and so on. Thus, we proceeded 
then from a linear relation to a curve, and to a curve of higher degree. This was 
a process of approximation. And yet, approximation to what? Jevons seemed to 
suggest that this formula would be increasingly approaching the true natural re-
lation. Even the use of the term ‘discover’ prompts this interpretation: had we 







God as a guarantor 
 
What gave Jevons the certainty that such laws existed? What justified him 
in excluding the assertion concerning the very existence of these laws from the 
realm of probability? A contemporary scientist might accept their existence as 
an axiom, because without this assumption no scientific inquiry would be pos-
sible. I argue nonetheless that Jevons’s case was different. In order to under-
stand his commitment to the existence of natural laws, we must recall the 
bridge between religion and science. 
Jevons found a justification for the existence of natural laws in God. As we 
read in the Preface to the Principles: 
 
Were this indeed a Chaotic Universe, the powers of mind employed in 
science would be useless to us. […] Happily the Universe in which we 
dwell is not the result of chance, and where chance seems to work it is 
our own deficient faculties which prevent us from recognising the oper-
ation of Law and of Design (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 2). 
 
Humans may not acknowledge the signs of order provided by the natural laws, 
but this did not mean that there weren’t any. The laws of nature had been im-
pressed on matter in the moment of its creation (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 173)58. 
Consequently, by induction “we have to interpret the will by which the condi-
tions of creation were laid down” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 122, emphasis added). 
The universe was created by God, so in Jevons’s eye it was certainly regulated 
by laws. Therefore, the universe concealed, but still revealing it by some 
marks, the Creator’s will. And the will of God could not be to create a chaotic 
universe, not to mention that the universe displayed the marks of design. 
The language that Jevons used was hardly a neutral one. It rather recalled 
the arguments of natural theology. William Paley had argued that the universe 
showed the hand of an intelligent Creator (see Paley, [1802] 2009, 19). In Pa-
ley’s view, God was the supreme Contriver of the world. This Contriver had 
 
58 Here it is stated that “patient and skilful examination of the records may […] dis-




created the universe according to a design, which showed through in nature by 
numerous instances59. As Paley had concluded,  
 
whenever we find a general plan pursued, yet with such variations in it, 
as are, in each case, required by the particular exigency of the subject to 
which it is applied, we possess, in such plan and such adaptation, the 
strongest evidence, that can be afforded, of intelligence and design (Pa-
ley, [1802] 2009, 227). 
 
Jevons, as a Unitarian, could certainly have been inclined towards natural the-
ology60. And indeed he relied on a Dieu horloger as a guarantor of nature’s or-
der. 
However, God’s design wasn’t the only source of certainty for Jevons. In 
his own words: 
 
we can never recur too often to the truth that our knowledge of the laws 
and future events of the external world is only probable. The mind itself 
is quite capable of possessing certain knowledge (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
235). 
 
In this view, if the laws of nature were beyond our reach, we nonetheless had a 
privileged access to our minds. Human sight may be obfuscated when enquir-
ing nature, but it was clear when looking into the observer’s own mind. Hence, 
we could be sure that “the fundamental laws of thought, and the rule of substi-
tution […], are certainly true” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 236). As stated above, for 
Jevons the inquirer’s mind was transparent to his own scrutiny. 
God guaranteed the existence and necessity of the natural laws and the 
laws of thought provided a foundation for human knowledge. In the array of 
 
59 For an example, see Paley, (1802) 2009, 20, where the author puts forward the case 
of fish’s eye. The different shape of crystalline lenses in the eye of terrestrial animals 
and fish. The fish have rounder lenses than other animals, to fit the different way in 
which light is refracted in the water.  
60 See for example the positions of Whately or Southwood Smith, in Hilton, 1988, 53-





probable statements, the laws of thought and logic were certain. Humans were 
darkly wise beings indeed. Jevons put forward thus a highly original synthesis 
of Butler and Paley61. On the one hand, Jevons took from Butler the probabilis-
tic character of human knowledge. Accordingly, human understanding was 
darkened. On the other hand, Paley’s conceptual framework secured the ration-
ality of the universe. Humans were also wise. Jevons’s position couldn’t be un-
derstood without referring to the certainty as well as the uncertainty of human 
knowledge. 
 
1.5. Ars combinatoria 
 
As stated above, Jevons depicted the universe in the terms of a ballot-box. 
The balls would be extracted one after the other from this infinite urn, accord-
ing to the laws of nature. Consequently, induction consisted in discovering the 
laws obeyed by natural phenomena. Induction was thus the inverse operation of 
deduction, and was far more complicated than the latter: 
 
Instead of the comparatively easy task of finding what effects will fol-
low from a given law, the effects are now given and the law is required. 
We have to interpret the will by which the conditions of creation were 
laid down (Jevons [1874] 1877, 122). 
 
Induction was an analytical process separating “the complex combinations in 
which natural phenomena are presented to us” (Jevons [1874] 1877, 122, em-
phasis added). 
The ballot-box metaphor echoed thus the tradition of the ars combinatoria, 
since it suggested that nature was a series of combinations and permutations. 
Such a link had already been noticed by Strong, who argued that “what for 
Bernoulli was little more than an illustration, comes to embody the illusive vi-
sion, reaching back beyond Leibniz to Lull and Ramus, of science as ars com-
binatoria” (Strong, 1976, 206). Indeed Jevons devoted a chapter of the Princi-
ples to elucidating the rules of combinatorial calculus. In his turn, Jevons him-
 




self didn’t fail to note the connection, quoting Leibniz and Bernoulli as sources 
of his own investigation. The art of combinations and permutations was then a 
method which enabled the scientist to orient himself among the seeming chaos 
of nature. As such, its scope wasn’t only logical, but also ontological. 
The ontological sense of Jevons’s combinatorial calculus has already been 
noted by some scholars, notably by Strong, in the paper mentioned above, and 
by Mays and Henry. However, none of them has ever attempted to clarify Jev-
ons’s link with this tradition. The purpose of this section shall be therefore to 
compare Jevons’s position with some theorists of the ars combinatoria. The il-
lustration of Jevons’s theory as well as the comparison with the thinkers of this 
tradition will show that he can be numbered among them. 
I will focus on the following expositors of the ars combinatoria: the Kab-
balist Abraham Abulafia, Ramon Llull, Francis Bacon, Giulio Camillo, John 
Wilkins, Gottfried Leibniz. The choice is justified, in some cases, by the fun-
damental role these authors had for the art’s development: this is notably the 
case of Abulafia and Llull, without whom the very birth of an ars combinatoria 
wouldn’t have been possible. Some others, like Wilkins and Bacon, took roots 
in the English philosophy. Their choice is motivated thus by the fact that they 
were important references in Jevons’s education. However, Jevons was influ-
enced by this tradition of thought much more than he himself was aware of. 
Consequently, the comparison is sometimes inspired by these unintentional 
proximities, like in the case of Giulio Camillo. 
I shall first take into account two metaphors which Jevons attached to the 
study of combinations among natural phenomena. The first metaphor was that 
nature was a secret language, waiting to be deciphered. This view will be com-
pared to the Kabbalah’s account, paying a particular attention to a pre-
Kabbalistic text, the Sepher Yetzirah (Book of Creation) and then to the Kabba-
list Abraham Abulafia. I will then briefly examine Ramon Llull’s ars magna. 
According to Jevons’s second metaphor, the world was instead a labyrinth 
through which the scientist had to find his way. This image shall be related to 
Bacon’s depiction of the world as a labyrinth and a forest. After that I will fo-




ons’s combinatorial calculus will be considered in its relations to his machines. 
Analysing Jevons’s Logical Alphabet and Machine shall prompt a comparison 
with Giulio Camillo’s Idea del theatro. Thereafter I will focus on Jevons’s 
view of language and of signs. This topic will require a parallel with Francis 
Bacon’s philosophy of language and John Wilkins’s project of a philosophical 
language. Thanks to the examination of Jevons’s account concerning the rela-
tion between words and things, it will be made clear the proximity of his view 
to Leibniz’s ones. 
The conclusions I have drawn from these studies are as follows. Jevons 
could be rightly numbered among those thinkers who contrived an ars combi-
natoria. However, Jevons’s position was different from many other examples 
of ars combinatoria because he didn’t believe that language had an immediate 
grasp on reality. The core of his art was the order of combinations rather than 
the terms involved. Therefore, the relevant aspect of his combinatorial art 
turned out to be its syntax. From this point of view, his theoretical construction 
displayed a most striking similarity with Leibniz’s characteristica. 
Additionally, the interest of pursuing such a study rests in the widening the 
current interpretations of Jevons’s logic, following a path at which scholars 
have only hinted but not developed62. Indeed none of this work has considered 
Jevons’s logic and philosophy of science in the light of the ars combinatoria. 
This path shows how Jevons logic could be interpreted as an ontology which 
was articulated as an art of combinations: the combinatorial structure of the 
Logical Alphabet corresponded to natural phenomena in Jevons’s mind, bring-
ing thus his logic closer to the traditional philosophical accounts of ars combi-




62 This path has been suggested in Strong, 1976, as I have highlighted, but also Mays, 
Henry, 1953, especially 488. For other works concerning Jevons’s logic, see: 
MacLennan, 1972; Schabas, 1984; 1990; Mosselmans, 2007, chap. 4. On Jevons’s 




The hidden meaning and the labyrinth 
 
In the Principles  Jevons argued that 
 
induction is the decyphering of the hidden meaning of natural phenom-
ena. Given the events which happen in certain definite combinations, 
we are required to point out the laws which govern those combinations 
((Jevons [1874] 1877, 124-125). 
 
This parallel showed that induction was a difficult task: “anyone can invent a 
secret language […]. But to decipher the letter, having no key to the signs 
adopted, is a wholly different matter” (Jevons [1874] 1877, 124). As we shall 
see, Jevons represented reality’s structure by the means of what he called the 
“Logical Alphabet”. In Jevons’s logic the objects could be denoted by letters, 
and the structure of their combinations mirrored the world’s own structure. 
In Jevons’s account, the letters of the Logical Alphabet could correspond 
to the events of the world, or to their qualities, as we shall see. However, the 
idea that we had to decipher the universe’s language was ancient. Moreover, it 
had a long-lasting association with understanding reality as a series of combi-
nations. This view was notably typical of the Kabbalah, according to which 
creation itself had been a linguistic process. The Kabbalah consisted first of all 
in interpreting the Scriptures. However, the Kabbalist went beyond the letter of 
the texts. He struggled to find, in the warp and weft of the Scriptures, the Torah 
preceding the creation itself. Indeed, before the writing of the sacred text, the 
eternal Torah conceived by God was nothing but a disordered series of letters. 
That was why the combinatorial art was fundamental to the Kabbalist (Eco, 
1993, 30-31). The temurah, one of the Kabbalist techniques, is of particular in-
terest in this regard63. It was the art of producing anagrams basing on the 
 
63 The theologian and Semitist Gershom Scholem have explained that temurah wasn’t 
originally a Kabbalist technique, as it had developed in the context of German Hassid-
ism. However, the Kabbalistic practices have been popularly attached to the following 




Names of God. The new words thus obtained displayed some of the text’s hid-
den senses. 
Abraham Abulafia, a Jewish Kabbalist and mystic born in Saragossa in 
1240, developed this procedure considerably (see Idel, 1988, 19). Abulafia 
tried to anatomize the name of God, combining it with different letters and vo-
calizing it differently. This practice had mystical purposes and it was related to 
an ecstatic process, involving some techniques of reciting the divine names 
(Idel, 1988, 25-30). In Abulafia’s own words: “in the thoughts of your mind 
combine and be purified” (Abulafia, Sitre Torah, MS. Paris, fol. 157b, as quot-
ed in Idel, 1988, 19). The combinational procedures were described by Abu-
lafia as follows: 
 
And begin by combining this name, namely, YHWH, at the beginning 
alone, and examine all its combinations and move it and turn it about 
like a wheel returning around, front and back, like a scroll, and do not 
let it rest, but when you see its matter strengthened because of the great 
motion, because of the fear of confusion of your imagination and the 
rolling about of your thoughts, and when you let it rest, return to it and 
ask [it] until there shall come to your hand a word of wisdom from it, 
do not abandon it (Abulafia, MS. München 408, fols. 65a-65b, also 
published in Sefer ha- Peli'ah, fol. 35b, as quoted in Idel, 1988, 21). 
 
As the great Abulafia’s commentator Moshe Idel has pointed out, for the Kab-
balist the name of God enabled one to read the world’s structure, providing him 
with a scientific knowledge as well as a magical power (see Idel, 1988, 19). 
The linguistic character of the world was the basis of the Kabbalistic lega-
cy. Its clearest expression is to be found in the Sepher Yetzirah, or The Book of 
Formation. The Sepher Yetzirah is a short cosmological treatise, whose con-
ception is still uncertain but dated between the fifth and the ninth century C.E. 
(see Segol, 2012, 25-28). As a matter of fact, the Sepher Yetzirah wasn’t stricto 
sensu a Kabbalistic text, as it preceded the birth of that tradition in the twelfth 




development of the Kabbalistic studies, becoming an integral part of them (see 
Dan, 2005, 4)64. 
According to this treatise, God created the world by the means of the ten 
Sephiroth and the twenty letters of Jewish alphabet. As we can read in the first 
chapter, “ten are the ineffable Sephiroth. Twenty-two are the Letters, the Foun-
dation of all things” (Ben Joseph, 1996, 17 [I, 2])65. The letters were then di-
vided in three categories to explain the creation of the elements, the planets, the 
months, Zodiac signs and human organs: 
 
The twenty-two sounds and letters are the Foundation of all things. 
Three mothers, seven doubles and twelve simples. The Three Mothers 
are Aleph, Mem and Shin, they are Air, Water and Fire. […] He hath 
formed, weighed, and composed with these twenty-two letters every 
created thing, and the form of everything which shall hereafter be (Jos-
peh, 1996, 18 [II, 1-2]). 
 
Their pronunciation was then the primal cosmogonical act (Ben Joseph, 1996, 
18 [II, 3])66. 
Moreover, God Himself had engaged in a combinatorial process, by pair-
ing the letters one after the other: 
 
For He shewed the combination of these letters, each with the other; 
Aleph with all, and all with Aleph; Beth with all, and all with Beth. 
Thus in combining all together in pairs are produced the two hundred 
and thirty-one gates of knowledge (Ben Joseph, 1996, 18-19 [II, 5]). 
 
The world itself was alphabetical. As the semiologist Umberto Eco has re-
marked, this view annihilated the distance between signifier and meaning (Eco, 
1993, 37-38). In the Sepher Yetzirah the letters weren’t the means of denoting 
 
64 On the Sepher Yetzirah, see also Dan, 2005, 15-18. 
65 The mentioned author was the alleged transcriber of the treatise, as related in Ben 
Joseph, 1996, 7. The notation in the parenthesis indicates the corresponding passage of 
the treatise, according to the chapter and verse. 
66 As we read here: “these twenty-two sounds or letters are formed by the voice, im-
pressed on the air, and audibly modified in five places; in the throat, in the mouth, by 




the natural objects, but were themselves those objects. Hence the privileged ac-
cess of the Kabbalist to reality: he was able to express the world because his 
language was formed by the primal constituents of reality. 
The entanglement between the theory of combinations and ontology, as 
well as its linguistic character, was also apparent in Ramon Llull’s works. 
Llull’s defined accordingly his ars magna in the introduction to the Introducto-
ria artis demonstrativae: “ista ars est et logica et metaphysica” (Llull, 1721-
1742, Vol. III, 1, as quoted in Rossi, 1960, 45), namely “this art is at once logic 
and metaphysical”. His ars combinatoria had thus ontological implications. In 
the Libre de contemplació en Déu (1273-1274) (Book of God’s Contemplation) 
Llull explained that we could understand our material world in the light of the 
spiritual one, by connecting the worldly objects’ qualities to God’s attributes. 
For example, the goodness of human beings was caused by the goodness of the 
Creator. Thus the divine qualities were the first constituents of reality67. 
The Book of God’s Contemplation had a great importance in Llull’s elabo-
ration of the art68. Here Llull found the first principles of his art in the divine 
attributes, which would be later called Dignitates. The divine Dignities were 
the basis of Llull’s art of combinations. But these principles had to be ordered 
and listed for an art of combinations to be born. Llull first ordered them into 
multiples of four, during the so-called “Quaternary Phase”, and then into mul-
tiples of three, during the “Ternary Phase”, according to the distinction Antho-
ny Bonner has marked in his edition of Llull’s writings (Llull, 1985, Vol. I, 56-
57). In the Ars brevis (1308), which was the most influential work of the Ter-
nary Phase with the Ars generalis ultima (1305-1308), the divine Dignities 
 
67 On this topic see Rubio, 2018, 88. See also Yates, 1954, 27, where it has been 
shown how the worldly and celestial phenomena have been compared to elemental 
processes in Llull’s works. See also Yates, 1982. 
68 As explained by Anthony Bonner, who edited the Selected Works of Ramon Llull for 
Princeton University Press, the Libre de contemplació pertained to the “Pre-Art phase” 




were nine69. Here, in his first figure (Llull, 1986, Vol. XII, 197)70, Llull associ-
ated nine letters, from B to K71, to the nine divine Dignitates, whereas the same 
letters were related to nine principles in the second figure72. Therefore in the 
Ternary Phase the principles of Llull’s art were eighteen. Moreover, these let-
ters were associated to a question, a subject, a virtue, a vice (see Llull, 1985, 
580-581). 
Everything could be reduced to these eighteen principles. As Llull wrote 
while elucidating the first figure, “everything that exists is implicit in the prin-
ciples of this figure, for everything is either good or great, etc. […] Therefore, 
whatever exists is reducible to the above-mentioned principles” (Llull, 1985, 
583). If the first figure showed that everything was connected to the Dignities, 
the second concerned the worldly objects. It was composed of three triangles. 
Each triangle was connected to three principles. For example, the first one sub-
sumed the categories of difference, concordance and contrariety. In their turn, 
these categories were articulated in three species. Now, putting together these 
categories and species one could classify every object, material or immaterial 
as it may be73. Moreover, these principles were also required to define the Dig-
nities. As Llull wrote, “the Figure T [the second figure] serves the First Figure, 
for through difference one can distinguish between goodness and goodness, be-
tween goodness and greatness, etc.” (see Llull, 1985, 585). 
Llull’s figures were deductive instruments, displaying how the combinato-
rial artist could represent the world through his logical language. The first fig-
ure for instance “is circular to show that any subject can become a predicate 
and vice versa, as when one says, ‘goodness is great’, ‘greatness is good’, and 
 
69 Bonitas, Magnitudo, Eternitas, Potentia, Sapientia, Voluntas, Virtus, Veritas, Glo-
ria; see Llull, 1986, Vol. XII, 197. 
70 The first figure was denoted by the letter A. 
71 The letters were nine because J was excluded. 
72 Differentia, Concordantia, Contrarietas, Principium, Medium, Finis, Maioritas, 
Aequalitatis, Minoritas; see Llull, 1986, Vol. XII, 200. The second figure was denoted 
by the letter T. 




so on” (Llull, 1985, 582). Several syllogisms could be formed by combining 
the Dignities in the form of subject or predicate. The artist could investigate 
thus the relations between subjects and predicates and define the terms accord-
ing to their nature (see Llull, 1985, 582)74. The combinatorial character was 
considerably apparent in the third and fourth figures. As we can see, the third 
figures paired the letters of Llull’s alphabet, so that various sentences could 
spring from their association, according to the letter’s different meanings. The 
fourth figure was composed by three concentric circles, “the outermost of 
which is fixed and the two inside ones of which are mobile” (Llull, 1985, 587). 
By moving the circles, the artist could explore the associations among the let-
ters in groups of three: in Llull’s own words, “one may seek out necessary con-
clusions and find them” (Llull, 1985, 587). 
These were some of the means through which Llull’s ars calculated the 
combinations of the nine letters. However, the guarantee that these combina-
tions had an ontological soundness were the causal influence of the Dignities. 
They were the pillars of the world and not by chance Moshe Idel connected 
them to the Sephiroths (see Idel, 1996)75. Nicholas of Cusa, medieval philoso-
pher and mathematician, didn’t fail to notice this feature of the ars magna: 
“primum fundamentum artis est quod omnia, quae Deus creavit et fecit, creavit 
et fecit ad similitudinem suarum dignitatum” (Nicholas of Cusa, Cod. Cus. 85, 
f. 55v., as quoted in Rossi, 1960, 49)76. As the historian of philosophy Paolo 
Rossi has stated, this metaphysical theory, i.e. the exemplarism, was in fact a 
guarantee that Llull’s logic primarily pertained to reality rather than only hu-
man discourse, because it enabled one to find the similarities between the Dig-
nities and the world (see Rossi, 1960, 49). 
 
74 Here we read: “In this figure, moreover, the artist seeks the natural conjunction be-
tween subject and predicate, as well as their relative disposition and proportion, so that 
he can find the middle term and thus reach a conclusion”. 
75 For a discussion of this topic and a comparison between Llull and the Kabbalah, see 
Hames, 2000, chap. 3. 
76 “The primal foundation of the art is that everything which God has created and done 




For his part, Jevons was at the same time distant and close to these views. 
On the one hand, the importance of studying natural phenomena in terms of 
combinations had for him too a theological foundation. As quoted above, “the 
laws of nature are the invaluable secrets which God has hidden, and it is the 
kingly prerogative of the philosopher to search them out by industry and sagac-
ity” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 126). Furthermore, both Jevons and Llull construct-
ed their combinatorial logic on the basis of an alphabet. They associated letters 
with qualities or objects and then combined them in sentences. These letters 
were evidently conventional, since they did not display any similarity with the 
thing denoted. This feature distinguished Jevons and Llull from the Kabbalah, 
where the letters themselves had an ontological value. On the other hand, Jev-
ons’s version of the ars combinatoria could not really be considered linguistic. 
It certainly was an analytical process, and as such it could be described as an 
act of deciphering. But we shall see that in Jevons’s eyes our words put things 
at distance, never expressing them exactly.  
In Jevons’s view the combinatorial calculus enabled to cope with the com-
plexity of reality. While describing the process of induction as inverse opera-
tion, he notably used the example of the labyrinth: “a person may walk into the 
most complicated labyrinth or the most extensive catacombs, and turn hither 
and thither at his will; it is when he wishes to return that doubt and difficulty 
commence” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 122). To leave the labyrinth the adventurer 
would have either to return by the path he made at first – challenging thus his 
memory – or to try every possible way. And nature was certainly similar to a 
labyrinth in this respect. The scientist could be lost among the multitude of 
phenomena, in which “we seldom observe any law in uninterrupted and undis-
guised operation” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 126). To the negligent observer, nature 
didn’t show any regularity at all, since “the laws may be simple, but their com-
bined effects are not simple, and we have no clue to guide us through their in-
tricacies” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 126). 
Depicting nature as a labyrinth of intricacies Jevons came near the ars 
combinatoria again. In the sixteenth century this tradition merged in fact with 




memorativa, which had long been related to the combinatory, found a new 
place in Ramus’s logical system77. In the Principles Jevons quoted Ramus’s di-
alectical method as a forerunner of his Logical Alphabet (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
703-704). Moreover, Jevons’s description of nature displayed a remarkable 
similarity to Francis Bacon’s account. For the latter, nature had indeed a maze-
like appearance, being akin to a forest or a labyrinth (Bacon, [1620] 1857-
1874, Vol. I, 129): its ways were mischievous, its resemblances deceptive, its 
signs misleading. That was why, in Bacon’s opinion, the scientific task needed 
a series of tables reporting the natural facts. Those tables aimed thus at ordinat-
ing the confused material of reality (see Rossi, 1957, 201-207; 1960, 166-168). 
Bacon’s method was meant to bring order in the array of facts, where an order 
was most difficult to be found. 
Jevons was certainly acquainted with Bacon’s image of the universe as a 
forest and a labyrinth. According to both Bacon and Jevons, the scientist had to 
cope with the variety of nature. But they gave different solution to overcome 
the scientist’s bewilderment in front of natural phenomena. Bacon fancied a se-
ries of tables where the natural phenomena had to be listed. Thanks to such ta-
bles the essential forms of natural objects could be sought. For his part, Jevons 
thought that his Ariadne’s thread was the study of combinations and permuta-
tions, with a proper adjustment from the theory of probability. We shall see 
now how his method was shaped. 
  
 
77 Paolo Rossi made an extensive analysis of the connections between the arts of 





Figure 1: Llull’s first figure (or figure A) of the Ars brevis 
(Llull, 1617, 116).  
 
 
Figure 2: Llull’s second figure (or figure T) of the Ars brevis 









Figure 4: Llull’s fourth figure of the Ars brevis 




Combinations and permutations 
 
Let us now consider the theory of combinations as presented by Jevons, 
mainly in the Principles’ chapter entitled The variety of nature, or the doctrine 
of combinations and permutations. Such a title reveals how strong an entan-
glement this theory had with the variety of nature. Had nature been in a static 
and unvaried state, there would have been no such thing as a theory of combi-
nations. A study of combinations was required because the natural objects were 
continuously merging and decomposing over and over again, creating new 
compounds. As we read at the beginning of this chapter: 
 
Certain it is that life demands incessant novelty, and that nature, though 
it probably never fails to obey the same fixed laws, yet presents to us an 
apparently unlimited series of varied combinations of events. It is the 
work of science to observe and record the kinds and comparative num-
bers of such combinations of phenomena, occurring spontaneously or 
produced by our interference. Patient and skilful examination of the 
records may then disclose the laws imposed on matter at its creation, 
and enable us more or less successfully to predict, or even to regulate, 
the future occurrence of any particular combination (Jevons, [1874] 
1877, 173). 
 
The study of combinations was thus the guide on which the scientist had to rely 
in fathoming the depths of nature. If he used it properly, he would even become 
able to predict events, and therefore to control the forces of nature. 
After explaining the utility and purpose of the theory, Jevons elucidated its 
mechanism. First of all, he marked the difference between combination and 
permutation. The first one considered the combined phenomena only with re-
spect to the elements involved, regardless of their order. The latter instead dis-
tinguished the results also on the basis of the order. For example, the couple of 
elements AB gives only one possible combination, but admits two permuta-
tions, i.e. AB and BA (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 177). Consequently, as Jevons 
wrote, “each new object or term doubles the number of combinations, but in-
creases the permutations by a factor continually growing” (Jevons, [1874] 




number considered, namely 𝑛! (in our notation)78. Then Jevons explained how 
to calculate the number of combinations selecting a given number of elements 
from a group, with exclusion of repetitions. This is what we call in fact “simple 




𝑘! (𝑛 − 𝑘)!
 
 
The results of these two formulas would give thus respectively every possible 
permutation and combination.  
This was the highest possible number of combinations and permutations 
which could result from a given number of elements. As matter of fact, the nat-
ural laws played a relevant role in this context. Since the universe was gov-
erned by the laws of nature, it was in Jevons’s opinion to a high degree regu-
lar. Hence, the combinations and permutations of phenomena admitted some 
restrictions (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 174). 
Jevons explained this concept through the example of the English alpha-
bet. From the twenty-six letters of this alphabet, an exceedingly high number of 
permutations, namely words, can be formed. However, we have to observe 
some rules lest it wouldn’t be possible for these words to be uttered. For in-
stance, the constitution of the human vocal organs may be unsuited to pro-
nounce several consonants in a row. Now, by studying the existing English 
terms, we can “learn the Laws of Euphony or calculate the possible number of 
words” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 175). Before calculating the possible combina-
tions, the scientist must identify the laws which could prevent some of them 
from forming: “the combinations of natural phenomena are limited by a great 
number of conditions which are in no way brought to our knowledge except so 
 
78 The permutations thus obtained included repetitions though. Jevons also explained 
how to exclude them (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 180). 





far as they are disclosed in the examination of nature” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
175). 
As one can easily imagine that, the combinatorial calculus had a close 
connection with the theory of probability. Such a link could not have escaped 
Jevons’s consideration, given how relevant probability was in his thought. The 
combinations of phenomena, being restricted by some laws, could indeed have 
different degrees of probability. Let us take into consideration another one of 
Jevons’s examples where this connection is particularly evident: 
 
If the letters of the word Roma be thrown down casually in a row, what 
is the probability that they will form a significant Latin word? The pos-
sible arrangements of four letters are 4 x 3 x 2 x 1, or 24 in number 
[…], and if all the arrangements be examined, seven of these will be 
found to have meaning, namely Roma, ramo, oram, mora, maro, armo, 




[1874] 1877, 203). 
 
Jevons relied on Laplace and De Morgan for this formula. According to it, the 
number of favourable events must be divided by the number of total events. 
Therefore, a proper investigation of the phenomena’s combinations would also 
consider the probability of each combination. And yet this connection between 
the combinatorial calculus and the theory of probability cannot be clarified 
without referring to Jevons’s logic. Hence, let us address this topic. 
 
A theatre of the world 
 
In Jevons’s eyes the natural laws limited the possibilities of phenomena’s 
combinations. They were thus the primary principles on which the scientist had 
to rely in his inquiries. Nonetheless, the principles of combinations proceeded 
primarily from logic, or more specifically from the laws of thought. What then 
is the relation between Jevons’s combinatorial calculus and his logic? And how 




While presenting the theory of combinations and permutations, Jevons 
clearly stated that its bases were to be found in logic. He thus wrote as follows 
in the Principles of Science: 
 
The Laws of Thought are the first and most important of all the laws 
which govern the combinations of phenomena, and, though they be 
binding on the mind, they may also be regarded as verified in the exter-
nal world. The Logical Alphabet develops the utmost variety of things 
and events which may occur, and it is evident that as each new quality 
is introduced, the number of combinations is doubled. Thus four quali-
ties may occur in 16 combinations; five qualities in 32; six qualities in 
64; and so on. In general language, if 𝑛 be the number of qualities, 2𝑛 is 
the number of varieties of things which may be formed from them (Jev-
ons, [1874] 1877, 173-174). 
 
The combinations were regulated by the laws of thought, i.e. the principle of 
identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle (or duality, in Jevons’s terms). 
Moreover, from this passage we apprehend that these laws may pertain to the 
human mind, but they belong to nature as well. In other words, the objects of 
the world are bound by the very same laws which shape thought. There was 
thus a continuity between the mind and the world. Jevons embraced Des-
cartes’s account, according to which the conscience was separated from the so-
called external world. But the bridge between these two domains consisted in 
the fact that the laws of thought were principles of the mind as well as of 
things. 
Even though each law of thought was required to found the combinational 
process, its real driving force was the law of duality80. That is why in the pas-
sage quoted above we read that for each quality considered, the number of 
combinations is doubled. For instance, if we take into account the quality of 
“being red” with respect to a given object, this item would be either red or not-
red. No additional alternative was given, according to the principle of the ex-
cluded middle. Hence, the formula here provided suggested that we can choose 
one of two alternatives for an 𝑛 number of times. Jevons clearly elucidated this 
 
80 The essential role of this law has been highlighted by Mays and Henry; see Mays, 




process in Studies and Exercises in Deductive Logic (1880), where he ex-
plained that “the successive application of the Law of Duality to two, three, 
four, five or more terms, gives rise to the development of all possible logical 
combinations, called the Logical Alphabet”81. 
The Logical Alphabet was compared by Jevons to the system of bifurcate 
classification. This method was embedded in the very statement of the laws of 
thought and as such had been employed by Aristotle (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
702). Porphyry and Ramus, as stated above, had used the dichotomic method. 
After them, the importance of the Porphyry’s Tree had been recognized by Jer-
emy and George Bentham, since in their view “it is the prototype of the Logi-
cal Alphabet which lies at the basis of logical method” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
703). Thus, Jevons’s appreciation for this logical tradition led him once again 
to the ars combinatoria. 
The Logical Alphabet was formed by all the combinations of qualities. 
Following its lines, we could formulate several propositions, excluding self-
contradictory statements. The truth of these propositions was to be judged on 
the basis of their correspondence with real objects. The Logical Alphabet was a 
guide through the forest of nature, because it was a map of the world. Accord-
ingly, as we read in the Principles: 
 
In a theoretical point of view we may conceive that the Logical Alpha-
bet is infinitely extended. Every new quality or circumstance which can 
belong to an object, subdivides each combination or class, so that the 
number of such combinations, when unrestricted by logical conditions, 
is represented by an infinitely high power of two (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
95). 
 
In Jevons’s eyes the universe was certainly not constituted by letters, but it was 
nevertheless possible to map it through the logical combinations of symbols. 
From that point of view, Jevons’s position shows a remarkable similarity to 
Llull’s one. In fact they both thought that the logical combinations could ex-
 
81 Jevons, (1880) 1884, 180. A similar description of the Logical Alphabet can be 




press the structure of reality, as I have remarked above. Hence, Jevons’s com-
binatorial art as well turned out to be at once logic and metaphysical. 
Jevons first presented the Logical Alphabet while describing the so-called 
indirect method of inference. For him, a direct inference drew the consequenc-
es from the premises, where the conclusions were obtained thanks to the prin-
ciple of substitution82. On the contrary, “the method of Indirect Inference may 
be described as that which points out what a thing is, by showing that it cannot 
be anything else”. Hence, this latter method was the negative of the first and it 
was the logical version of the mathematical reductio ad absurdum (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, 81). 
This procedure evidently required an exhaustive list of all the various pos-
sibilities. It was therefore liable to fallacies and blunders. The Logical Alpha-
bet was certainly of help in removing every impossible outcome. However, 
Jevons knew how insidious this method still was83. Therefore he spent a lot of 
effort in devising some machines which could secure its success84. The first 
 
82 See Jevons, (1874) 1877, chap. 4. The principle of substitution was also extensively 
illustrated in the paper of 1869, The Substitution of Similars (see Jevons, 1890). 
83 See, for example, Jevons, (1874) 1877, 96, where we read as follows: “the amount 
of labour [in Logical Deduction] is often found to be considerable. The mere writing 
down of sixty-four combinations of six letters each is no small task, and, if we had a 
problem of five premises, each of the sixty-four combinations would have to be exam-
ined in connection with each premise. The requisite comparison is often of a very te-
dious character, and considerable chance of error intervenes. I have given much atten-
tion, therefore, to lessening both the manual and mental labour of the process, and I 
shall describe several devices which may be adopted for saving trouble and risk of 
mistake”. 
84 For an illustration of Jevons’s logical machines see notably: Henry, Mays, 1953,  
493-499; Maas, 2005, 124-150, where the problem was addressed from a broader 
point of view, considering the importance of mechanical analogies and their influence 




one of these devices was the Logical Slate85. It simply was a blackboard on 
which the Logical Alphabet had been engraved. The logician was thus relieved 
of a grave labour, because he didn’t have to write all the possibilities every 
time from the beginning. He could also write on the same slate his premises, so 
that he could easily compare them with the Logical Alphabet’s structure. 
The second device, the Logical Abacus86, was much more complicated. It 
was contrived to further reduce the risk of error embedded in the indirect infer-
ence. As we read in On the Mechanical Performance of Logical Inference, 
 
the fixed order of the combinations in the written abecedarium87 renders 
it necessary to consider them separately, and to pick out by repeated 
acts of mental attention those which fall into any particular class. Con-
siderable labour and risk of error thus arise. The Logical Abacus was 
devised to avoid these objections, and was constructed by placing the 
combinations of the abecedarium upon separate movable slips of wood, 
which can then be easily classified, selected and arranged according to 
the conditions of the problem (Jevons, 1890, 151, emphasis added). 
 
The Logical Alphabet was indeed a map of the phenomena’s possible combina-
tions. However, it was fixed, whereas the Abacus introduced the mechanical 
movement to the Alphabet. 
  
 
85 The Slate was first depicted in The Substitution of the Similars (Jevons, 1890, 116), 
then in On the Mechanical Performance of Logical Inference (Jevons, 1890, 151) and 
eventually in the Principles (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 95-96). 
86 The Logical Abacus was first presented before the Manchester Literary and Philo-
sophical Society on the third of April 1866. An exhaustive description of his parts and 
mechanism was though included in the appendix to the Substitution of Similars (see 
Jevons, 1890, 133-136 and 151-152); see also Jevons, (1874) 1877, 104-106. 










This dynamical aspect was even more evident in the Logical Machine, by 
far the most sophisticated of Jevons’s contrivances (Jevons, 1890, 152-172; 
[1874] 1877, 107-114). He illustrated its functioning to the Royal Society in 
1870, not to mention that it was on the title-page of the Principles of Science 
(see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 108). The Machine had a keyboard which enabled 
one to express the logical sentences, according to Jevons’s notation. Some keys 
permitted one to fill in the terms of a proposition. Each term obviously includ-
ed its negative as well. There were also some operational keys, namely intro-
ducing the copula, the full-stop and the disjunctive conjunction. We could thus 
insert the premises of a stretch of reasoning into the machine. Once all premis-
es had been inserted, we could press another operational key, the Finis key, to 
calculate the result. Eventually the Machine would eliminate every conclusion 
which would be inconsistent with the premises. The Logical Machine was in-
deed able to provide all the possible combinations resulting from the proposi-
tion inserted, in accordance with the laws of thought. As Jevons wrote, 
 
the machine is thus the embodiment of a true logical system. The com-
binations are classified, selected or rejected, just as they should be by a 
reasoning mind, so that at each step in a problem, the Logical Alphabet 
represents the proper condition of a mind exempt from mistake (Jevons, 
[1874] 1877, 111). 
 
Harro Maas has argued that the Logical Machine imitated the operations 
performed by the human mind (Maas, 2005, 98 and 131-132). Jevons and some 
of his contemporaries, like Charles Babbage for instance, were thus accus-
tomed to considering the mind itself as a machine. It should be added to 
Maas’s remark that the Logical Machine was nonetheless constructed on the 
basis of the Logical Alphabet. Consequently, it only showed the mind’s func-
tioning because it represented the combinations of natural phenomena. Each 
configuration of the premises in the Logical Machine corresponded to a recon-
figuration of the Logical Alphabet: “should the premises be self-contradictory 
it will be found that one or more of the letter-terms disappears entirely from the 




logical implication, since its configurations were intended as representation of 
the real phenomena’s combinations. 
The Logical Alphabet may be a map of reality, but the Logical Machine 
was a veritable theatre of the world. It added in fact a dynamical feature to the 
static listing of phenomena’s combinations. And yet the Machine could imitate 
the movement of combinations thanks to the isomorphism between the Logical 
Alphabet and the world, namely because the laws of thought were regulating 
the mind as well as things. The logicians Mays and Henry have highlighted this 
character of the Alphabet very clearly, arguing that 
 
the set of combinations making up the Logical Alphabet may be taken 
as typifying the abstract structure of the world. There is an isomorphism 
between the assumed combinatorial character of the universe and the 
Logical Alphabet (Mays, Henry 1953, 490). 
 
The Alphabet’s combinations mirrored the combinatorial character of the 
world itself. The content could certainly change, with the transformation of the 
worldly objects. Though, the structure remained the same, like a skeleton cov-
ered with new flesh but itself unaltered. 
Moreover, the expression “theatre of the world” could not fail to bring to 
mind some texts of the sixteenth century, like Giulio Camillo’s Idea del The-
atro (The Idea of the Theatre). According to Giulio Camillo, also known as ‘il 
Delminio’, we could depict the world as a palace whose parts were the very on-
tological roots of reality88. These fundamental elements, both perceptible and 
imperceptible, could be shown in the philosopher’s argumentation; hence the 
word ‘theatre’, which went back to the Greek verb théaō, ‘to see’ (Camillo, 
2005, 35). The edifice was indeed nothing but a manifestation of God Himself, 
since “non possiamo trovar magion più capace, che quella di Dio” (Camillo, 
2005, 150)89. Camillo also aimed at offering a systematic representation of 
 
88 The metaphysical character of this Theatre has been elucidated by Lina Bolzoni in 
Camillo, 2005, 18. For this concept also see Rossi, 1960, 97-100. 




human knowledge, so that he fancied a library whose books encompassed all 
the branches of knowing (see Camillo, 2005, 39-43). 
Let us take some steps in Camillo’s theatre. In his visionary construction, 
each of the seven planets was associated with a Sephiroth, with a pillar of the 
palace and with an angel of God (see Camillo, 2005, 169-173). At their turn, 
the seven columns intersected with seven degrees, representing the passage 
from unity to plurality in the world. Through these degrees the divine princi-
ples attained their embodiment in nature and human beings. The columns and 
degrees were compounded with each other, producing forty-nine combinations 
in total90. Every part of the palace was connected with some images, as the ars 
memorativa’s tradition recommended (see Camillo, 2005, 20)91. This setting 
was far from static though. The same images assumed different meanings ac-
cording to the degrees in which they were collocated. The images migrated into 
new combinations. Furthermore, such a mobile series of combinations recalled 
the mobile wheels of Llull, as Lina Bolzoni has remarked in her introduction to 
Camillo’s text (see Camillo, 2005, 22-23). Llull fourth figure was indeed com-
posed by concentric circles. Moving the circle, the philosopher produced new 
combinations, just like the Kabbalist Abulafia did spinning the names of God. 
Jevons’s Logical Machine displayed what was previously invisible, as well 
as Camillo’s theatre. It showed the new possible configurations of the world, in 
accordance with the given premises. Moreover, the images moving through 
Camillo’s Theatre could be compared to the new associations of qualities in 
Jevons’s logic. Once a figure had moved in a different degree of the palace, it 
assumed new qualities and therefore a new meaning. In the same way the addi-
tion of a premise in Jevons’s Machine excluded some combinations. We could 
 
90 Lina Bolzoni described very linearly this structure in the introduction (see Camillo, 
2005, 21-22). 
91 Here we read: “come insegna l’arte della memoria, ogni luogo deve essere contras-
segnato da una o più immagini”; in my translation: “as the art of memory teaches, eve-





notice that the movement of the images in the degrees was imaginary, whereas 
Jevons’s Machine involved an actual dynamic process. However, Camillo’s 
imagination was far more prolific than that. He even fancied an actual rhetori-
cal machine (see Camillo, 2005, 58). It was a wheel – a reminiscence of Llull’s 
fourth figure. In the middle there was the rhetor’s subject matter and in the sur-
rounding circles there were inscribed some rhetorical techniques and tools. 
Pulling a rope, the wheel spun. It thus suggested to the rhetor which techniques 
to use for embellishing his argument. 
As I have argued, the Logical Machine combined displaying and moving. 
It was a dynamical map of the possible combinations. However, Jevons’s no-
tion of the relationship between language and reality was completely different 
from Camillo’s or Llull’s one. Consequently, his Theatre of the world had a 
very different appearance as well. In the example of ars combinatoria we have 
seen thus far that language had a firm grasp on reality. The Kabbalist already 
spoke the language of the world, because the world was that language. Llull 
and Camillo argued that their theoretical constructions touched the very essen-
tial elements of the world. This wasn’t the case for Jevons. I shall now investi-
gate this discrepancy. 
 
The series of signs and things 
 
The above-mentioned examples of ars combinatoria held that it was pos-
sible to grasp the first constituents of reality. The signs were close to things. 
There was a correspondence between them, if not an identity. What was Jev-
ons’s position in this regard though? He mentioned this topic several times, but 
he didn’t investigate it extensively. For him, this problem was primarily related 
to logic, as we can easily imagine. The problem was tackled as follows in the 
introduction to the Principles of Science: 
 
I need hardly dwell upon the question whether logic treats of language, 
notions, or things. As reasonably might we debate whether a mathema-
tician treats of symbols, quantities, or things. A mathematician certainly 
does treat of symbols, but only as the instruments whereby to facilitate 




mathematical science must be verified in concrete objects in order that 
the calculations founded upon them may have any validity or utility, it 
follows that the ultimate objects of mathematical science are the things 
themselves. In like manner I conceive that the logician treats of lan-
guage so far as it is essential for the embodiment and exhibition of 
thought. Even if reasoning can take place in the inner consciousness of 
man without the use of any signs, which is doubtful, at any rate it can-
not become the subject of discussion until by some system of material 
signs it is manifested to other persons. The logician then uses words and 
symbols as instruments of reasoning, and leaves the nature and peculi-
arities of language to the grammarian. But signs again must correspond 
to the thoughts and things expressed, in order that they shall serve their 
intended purpose. We may therefore say that logic treats ultimately of 
thoughts and things, and immediately of the signs which stand for them. 
Signs, thoughts, and exterior objects may be regarded as parallel and 
analogous series of phenomena, and to treat any one of the three series 
is equivalent to treating either of the other series (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
8-9). 
 
The passage is dense and complex. It recalls Aristotle’s famous paragraph 
from the De Interpretatione, where the Stagirite argued as follows: 
 
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words 
are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same 
writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental ex-
periences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also 
are those things of which our experiences are the images (Aristotle, 
1928, Vol. I, 60 [16 a, 4-12]). 
 
It is not unlikely that Jevons knew Aristotle’s passage. As we shall see, the 
similarities are remarkable. As for Jevons’s argumentation, some observations 
are due. First of all, Jevons was evidently willing to put the problem aside as 
soon as possible. As Margaret Schabas has argued, he was not inclined to med-
dle into philosophical intricacies (Schabas, 1990, 55)92. This did not mean that 
he didn’t acknowledge the problem at all. In his mind, the logician and the 
mathematician were concerned with things. Consequently they did not treat 
 
92 Margaret Schabas has rightly argued that this was the case of Jevons’s allegiance to 
empiricist positions. Thus she held that “Jevons, like Herschel, was first and foremost 
the practical scientist with little patience for philosophical problems that might impede 




symbols per se, but only in order to handle the objects of the world. However, 
symbols were not all the same. The mathematical symbols for example were 
particularly fit for treating quantities. Hence their suitability for political econ-
omy, whose matters had a quantitative nature (Jevons, 1871, 3-4). The symbols 
were tools, and as such each was suited for a different task. 
The logician used the signs as instruments for constructing inferences. 
Here Jevons wondered if signs were not involved in thinking too. Nevertheless 
Jevons seemed to have dismissed this question in the course of the Principles. 
Moreover this idea wouldn’t be consistent with Jevons’s empiricist theoretical 
framework. From such a point of view, perceptive knowledge was certain and 
required no mediation. As Jevons held, 
 
if I see blue sky, I may be quite sure that I do experience the sensation 
of blueness. Whatever I do feel, I do feel beyond all doubt. We are in-
deed very likely to confuse what we really feel with what we are in-
clined to associate with it, or infer inductively from it; by the whole of 
our consciousness, as far as it is the result of pure intuition and free 
from inference, is certain knowledge beyond all doubt (Jevons, [1874] 
1877, 236). 
 
In Jevons’s mind perceptive knowledge was certain as long as it concerned the 
inner conscience. He believed, as Aristotle did, that everyone had the same 
mental impressions of things. Once it had to enter an inference though, being 
expressed in signs, differences, and thus confusion and error, arose. Jevons 
clearly stated that in his view “all knowledge proceeds originally from experi-
ence”, so that our mental impressions were the material with which scientific 
knowledge was built (see Jevons, [1874] 1877, 339). 
Jevons’s empiricist beliefs seemed to guarantee that we had an immediate 
connection with things. However, we could only treat things through signs. As 
Jevons argued, thoughts required the materiality of signs. Without language the 
reasoning process couldn’t access the interpersonal dimension of knowledge. 
Consequently, in the passage already quoted Jevons held that there must be a 
correspondence of some kind between our language and the world, as well as 




ence the words would have been inadequate with respect to things. But Jevons 
stated that the three series were analogous: we could equivalently treat any of 
them. Oddly enough though, we could never manifest thoughts or say things 
directly. So, the only series that we could actually treat was the one of signs. 
Evidently this didn’t prevent us from speaking of objects. It only implied that 
what we could say was influenced by the nature of the signs we used. 
What was the nature of those signs? As argued above, in Jevons’s eyes the 
universe was infinite. Human knowledge was limited. Therefore, it wasn’t sur-
prising that this finiteness pertained our signs as well. Indeed, as Jevons wrote, 
“there is no branch of science in which our symbols can cope with the com-
plexity of Nature” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 216). We couldn’t but see nature as in 
a mirror. We should add, however, that we also see it in the form of an enigma. 
According to Paul’s verse, not only did we see nature as in a mirror, but also 
‘en ainigmati’. The Greek word ‘ainigma’ could be translated as ‘enigma’, 
‘puzzle’, as well as ‘allusion’ or ‘symbol’. Paul’s sentence suggested that the 
world displayed allusive symbols, which had to be interpreted. In the same 
way, in Jevons’s mind the signs didn’t completely catch the denoted things. 
They were allusions. 
The allusive nature of signs was connected to the probabilistic character of 
knowledge. Speaking of the mathematical symbols, he wrote thus as follows: 
 
In truth men never can solve problems fulfilling the complex circum-
stances of nature. All laws and explanations are in a certain sense hypo-
thetical, and apply exactly to nothing which we can know to exist. In 
place of the actual objects which we see and feel, the mathematician in-
variably substitutes imaginary objects only partially resembling those 
represented, but so devised that the discrepancies may not be of an 
amount to alter seriously the character of the solution (Jevons, [1874] 
1877, 458). 
 
Jevons did believe that thoughts could grasp the object. However, once the 
thought had to be translated in some signs of any sort – mathematical or stricto 
sensu linguistic as they may be –, the object started to drift apart. Again, not 




we could never be certain of our statements, which were nothing more than 
probable. 
Words and things had therefore at once a relation of distance and proximi-
ty. They were distant from the things, because they were not the things them-
selves. And yet they were close to them, insomuch as they could stand for them 
in the intersubjective exchange of information. Jevons briefly treated this sub-
ject matter in the Principles: 
 
There is no identity of nature between a word and the thing it signifies; 
the substance iron is a heavy solid, the word iron is either a momentary 
disturbance of the air, or a film of black pigment on white paper; but 
there is analogy between words and their significates. […] The whole 
structure of language and the whole utility of signs, marks, symbols, 
pictures, and representations of various kinds, rests upon analogy (Jev-
ons, [1874] 1877, 628). 
 
The Kabbalists had argued that the universe had been written by God in the let-
ters of the Hebraic alphabet. On the contrary, for Jevons these possibilities 
were gone, never to come back. The first constituents of reality were to be told 
in human words. Were they the Kabbalist’s Sephiroths, the elements from 
which nature had been composed, or Llull’s divine Dignities, they were made 
accessible by our language. In Jevons’s account, the ontology was deprived of 
this semantic intension. As we shall see, language had a different task. If there 
were some fundamental constituents of reality, their intension changed consid-
erably. 
Nonetheless, names had something in common with things. They were 
similar to them. In fact Jevons stated that the analogies took roots in some sort 
of similarity or resemblance (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 628)93. Such a resemblance 
was the condition of possibility for using language. As Jevons wrote, 
 
the use of words constantly involves analogies of a subtle kind; we 
should often be at a loss how to describe a notion, were we not at liber-
 
93 Here we read: “A cursory examination of the way in which we popularly use the 




ty to employ in a metaphorical sense the name of anything sufficiently 
resembling it (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 628). 
 
Language had to rely upon analogies. Furthermore, analogy had a primary im-
portance in Jevons’s thought. The principle of the substitution of the similars 
depended on it, since for substituting two terms we have to imply that they are 
similar enough to each other (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 17). So, analogy owed its 
importance to the nature of language. As we have read, for Jevons there was no 
identity of nature between words and things. Thus, all we could do was to con-
nect things and words by analogies, highlighting their resemblance. 
The problem of the relation between words and things was very ancient, 
going back to Plato’s Cratylus. However, Jevons’s issues concerning this link 
were very familiar to English philosophical tradition. Francis Bacon had devot-
ed considerable attention to it, his considerations being very influential on sub-
sequent thinkers. This subject matter was involved in the discussion of the so-
called idola fori, or the idols of the marketplace. 
Jevons was well acquainted with this Baconian doctrine: among his manu-
scripts in the John Rylands Library there still are some notes of a lesson he at-
tended, concerning this topic (Jevons’s archive: Jevons’s Family Papers, 
6A/5/27 [15 pp.]). Those idols were in Bacon’s opinion “the most troublesome 
of all” and they had crept “into the human understanding through the alliance 
of words and names” (Bacon, [1620] 1857-1874, Vol. I, second part, LIX, 261-
262). In this passage Bacon explained that the words were influenced by the 
understanding. Though, as the common understanding was very poor, the 
words were shaped according to a vulgar way of thinking. Those words were 
thus unable to collect the essential characters of the things, focusing on wrong 
or inessential features. The words could also lose all contact with reality, be-
coming mischievous signs pointed at nothing (Bacon, [1620] 1857-1874, Vol. 
I, second part, LX, 262-263). Moreover, those were the words which we had to 
use in any case. Hence the words became obstacles. They hindered the process 




the vulgar sense crystallized in them (Bacon, [1620] 1857-1874, Vol. I, second 
part, LIX, 262). 
Bacon’s awareness of the intricacies embedded in his language prompted 
his interest in other linguistical systems. He spoke of Chinese ideograms as fol-
lows: “it is the use of China, and the kingdoms of the high Levant, to write in 
Characters Real, which express neither letters nor words in gross, but Things 
or Notions” (Bacon, [1605] 1857-1874, Vol. III, 399, emphasis added). Chi-
nese writing reduced the distance between language and reality. As such, the 
ideograms were real characters. Those characters were in fact “radical words” 
(Bacon, [1605] 1857-1874, Vol. III, 400): an “atomistic unit of meaning” 
(Singer, 1989, 6). The Chinese ideograms could touch these fundamental units 
of sense, because they referred to notions directly. They dispended with the in-
termediary of letters. Though, these signs had no similarity with the things de-
noted. They simply attached to the notions directly but didn’t depict them. 
In this regard they differed from the hieroglyphs, which had a congruity or 
similarity with the things represented. As we read in The Advancement of 
Learning (1605): 
 
As to Hieroglyphics, (things of ancient use, and embraced chiefly by 
Aegyptians, one of the most ancient nations), they are but as continued 
impresses and emblems. And as for Gestures, they are transitory Hiero-
glyphics, and are to Hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words writ-
ten, in that they abide not; but they have evermore, as well as the other, 
an affinity with the things signified (Bacon, [1605] 1857-1874, Vol. III, 
400). 
 
Hieroglyphs depicted things because they were themselves depictions. Moreo-
ver, hieroglyphs had a gestural nature in Bacon’s eyes: they were fixed ges-
tures. Gestures were natural reactions. Therefore the hieroglyphs displayed a 
much higher proximity to reality than any other language. 
Bacon’s treatment of real characters and hieroglyphs had a high appeal in 




things themselves started to attract several authors94. As Paolo Rossi has re-
markably illustrated, its attractiveness was triggered by certain historical condi-
tions. The impact of Comenius’s work, due to his recent visit in England, com-
bined with influence of the Baconian circles in the Royal Society. Furthermore, 
in the English context these developments were wedded to the progress of 
physical and mathematical sciences, which required a new language for new 
branches of knowledge (see Rossi, 1960, 203). 
As I have stated above, Jevons was acquainted with Bacon’s notion of ido-
la fori. We could hear a Baconian echo when Jevons spoke of the distance be-
tween things and words, or of the impossibility of exhausting the object’s na-
ture through words. Yet his knowledge of the debate might had been more ex-
tended. He probably knew the seventeenth century discussion concerning the 
real characters and Bacon’s linguistics. He was certainly acquainted with John 
Wilkins’s work, as he noted it in his “Book of References”. It is a ponderous 
notebook, still stored in the John Rylands Library’s archive, containing the ref-
erences to several books Jevons found worthy of reading. The book mentioned 
was the Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language and it 
was attached to the voice “language” (Jevons’s archive: Jevons’s Family Pa-
pers, 6A/6/4/13, The Book of References). Jevons added that it was a remarka-
ble piece of work. 
As for Wilkins, he shared the Baconian “distrust of language”95. He pri-
marily aimed at outlining a “Real universal Character, that should signify not 
words, but things and notions, and consequently might be legible by any Na-
tion in their own Tongue” (Wilkins, 1668, part I, 13, [III, 5]). Wilkins admit-
ted, showing a considerable similarity to Jevons’s account, that people general-
ly shared the same internal notions or apprehensions of things. Unless that they 
had many conventional names related to these internal notions. Therefore, the 
 
94 For an extensive treatment of artificial languages, in relation to Bacon’s linguistic 
problematic, see Formigari, 1970. 
95 The expression, very famous indeed, was Richard Foster Jones’s formulation; see 




curse in the confusion of tongues could only be broken by establishing a biuni-
vocal correspondence between the notion and its expression. Wilkins wanted to 
create thus a new, artificial language: simple, useful, and, more importantly, 
truly representing the essence of things. Due to its own qualities, such a philo-
sophical language would have spread spontaneously (see Wilkins, 1668, part I, 
20, [V, 2]). 
Introducing his Essay, in the “Epistle to the Reader”, Wilkins explained 
his own past mistake in this regard. He considered the Hebrew as a suitable ba-
sis for such a universal language, as it consisted of few radicals. For him it had 
therefore seemed the best possible choice in order to express the Baconian 
“radical words”. Thus Wilkins held that every design of a universal language 
so far attempted, including his own, was mistaken in its foundations. They all 
started from existing languages, while a true philosophical language had to ac-
count for the nature of things. Accordingly, they ought to start from things 
themselves. This idea was mirrored in the tables that Wilkins had started to re-
dact before writing the Essay (see Wilkins, “Epistle to the Reader”). The suc-
cess of a universal character depended in fact on this imposing classificatory 
endeavour: the “just Enumeration or description of such things or notions as 
are to have Marks or Names assigned to them” (Wilkins, 1668, part I, 20, [V, 
3]). 
This encyclopaedic effort, which is reminiscent of Bacon’s tables, had to 
provide the material for the universal character. In the wake of this classifica-
tion, Wilkins’s language associated some syllables to the genuses. The species 
would then be specified, according to their ontological differences, with the 
addition of a consonant. Thus, this artificial language showed a combinatorial 
nature: adding the appropriate differences, Wilkins composed the words start-
ing from their supposed essential elements (Wilkins, 1668, 414-420, part IV 
[III]). The combinatorial process, which recalled Llull’s ars magna, would 
have produced the new words of the philosophical language. 
Now, what did Wilkins and Jevons have in common? What could have 
aroused Jevons’s interest in Wilkins’s work? Their connection primarily con-




to get rid of natural languages. They were ambiguous, obscure, ill-suited to the 
scientific research. For his part, Jevons thought that logic had to correct the 
common mistakes of ordinary language. For him as well the everyday language 
was mischievous (see Jevons, 1890, 148)96. Given this mistrust, it is not sur-
prising that Jevons could have appreciated Wilkins’s project. And yet Jevons 
envisaged a different solution for the same problem. Jevons didn’t believe that 
the solution to the faults of ordinary  language was to create an artificial idiom. 
His ars combinatoria was a structure, a syntax. On the contrary, Wilkins’s arti-
ficial language had to create a syntax as well as a semantics. Furthermore, the 
rules of Jevons’s syntax come from elsewhere. If Wilkins founded his language 
on the classification of reality, Jevons trusted the laws of thought and the theo-
ry of probability. 
On the other hand, Jevons’s logic and Wilkins’s philosophical language 
had in common the arbitrary character of signs. Wilkins’s philosophical lan-
guage even associated conventional syllables and letters to the genuses and 
species denoted. However, Wilkins was persuaded that his language had to 
catch the primary elements of reality. His new words demanded a connection 
with the constituents of reality for the project to have any value. Jevons’s logic 
did associate arbitrary letters to denote the terms. However, Jevons had no pre-
tention to grasping the radical words, the basic units of meaning composing re-
ality. His depiction of reality depended on its relational aspect. The Logical 
Machine represented the combinations of the terms given the laws of thought 
and the logical principles. But the terms involved in this calculation weren’t the 
primary constituents of reality at all. 
In Jevons’s opinion, symbols were imperfect tools. Consequently, we 
couldn’t see the world but en ainigmati. Even admitting that the signs could 
grasp the real objects of the world, Jevons’s interest was elsewhere. He wanted 
to depict the relations of phenomena, the concatenations of events. The constit-
uents of reality were not some real elements from which the world had origi-
 
96  Here Jevons explained that the use of letters in the place of terms could provide 




nated. Those primary elements were the laws of nature and of thought, namely 
the principles of combinations. Hence the syntactic character of his ars combi-
natoria. Let us then link Jevons with a philosopher who had bent the rules of 
ars combinatoria in a similar direction, i.e. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. 
 
A syntax of combinations 
 
The dream of realizing an ars combinatoria was a long-lasting one for Leibniz. 
The project of a characteristica universalis, a universal language, engaged him 
throughout his life, undergoing different phases and theoretical changes. He 
was acquainted with the English treatises concerning a real character, from 
which he probably drew the term ‘characteristica’. However, he nurtured this 
interest independently of them, from his youth97. Indeed his very first work was 
a Dissertatio de arte combinatoria (Leibniz, 1875-1890, Vol. IV, 27-102), 
which he presented in 1666 to get a teaching position in the university of Leip-
zig 98. In his mind this art was revolutionary. It was meant to cast a new light 
on the two traditional branches of logic, as illustrated by Porphyry and then 
Boethius: the ars inveniendi and the ars demonstrandi (Leibniz, 1966, XII). 
Here Leibniz wrote as follows: 
 
Since everything which exists or which can be thought must be com-
pounded of parts, either real or at least conceptual, whatever differs in 
kind must necessarily either differ in that it has other parts, hence the 
use of complexions; or by another situs, hence the use of dispositions. 
The former are judged by the diversity of matter; the latter, by the di-
versity of form. With the aid of complexions, indeed, we may discover 
not only the species of things but also their attributes. Thus almost the 
whole of the inventive part of logic is grounded in complexions – both 
that which concerns simple terms and that which concerns complex 
terms; in a word, both the doctrine of divisions and the doctrine of 
propositions; not to mention how much we hope to illumine the analyt-
 
97 Concerning Leibniz’s knowledge of the search for a universal language in the Eng-
lish philosophy see Maat, 2004. 
98 See Parkinson’s introduction to his translation of some of Leibniz’s logical writings 




ic part of logic, or the logic of judgment, by a diligent examination of 
the modes of the syllogism (Leibniz, [1956] 1989, 80-81). 
 
Leibniz argued that everything was composed of parts. Therefore, there were 
two ways in which things were distinct from each other: either they were com-
posed by different parts, or the parts were the same but had a different order. In 
the first case the objects could be compared by using the theory of combina-
tions, which Leibniz called complexions. In the second case, we had to rely on 
the permutations, which here are called dispositions. 
Now, Leibniz’s ars combinatoria owed its relevance to an ontological 
quality, namely the fact that everything was composed of parts. Every logical 
procedure thus relied on the possibility of defining those parts: “in order to de-
termine a certain complexion, however, the greater whole is to be divided into 
equal parts assumed as minima (that is, parts now not to be considered as fur-
ther divisible)” (Leibniz, [1956] 1989, 78). These were the atomic components 
of a complexion. Accordingly, Leibniz defined a complexion composed of two 
prime terms a “com2nation”, whereas one composed of three was a 
“com3nation” and so on (Leibniz, [1956] 1989, 78). 
Leibniz returned to this idea some years later, in a text written in 1679. In 
these pages, whose title was Elementa characteristicae universalis (Leibniz, 
1903, 42-92), Leibniz argued that every term could be attributed a numerus 
characteristicus (a “symbolic number”99), according to its definition. A prime 
term was denoted by a single number, whereas a complexion’s number resulted 
from the multiplication of its components’ numbers. For instance, the term 
‘man’ was defined by the concepts of animal and that of rationality: it was 
therefore a “com2nation”, in De arte combinatoria’s words. Attributing the 
number 2 to ‘animal’ and the number 3 to ‘rational’, the numerus characteris-
ticus of ‘man’ turned out to be 6 (2 x 3). There was a simple method then to de-
termine if a proposition was true or false. We had to divide the symbolic num-
ber of the subject by the one of the predicate (Leibniz, 1903, 42-43). If the re-
sult was a whole number, the proposition would be true. These were some ex-
 




amples of Leibniz’s famous characteristica, a symbolic language that acted 
like a calculus of terms100. 
In these texts Leibniz seemed to suggest that we could find those prime in-
divisible elements or concepts, which he later called “primitives”. The primi-
tives were indeed those “indefinable concepts”, concepts that were the mark of 
themselves only. As such, they were “irreducible and to be understood only 
through itself and therefore lacks requisite marks” (Leibniz, [1956] 1989, 292). 
Was this really the case though? Could we grasp the primitives? This point was 
a very controversial one. In De arte combinatoria he did suggest that without a 
definition of those atomic parts the art could never function. Moreover, in De 
organo sive arte magna cogitandi, in 1679, he held that “it is the greatest rem-
edy for the mind if a few thoughts can be found from which infinite others 
arise in order” (Leibniz, [1934] 1997, 1)101. 
Could those few prime thoughts be found eventually? Let us look at this 
task in the light of the Monadology, the most famous of Leibniz’s metaphysical 
texts. Here (§61) he addressed the notion of compound, which is notably relat-
ed to the ars combinatoria’s project: 
 
Compound beings are in symbolic agreement with the simple. For eve-
rything is a plenum, so that all matter is bound together, and every mo-
tion in this plenum has some effect upon distant bodies in proportion to 
their distance, in such a way that every body not only is affected by 
those which touch it and somehow feels whatever happens to them but 
is also, by means of them, sensitive to others which adjoin those by 
which it is immediately touched. It follows that this communication ex-
tends to any distance whatever. As a result, every body responds to eve-
rything which happens in the universe, so that he who sees all could 
read in each everything that happens everywhere, and, indeed, even 
 
100 The word ‘character’ was for Leibniz a synonym of ‘symbol’; see Leibniz, 1875-
1890, Vol. VII, 31, where we read: “Omnis Ratiocinatio nostra nihil aliud est quam 
characterum connexio et substitutio, sive illi characteres sint verba sive notae, sive 
denique imagines”; see also Leibniz, 1875-1890, Vol. VII, 131, where ‘character’ is a 
synonym of ‘sign’. 
101 The text was first published in Couturat’s edition; see Leibniz, 1903, 429-432. For 




what has happened and will happen, observing in the present all that is 
removed from it, whether in space or in time. “All things are con-
spirant”, as Hippocrates said. But a soul can read within itself only what 
it represents distinctly; it cannot all at once develop all that is enfolded 
within it, for this reaches to infinity (Leibniz, [1956] 1989, 649). 
 
The whole universe was in each monad. The world as Leibniz saw it was ka-
leidoscopic: an endless game of mirrors, where every part referred to all the 
others. 
The analysis of such a passage raises a crucial question related to the ars 
combinatoria: how could we find the primal elements of reality? Once admit-
ted that everything was in connection with everything else, such a task was 
doomed to failure. The compounds and the simple things were constantly refer-
ring to each other. Every single act reverberated in every part of the universe, 
in an infinite warp and weft of relations. The same thought was also formulated 
in a short but extremely relevant text, i.e. Primae Veritates (Leibniz, 1903, 
518-523). As Leibniz argued here, “there are no atoms; indeed, there is no 
body so small that it is not actually subdivided. […] Hence it follows that every 
small part of the universe contains a world with an infinite number of crea-
tures” (Leibniz, [1956] 1989, 269-270). Eventually, finding the fundamental 
constituents of reality was not only impossible, but also absurd. Everything 
was in everything else. There was no such thing as a prime element. 
What kind of consequences did this thought have on the ars combinatoria? 
At first we could be tempted to assume that in this framework no such art 
would ever be possible. Nevertheless, this wasn’t the end of Leibniz’s dream. 
He recalled the steps of his characteristica in a text entitled Historia et com-
mendatio linguae characteristicae (Leibniz, 1875-1890, Vol. VII, 184-189). 
Through these pages Leibniz evoked at once the origins and the future hopes of 
his own art. Its roots were as old as Pythagoras, according to whom the num-
bers were the core of reality. This endeavour was then, in Leibniz’s eyes, an at-
tempt of redacting an alphabet of human thoughts. These primitive thoughts 




Combining the letters of this alphabet and analysing the compound terms, one 
would have been able to judge and discover everything. 
This was indeed the project that Leibniz had described in his De arte com-
binatoria. However, when he wrote the Historia et commendatio, between 
1679 and 1680, he was still persuaded that this art was possible as well as nec-
essary. Once we had the symbolic numbers of the metaphysical and moral no-
tions, we would have a new, marvellous reasoning instrument. Leibniz even 
argued that this instrument would enable us to weigh the pros and cons of a de-
cision, making his calculus very similar to the utilitarian calculus of pleasures 
and pains. The characteristica would also be a tool for comparing the different 
positions in a dispute. We could measure our arguments, thus avoiding many 
harsh controversies. Lastly, this ars would clear the way for religious conver-
sion, since it would prove the soundness of true religion with impeccable 
demonstrations. Leibniz showed thus that his interest was political: like Llull’s 
ars magna, the characteristica ought to be an instrument for bringing everyone 
together in a reconciled Christianity102. 
However, Leibniz knew that his task depended on the identification of the 
prime elements. He was also aware that this project could be inconsistent with 
metaphysical beliefs. He therefore addressed this topic in the final passage of 
the Historia and commendatio, writing as follows: 
 
But we must go beyond words. It is difficult to establish the symbolic 
numbers of those few things which are different from any other, be-
cause of the things’ marvellous intertwinement. Therefore I believed 
that I contrived an elegant device, by the means of which it is possible 
to demonstrate that all reasoning can be proved by numbers. I behave as 
if such remarkable symbolic numbers were already given. Then, taking 
into account a certain general quality of their own, I assume in the 
meanwhile some other numbers, which are consistent with this quality. 
Using them, I prove all the logical rules in a remarkable order, and I 
show how to estimate if some argumentations are formally valid. Then 
we could easily and veritably determine if the argumentations are truly 
valid and conclusive with respect to their subject matter, without any 
 
102 Josep E. Rubio highlighted how conversion was the real purpose of Llull’s art: see 




intellectual effort or risk of error, only once we had the real symbolic 
numbers of things (Leibniz, 1875-1890, Vol. VII, 189, my transla-
tion)103. 
 
The relevance of this passage for our topic could hardly been underestimated. 
Here Leibniz showed how to avoid the problem of identifying the primitives. 
One could make as if there were some, postulating the symbolic numbers of 
things and developing the reasoning accordingly. 
I translated the verb ‘fingo’ with ‘behave as if’ to highlight the hypothet-
ical nature of Leibniz’s ‘elegant device’. Rossella Fabbrichesi, professor of 
Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Milan, suggested that Leibniz’s 
philosophy could be considered as centred on the ‘as if’ (Fabbrichesi, 2000, 
93). Leibniz encouraged the use of quantities of complexions as if they were 
the actual symbolic numbers. He invited us to consider the primal elements as 
if they were the primitive constituents of thought and reality. In Leibniz’s opin-
ion the destiny of his ars combinatoria depended on the soundness of our 
knowledge. In this regard he agreed with Wilkins. Though for Leibniz we must 
not expect to have completed the encyclopaedia before using the calculus. 
Meanwhile, we could use it in this hypothetical way, since it would be a pre-
cious tool in arguments and discussions. “Car alors raisonner et calculer sera 
 
103 I transcribe here the original latin: “Sed ultra verba eundum est. Cum vero ob admi-
rabilem rerum connexionem paucarum rerum ab aliis diversarum Numeros character-
isticos dare difficillimum sit, ideo elegans ni fallor artificium excogitavi, quo ostendi 
possit, quod ratiocinationes per numeros comprobare liceat. Fingo itaque Numeros 
characteristicos illos, tantopere mirabiles, jam dari, observataque illorum generali 
proprietate quadam, tales numeros qualescunque ei proprietati congruentes interim 
assumo, iisque adhibitis statim mirabili ratione omnes regulas Logicas per numeros 
demonstro et ostendo, quomodo cognosci possit an argumentationes quaedam sint in 
forma bonae. An vero argumenta vi materiae bona sint aut concludant, tum demum 
sine ullo labore animi aut errandi periculo judicari poterit, cum ipsi veri Numeri Cha-




la même chose” (Leibniz, 1903, 28)104, as he wrote commenting on Descartes’s 
letter to Mersenne105. 
It was a fruitful make-believe. Moreover, it was a necessary make-believe, 
in the absence of which we couldn’t utter a word. Indeed, both Jevons and 
Leibniz thought that everything required the signs to be expressed. Every hu-
man exchange, every reasoning process, every scientific enterprise demanded 
the signs. On this topic Leibniz was even more positive than Jevons. In De 
cognitione, veritate et idea Leibniz explained the functioning of signs, giving 
us a glimpse of their power: 
 
For the most part, especially in a longer analysis, we do not intuit the 
entire nature of the subject matter at once but make use of signs instead 
of things, though we usually omit the explanation of these signs in any 
actually present thought for the sake of brevity, knowing or believing 
that we have the power to do it. Thus when I think of a chiliogon, or a 
polygon of a thousand equal sides, I do not always consider the nature 
of a side and of equality and of a thousand (or the cube of ten), but I use 
these words, whose meaning appears obscurely and imperfectly to the 
mind, in place of the ideas which I have of them, because I remember 
that I know the meaning of the words but that their interpretation is not 
necessary for the present judgment. Such thinking I usually call blind or 
symbolic; we use it in algebra and in arithmetic, and indeed almost eve-
rywhere. When a concept is very complex, we certainly cannot think 
simultaneously of all the concepts which compose it. But when this is 
possible, or at least insofar as it is possible, I call the knowledge intui-
tive. There is no other knowledge than intuitive of a distinct primitive 
 
104 “Because then reasoning and calculating shall be the same thing” (my translation); 
G. W. Leibniz, 1903, 28. 
105 As all the argumentation I developed here is drawn from Leibniz’s commentary on 
this letter, I quote the entire passage: “Cependant quoyque cette langue depende de la 
vraye philosophie, elle ne depend pas de sa perfection. C’est à dire cette langue peut 
estre établie, quoyque la philosophie ne soit pas parfaite: et à mesure que la science 
des hommes croistra, cette langue croistra aussi. En attendant elle sera d’un secours 
merveilleux et pour se servir de ce que nous sçavons, et pour voir ce qui nous manque, 
et pour inventer les moyens d’y arriver, mais sur tout pour exterminer les controverses 
dans les matières qui dependent du raisonnement. Car alors raisonner et calculer sera 




concept, while for the most part we have only symbolic thought of 
composites (Leibniz, [1956] 1989, 292). 
 
As Leibniz held, the knowledge of a primitive notion could only be intui-
tive. Nevertheless we rarely get this sort of understanding. Mostly we think and 
reason through signs. And only thanks to signs could we start thinking, reason-
ing. Thanks to signs, we can fashion a chain of argumentation even though we 
don’t have a clear intuition of every notion included in the reasoning process. 
Just like we do in a geometrical demonstration. Therefore, the core of Leibniz’s 
ars combinatoria turned out to be its syntactic nature. Notwithstanding our ig-
norance of the primitives, the reasoning chain of signs was able to work any-
way. The guarantee of its truth wasn’t the correspondence between signs and 
the first constituents of reality: it was its inner structure. That was why Leibniz 
compared this mechanism with algebra. Thus we understand that for him the 
mathesis universalis was something more than a struggle to measure every-
thing. His art was akin to algebra not only because it attached numbers to 
things, but also – and more importantly – because it had the same functioning. 
Algebra was a blind thinking, as well as his ars combinatoria, meaning that we 
were not bound to define the elements in use at every turn of the process. Even-
tually its course would drag us to a new conclusion, a deduction, or a discovery 
– being an example of ars inveniendi. This chain didn’t rely on the meaning of 
each element, but rather on their connections. 
Now, among all the projects of an ars combinatoria, Leibniz’s one was the 
most akin to Jevons’s. As I have argued above, Jevons’s Logical Alphabet rep-
resented the world’s structure. As such, the terms he used had nothing in com-
mon with the things denoted. At every turn we drew the Alphabet, the content 
of the terms could change. What persisted was their order, or their syntax. The 
similarity with Leibniz is stunning indeed. Both Leibniz and Jevons had lost 
the faith in the possibilities of immediately grasping the primitives, the constit-
uents of reality. Furthermore, the primitives changed from Leibniz to Jevons. If 
for the first they were the primal concepts of intellect, for the latter the constit-




As I have shown, the Alphabet sprung from the laws of thought and logic. 
Moreover, the actual combinations of phenomena were regulated by the laws 
of nature. These laws, governing at once the phenomena and our ways of de-
picting them, were the prime elements of reality. They were the secret keys that 
God had hidden in the world, according to Jevons’s reinterpretation of the clav-
is universalis. For Jevons one didn’t have to identify the complexions’ atoms, 
in Leibniz’s terms. The key for deciphering reality was understanding the laws 
of combinations, namely the natural laws. 
Jevons and Leibniz disagreed concerning the nature of signs as well. Jev-
ons, due to his empiricist account, nurtured a nostalgia for things. To him the 
signs were defective, dimly alluding to things themselves. Leibniz’s position 
was different. In a letter to his friend Tschirnhaus, where he was concerned 
with distinguishing the algebra and his art, he wrote that 
 
no one should fear that the contemplation of characters will lead us 
away from the things themselves; on the contrary, it leads us into the in-
terior of things. For we often have confused notions today because the 
characters we use are badly arranged; but then, with the aid of charac-
ters, we will easily have the most distinct notions, for we will have at 
hand a mechanical thread of meditation, as it were, with whose aid we 
can very easily resolve any idea whatever into those of which it is com-
posed. In fact, if the character expressing any concept is considered at-
tentively, the simpler concepts into which it is resolvable will at once 
come to mind. Since the analysis of concepts thus corresponds exactly 
to the analysis of a character, we need merely to see the characters in 
order to have adequate notions brought to our mind freely and without 
effort. We can hope for no greater aid than this in the perfection of the 
mind (Leibniz, [1956] 1989, 193). 
 
After all, we had nothing but signs. Jevons intuited this possibility when he 
said that the signs were always needed to express thoughts. He did not draw the 
consequences of it though, as Leibniz did in this passage.  
 Jevons and Leibniz had similar positions from some points of view. For 
instance, they both shared a belief that the reasoning process was a mechanical 
one. Once the machine had started, its functioning didn’t depend on human 
mind. Jevons explained it remarkably when he argued that the laws of thought 




regarding the problem of correspondence between signs and the things. In final 
part of the passage quoted from the Historia et commendatio, Leibniz seemed 
to suggest that the conclusiveness of reasoning eventually rested on the discov-
ery of the real numeric characters. Nevertheless, all the passages analysed hint-
ed at a different position. The blind thought was able to work autonomously, 
since it was also an ars inveniendi. Even admitting that we could never have 
any idea of the primitives, Leibniz’s ars would still retain its value. In Leib-
niz’s construction truth eventually moved apart from the correspondence be-
tween signs and things, as Fabbrichesi has noted (Fabbrichesi, 2000, 94). 
By contrast, Jevons’s logic was no ars inveniendi. He stated that deduction 
only unfolded some knowledge we already had (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 118). In 
Jevons’s eyes, knowledge ultimately came from experience (Jevons, [1874] 
1877, 12). But experience couldn’t access the interpersonal level of knowledge 
without signs. Humans required language. Hence Jevons’s account brings to 
mind Dante’s De vulgari eloquentia (1302-1305), according to which 
 
of all creatures that exist, only human beings were given the power of 
speech, because only to them was it necessary. It was not necessary that 
either angels or the lower animals should be able to speak; rather, this 
power would have been wasted on them, and nature, of course, hates to 
do anything superfluous. Now, if we wish to define with precision what 
our intention is when we speak, it is clearly nothing other than to ex-
pound to others the concepts formed in our minds (Alighieri, [1302-
1305] 1996, book I, [II, 1-2], 4-5). 
 
Language was meant, here as well as in Jevons’s account, to share ideas with 
others. As Dante explained in the following passage, angels didn’t require any 
idiom because their thoughts were manifest to their own kind, thanks to their 
extraordinary intellectual faculties (Alighieri, [1302-1305] 1996, book I [II, 2-
4], 4-8). Animals were guided by instinct. Their behaviours and passions were 
all the same, so that animals didn’t need words to understand each other 
(Alighieri, [1302-1305] 1996, book I [II, 4-7], 6-15). Language solely per-
tained to humans. 
This was also true from Jevons’s point of view. In his eyes as well humans 




tinguished them from animals. And still they differed from superior creatures 
because they needed signs to express themselves to others. Therefore language 
was the mark of human deficiency. Humans, as earthly creatures, were finite. 
Language was the prerogative of darkly wise beings, whose knowledge was 




HUMANS AND SOCIETY AS THEY ARE AND OUGHT TO BE 






2.1. Nineteenth century Unitarians 
 
In 1836 a Liverpool minister, still young but destined to gain notoriety, 
conducted an inquiry concerning authority in religious matters. In this work, he 
launched an attack on the Unitarians, whose cold faith was in his mind unap-
pealing: 
 
The Unitarian takes with him the persuasion that nothing can be scrip-
tural which is not rational and universal, and he finds a preceptive sys-
tem, in which local and circumstantial beauties are frittered into cold 
ethical generalities, and a doctrinal theory, in which burning oriental-
isms are turned into pale and sickly truisms (Martineau, [1836] 1845, 
60). 
 
At a first sight we could be inclined to think such an attack came from an 
Evangelical, who were known for their scepticism with regard to Unitarian po-
sitions. We couldn’t be further from the truth: it is James Martineau, probably 
the most famous among nineteenth century Unitarians. 
Given that the Unitarian creed underwent significant change during the 
Victorian age, Martineau’s attack would be understandable1. Some of his ad-
 
1 Concerning the rift between the two groups within the Unitarianism, one endorsing 
reform and the other wanting to conserve the organization and doctrinal core, see: 
Wilbur, 1945, 367-368 and 372; Webb, 1990, 126-149; Greenwood, Harris 2011, 49; 
Ledger-Lomas, 2017, Vol. III, 99-123 and 102-103. 
109 
 
herents rejected the iconic personalities of Unitarianism, like Joseph Priestley. 
They also refused the precepts of utilitarian philosophy, which had long been 
linked to Unitarianism. They were even loath to call themselves ‘Unitarians’, 
believing that this name was too strong a reference to a sectarian attitude. They 
had to abandon such a denomination if they wanted to gain more respect from 
Anglicans and other Dissenters2. The leader of the so-called reformists was 
James Martineau himself, together with his colleagues in Liverpool, John Ham-
ilton Thom and John James Tayler. A strong influence on this group came from 
the other side of the ocean, from the famous American minister, William Ellery 
Channing. Arthur Boggs, professor of English at Portland State College, Ore-
gon, has argued in the Transactions of the Unitarian Historical Society that 
very few ministers followed Martineau (Boggs, 1966, 149, n. 34). While it may 
have been a small group, it was a highly influential one due to the popularity of 
its members. 
Taking into account what happened within Unitarianism during the nine-
teenth century is particularly important to studying Jevons’s thought. Liverpool 
was an important centre in the initial phase of these reforms, as was Manches-
ter, once John Tayler and James Martineau began teaching at Owens College 
(see Waller, 1986, 235). Jevons was also personally acquainted with some of 
the reformists, firstly with James Martineau, both because of his family rela-
tions3 and because Jevons attended Martineau’s lectures on mental philosophy 
at Manchester New College, in London (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 421). As 
noted above, few scholars have focused on the influence of Unitarianism on 
 
2 On the name ‘Unitarian’, which James Martineau was willing to relinquish, see: 
Webb, 1988, 146. Martineau’s distastes of the name ‘Unitarian’ was also apparent in 
his project of founding a Church detached from doctrinal and sectarian character, i.e. 
the Free Christian Union; with regard to this project, see Ledger-Lomas, 2010. 
3 The two families, both Liverpool Unitarians, were well acquainted: Jevons’s older 
sister Lucy had even been engaged to Russell Martineau, son of James Martineau, but 
she broke off the engagement; see Könekamp, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 11. Another refer-
ence to Mrs. Martineau from Herbert Jevons, Stanley’s brother, shows that the two 
families were connected: see Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 13. 
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Jevons’s thought, Bert Mosselmans the exception who proves the rule 
(Mosselmans, 2007, chap. 6). Mosselmans, however, has not taken into ac-
count the division between these two trends, that is, between those endorsing 
reform and those opposing it. Instead, I consider that this topic cannot be ne-
glected in a study of Jevons’s religious inclinations.  
The current presentation of the debate between the endorsers and oppo-
nents of reform in the Unitarian context will be mainly focused on two people: 
James Martineau and William Gaskell. Martineau was the leader of the reform-
ists, whereas Gaskell was still attached to the traditional forms of the Unitarian 
creed. Apart from the unquestionable popularity of these ministers, the choice 
of focusing on them is due to their connections with Jevons. As I have noted, 
Jevons became acquainted with Martineau through his lectures. Gaskell had 
been appointed minister at Cross Street Chapel in Manchester in 1828 (Brill, 
1984, 26). He lived in Manchester and preached there all his life: he gave his 
last sermon at Cross Street on the 13th January 1884 (Brill, 1984, 117), the 
same year of his death. As we know, Jevons was in Manchester between 1863 
and 1876. Moreover, Gaskell was Jevons’s colleague at Owens College, where 
he was a lecturer in English Literature from 1861 on (see Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. III, 94, n. 3). 
In Jevons’s correspondence we can find a reference to Gaskell. Edward 
John Broadfield, journalist and early student at Manchester College, wrote to 
Jevons as follows: “I have been continuing to act as a substitute of Mr. Gaskell 
since I saw you” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. III, 94)4. Broadfield’s way of refer-
ring to the Cross Street minister, calling him simply by his family name and 
without introducing him, suggests that Jevons was acquainted with Gaskell. 
Hence, the latter could be a fair representative of the link between Jevons and 
the positions of the opponents to Martineau. 
Together with Martineau’s and Gaskell’s, I take into account other peo-
ple’s positions. The most important among them is William Ellery Channing’s. 
I have chosen to pay some attention to Channing by virtue of his connection to 
 
4 For Edward John Broadfield, see Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. III, 70, n. 1. 
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Martineau. Furthermore, some of Channing’s lectures, such as Likeness to God 
and Self-culture, are important for our purposes. Not to mention that Jevons 
was probably acquainted with Channing’s works, as his correspondence sug-
gests5. I now describe further the gulf dividing the Unitarian Church in the Vic-
torian age. I focus in particular on the following points: the relation between 
determinism and free will, with reference to the rejection of Priestley’s deter-
minism, or what he called ‘philosophical necessity’; the criticism of Utilitarian-
ism and the morality of punishments and rewards; the preference of the reform-
ists for inner faith and the stress on religious sentiments; and the opposition be-
tween reason and sentiment. 
 
“A millstone round the neck” 
 
Unitarianism had been entwined with determinism from its very birth. Jo-
seph Priestley, one of the founding fathers of English Unitarianism, was the 
herald of philosophical determinism. Priestley was a follower of Hartley’s As-
sociationism, of which he learned while studying at Daventry Academy in the 
1750s6. As Priestley explained in The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity 
(1777), “there is some fixed law of nature respecting the will, as well as the 
other powers of the mind, and every thing else in the constitution of nature” 
(Priestley, 1777, 7). In Priestley’s account, every act was determined by a 
cause, namely a motive, being thus bound to causal laws. These laws took roots 
in the sensations of pleasure and pain: our encounter with certain objects pro-
vided us with pleasurable or painful sensations. The repetition of these actions 
created certain habits, the main purpose of which being seeking pleasure and 
avoiding pain (Priestley, 1777, 36-37)7. Choices were thus determined by the 
 
5 See Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 292, where Jevons informed his brother that he was 
reading a lecture of Channing about labour. The editors connected this reference to the 
following text: Channing, (1840) 1903, Vol. V. 
6 On the relation between Priestley and Hartley, see Webb, 1990, 127-128. 




state of mind of the subject, namely his inclination or disinclination towards 
the object considered and the views of the ditto (Priestley, 1777, 26). The af-
fections of the mind, informed by sensations of pleasure and pain, had the same 
inescapable power that gravity exercises on a stone (Priestley, 1777, 27). 
Many Unitarians discovered this doctrine in Priestley’s texts and in his fol-
lowers, the most famous of whom was Thomas Belsham (Webb, 1990, 131). 
The Warrington Dissenting Academy, where Priestley had a teaching appoint-
ment from its foundation in 1757, was an important channel for spreading of 
his doctrines (see Wilbur, 1945, 295)8. However, the allegiance to determinism 
was undermined by the reformists in the 1830s. The attack came from Marti-
neau, in the context of the so-called Liverpool Controversy. Given the influ-
ence of Unitarianism in Liverpool, in 1839 the Anglican minister Fielding Ould 
invited the Liverpool Unitarians to attend some lectures of orthodox priests 
showing the errors of Unitarian creed. Martineau and his colleagues John Ham-
ilton Thom and Henry Giles consented. It became a doctrinal battle, where the 
Anglican and Unitarian ministers publicly argued with each other9. Martineau 
gave five lectures. One of them, entitled The Christian View of Moral Evil, pre-
sented a sharp attack against the doctrine of philosophical necessity. 
Priestley thought that embracing a deterministic position was the only way 
to be consistent with the doctrine of divine prescience: as he wrote, “if man be 
possessed of a power of proper self-determination, the Deity himself cannot 
controll it […] and if he does not controll it, he cannot foresee it” (Priestley, 
1777, 21). Hence, everything was determined by God and was part of His plan. 
And thus – Martineau objected – sin, suffering and evil would be a part of 
God’s plan too. This philosophical argument was almost blasphemous in Mar-
tineau’s eyes, attributing evil things to an allegedly benevolent God (Marti-
neau, 1839a, 12 and 41). 
 
8 On Warrington Academy also see Raymond, Pickstone 1986, 130-133. 
9 On this subject matter see: Wilbur, 1945, 355; Waller, 1990, 245; 1994. The lectures 
are gathered in two volumes: Ould et alt., 1839; Giles, Martineau, Thom 1839. 
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Moreover, such a position attributed an external source to human wicked-
ness. As Martineau believed, any doctrine of this kind couldn’t but jeopardize 
the sense of individual responsibility, which in his mind was a distinguishing 
feature of Christianity (Martineau, 1839a, 34). Philosophical necessity fa-
voured the passive virtues over the active ones, discarding the sense of duty 
and obligation. Martineau feared that 
 
he who is haunted by the immutability of things, and feels himself 
locked in with, the universal mechanism, will chafe himself with no 
rash spirit of resistance, nor vainly thrust his hand against the fly-wheel 
of nature (Martineau, 1839a, 41). 
 
According to the doctrine of philosophical necessity, God was primarily the 
first cause, and the divine infinitude was worshipped more than His sanctity 
and His moral attributes (Martineau, 1839a, 44-45). To Martineau this was ut-
terly unacceptable. 
Martineau had been much influenced by Hartley and Priestley in his youth; 
an inescapable influence, given that he was educated at Manchester College, in 
York, where the Priestleyan tradition was strong10. When a minister in Liver-
pool, Martineau began to drift away from the two deterministic thinkers. In 
1833 he published three articles on Priestley in the Monthly Repository, ac-
knowledging his debt towards him as well as their differences of opinion11. As 
Ralph Waller has remarked, William Ellery Channing played a considerable 
role in Martineau’s change of allegiance (Waller, 1986, 244-245). The Ameri-
can preacher was so pleased with Martineau’s extensive criticism of determin-
ism that he wrote him to express his appreciation: 
 
The part of your discourse which gave me the sincerest delight, and for 
which I would especially thank you, is that in which you protest against 
the doctrine of philosophical necessity. Nothing for a long time has giv-
en me so much pleasure. I have felt that that doctrine, with its natural 
connections, was a millstone round the neck of Unitarianism in Eng-
land. I know no one who has so clearly and strongly pointed out as 
 
10 On Martineau’s education, see Waller, 1986, 228-232. 
11 These papers are now collected in Martineau, 1890. 
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yourself its inconsistency with moral sentiments in God, and with the 
exercise of moral sentiments towards him by his creatures (Channing, 
1880, 447). 
 
When he wrote this letter to his British colleague, Channing had already 
being publicly critical of Priestleyan determinism. And these commentaries in-
spired many ministers overseas, including Martineau, Thom and Tayler (see 
Wach, 1993, 455-456). As early as 1819, during the famous Baltimore Dis-
course, Channing made his opposition to determinism clear. Had God an irre-
sistible power over the human heart, humans would be deprived of every sense 
of moral responsibility and God would turn out to be the cause of every evil 
deed. Humans would be nothing but machines (see Channing, 1819, 67). In a 
sermon called Likeness to God (1828), Channing made his position even clear-
er, stating as follows: 
 
Man has animal propensities as well as intellectual and moral powers. 
He has a body as well as mind; He has passions to war with reason, and 
selflove with conscience. He is a free being, and a tempted being, and 
thus constituted he may and does sin, and often sins grievously (Chan-
ning, 1828). 
 
Humans were free beings. They could do either good or evil, behave well or 
sin. That was why the likeness to God and His moral attributes were essential 
to Channing. In this view, God was a model of moral behaviour and humans 
had the capacity of coming closer to Him. 
Humans were no machines, Channing argued. This meant they were en-
dowed with a free will, as Martineau stated too. Both Martineau and Channing 
felt that denying the existence of such a free will would imply the denial of 
moral responsibility. Their battle against the doctrine of philosophical necessity 
was first and foremost driven by that reason. Martineau committed to this posi-
tion in the Liverpool Controversy: 
 
Let each consider his own life as an indivisible unit of responsibility, no 
less complete, no less free, no less invested with solemn and solitary 
power, than if he dwelt, and always had dwelt, in the universe alone 
with God. […] We cannot, by ancestral or historical relations, renounce 
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our own free-will, or escape one iota of its awful trusts. No faith which 
fails to keep this truth distinct and prominent, no faith which shuffles 
with the sinner’s moral identity, contains the requisites of a ‘doctrine 
according to godliness’ (Martineau, 1839a, 37-38). 
 
When it is a matter of how to behave, everyone is alone before God and the 
choice is each of our own. 
If the endorsers of the ‘new school’ were eager to mark their difference 
from Priestley and his philosophical doctrines, this wasn’t the case for all Uni-
tarians. Gaskell kept true to the founding father of English Unitarianism. As the 
historian Robert K. Webb has written, “the Priestleyan verities ran like a 
ground bass through all he did and said” (Webb, 1988, 152). There are notably 
two sermons showing these influences. The first one is the sermon given at the 
death of his friend John Ashton Nicholls. This was a profession of faith of the 
materialism and determinism of Priestley. Not that Gaskell or Priestley denied 
the resurrection of the dead. Spirit is not confined to our mortal flesh. Nonethe-
less, Gaskell described death in terms of decomposing particles: 
 
What, then, is Death? […] It is not destruction. Nothing in the universe 
is ever destroyed, nothing ever allowed to perish. Go question Science, 
and it will assure you of that. It will shew you, that not a single particle 
of matter is ever lost. You may compose or decompose the substances 
in nature to infinity, but put them out of existence you cannot. Even the 
fire, which is deemed so destructive an agent, does not really destroy, 
but always resolve things into their elements. This teaches us with re-
gard to the body, that though it will undergo great changes, and assume 
new forms, and enter into fresh combinations, it can never be annihilat-
ed (W. Gaskell, 1859, 9). 
 
Gaskell didn’t hesitate to use a scientific vocabulary, mentioning elements and 
combinations. He used a chemist’s language – the kind of argument which 
Priestley would have much appreciated. 
Perhaps Priestley would have appreciated even more Gaskell’s following 
remark on the divine government: “Divine Providence”, as the Manchester 
preacher stated, “[…] for our good, has placed us under a severe and painful 
system of discipline. It is by the same agency that we are trained for a new and 
higher condition of being” (W. Gaskell, 1859, 12). Although Gaskell always 
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depicted God as a benevolent Creator12, he acknowledged the role of God in 
shaping our moral behaviour. This feature of God’s plan was also very appar-
ent in a sermon Gaskell preached in 1878. Here, he stated that nature had a 
fixed course: vice inevitably produced punishment; virtue necessarily brought 
reward. The world has its immutable order and only thanks to it alone we can 
shape our demeanour. As Gaskell said,  
 
it is pervaded by universal relations and dependencies, their foundation 
is laid for our instruction and guidance. By these means the sciences are 
built up; by these means the ultimate object of the world’s existence is 
discovered; and by these means we turn from the present to the past, 
and bring back to us lessons of an important and valuable kind (W. 
Gaskell, as quoted in Webb, 1988, 152). 
 
God’s government is as ordered as a clock. That is why we can – and ought to 
– make inquiries concerning the moral character and the consequences of our 
actions, as Gaskell himself pointed out here. 
These statements are starkly different from Channing’s and Martineau’s 
ones. According to them, God endowed us with free will and thus gave us the 
responsibility to choose good instead of evil. On the contrary, in Gaskell’s ac-
count Divine Providence educated us, guiding human beings towards good. 
Thus Gaskell did nothing but endorse Priestley’s principles: in The Doctrine of 
Philosophical Necessity God was described as a loving father, who wanted to 
secure our happiness and therefore made us subject to His discipline (Priestley, 
1777, 78-79). 
As a matter of fact, Priestley answered ante litteram to Martineau’s criti-
cism, namely that ruling out free will would result in annihilating moral re-
sponsibility (see Priestley, 1777, 73-89). From Priestley’s point of view, when-
ever we praise someone by saying that he behaves well, we are actually prais-
ing them for their disposition. It is their disposition which is good, and their ac-
tions will necessarily be good due to the constraint of their disposition (Priest-
 
12 See for instance the beginning of this very sermon, where Gaskell argued that God 
had placed us into a joyful universe (W. Gaskell, 1859, 7-8). 
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ley, 1777, 80). Hence, human nature as it is conceived by the deterministic phi-
losopher was in Priestley’s mind consistent with moral judgement. Such a per-
son would have a good disposition, by virtue of Divine government. We could 
be sure that praise wouldn’t be in vain, because every action proceeding from a 
good disposition would be good. We cannot state the same for someone pro-
vided with free will, since their will might interpose between their disposition 
and action. Therefore, if we assumed that humans have free will, they would 
behave whimsically. Their actions would have no comprehensible reason or 
pattern: a self-determining person is ultimately unreliable (Priestley, 1777, 76-
77). 
 
Punishments and rewards 
 
In Priestley’s account, people’s actions were determined by sensations of 
pleasure and pain. Their behaviour was thus foreseeable, and therefore the 
agent was reliable. Such a vision of human nature was connected to a morality 
of punishments and rewards: God educated humans by repaying good actions 
with rewards and punishing wicked behaviour. This was Priestley’s as well as 
Paley’s view of morality (Paley, [1785] 1815, 52). Moreover, this was the basis 
of utilitarian moral theory, both of Paley’s religious version or of Bentham’s 
secular one (see Schneewind, 1977, 122). Indeed, Martineau’s ‘new school’ 
was at odds with this moral system as well. 
Martineau developed his argument against Utilitarianism at length in a re-
view of Bentham’s Deontology, published in the Monthly Repository in 1834. 
In his mind, Bentham’s view of human nature was too restrictive: he reduced 
every purpose to the quest for happiness, ultimately assuming a selfish individ-
ual, incapable of altruistic deeds (Martineau, 1834, 615 and 618-619). Fur-
thermore, the Benthamite version of punishments and rewards, namely the 
sanctions, turned out to reduce human dignity. Martineau was critical of Ben-
tham for his conception of humans as only influenced by exterior pleasures and 
pains, such as other people’s approval (moral or popular approval) or negative 
consequences on health and well-being (physical sanction). The utilitarian 
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agent lacked the capacity to feel interior pleasures. Are there, asked Martineau, 
no actions pleasurable in themselves, regardless of their consequences? 
Doesn’t the exercise of a benevolent deed provide in itself pleasure to the agent 
who performs it? “The contemplation”, continued Martineau,  
 
and still more, the exercise of compassion, integrity, benevolence, 
awaken feelings which have so little concern with the outward ad-
vantages of these virtues that, at the moment of excitement, they repu-
diate the idea of them as an unworthy intrusion (Martineau, 1834, 618-
619). 
 
As Martineau argued, Bentham excluded the possibility of disinterested acts, 
namely of actions “which are willed solely from their internal qualities” (Mar-
tineau, 1834, 620). Therefore, disinterested actions were absurd in a moral sys-
tem founded on punishments and rewards. 
Martineau reaffirmed this point in the preface to his book of hymns. Here 
he started by remarking that “worship is an attitude which our nature assumes, 
not for a purpose, but from an emotion” (Martineau, 1840, V). It is not intend-
ed to persuade God to make our own advantage; rather, it is a natural disposi-
tion. As Martineau added, “in opposition to this Natural idea of worship stands 
the Utilitarian, which considers it an ‘Instrumental act’”. The utilitarian wor-
shipper, in what the author was likely to consider a Paleyan attitude, asked: 
‘What for’? The true believer asked for nothing, in Martineau’s eyes, because 
he didn’t calculate his advantages and rewards. This view of worship had no 
holiness in it, it had no contact with the soul. Martineau connected the natural 
attitude towards worship to artistic and poetic power: 
 
Sacred poetry in particular, has its origin in the natural, and its decline 
in the Utilitarian view of worship. Every simple utterance of a deep af-
fection, not poured out with an aim, but merely overflowing, is poetry 
in its essence, whatever be its form: and on the other hand, no expres-
sion of thought or feeling which has an ulterior purpose, of instruction, 
exposition, persuasion, impression, can have the spirit of poetry (Marti-





A warm-blooded and inner faith 
 
This quotation exemplifies a relevant feature of the ‘new school’: its 
commitment to religious sentiment. This turn has been properly explained by 
Webb in his paper Views of Unitarianism from Halley’s Comet (Webb, 1986, 
188-189). Unitarian believers had long been accustomed to hearing doctrinal 
sermons, where the ministers were stating the difference between their sect and 
orthodoxy or other Dissenters. During the 1830s the atmosphere changed, and 
the reformists were sensible to that. Then “even the most rational-minded of 
Unitarians thrilled to the soul-stirring appeals of William Ellery Channing” 
(Webb, 1986, 189) as Webb has written. For the reformists, the roots of reli-
gion were to be found in the heart, not in a dogma or in the intellect. As the 
Unitarian minister John Tayler said in a discourse entitled The Religion of the 
Intellect and the Religions of the Heart (1851), it was feeling which made the 
unlearned savages religious: “the same feeling which fills the bosom of the 
child with wondering reverence and awe when the name of God is first associ-
ated with the beauty and grandeur and immensity of the visible universe” 
(Tayler, 1851, 290). 
Martineau reproached Priestley for his lack of poetic spirit, which made 
his faith cold-blooded, deprived of warm feeling (Martineau, 1890, Vol. I, 25-
27). What he valued in Channing, by contrast, was this: the intensity of his 
moral feeling, absorbing everything else into itself (Martineau, 1890, Vol. I, 
91). The American minister was indeed renowned for stressing the sentimental 
features of the Christian creed. In the Baltimore discourse he stated that the 
love of God was the most important virtue for Unitarian Christianity:  
 
We believe, that this principle is the true end and happiness of our be-
ing, that we were made for union with our Creator, that his infinite per-
fection is the only sufficient object and true resting-place for the insa-
tiable desires and unlimited capacities of the human mind, and that 
without him our noblest sentiments – admiration, veneration, hope, and 




This stress on the sentimental aspects of religious experience matched an-
other important point which distinguished the ‘new’ from the ‘old school’, 
namely the inner character of religion. Unitarianism was traditionally connect-
ed to the framework of natural theology. According to the latter, God’s plan 
was apparent in the order of nature and the natural laws were consistent with 
Divine Providence. Consequently, one could search for the signs of God’s hand 
in nature. The book of nature was then meant to harmonize with the Scriptures. 
As Gaskell argued in a lecture called Strong Points of Unitarian Christianity 
(1873), Unitarianism stated that God was one and thus found corroboration in 
the natural order: 
 
Nature on this point is in harmony with the Bible. In all departments of 
science one plan, one purpose, one presiding Mind is manifest. The 
laws in operation show that one Author framed them. The heavenly 
bodies move in one direction, and as one system; one principle of at-
traction governs all their motions; they are related to one great scheme; 
the same Spirit worketh all in all. Our natural intelligence vouches for 
the same truth (W. Gaskell, 1873, 22). 
 
The natural laws guaranteed the existence of a Supreme Contriver. 
The ‘new school’ questioned this view. As I have explained above, the re-
formists were critical of the moral system of punishments and rewards because 
it was extrinsic to the moral subject. Moreover, they were loath to seek Divine 
traces in nature: the natural seat of religion was inside the believer, in the 
depths of his conscience. In the Liverpool Controversy Martineau expressed 
this thought very clearly, saying that “our own conscience is the window of 
heaven through which we gaze on God” (Martineau, 1839a, 3). Thus, when one 
strays from the Christian moral path, God’s eye could be discerned in one’s 
own accusing heart: “our moral nature, left to itself, intuitively believes that 
guilt is an estrangement from God, – an unqualified opposition to his will” 
(Martineau, 1839a, 4). In Martineau’s mind, if God was to be found within 
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ourselves, then He was also intuitively known to us. In that he agreed with 
Channing, as Ralph Waller has noticed (see Waller, 1986, 244)13. 
 
Reason and sentiment 
 
As we have seen, the reformists stressed the relevance of religious senti-
ment. However, it is worth considering that praising religious sentiment, intui-
tion and the inner view of faith did not trigger an irrational or mystical account 
of religion for the reformists. Their call for a warmer faith didn’t make them 
less confident in the progress of scientific knowledge. The ‘new’ and the ‘old 
school’ agreed in this: Gaskell greeted the advancement of science (see W. 
Gaskell, 1875, 16) and his Manchester colleague Tayler praised his friend 
Charles Lyell for disposing of “the old cosmical view of things, when creation 
was limited to some six thousand years, and shut up within the narrow bounda-
ries of the Ptolemaic system” (John Tayler to Charles Lyell, as quoted in 
Wach, 1991, 450). As a matter of fact, no one was more open to the call of ra-
tionality than Martineau himself, who nonetheless struggled to affirm the sen-
timental character of religion. Martineau was invariably associated with the 
movement of higher criticism which he first met with in Bristol from Lant Car-
penter (Waller, 1986, 230). First and foremost, Martineau had a ‘critical mind’, 
in the words of Ralph Waller (Waller, 2002)14. 
Martineau was very unwilling to leave to science the domain of rationality 
and to seclude religion in the domain of sentiment. Martineau took this position 
while criticizing the modern materialist thought, in a lecture delivered at Man-
chester New College, in 1874. Here he explained that science was far from 
 
13 Here Waller has quoted an interesting passage from a letter from Channing to Mar-
tineau, where the former stated that the truth of God’s goodness came intuitively to 
him. 
14 In this paper, the author has investigated Martineau’s thought in the light of the ten-
sion between the “critical mind” and the “will to believe”. Thus, Waller has argued 
that Martineau applied critical thought to discard some religious positions, while pas-
sionately endorsing those aspects he considered as fundamental to the Christian faith.   
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dismissing the idea of God. The scientist struggled to explain everything in ma-
terial terms, but they were at a loss to explain mental phenomena with matter. 
They tried to forge ad hoc categories in order to account for what was unac-
countable in the terms of matter. Therefore some of the words they used im-
plied an unacknowledged theological view: such words were théofora onóma-
ta, as Martineau called them, “terms that bear God in them” (Martineau, 1890, 
Vol. IV, 175). The scientist had expelled God from his theory, lest He made it 
unscientific. But eventually he reintroduced Him. As Martineau said, with 
quite a touch of irony, 
 
such extremely clever Matter, – Matter that is up to everything, even to 
writing Hamlet, and finding out its own evolution, and substituting a 
molecular plébiscite for a divine monarchy of the world, may fairly be 
regarded as a little too modest in its disclaimer of the attributes of Mind 
(Martineau, 1890, Vol. IV, 175). 
 
As Martineau stated, in terms which are reminiscent of the Uniformitarian-
Catastrophist debate, it is impossible to explain the universe without any refer-
ence to the Supreme Mind regulating it and ensuring the continuity of being 
(see Martineau, 1890, Vol. IV, 172)15. Martineau considered that this account 
wasn’t only theoretically unacceptable: it was also dangerous from a moral 
point of view. Were we willing to rule out God, we would remain deprived of 
every adequate source for our moral and higher qualities (see Martineau, 1890, 
Vol. IV, 186). This would leave us in a world populated by base, selfish be-
ings, ready to abuse others (see Martineau, 1890, Vol. IV, 188-189). Without 
religion, Martineau argued, we would have no means to make our higher facul-
ties prevail: we would be abandoned to the tyranny of our nature, incapable of 
doing what ought to be done (see Martineau, 1890, Vol. IV, 192-193). 
The only way to reconcile religion and science, as Martineau concluded, 
was not by 
 
lodging the one in the Reason and the other in the Imagination, in order 
to keep them from quarrelling, but in recognizing a Duality in the func-
 
15 For the Uniformitarian-Catastrophist debate, see the first chapter. 
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tions of Reason itself, according as it deals with phenomena or their 
ground, with law or with causality, with material consecution or with 
moral alternatives, with the definite relations of space and time or with 
the indefinite intensities of beauty and values of affection which bear us 
to the infinitely Good (Martineau, 1890, Vol. IV, 194). 
 
Reason couldn’t be left to science: religion had to claim its role in the intellec-
tual as well as in the moral life. 
Having presented the main characteristics of the ‘new’ and ‘old school’, let 
us focus on Jevons’s thought, paying attention to his link with these theories 
and doctrines. 
 
2.2. Jevons as a Unitarian 
 
Jevons had always been a godly man, as his grandniece Rosamond 
Könekamp remarked in the Biographical Introduction to the Papers and Cor-
respondences of William Stanley Jevons (see Könekamp, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 
52). Moreover, he had always been a Unitarian. In this section, I consider Jev-
ons’s link with Unitarianism. 
 
A lifelong Unitarian 
 
The correspondence between the young Stanley and his sister Henrietta 
collects various religious speculations and we can also find evidence of Jev-
ons’s allegiance to Unitarianism. In a letter dated 3rd May 1856, when Jevons 
was a young man of twenty, he wrote to his sister that 
 
the exterior religion has varied with different times & people, from the 
most barbarous (examples it is unnecessary to name) in which the in-
ward meaning was often quite lost sight of or misrepresented, down to 
the most simple & truth-like which I have no hesitation in saying, is, 
among creeds, the Unitarian (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 225-226). 
 
On the 1st October of the same year Jevons expressed again to his sister his be-
liefs concerning the superiority of Unitarianism. In contrast to many other reli-
gious creeds, Unitarian faith wasn’t a matter of doctrine. Its followers didn’t 
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condemn believers on the basis of their religious opinions, not to mention that 
they didn’t consider eternal damnation or salvation to depend on such opin-
ions16. As Jevons stated, 
 
[Unitarians] do not profess to teach people any creed and therefore do 
not exhibit the bigoted zeal of other sects which seems to succeed so 
well. In general they only teach others to be good & principled, a thing 
too indefinite and uninviting for most minds. At least this is my view of 
Unitarianism, and only thus far would I call myself a Unitarian (Jevons, 
1972-1981, Vol. II, 242). 
 
Jevons underlined what he considered to be the strongest point of Unitari-
an faith: its moral inclination. From his point of view, Unitarianism was pref-
erable to any other creed because of its moral teachings. As Boggs said, Unitar-
ianism was a religion “without dogma, without creed” (see Boggs, 1966). From 
the Unitarian point of view, it doesn’t matter what one believes, but how one 
behaves. This position was one of the foundations of Unitarianism17, and Jev-
ons utterly embraced it. In the above quoted letter of the 3rd May 1856, he 
wrote that the various religious faiths were nothing but the exterior manifesta-
tions of few, simple moral truths (see Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 225). 
Jevons also wrote to his sister that he had thrown away all dogmas: “I 
judge”, he said, “of a religion by the abstract morality it contains, and by its ef-
fects on the character, condition & happiness of men” (Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. II, 296). Accordingly he called Christ “a great genius”, one devoting his 
powers to morality instead of science or art (see Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 
 
16 This idea was one of the fundamental points of Unitarianism: see Boggs, 1966, 144; 
see also W. Gaskell, 1844, 14-15 especially. 
17 On this topic see, for example: Wilbur, (1945) 1947, 5, where Wilbur stated that 
Unitarians were “far more concerned with the underlying spirit of Christianity in its 
application to the situations of practical life than with the intellectual formulations of 
Christian thought”;  Smith, 2006, 25, where the author illustrated how the Racovian 
Catechism, by Socinus, advocated a rational approach to the Scriptures and put the 
emphasis on moral conduct. 
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155). Jevons believed, together with many Unitarians18, that Christ was merely 
a human being. 
Nor were these ideas solely confined to Jevons’s youth. His wife collected 
some notes about religious topics, which were meant to be a preparation for the 
Tenth Bridgewater Treatise he intended to write. Thanks to these notes it can 
be understood that there was a substantial continuity in Jevons’s religious 
views. For instance, he clarified his beliefs concerning Christ as follows: “my 
veneration for Jesus is wholly founded on the heartfelt beauty of His teachings, 
and the manifest workings of a Divine Spirit in His life and works” (Jevons, 
1886, 454). Jevons still considered Jesus, although inspired, just a human be-
ing. We shall see that attributing divine inspiration to Jesus tied Jevons’s posi-
tion to Martineau’s one. However, it is apparent by these notes, as well as by 
Jevons’s project of writing a Bridgewater Treatise, that he engaged in religious 
speculations throughout all his life 
Jevons’s religious ideas have already been investigated in the first chapter, 
in connection with his epistemology and philosophy of science. In this chapter 
I consider Jevons’s religious views in connection with his moral philosophy 
and his Unitarian allegiance. This issue involves a question: where to place 
Jevons with respect to the debate between the ‘new’ and ‘old school’ in nine-
teenth-century Unitarianism? By this question I do not imply that Jevons actu-
ally took a position for or against either of these parties. Rather, I raise the 
question concerning who influenced Jevons throughout his life and studies. We 
shall see that Jevons was in line with the natural theology’s account of the uni-
verse, consistent with the ‘old school’. He also inclined towards a deterministic 
view of human behaviour. I also focus on Jevons’s projects for social reform, 
connecting them with the Unitarianism. I argue that social reform was mostly 
conceived of as moral reform. As a consequence, Jevons’s deterministic ac-
count faced a challenge. His commitment to the moral reform of individual 
character was difficult to reconcile with moral determinism. Hence, I argue that 
 
18 See Smith, 2006, chap. 12, “Humanitarians” Unitarianism, where the author inves-
tigated the origins of this position. Moreover, this was also Priestley’s conviction. 
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Jevons was influenced by the moral views of James Martineau, whose concept 
of free ensured the possibility of self-improvement. 
 
The continuity with the ‘old school’ 
 
Let us first address Jevons’s conception of the universe. As I argued in the 
first chapter, Jevons considered the universe to be ordered by laws and God’s 
design. The language and concepts he expressed recalled the work of William 
Paley, as I have argued. In the first chapter I have addressed this topic with ref-
erence to the Principles of Science. However, we can find further examples in 
his correspondence and private journals. In a journal entry dated 28th January 
1857, Jevons admitted that he had recently been disturbed by the problem of 
finding a solid basis for his religious beliefs: a basis which could put together 
religion and science (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 154)19. Here he also confessed 
his rejection of revealed religion. In Jevons’s eyes, the very idea of Revelation 
was almost blasphemous. God had no need to break the order of nature to re-
veal himself. This would be a sign of imperfection. Jevons considered that 
“God is seen if anywhere in the wonderful order and simplicity of Nature, in 
the adaptation of means to ends, and in the creation of man to which everything 
refers, with power capable of indefinite improvement” (Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. I, 155). 
His scientific education surely made Jevons inclined to look at the world 
as ordered by laws. However, such an account had a religious character. More-
over, in the Unitarian circles, where scientific efforts were widely pursued, 
natural theology was popular. Gaskell, as I have shown above, embraced natu-
ral theology, and deduced from it a deterministic view of the world, where the 
Priestleyan and Paleyan legacies harmonized. In his turn, Jevons fitted this tra-
dition perfectly. Indeed, not only did he think that the universe was regulated 
by necessary laws; he also considered humans as bound by these laws. Thus, 
 
19 This passage and topic have already been addressed in the first chapter. 
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his position shows a remarkable similarity with Gaskell’s one. Let us focus on 
Jevons’s observations about these two topics. 
On the 3rd May 1856, Jevons wrote that “God is but the embodiment of the 
first & greatest principle of the world, viz, universal good, order tending to-
wards good, design, all coming under the comprehensive term Providence” 
(Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 226). A further specification of this thought can be 
found in Jevons’s journal, where we read as follows: “the world is evidently 
but one vast organism full of motion and intelligence; it is not mere matter, for 
the very order & form of it express intention & mind” (Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. I, 155). This last statement proves that Jevons was unwilling to assume 
that such an order could be inherent in nature alone: in front of such a perfect 
adaptation of means to ends and constant improvement one could only admit 
the presence of an ordering Mind. Paley’s Natural Theology demonstrates a 
close similarity to Jevons’s thought:  
 
Others have chosen to refer everything to a principle of order in nature. 
A principle of order is the word: but what is meant by a principle of or-
der, as different from an intelligent Creator, has not been explained ei-
ther by definition or example. […] Order itself is only the adaptation of 
means to an end: a principle of order therefore can only signify the 
mind and intention which so adapts them (Paley, [1802] 2009, 76). 
 
I have already presented Gaskell’s strong belief in the inescapable power 
of causality. In his view, God’s government was indeed manifest in the ordered 
structure of causal relations. Jevons’s account was very similar. In the notes 
collected by his wife he addressed the topic of prayer, questioning the piety of 
interpreting prayers as requests to God. “A single ounce of air or water”, ar-
gued Jevons, 
 
cannot be diverted from its appointed course without breaking through 
the framework of nature. The universe might be destroyed and recreated 
as easily as a leaf be made to fall otherwise than as predetermined caus-
es make it (Jevons, 1886, 452). 
 
According to Jevons, prayers were unacceptable because they neglected the in-
escapable power of divine providence. A prayer “implies an impeachment of 
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His goodness and His wisdom. It is as much as to say that God has ordered 
things in one way and we think they should be otherwise” (Jevons, 1886, 452). 
Consequently, prayers could only be pious if understood differently: “cannot 
we ask that God, instead of bending His course to ours, will bend our course to 
His?” (Jevons, 1886, 452). 
These notes had been written when Jevons was approaching his premature 
death. A comparison with previous statements, dating from his youth, shows a 
remarkable continuity of thought. Indeed when he was only eighteen he called 
himself a “Dependant Moralist” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 66). Human be-
haviour was in his mind determined by animal instincts. Jevons would later 
identify such principles with the desire for seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, 
consistent with utilitarian moral theory. 
Michael White has underlined that Jevons embraced this position while he 
was in Australia (see M. White, 1982, 34). Indeed on the 13th September 1856, 
after attending a lecture by John Woolley entitled ‘The Selfish Theory of Mor-
als’, Jevons made some important remarks in his journal. He stated that  
 
in its action on the body the mind must follow a simple & universal law 
of seeking the most pleasure, and follow it as implicitly as the railway 
train follows the curves & turns of the line upon which it is running 
(Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 133). 
 
He then added that “a mans mind and character may be likened to a complicat-
ed piece of machinery moved by steam” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 133), its 
steam being self-interest. The constraint of this principle was absolute, so that 
it was “beyond a mans nature to act otherwise” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 
133). 
The universe was regulated by natural laws, expressing God’s order and 
design, and humans were no exception. In Jevons’s own words, each individual 
person must be “a creature of cause & effect” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 
361). If we wanted to understand humans, we had thus to identify the general 




Men possess animal powers & functions; they have logical minds; they 
have a series of emotions; and they are placed in contact with definite 
but extremely variable external circumstances. A perfect consideration 
of all these data, in fact of all the causes in operation must result in a 
determination of all effects; for instance in the case of a single person it 
must explain every trait of his character, every action of his life, every 
word he has spoken, every thought he has conceived (Jevons, 1972-
1981, Vol. II, 362).  
 
A complete, scientific study of the human being would give an account of eve-
rything. This was an ideal, as Jevons himself admitted. However, had we an 
exhaustive knowledge of the circumstances, no act or thought would remain 
unexplained. 
Thus, if we compare Jevons’s position with Gaskell’s sermons on divine 
government the similarity is remarkable. Both considered God’s providence as 
a series of causes and effects. Moreover, they both believed that humans were 
determined by these causes, consistent with Priestley’s account. Jevons was in-
deed unwilling to admit free will if this meant that certain acts would be un-
caused: “man is said to possess free will but however this be, he is at least a 
phenomenon in which effect is always connected with cause” (Jevons, 1972-
1981, Vol. II, 362). Jevons’s belief in the deterministic character of the uni-
verse and therefore of human action corresponded with the view of the ‘old 
school’: in a Paleyan or Priestleyan world, where nothing is without cause, 
human beings couldn’t but be entangled in the causal order too. 
 
The commitment to social reform 
 
Let us take into account another feature of Jevons’s work where the Uni-
tarian influence is particularly evident: the commitment to social reform. As 
Raymond Holt has pointed out in his pioneering study, The Unitarian Contri-
bution to Social Progress in England, Unitarians had a leading role in many 
social changes (see Holt, 1938, 13 for instance). This was primarily triggered 
by Unitarian theology. Unitarians valued righteous demeanour much more than 
adherence to creeds. Consequently, they paid particular attention to moral 
norms, the respect of which solely made a Christian worthy of his name (see 
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Holt, 1938, 16)20. Jevons was in complete agreement with this attitude: in his 
opinion, a sincere and moral Catholic was preferable to an immoral Anglican 
(Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 296). 
The stress they put on the moral features of religion made Unitarians very 
attentive to people’s social conditions. Unitarians, like the physician South-
wood Smith, were engaged in the draft of the Poor Laws of 1834 (see Holt, 
1938, 157). The concern for the conditions of the poor was shared by Unitari-
ans overseas. The American Unitarian Association, founded in Boston in 1825 
(Harris, 2009, XXI), was alarmed by the growing destitution of Boston labour-
ers. They thus created the Boston Ministry to the Poor in 1827, appointing the 
post of Minister to Reverend Joseph Tuckerman (see Wach, 1993, 539). 
Thanks to his engagement, Tuckerman became well-known in England as well. 
Consequently, his second visit to England in 1833 encouraged the English Uni-
tarian ministers to found, in the main industrial towns, the so-called Domestic 
Missions, on the model of Tuckerman’s organization (see Wach, 1993, 540). 
For Unitarians, social reform was also a means to transmit the middle-class 
values where they seemed to be in danger. Some social historians, like Howard 
Wach and John Seed, have remarked how Unitarian chapels and Domestic 
Missions were a breeding ground for middle-class ideology (see Wach, 1991; 
1993; J. Seed, 1982; 1986). For instance, Tuckerman expressed his worries 
concerning the social consequences of industrialization. Labour took women 
and children away from the hearth, jeopardizing the family and consequently 
society as a whole (see Wach, 1993, 539). Unitarian ministers promulgated 
from the pulpit the ideals of thrift, temperance and domesticity (see Wach, 
1991, 434-435; Seed, 1986, 134-136). Thus Unitarianism was an important ve-
 
20 Here we read: “the letter killeth but the Spirit giveth life and so attach less im-
portance to assent to the Creeds than to the lives that men live. In the words of one of 
the early Unitarians, Michael Servetus: “To be a Christian is to be like Christ”“. Holt 
has been very liberal in the use of the term ‘Unitarian’. Strictly speaking, Servetus 
wasn’t a Unitarian. Despite questioning the truth of Trinity, a more appropriate de-
nomination would be “Socinian”. As a matter of fact, the term ‘Unitarianism’ was 
born much later, in the second half of the eighteenth-century; see Wilbur, 1945, 262. 
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hicle for the consolidation of those middle-class virtues which became repre-
sentative of Victorian age itself. They certainly were a small group21 but still a 
very influential one, since the Unitarian chapels often numbered among their 
followers some very important members of the social elites22. 
A similar concern for social reform could also be found in Jevons’s works. 
Such commitment grew stronger in the last years of his life, as various scholars 
have noted23. Whatever the cause of this growing interest may be, I would like 
to stress how consonant his efforts were with the Unitarian perspective. For in-
stance, Jevons shared with Tuckerman the concern about family relations in the 
industrial environment, as seen in the paper Married Women in Factories, later 
included in Methods of Social Reform (see Jevons, 1883, 156-179). Although 
such concerns for the role of women in the household was wide-spread in the 
Victorian England, in Jevons’s case this issue turns out to be closely connected 
with the Manchester Unitarians. 
As for the above-mentioned paper, Jevons mainly relied on his experience 
of working class conditions in Manchester24. Given the pervasive presence of 
Unitarians in Manchester, it could easily be argued that Jevons’s interest in 
these issues was triggered by his acquaintance with such circles. This argument 
 
21 Concerning the number of Unitarian Congregations, their attendants and their social 
composition, see Webb, 1986, 180-187. 
22 See Seed, 1982, 4, concerning Manchester specifically; 1986, 120-121, concerning 
other cities as well. 
23 For the importance of social reform in Jevons’s thought, see: Hutchison, 1982; 
Bowman, 1989; 1997, where the author addressed the problem of education in relation 
to classical economists; Peart, 1996, where the topic is investigated diffusely; 
Mosselmans, 2007, 78-81, for the role of policy with respect to religion, and 100-104, 
for this topic in relation to music. 
24 See Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. V, 164, where, answering to a criticism in the Man-
chester Guardian, Jevons wrote as follows: “I am not quite so ignorant of a factory 
population as [Mr. Darbyshire] supposes, having lived thirteen years at Manchester, 
and lost no opportunity of becoming acquainted with the subjects about which I have 
the temerity to write”. 
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is buttressed by the fact that Jevons was investigating this topic with the help of 
Edward Herford. The latter was a Unitarian, founder of the Manchester Statis-
tical Society, and brother of the minister William Henry Herford (Jevons, 
1972-1981, Vol. V, 167). 
Jevons was very concerned with infant mortality. He compared the Re-
ports of the Medical Officers to the Privy Council of some rural areas in Eng-
land with the reports on industrial areas. Starting from the high rate of infant 
mortality in rural districts, Jevons connected infant mortality with the absence 
of the mother from the household. Mothers, needing to work, were forced to 
leave their infant children to nurses. Consequently, the children often died of 
neglect (see Jevons, 1883, 164). This phenomenon had come to public attention 
at various times, as Jevons stated. However, no significant change had oc-
curred. “Can such things be in a Christian country?” (Jevons, 1883, 157), re-
monstrated Jevons. He thus showed how he considered the care of the poor and 
wretched to be a Christian responsibility. 
Moreover, Jevons’s position has to be seen in the middle-class context of 
which Tuckerman’s statements were an example: the woman was the symbol 
of the household, the embodiment of the pureness of feelings25. It is not sur-
prising that Jevons thought that children were to be taken care of only by their 
own mothers. “There can be no doubt that the proper place of a good house-
wife is in her house” (Jevons, 1972.1981, Vol. V, 165), stated Jevons, thus en-
dorsing the middle-class model of the respectable household. 
 
Social reform as moral reform 
 
Before continuing the exposition of Jevons’s efforts as a social reformer, it 
is worth noting that, in the eyes of Victorians, political and social reform was 
first and foremost moral reform, a reform of individual motives or behaviour, 
or both. Stefan Collini, in his work Public Moralists, has argued that moral 
 
25 For the construction of such an ideal of womanhood, investigated in relation to 
Evangelical religious thought, see Davidoff, Hall 1987, 95-96, 149-172. 
133 
 
speculations had an unquestionable primacy during the Victorian age (see Col-
lini, 1991, 64). Hence, any political change had to rely on a change in the mor-
al attitudes of individuals (see Collini, 1991, 107). Consistent with this idea, 
political measures were often refused because they weakened people’s charac-
ter (see Collini, 1991, 100). Jevons’s account was no exception. In his view, 
proper political reform should aim to reform individual character26. This view 
implied an individualistic understanding of society. I will address this topic lat-
er. Let us now focus on the link between Unitarianism and the reform of char-
acter in Jevons’s work. 
As I remarked above, since they avoided to stress the doctrinal features of 
their belief, Unitarians put a stronger accent on the moral aspect of religion. 
They openly acknowledged the moral penchant of Unitarian faith. Moreover, 
this attitude was equally shared by the two branches of nineteenth-century Uni-
tarianism. For instance, in the Rationale of Religious Belief, Martineau distin-
guished two views of the beneficial effects provided by the Christian faith. Ac-
cording to the first one, believing in the doctrine of atonement was enough to 
ensure salvation for the believer. The sacrifice of Christ for humankind was 
thus compared to a charm, magically saving humans from the wrath of a vin-
dictive God. “The other view of the value and influence of religion”, continued 
Martineau, “supposes it to act, not on the mind of God, but on the character of 
man; and conceives it to be essential to the loftiness, refinement, and energy of 
that character” (Martineau, [1836] 1845, 82). According to this second view, 
with which the author was sympathetic, religion saved humans by improving 
them (see Martineau, [1836] 1845, 83). 
On this point, there was such a consonance of ideas between Martineau 
and Gaskell that they even used the same words. Like Martineau, Gaskell was 
at odds with the endorsers of the dogma of atonement, according to which 
 
26 On the centrality of character in Jevons’s thought, see M. White, 1994, 430, where 
the author explains how the notion of character “provided the analytical link between 
the universal ‘natural’ laws of behavior implicit in marginal utility theory and the so-
cial behavior which verified those laws”. 
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“trust in Jesus is made to act like a charm” (see W. Gaskell, 1875, 11, empha-
sis added). On the contrary, Gaskell stressed the practical attitude of Christiani-
ty. Jesus had encouraged his disciples to follow his example, to put what he 
said into practice. Hence, every Christian who did not acknowledged Jesus’s 
moral promptings had misunderstood the message of Christ, confining it to an 
array of dead precepts (see W. Gaskell, 1875, 12). 
Everyone ought to pursue this path of moral improvement. However, such 
a task was more urgent for those who lived in a destitute condition. Material 
wretchedness engendered moral corruption –  a much more insidious kind of 
privation. As Channing claimed, “the great calamity of the poor is not their 
poverty, understanding this word in the usual sense, but the tendency of their 
privations, and of their social rank, to degradation of mind” (Channing, [1835] 
1903, 266)27. Both the leading figures of the ‘old’ and ‘new school’ intended to 
guide the working classes and the poor towards moral improvement. This pro-
cess was often understood as a promise of future salvation, while the social re-
lations of the status quo remained unaltered. 
This tendency was for instance very evident in John Tayler’s sermons, 
which endorsed the contemporary division of society and supported the values 
of the rising middle-class. In a lecture entitled The Moral Education of the 
People, Tayler explained that such education required an understanding one’s 
station in life and one’s circumstances. One should also understand that assum-
ing a correct moral behaviour was the only way to acquire happiness. Right 
conduct was then interpreted as “respectful demeanour towards superiors in 
age and worldly station” (J. Tayler, as quoted in Wach, 1993, 456). It is worth 
mentioning that this lecture was delivered in 1833, in Manchester. Tayler’s 
teaching aimed at finding a resolution to Manchester conflicts through the solid 
morality of the middle-class (see Wach, 1991, 425-430 especially; 1993, 540-
542, and 546-548). 
As Wach has noticed, Tayler’s solution to class conflicts was primarily 
moral rather than political. As Tayler said, there was “something wrong in so-
 
27 On this topic, with respect to Channing’s thought, see also Wach, 1993, 545. 
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ciety; – something out of joint in mutual relations of its different classes; –  
some deep-seated disease in the heart of it, which is not to be expelled by polit-
ical reform alone” (J. Tayler, as quoted in Wach, 1993, 447). The answer was 
to be found in recognizing that the “the interests of that two classes cannot real-
ly be separated” (J. Tayler, as quoted in Wach, 1993, 447). The opposing clas-
ses should understand that their opposition was vain and counterproductive. In-
terests should then be reconciled and harmonize together. 
This response to political, social and economic conflict was a common-
place of the Victorian age. One might look at some industrial novels of the 
1830s for instances of it. For example, Elizabeth Gaskell, William Gaskell’s 
wife, expressed this hope very clearly. In her novel North and South, Higgings, 
a leader of the strike which was taking place in the imaginary city of Milton, 
wished for such a conciliation. Against the conflict tearing apart masters and 
men, “our only chance”, said Higgings, “is binding men together in one com-
mon interest; and if some are cowards and some are fools, they mun come 
along and join the great march, whose only strength is in numbers” (E. Gaskell, 
1982, 233). Mr. Hale, a Dissenter who was pushed by his religious integrity to 
a refusal of his appointment as an Anglican minister, answered as follows: 
“your Union in itself would be beautiful, glorious, – it would be Christianity 
itself – if it were but for an end which affected the good of all, instead of that 
of merely one class as opposed to another” (E. Gaskell, 1982, 233). 
Just like in the case of Higgings in North and South, this conciliation often 
implied that the working class had to learn and embrace the laws of political 
economy. According to Tayler, the working classes had to be explained how 
the rate of wages were bound to economic laws (see Wach, 1991, 447). Natu-
rally there were slight differences among the Unitarian ministers here men-
tioned. Tuckerman, whose acquaintance with the conditions of the poor was 
extensive, wasn’t so consonant with economic precepts as Tayler was. Tuck-
erman questioned the theory of full employment, according to which the mar-
ket functioning naturally ruled out unemployment. Tuckerman, in contrast, ar-
gued that poor people could be poor not due to their unwillingness to work, but 
because they couldn’t obtain any employment (see Wach, 1993, 544). If on the 
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one hand Tuckerman and his colleague Channing criticized the crude mecha-
nism of political economy, on the other Martineau sided with the contemporary 
understanding of economic law. Thus Martineau reproached Channing for at-
tacking the economists’ statements without a real knowledge of the subject 
matter (Martineau, 1890, Vol. I, 124-125). 
Working classes had to follow economic laws and take the middle class as 
a model of right behaviour. As Martineau stated, the working class ought to 
acquire the “habits of providence, which, as a rule characterize the middle clas-
ses” (J. Martineau, as quoted in: Ledger-Lomas, 2017, 119). In Theologies of 
Power, John Seed has shown how strongly the ideals of thrift and accountabil-
ity were supported amongst Unitarians. Seed drew on the journal of George 
Heywood, a member of Cross Street Chapel in Manchester, between 1813 and 
1840 (Seed, 1986, 134-136). When he still was a young grocer, Heywood un-
derstood, from the Manchester minister John Grundy, that business success 
was a reward for one’s virtue. One’s effort, as Grundy’s sermons taught him, 
ought to be carefully watched by the means of self-examination: that was why 
Heywood started to keep a diary to “answer the examination of our conduct 
and actions” (G. Heywood’s diary, as quoted in Seed, 1986, 135). As John 
Seed has argued, Heywood’s case was a perfect instance of Unitarian values in 
the early nineteenth century: “the vindication of self-help, the confidence in the 
blessing of Providence, the celebration of moderate worldly pleasure, the dis-
dain for those who fail to become independent and successful” (Seed, 1986, 
135). 
 
Self-culture: Channing on moral improvement 
 
The best example of exhortation to moral improvement in a Unitarian con-
text was Channing’s Self-culture. Channing delivered this lecture in September 
1839, in Boston. This was an introduction to the Franklin Lectures, a course 
specifically addressed to manual labourers. Channing dedicated his lecture to 
the concept of self-culture, “or the care which every man owes to himself, to 
the unfolding and perfecting of his nature” (Channing, 1839, 6). It was a pro-
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cess of self-improvement, conducted for its own sake, regardless of any mate-
rial advantage (see Channing, 1839, 18-19). “A man […] is to cultivate himself 
because he is a man” (Channing, 1839, 19), simply qua human being. Putting 
the self-culture into practice meant to harmonize all the principles of our na-
ture, like the moral, religious, intellectual and social principles. Channing clari-
fied the meaning of self-culture as follows: 
 
To cultivate anything, be it a plant, an animal, a mind, is to make grow. 
Growth, expansion is the end. Nothing admits culture, but that which 
has a principle of life capable of being expanded. He, therefore, who 
does what he can to unfold all his powers and capacities, especially his 
nobler ones, so as to become a well-proportioned, vigorous, excellent, 
happy being, practises self-culture (Channing, 1839, 8). 
 
Cultivating oneself meant to develop one’s best faculties, like the capacity 
of seeing beauty, as well as the eternity and infinity dwelling in beauty itself 
(see Channing, 1839, 13-15). However, any push towards improvement ought 
to start from morality. The intellectual faculty, which often was considered to 
have priority over the others, had to be exercised in a disinterested way. 
“Without this fairness of mind”, remarked Channing, “which is only another 
phrase for disinterested love of truth, great native powers of understanding are 
perverted and led astray; genius runs wild; ‘the light within us becomes dark-
ness’” (Channing, 1839, 10). The most wonderful power of the intellect con-
sisted in “rising from particular facts to general laws or universal truths” 
(Channing, 1839, 11). Channing took Newton as an example of this intellectual 
excellence: 
 
Men had for ages seen pieces of wood, stones, metals, falling to the 
ground. Newton seized on these particular facts, and rose to the idea 
that all matter tends, or is attracted, towards all matter; and then defined 
the law according to which this attraction or force acts at different dis-
tances (Channing, 1839, 12). 
 
However, where did the ability to cultivate oneself come from? What were 
its conditions of possibility? As I have already noted, Channing relied on free 
will. Consequently, one could make use of this power to put self-culture into 
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practice. “A man has within him capacities of growth” (Channing, 1839, 15), 
wrote Channing. Hence, self-culture had also a role to play in Channing’s criti-
cism of Priestleyan determinism: 
 
I do not look on a human being as a machine, made to be kept in action 
by a foreign force, to accomplish an unvarying succession of motions, 
to do a fixed amount of work, and then to fall to pieces at death; but as 
a being of free spiritual powers (Channing, 1839, 15). 
 
As for self-culture’s conditions of possibility, Channing was explicit: 
“there are two powers of the human soul which make self-culture possible, the 
self-searching and the self-forming power” (Channing, 1839, 7). The self-
searching power was, as Channing explained, the faculty of turning the mind 
on itself. We could thus “discern not only what we already are, but what we 
may become” (Channing, 1839, 7). We could watch the germ of a superior per-
fection, which is the purpose of our life. Furthermore, it was this introspective 
capacity that distinguished the civilized person from the brute, who lacked such 
an ability. 
The self-searching power was a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
self-culture: “we have a still nobler power, that of acting on, determining, and 
forming ourselves” (Channing, 1839, 7). This self-forming power had even 
more relevance, due to its connection with responsibility. In Channing’s ac-
count, people had the power of regulating their faculties and efforts; and con-
sequently also the responsibility of what they might become. Thanks to this 
power, we could ascend the heights of virtue, happiness and fate. That was why 
self-culture “transcends in importance all our power over outward nature. 
There is more of divinity in it, than in the force which impels the outward uni-
verse” (Channing, 1839, 8). 
Self-culture was possible because it had its foundation in our nature. 
Moreover, it wasn’t simply given to us for our own purpose: it was our “sol-
emn duty” (Channing, 1839, 8). Channing was confident that this duty and 
privilege of ours could be actualised. His age, in Channing’s eyes, was one of 
“progress of the mass of the people in intelligence, self-respect, and all the 
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comforts of life” (Channing, 1839, 42). This improvement owed its success to 
religion: “it was religion, which, by teaching men their near relation to God, 
awakened in them the consciousness of their importance as individuals” 
(Channing, 1839, 43). According to Channing, religion had brought the indi-
vidual to attention. Whatever the cause of this attention may be, all the men-
tioned Unitarians believed that the improvement of the individual had a pivotal 
role in the progress of society. This was the case for Jevons too. 
 
The improvement of character 
 
Jevons’s main answer to the social problem of his time was also moral. In 
the preface to the second edition of The Coal Question (1866), he wrote that, in 
times of lessening prosperity, we had increasingly to take care of social im-
provement. Such an improvement first and foremost had to be attained by rais-
ing “the character of the people appreciably” (Jevons, [1865] 1906, XLVII).  
Then Jevons specified that this urgency concerned primarily the lower classes: 
“ignorance and pauperism and vice” lived among the English (Jevons, [1865] 
1906, XLVII). Some measures had to be taken against these evils: “the igno-
rance, improvidence and brutish drunkenness of our lower working classes 
must be dispelled by a general system of education, which may effect for a fu-
ture generation what is hopeless for the present generation” (Jevons, [1865] 
1906, XLVIII). It is not surprising that Jevons put a lot of emphasis on educa-
tion, since this was the main means to attain social improvement through the 
improvement of character28. 
Jevons believed the working classes to be intemperate: in his own words, 
the “want of self-reliance and providence […] is the crowning defect of the 
poorer classes” (Jevons, [1865] 1906, 200). He often expressed this conviction. 
For instance, he took this topic into consideration in the address to Section F of 
 
28 Concerning Jevons’s stress on education, see Hutchison, 1969, 236;  Bowman, 
1989; 1997; Peart, 1996, where this topic has been analysed at length (especially chap. 




the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Here he stated that the 
solution to the pauperism of the working classes could never lie in raising their 
wages. Even if their wages were higher, they would simply spend more than 
before, finding themselves in the same circumstances again. As Jevons stated, 
“there are comparatively few signs that the wages of the working-classes, even 
when sufficient, are saved and applied really to advance the condition of the 
recipients” (Jevons, 1883, 205). 
The same thought was stated in The State in Relation to Labour (1882), the 
last of Jevons’s works. Here we read that “those who know not how to spend 
well are often injured rather than bettered by higher earnings” (Jevons, [1882] 
1910, 74). Hence, Jevons concluded that the real solution was to reform the in-
dividual character: “it is only with the increase of education and temperance 
that the increase of wages will prove a solid advantage” (Jevons, 1883, 205). 
Policy alone was at a loss as to how make permanent changes, without chang-
ing the individuals first. 
Evidently this principle was consistent with liberalism and free trade, even 
though we shall see that Jevons was far from being a blind advocate of free 
trade. Policy measures were evaluated on the bases of their capacity to develop 
good moral qualities, like self-reliance and temperance. For the same reason 
Jevons was enthusiast of the Poor Laws (see Jevons, 1883, 192, 197-198, 266). 
Thus, Jevons criticized “indiscriminate charity”, which “tends to create and 
perpetuate a class living in hopeless poverty” (Jevons, 1883, 197). Medical 
charities suffered the same problem: they discouraged self-reliance and thrift. 
Medical institutions should provide relief from accidents, not ordinary care. 
The latter should be left to individuals. “No working man is solvent unless he 
lay by so much of his wages as will meet the average amount of sickness fall-
ing to the lot of the man or his family” (Jevons, 1883, 199), stated Jevons. In 
their turn, trade unions ought to favour these practices, and only thus “they 
manifest that spirit of self-reliance which is the true remedy of pauperism” 
(Jevons, 1883, 199). 
Jevons addressed these topics in a lecture delivered in Manchester, in 
1866. As professor of Political Economy at Owens College, he opened the se-
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ries of evening classes organized by the Cobden Memorial Committee (see 
Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. VII, 37-54). These lectures were addressed to public 
school teachers. Following the spirit of their founders, Jevons chose to deal 
with the diffusion of knowledge of political economy among the working clas-
ses. However, this lecture, in Jevons’s own words, “brought some little criti-
cism from the part of the Radicals” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 207). In re-
sponse to one of them, Jevons quoted Cobden to show how aligned their views 
were concerning the responsibilities of the labouring classes: 
 
No people were ever yet elevated except through their own advancing 
wealth, morality, and intelligence; and anyone who tells the working-
men of this country that they may be raised in the social scale by any 
other process than that of reformation in themselves, is interested either 
in flattering or deceiving them (Jevons, 1883, 121). 
 
Jevons clarified his own position through Cobden’s words: every social reform 
ought to rely on moral reform. In the absence of the latter, political reform 
could have no grasp on people. 
In Jevons’s mind, the lower classes ought to take the middle-class as a 
model of morality. The real difference between these two classes was not their 
earnings, but their attitude towards thrift: 
 
There is no doubt that the very poorest classes of labourers are really 
unable to save any appreciable sum of money, but I believe that this is 
by no means the case with artizans. Receiving often £75 or £100 a year, 
they are really much better able to save that many clerks, shopmen, and 
others who would nevertheless be more provident (Jevons, 1883, 146). 
 
Jevons then agreed with the Unitarian ministers, of the likes of Tayler and Mar-
tineau. 
This belief that the middle-class ought to be taken as a model of behav-
iour was pivotal for some of Jevons’s works. Bert Mosselmans has investigated 
this topic through his study of Jevons’s musical writings (see Mosselmans, 
2007, 100-104). In the paper Amusements of the People (1878) Jevons ad-
dressed the problem of  the “progressive degradation of popular amusements” 
(Jevons, 1883, 3). According to him, the lower classes indulged in some activi-
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ties which he wouldn’t call respectable, but rather clumsy and vulgar (Jevons, 
1883, 4). The English working class also had an inclination for the worst of 
habits, namely drunkenness. 
Jevons remarked that amusement had often been considered an evil, that 
is, as sinful. For his part, Jevons refused this idea. He thus proved himself to be 
consistent with the Unitarian faith, which was far from condemning earthly 
pleasures as sinful in themselves29. On the contrary, Unitarians encouraged 
mild and respectable leisure. Jevons was thus in perfect harmony with Unitari-
an beliefs when he tried to encourage wise and instructive amusements for the 
‘hands’. Intemperate as they were, they should learn how to wisely spend their 
earnings, since in his view “they earn well, but they spend badly” (Jevons, 
1883, 6). They should be taught to spend better and to appreciate refined 
amusements. And they could only learn more refined taste by taking as an ex-
ample those who already had such habits, namely the educated middle class. In 
its turn, the middle class should endorse this development, and not refuse mix-
ing with the lower classes:  
 
Too often the least tendency towards culture is condemned. If a factory-
girl or a housemaid appears in a smart bonnet and a well-made dress, 
our high-class moralists object at once that she is aping her betters. 
How can good earnings be better spent than in aping your betters? How 
is real civilisation to be attained if the mere necessaries of life are to be 
good enough for the bulk of the people (Jevons, 1883, 6-7)? 
 
Jevons was persuaded that such an educative task would be accomplished 
perfectly by music, the worthiest of all amusements. Here he also gave way to 
his religious beliefs: “pure and sacred music [are] the deepest products of feel-
ing of the mind” (Jevons, 1883, 15). The pureness of melody, as Jevons de-
scribed it, seemed “to raise the hearer above the trifling affairs of life. At times 
it ‘brings all Heaven before our eyes’” (Jevons, 1883, 10). This last sentence 
 
29 For an example, see Channing, 1839, 40; here Channing explained that he was far 
from suggesting that the labourers had to turn down leisure and amusements in favour 




was a quotation from a hymn by William Cowper. It is remarkable that Marti-
neau had included this hymn in his collection, Hymns for a Christian Church 
and Home (Martineau, 1849, hymn n. 46). Martineau might have been Jevons’s 
source here. 
In Jevons’s mind these musical performances should take place in the East 
End of London, a neighbourhood where pure amusements were much needed. 
However, this educational purpose could only be reached with the help of the 
higher classes: 
 
Our hopes of elevating public taste would be sadly dashed to the 
ground, were vulgarism to invade our highest places of entertainment. 
Nor do I believe that there would be any gain in the end. Long may the 
time be distant; but if once such a place be deserted by the middle and 
upper classes and set down as vulgar, the course of its decline can be 
foreseen. Whatever our great caterers do, they must make a point of 
mingling all classes together, and retaining a reputation as places of 
fashionable resort (Jevons, 1883, 18). 
 
As mentioned above, Tayler believed that the different classes had to go be-
yond their disagreements, towards a conciliation of the whole society. Only the 
meeting of members of the classes with one another would solve the conflict. 
The same thought inspired Jevons’s analysis of so-called industrial part-
nership. Jevons was persuaded that the ‘hands’ would never put enough effort 
in their work until they had a share in profits. Thus, he suggested an industrial 
partnership where workers shared profits with their employers, thanks to which 
workmen would become by degrees “their own capitalists” (Jevons, 1883, 
119). Such a partnership ought to bind together people from different classes:  
 
The advocates of industrial partnerships wish to see honest labour meet 
with its due reward. They consider that combination should be in a per-
pendicular, and not in a horizontal, direction. The master is to combine 
with his men, to be their true leader, and after all the ordinary costs of 
wages, interest, and superintendence are provided for, the surplus is to 





Trade unions tended to create associations among the labourers of the 
same trade. Thus, trade unions made labourers stick together, encouraging mis-
trust towards their employers. Moreover, they supported workers in need, and 
consequently, like medical charities, they discouraged zealous and skilful work 
(Jevons, 1883, 126-127). They weakened the necessity of self-help. On the 
contrary, if workers saw their own benefit in the business, they would work 
harder. This purpose could only be attained if workers and their employers 
would acknowledge their common interest and start cooperating: “could [the 
employee] really be made to feel his interests identical with those of his em-
ployers, there can be no doubt that the profits of the trade could be greatly in-
creased in many cases” (Jevons, 1883, 127). 
Every class could take advantage of cooperation. Furthermore, in Jevons’s 
mind, moral improvement didn’t concern labourers exclusively. Bankers and 
capitalists ought to develop their capacity of decision-making as well. This 
point was raised by Sandra Peart, in her discussion of the process of inter-
temporal decision-making (Peart, 1996, 148-150 especially). Peart has shown 
that what working classes particularly lacked was the capacity of taking wise 
decision concerning their future. They spent their money improvidently. They 
married too early without considering the consequences on their future off-
spring (Jevons, 1883, 172). They systematically underestimated the importance 
of the future with respect to the present. However, she has further argued that 
middle classes weren’t so skilled in making long term decisions either (Peart, 
1996, 54). In his analysis of the business cycle, Jevons explained that bankers 
and investors managed business recklessly, being incapable of reading the 
signs of imminent crises. In Commercial Crises and Sunspots Jevons even at-
tributed an ‘inflammable spirit’ to investors (Jevons, [1878-1879] 1884, 243). 
Jevons spoke thus the language of moral reform: the speculators ought to tem-
perate their hot spirits in the coolness of prudence and self-control. As Chan-
ning had argued, humans had to cultivate themselves because they were hu-




2.3.  “The Creature of a Creator” 
 
Like many Victorians, Jevons believed that humans ought to follow the 
path of moral improvement. However, we should now shed light on a problem 
involved in Jevons’s thought. As argued above, Jevons had a deterministic 
conception of the universe. Humans were a part of the universe, and, as such, 
regulated by fixed laws too. 
Hence, two questions arise. First, if we are governed by unbending laws, 
what is the condition of possibility of self-improvement? Channing numbered 
two faculties, the self-inspecting and self-forming one, in order to ensure that 
self-culture was possible. As for Jevons, what made moral reform possible? 
Second, the problem is even more profound than that, involving a question of 
consistency: if we are creatures in a universe regulated by God’s plan, why is it 
necessary for us to improve ourselves? Addressing the topic of prayer, Jevons 
excluded petitions for any change in the order of things:  
 
To ask the Creator distinctly for any concrete object or service is not 
only vain and useless, but it is more – it borders on impiety. It implies 
an impeachment of His goodness and His wisdom. It is as much as to 
say that God has ordered things in one way and we think they should be 
otherwise. But are there no other petitions which we can make? Cannot 
we ask that God, instead of bending His course to ours, will bend our 
course to His (Jevons, 1886, 452)? 
 
This account would be consistent with a deterministic interpretation of the uni-
verse and humans. Instead of bending things to our will, we should find our 
place in God’s providence. However, Jevons wasn’t always so firm on that. As 
a matter of fact, advocating for the improvement of the individual character 
implied hoping for a modification in the course of the universe. Investigating 
this ambiguity in Jevons’s thought shall be the purpose of the following pages. 
 
The gulf between mind and matter 
 
The problem tackled here is related to the one already treated in the first 
chapter with respect to logic. In the first chapter I asked whether Jevons’s logic 
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was descriptive or prescriptive. The same could be asked concerning Jevons’s 
theory of morals: is human behaviour eligible for prescription or description? 
How do these levels overlap or differ? Jevons’s endorsement of determinism 
might suggest that human behaviour could only be studied scientifically and 
then described. He called himself a ‘dependant moralist’ in his young age. I 
have quoted above several passages from his where his position seemed trans-
parent. According to Jevons, humans were directed by their animal instincts 
and thus sought pleasure. Once we knew every relevant variable, we would be 
able to predict human behaviour fully. Just like a train on its tracks, humans 
could not be diverted from their path. However, if we are bound by our nature 
to act in such a way, is there any latitude for moral improvement? 
Jevons didn’t confine himself to the territory of description. Otherwise his 
exhortations for moral improvement would be pointless. Jevons admitted, not 
without a certain ambiguity, both description and prescription. Bruce Mazlish 
has underlined this intricacy in Jevons’s account. In a letter to his sister, as 
Mazlish has argued, Jevons gave her advices for her education. He suggested, 
using a notion most similar to the modern one of human capital30, that she had 
to complete her education before undertaking other tasks. This attitude is mani-
festly prescriptive: as Mazlish has noticed, “the particles in molecular physics 
do not have to be told how to behave; human beings, as self-interpreting crea-
tures, do” (Mazlish, 1986, 143). 
A proper investigation of this topic requires a comparison with Harro 
Maas’ argument on mechanical reasoning in Jevons’s thought. In his book Wil-
liam Stanley Jevons and the Making of Modern Economics, Maas has rightly 
highlighted the importance of mechanical analogies in Jevons’s account. Maas 
has remarked, agreeing with White (see M. White, 1994a), that the progress of 
psychological science in Jevons’s time “tended to blur the notorious distinction 
between mind and matter” (Maas, 2005, 10). Hence, the distinction between 
moral and physical sciences faded away as well (Maas, 2005, 9). Mind and 
matter were ordered by the same rules. Thus some scientists undertook the 
 
30 On this topic, see also Bowman, 1997, 464. 
147 
 
study of mechanical contrivances. One could investigate the functioning of 
machines in order to cast light on logical reasoning and on nature itself (Maas, 
2005, chap. 5). That was why, as Maas has argued, Jevons constructed his logi-
cal machines: “Jevons believed that his mechanical contrivance mimicked the 
process of logical inference of ordinary individuals” (Maas, 2005, 132, in the 
original there is emphasis on ‘process’). 
Maas has clearly stated that Jevons’s didn’t consider humans to be ma-
chines (Maas, 2005, 131)31. Mechanical contrivances only mimicked the rea-
soning process. Nonetheless, where does this difference between human beings 
and machines lie? Maas hasn’t investigated this point, although it is a funda-
mental one. My contention here is that, in Jevons’s account, there will always 
be a gulf between humans and machines. Such a gulf is related to the distinc-
tion between ‘is’ and ‘ought’: only humans dwell in the realm of ‘ought’, 
whereas machines are bound to ‘is’. Prescription has a meaning only for crea-
tures who can change themselves. Machines can be described, but it would be 
useless to give them any prescription. We shall also see that this difference is 
founded on Jevons’s religious thought, namely on the ontological gap between 
the infinite and the finite. 
As argued above, Jevons didn’t draw all the consequences of assuming a 
deterministic universe regulated by divine providence. Jevons never tackled the 
inconsistency implied in the encouragement for moral improvement, within a 
universe ordered by God’s plan. He simply assumed that an improvement of 
that sort was necessary. This ordered plan had to allow us the possibility of 
moral improvement through self-help, as Jevons’s texts on social reform 
showed. Humans could – and ought to – improve themselves. This is the first 
and fundamental discrepancy between human beings and mechanical contriv-
ances. Machines simply are what they are, they know no ‘ought’. Humans, in-
 
31 Here Maas also distinguished his position from Mirowski’s one. According to the 
latter, mental processes were reducible to material operations, so humans were just 
like machines. In this regard, see Mirowski, 2002, 40. 
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stead, belong to both the realms of ‘is’ and ‘ought’, being at once liable to pre-
scription and description. 
Moreover, Jevons had an interest in preserving the possibility and necessi-
ty of individual improvement. I have explained how deeply the Victorians re-
lied on individual improvement in view of social reform: no reform would have 
been possible without a change in the character of the people. Hence, ruling out 
such a possibility would have meant abandoning society to its current state, 
which for them was unacceptable. Jevons found in the precepts of self-help, 
self-reliance and cooperation a desideratum, a proper set of values for a moral 
system. Moral and social sciences may be approaching the model of physical 
ones, but they would never correspond with them. In Jevons’s account, moral 
sciences were still supposed to offer a model of good behaviour. As Jevons 
stated in the Address to the British Association, 
 
Chemistry cannot analyse the heart; it cannot show us how to temper 
the passions or mould the habits. The social sciences are the necessary 
complement to the physical sciences, for by their aid alone can the main 
body of the population be rendered honest, temperate, provident, and 
intelligent (Jevons, 1883, 196). 
 
Physical sciences described behaviour, but an investigation of the heart and a 
set of prescriptions was needed too, without which the individual, as well as 
the whole society, would be lost. 
Furthermore, if humans have to follow moral prescriptions, it is because 
they make mistakes. Once one is given a prescription, it can be complied or 
not. As Jevons wrote in The State in Relation to Labour, “people are always 
reasoning, well or ill – usually ill” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 19). They even in-
clined towards bad reasoning. This apparently insignificant point states another 
important difference with machines, and thus between matter and spirit: a ma-
chine does not err. This problem has also been addressed in the first chapter 
with respect to logic. If, in Jevons’s view, logic was rooted in the human mind, 
how could logical mistakes be accounted for? As a matter of fact, Jevons’s log-
ical machines were meant to help avoid those errors. That was why, after de-
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signing the Logical Abacus, “a second step towards a mechanical logic was 
soon seen to be easy and desirable” (Jevons, 1890, 151, emphasis added): 
 
The fixed order of the combinations in the written abecedarium renders 
it necessary to consider them separately, and to pick out by repeated 
acts of mental attention those which fall into any particular class. Con-
siderable labour and risk of mistakes thus arises (Jevons, 1890, 151). 
 
The Logical Abacus found a remedy to this inconvenience. Once properly set, 
the mechanism didn’t admit errors. A machine’s mistake is simply a malfunc-
tioning. Strictly speaking, machines cannot be mistaken: it is foreign to their 
nature. Mistakes are only possible in the scope of mind, namely of spirit. Only 
humans ought to reason properly, and so only humans can make errors of rea-
soning. 
As for the difference between matter and spirit, there are other occurrences 
in Jevons’s works where such difference is implied. In a short paper entitled “A 
Deduction from Darwin’s Theory”, Jevons touched on this topic. Here he stat-
ed that the highest forms of civilization develop in temperate climates. In con-
clusion to his argument, he added the following statement: 
 
the utmost result of speculations of this kind, supposing them to be val-
id, would consist in establishing a general tendency […]. I do not for a 
moment suppose that any common physical cause, such as soil, climate, 
mineral wealth, or geographical position, or any combination of such 
causes, can alone account for the rise and growth of civilization in As-
syria, Egypt, Greece, Italy, or England. Material resources are nothing 
without the mind which knows how to use them. No physiology of pro-
toplasm, no science that yet has a name, or perhaps ever will have a 
name, can account for the evolution of the intellect in all its endless de-
velopments (Jevons, 1869, 232). 
 
Despite the progress of psychology, mind continued to have rules of its own. 
Science couldn’t explain anything because matter was insufficient to cast light 
on intellectual phenomena, as Martineau argued at length in his battle against 
modern materialism. 
The idea that mind wasn’t reducible to matter was crucial in the closing 




Now among the most unquestionable rules of scientific method is that 
first law that whatever phenomenon is, is. […] If then there is to be 
competition for scientific recognition, the world without us must yield 
to the undoubted existence of the spirit within. Our own hopes and 
wishes and determinations are the most undoubted phenomena within 
the sphere of consciousness. If men do act, feel, and live as if they were 
not merely the brief products of a casual conjunction of atoms, but the 
instruments of a far-reaching purpose, are we to record all other phe-
nomena and pass over these? We investigate the instincts of the ant and 
the bee and the beaver, and discover that they are led by an inscrutable 
agency to work towards a distant purpose. Let us be faithful to our sci-
entific method, and investigate also those instincts of the human mind 
by which man is led to work as if the approval of a Higher Being were 
the aim of life (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 769). 
 
This passage is interesting to our purposes. Here Jevons stated that the exist-
ence of the spirit dwelling within us excluded the possibility that human life 
could be a product of mere chance. Humans have a sense of a higher purpose 
and strove to deserve the approval of a Higher Being. 
In the passage quoted above, not only did Jevons assert that mind was not 
reducible to matter. He also relied on phenomena of the inner conscience to 
provide evidence of God’s influence over us. He suggested that our inner expe-
rience was enough to prove ‘the undoubted existence of the spirit within’. This 
position echoed the words of Martineau, who often highlighted the inner char-
acter of religion. In Martineau’s words, “our own conscience is the window of 
heaven through which we gaze on God” (Martineau, 1839, 3). As I have stated 
above, Jevons embraced the framework of natural theology. However, in the 
dense quoted passage above, he relied on self-consciousness in order to show 
the ultimate purpose of the human being and the existence of a Higher Being. 
A similar position can be found in his notes about religion collected by his 
wife: 
 
The very wish for immortality, the very protest which the mind makes 
against its own extinction, gives a presumption that all accounts are not 
here closed. Whence come these feelings of hope, of confidence in 




In a journal entry, on the 4th March 1866, Jevons expressed the same thought: 
 
How can we doubt that there is a God when we feel Him moving in us? 
[…] Whence is this feeling that even failure in a high aim is better than 
success in a lower one? It must be from a Higher Source, for all lower 
nature loves & worships success, & cheerful life (Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. I, 202). 
 
Putting the accent on the inner life of conscience and its feelings showed 
that Jevons was liable to the influence of the ‘new school’. This influence is 
relevant, since Jevons used this argument to argue for the very existence of a 
Creator. Jevons also suggested that our inner perception of God was at the 
foundations of our moral duty, providing us with an aim higher than our na-
ture’s. Such a statement brings Channing and Martineau to mind, since they 
had strongly argued that God’s moral features were prior to anything else in 
His nature. 
As I have discussed in the first chapter, the human mind was considered 
transparent to itself, thus, in Jevons’s eyes our inner experience revealed the 
existence of the Almighty as well. “Creation is not yet concluded”, wrote Jev-
ons, “and there is no one of us who may not become conscious in his heart that 
he is no Automaton, no mere lump of Protoplasm, but the Creature of a Crea-
tor” (Jevons, 1890, 294). As Channing stated, humans are no machines, or au-
tomata in Jevons’s terms. Here Jevons also distinguished humans from ‘lower 





Humans are not mechanic contrivances. They are endowed with spiritual 
features, which are not reducible to the mechanisms of matter. Hence, matter 
and spirit do not overlap, and humans and machines differ from one another. 
Nonetheless, how do machines and humans differ? Jevons was a committed 
partisan of unity in method: from his point of view, the scientific method could 
and should be introduced in all domains of knowledge. However, when applied 
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to the study of the individual mind, scientific investigation was challenged. 
Jevons followed Aristotelian metaphysics and argued that no science of the in-
dividual was possible: “an individual cannot be defined, and can only be made 
known by the exhibition of the individual itself” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 711)32. 
Therefore, science was necessarily at a loss to account for the phenomena of 
individual life. In the Principles of Science Jevons wrote as follows: 
 
It is apparent that in human character there is unfathomable and inex-
haustible diversity. Every mind is more or less like every other mind; 
there is always a basis of similarity, but there is a superstructure of feel-
ings, impulses, and motives which is distinctive for each person. […] 
The complexities of existing phenomena probably develop themselves 
more rapidly than scientific method can overtake them. In spite of all 
the boasted powers of science, we cannot really apply scientific method 
to our own minds and characters, which are more important to us than 
all the stars and nebulae (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 733-734). 
 
The most unaccountable of all individual features was genius. As Jevons 
explained in the Principles of Science, before giving portraits of some eminent 
scientists, “nothing, indeed, is less amenable than genius to scientific analysis 
and explanation” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 576). Genius didn’t bend to scientific 
explanation because it was a breach of the ordinary course of nature: “as genius 
is essentially creative, and consists in divergence from the ordinary grooves of 
thought and action, it must necessarily be a phenomenon beyond the domain of 
the laws of nature” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 576). In the notes he wrote towards 
the end of his life Jevons was quite clear about the origin of such a power. 
“Among the lower animals”, as he stated, “is the bounded variety – that same-
ness that is truly hopeless. But man may possess genius. We know not whence 
it comes, but from the mysterious working of the Primary Cause” (Jevons, 
1886, 453, emphasis added). 
Genius could break the laws of nature because it was not of this world, re-
sulting from divine intervention. Consequently, history could never be scientif-
 
32 See also Jevons, (1874) 1877, 595, where Jevons quoted Plato and Aristotle con-
cerning the impossibility of acquiring any knowledge of the individual. 
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ically explained, since it implied the action of genius. As we have seen in the 
last chapter of the Principles of Science, God had the power of interfering with 
the series of natural causes33. Genius was just an instance of God’s ability to 
modify the universe according to His will. Furthermore, through genius God 
also gave humans the possibility of creation, namely of escaping their own 
boundaries and the boundaries of nature. The human mind could break through 
the ‘is’, or its ordinary course of thought; something which no machine could 
ever accomplish. 
However, genius wasn’t the only faculty which depended on the Primary 
Cause. “Are not all high thoughts”, asked Jevons, “all pure desires, the gift of 
God? Are not all hearts moved in more or less degree towards the good they 
would not otherwise have conceived?” (Jevons, 1886, 455). God was thus a 
guide to our moral sentiments, and showed the path of goodness and higher 
motives. Thus, Jevons seems to suggest that the condition of possibility for 
moral improvement rested on a divine gift. Channing had postulated a self-
inspecting and self-forming faculty to secure the steps of the person engaged in 
self-culture. In his turn, Jevons postulated that God had provided His creature 
with the purest sentiments and the capacity to conceive goodness. And yet, un-
like Channing, Jevons didn’t tackle this foundational problem explicitly, leav-
ing us to mere hypotheses concerning the condition of possibility of moral im-
provement. 
According to Jevons, the divine hand was also visible in Jesus, whose na-
ture showed “the manifest workings of a Divine Spirit in His life and works” 
(Jevons, 1886, 454). It is worth mentioning that this position recalled Marti-
neau’s theory of Christ’s inspiration. As Martineau argued in the Liverpool 
Controversy, “the inspiration of Christ is not any solitary, barren, incommuni-
cable prodigy; but diffusive, creative, vivifying as the energy of God” (Marti-
neau, 1839b, 7). In Martineau’s mind, Christ was completely filled by this di-
vine energy, which in him was present more intensively than in anything or an-
 
33 See the Uniformitarian-Catastrophist debate as explained in the first chapter. 
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yone else (see Martineau, 1900, Vol. II, 212)34. Thus, Jevons mentioning the 
divine spirit in Christ proves again that he was informed by the position of the 
reformers. However, the divine spirit wasn’t at work in moral sentiments ex-
clusively. As Jevons wrote in The State in Relation to Labour, “reason is a Di-
vine gift” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 170) as well. Hence, we had the responsibility 
to use it – and to use it properly. Furthermore, the supernatural origin of these 
sentiments and faculties implied that human knowledge, which is finite, could 
never grasp them fully. As Jevons wrote, “I do believe that there spring forth 
from the human mind and heart – the feelings which science will never analyse 
– hope and trust and self-devotion” (Jevons, 1886, 455). 
Here Jevons was firmer in stating that science could never attain a com-
plete understanding of those feelings. They exceed our knowledge, they surpass 
it. Thus, I would like to call the spirit ‘an excess’ with respect to matter, in or-
der to clarify Jevons’s position. Jevons was positive that those feeling would 
never be analysed, because they inherently surpassed the order of nature. Being 
directly caused by God, their origin was infinite. Those faculties were in his 
mind ‘a window through which we gaze on the infinity’, and thus will always 
exceed our finite knowledge. Not to mention that such an excess couldn’t be 
ascribed to any machine, since contrivances are the product of human 
knowledge. 
Reason, genius, pure desires, are all gifts of God. Consequently, they shall 
always exceed the series of causes regulating nature. They added an element of 
novelty and unpredictability to human action. This view of mental faculties 
was, however, at odds with Jevons’s desire to found social sciences on a sound 
scientific basis. This tension runs through his major economic work, The Theo-
ry of Political Economy, as Michael White has rightly pointed out (see M. 
White, 1994a, 216-219). Here Jevons claimed that his work was a “mechanics 
of human interest” (Jevons, 1871, 24). His work on the laws of muscular exer-
tion, where he tries to reconstruct “the mathematical relations upon which the 
science of economy is founded” (Jevons, 1870, 158), also went in this direc-
 
34 On this topic see also Waller, 2002, 347-350. 
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tion. Nonetheless, in his Theory Jevons argued that the economic agent chose 
his course of action: “the mind of an individual is the balance which makes its 
own comparisons, and is the final judge of quantities of feelings” (Jevons, 
1871, 19). “Pleasures”, Jevons added, “are, for the time being, as the mind es-
timates them; so that we cannot make a choice, or manifest the will in any way, 
without indicating thereby an excess of pleasure in some direction” (Jevons, 
1871, 19). White has highlighted the ambiguity of this argument: Jevons didn’t 
clarify if this will had a mechanical nature or was free to choose (see M. White, 
1994a, 218). 
The difference between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ plays a preponderant role in this 
problem. If the agent’s decisions weren’t voluntary, every decision would be 
acceptable. Indeed the agent would have no choice but the one actually made. 
No prescription could reasonably apply to this agent’s behaviour, since the 
agent could not behave differently. However, Jevons held that some decisions 
might be more desirable than others. Thus, while discriminating a lower from a 
higher rank of feelings, he wrote as follows: “if the claims of a family or of 
friends fall upon him, it may become desirable that he should deny his own de-
sires and even his physical needs their full customary gratification” (Jevons, 
1871, 30). The hierarchy of feelings in Jevons’s economic theory shall be fur-
ther investigated in the next chapter. Here, it is important to connect this pas-
sage with the ‘is-ought question’. Jevons used the term ‘should’, which is con-
nected to the domain of ‘ought’. In the face of a greater good, the economic 
agent had to relinquish his immediate desires. He ought to act in such a way. 
Not to mention that humans generally reasoned badly. As argued above, in 
Jevons’s eyes all classes had to learn how to make more cautious decisions. 
The labourer ought to spend better, the businessman ought to restrain himself 
from rash investments and to foresee crises in the market. 
Consequently, Jevons kept a place for moral decision and improvement 
even in his ‘mechanics of interest’. It is worth mentioning that this oscillation 
gave a high degree of ambiguity to his theory. But what was the reason for this 
ambiguity? Why was Jevons so eager to give his agent the capacity of choice? 
According to White’s hint, Jevons was well aware of the moral implication of 
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physiological psychology (see M. White, 1994a, 220). A deterministic theory 
of morals might jeopardize individual responsibility, and with it the harmony 
of the whole society. That was why Jevons was inclined to leave some latitude 
to free will. Ruling the ‘ought’ out of human behaviour would result in an im-
moral individual, and thus an immoral society. Jevons expressed this concern 
in the final chapter of the Principles, where he wondered if science was meant 
to be materialistic: “if so, our boasted free will become a delusion, moral re-
sponsibility a fiction, spirit a mere name for the more curious manifestations of 
material energy” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 736). As I have shown in the first chap-
ter, for Jevons, assuming that science could explain everything within its 
framework was a mistaken and arrogant philosophy of science. The universe, 
as an infinite creation of an infinite Being, could not be encompassed in a ma-
terialistic account. 
As we have seen from his notes and works, for Jevons humans were no au-
tomata. Human beings were creatures of ‘ought’ and ‘is’ at once. Matter would 
never exhaust spirit. White has suggested that Jevons was uneasy about Marti-
neau’s criticism of scientific psychology. Despite being dissatisfied with Mar-
tineau’s knowledge of this domain, the Unitarian minister produced Jevons the 
urge to reconcile religion and science. According to White, Jevons’s way to 
harmonize them was to keep them analytically separate: beliefs and knowledge 
divorced from one another in Jevons’s view (see M. White, 1994a, 222-223). 
My contention here is that Jevons was far more haunted than that by Marti-
neau’s argument. The head of the reformers had provided Jevons with a way to 
focus on the peculiarities of spirit with respect to matter. That was why Jev-
ons’s religious beliefs couldn’t be confined to the private sphere. Religious cat-
egories were at the foundation of his epistemology as well as of his moral pre-
cepts. In Jevons’s view, God was the infinite source of man’s moral qualities, 
his path towards good. Humans were no machines, but the creatures of a Crea-





2.4. Individuals and society 
 
As we have seen, Jevons primarily conceived social reform in terms of in-
dividual improvement. However, how did he conceive of society? What was 
the place of the individual within society? In the present section, I address 
these questions. I argue that Jevons had an individualistic account of society. I 
will then distinguish moral from political individualism, explaining that Jevons 
was a moral individualist, but not a political one. Moreover, I stress how Jev-
ons, like many Victorians, dreaded that his beliefs could be seen as an en-
dorsement of egoism. 
 
The primacy of the individual 
 
Jevons tackled this problem while reading Whately’s Lectures on Political 
Economy, in Australia35. According to Whately, as Jevons remarked in his 
notes, humans were endowed with a social instinct “conferred by God on Man, 
the system of cooperation, and exchange which civilized Society always pre-
sents, being a remarkable & very striking because unexpected example of de-
sign in Providence” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 158). Jevons utterly agreed 
with Whately in this respect. While Whately considered that divine providence 
was the means through which society progressed from an uncivilized to a civi-
lized state, Jevons took progress in civilization instead to be the result of the 
divine gift of reason. As we read in his notes, 
 
the proposition that none can raise themselves from the savage state 
etc., the first civilizing influence being the direct agency of God is 
changed to the prop. that none can raise themselves but by the aid of 
reason derived from God, but that having received this in their creation, 
all have risen to a degree of civilization proportional to their mental ca-
pabilities (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 159). 
 
 
35 Micheal White has already brought these notes to attention, pointing out Whately’s 




Once again, religion had a pivotal role in Jevons’s thought, for the principle at 
the basis of society – i.e. reason – was a divine gift. 
Moreover, the individual had obligations towards society. These duties 
firstly consisted in the moral obligation of the middle-class towards the labour-
ing classes:  
 
In the eye of the economist and the statesman, in regard to the public in-
terests, and before the face of God, the welfare of the working-man and 
the workingman’s class is as much an object of care as that of the 
wealthiest capitalist; and, indeed, in proportion to the numbers con-
cerned, vastly more so (Jevons, 1890, 107). 
 
It is worth mentioning that William Gaskell preached a sermon entitled The 
Duties of the Individual to Society, at Cross Street in 1858. In this sermon Gas-
kell praised the departed manufacturer John Potter for his social engagement. 
Whoever forsook society, argued Gaskell, forsook their best instincts – in-
stincts which made them acknowledge all as their brethren (see W. Gaskell, 
1858, 4): “self is not the only object of our existence, else why were we en-
dowed with social affections, and made susceptible of social wants and enjoy-
ments?” (W. Gaskell, 1858, 5). The individual ought to give something in ex-
change of all the advantages that society offered. Our service should take into 
account the whole world, “for it is the world of our fellow-beings” (W. Gas-
kell, 1858, 4). 
Both for Jevons and Gaskell, God had provided humans with social in-
stincts. Human beings lived in a society of brothers. However, our previous in-
vestigations suggest that Jevons’s view of society was individualistic. As I 
have argued, individual character was for him the ground where social reform 
took root. If the singular person had this intermediary function between society 
and reform, it was because of his primacy. Primacy in the sense that the indi-
vidual was the engine and the core of society. This is manifest in Jevons’s con-
ception of history, in which it was individual action and genius which altered 




There have been writers who, however industrious, were shallow, for 
they thought that science could account for the course of history. They 
utterly failed to see that a nation as a whole is the most complicated of 
phenomena, because not only is each individual different from each 
other, but any one may act upon the whole in a manner wholly incalcu-
lable. Genius or ingenium means inborn powers, of which no one can 
give a further account (Jevons, 1886, 453). 
 
These statements entail an individualistic account of society. Indeed, from Jev-
ons’s perspective, the individual behaviour could not be explained collectively. 
Moreover, the endeavours of private individuals were the pillars of social 
progress. As Jevons stated in Experimental Legislation and the Drink Traffic, 
society progressed thanks to tentative attempts to innovate it. Whenever such 
an ‘experiment’ succeeded, and was replicated, we had a new discovery (Jev-
ons, 1883, 256-257). The credit for such inventions went entirely to private in-
dividuals: “every new heading that is inserted in the London Trades’ Directory 
is claimed by those private individuals who have tried a new trade” (Jevons, 
1883, 256). As Jevons added, “the struggle for existence makes us all look out 
for chances of profit. We are all, perhaps, in some degree inventors” (Jevons, 
1883, 256-257). Everyone had to make their own way in the struggle for life. 
Competition triggered the search for novelty through experimentation. As Jev-
ons concluded, 
 
If we had time to trace the history of the steam engine, of gas lighting, 
of electric telegraphs, of submarine cables, of electric lighting, or of any 
other great improvement, we should see, in like manner, that the wis-
dom of Parliament has had nothing to do with planning it. From the first 
to the last the rule of progress has been that of the ancient nursery 
rhyme – Try, try, try: And if at first you don’t succeed, Try, try, try 
again (Jevons, 1883, 257-258). 
 
Inventions flourished by virtue of private initiative; the state had little or noth-
ing to do with them. It is not surprising that Jevons was an avid reader of Sam-
uel Smiles’s Lives of Engineers36. 
 
36 See Jevons’s remark on the excellence of Samuel Smiles’s work in Jevons, (1865) 
1906, 102. Jevons’s connection with Samuel Smiles has also been pointed out by 
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Jevons’s faith in private initiative and his individualistic interpretation of 
society were in accordance with his liberalism, endorsement of free trade and 
discouragement of state intervention. This commitment to free trade was par-
ticularly strong in Jevons’s youth. He expressed his position clearly in a letter 
to the Empire newspaper. The subject matter was the Australian railway sys-
tem. Here the young Jevons argued that a misconception of economic theory 
could entail counterproductive decisions on the part of government. Thus he 
wrote that “when starting thus upon principles of economy radically false, it 
becomes doubly necessary to watch the steps of those who are charged with 
executive power, and entertain such opinions” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 
266)37. 
For instance, a public investment in the extension of the railway lines 
would increase the public debt, hindering economic growth: “unproductive ex-
penditure and a public debt will only burden and retard this colony” (Jevons, 
1972-1981, Vol. II, 268). Expenditures should be repaid by ticket fares, so that 
the investments would be counterbalanced by the appropriate returns. In Jev-
ons’s mind, private investors had proven to be far more longsighted than public 
organizations: 
 
In the States […] the lines of railway are, I believe, projected and exe-
cuted by private speculators, Yankee men of business, of well-known 
foresight and acuteness. Does the general success of Government works 
in this colony or any other country whatever, warrant us in supposing 
the same economy and foresight will be employed, or the same success 
attend the Government railway undertakings at present in question 
(Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 267). 
 
Jevons expressed his endorsement of free trade in The Coal Question as well. 
Here, taking into consideration the English policy, Jevons wrote as follows: 
“our growth has been nourished by freedom, not by restrictions” (Jevons, 
[1865] 1906, 434). 
 
Mays; see Mays, 1962, 244, where this topic had been addressed with respect to scien-
tific methodology. 




Moral and political individualism 
 
Jevons’s individualistic views made him inclined to consider the private 
initiative more efficient than state intervention. However, his stance against 
state intervention wasn’t as strict as it may seem. This statement could be be-
wildering, without an elucidation of the term ‘individualism’. Jevons surely 
had an individualistic account of society – unless that several forms of individ-
ualism can be identified. Differentiating these forms turns out to be productive 
to investigate Jevons’s thought. 
Stefan Collini, in Liberalism and Sociology, has distinguished political 
from moral individualism. Individualism had a political feature, advocating 
against state intervention, collectivism and socialism. This political form of in-
dividualism was often buttressed by a moral individualism, even though the 
two forms did not overlap. The moral individualist considered the subject as 
self-centred, and individual action as free and independent. This subject was 
free to pursue their own ends, so that the word ‘individualism’ was often inter-
preted as a synonym of egoism (see Collini, 1979, 16)38. Collini’s account of 
individualism is set in the 1880s, where the political sense became increasingly 
widespread. At the same time the moral sense was increasingly associated with 
egoistic pursuits (see Collini, 1979, 18). Consequently, in 1885 Sigdwick wrote 
that “Individualism of the extreme kind has clearly had its day” (H. Sidgwick, 
as quoted in Collini, 1979, 17), trying to distinguish his own position from the 
predominant harsh interpretation of the term. 
Where does Jevons’s individualism fit into Collini’s scheme? Jevons was 
first and foremost a moral individualist. A clear statement of his moral individ-
ualism can be found in his notes. While explaining that the human mind and 
character could be compared to a piece of machinery, Jevons also presented the 
basis of his moral account:  
 
38 Collini has relied on the entries of the Oxford English Dictionary in the distinction 




I regard man in reality as essentially selfish, that is as doing everything 
with a view to gain enjoyment or avoid pain. This self interest is cer-
tainly the main-spring of all his actions, and I believe that it is beyond a 
mans nature to act otherwise, just as food, his fuel is the source of all 
his bodily actions, and his only possible maintainance. […] In its action 
on the body the mind must follow a simple & universal law of seeking 
the most pleasure, and follow it as implicitly as the railway train fol-
lows the curves & turns of the line upon which it is running (Jevons, 
1972-1981, Vol. I, 133). 
 
Jevons’s considerations were triggered by John Woolley’s lecture on the selfish 
theory of morals (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 132). And yet these were the basic 
principles of Utilitarianism as Jeremy Bentham presented it. Indeed Bentham’s 
Introduction to the Principles of Moral and Legislation opened with a very 
similar statement: 
 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we 
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand 
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and ef-
fects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we 
say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjec-
tion, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it (Bentham, [1823] 
1996, 11). 
 
According to Robert Collison Black, Jevons didn’t study Bentham’s phi-
losophy extensively until he went back to University College of London in 
1859. There he attended John Hoppus’s course on Philosophy of Mind and 
Logic, which encompassed Bentham’s work. Black has also suggested that 
Jevons’s acquaintance with Bentham’s theory of morals had been transmitted 
by James Martineau (see R. D. C. Black, 1972a, 123-124). In any case Ben-
tham’s influence on Jevons’s thought became significant, corroborating the 
moral individualism which Jevons had outlined in his notes. Black has rightly 
highlighted how Jevons’s endorsement of Utilitarianism wasn’t nominal at all, 
notwithstanding Ross Robertson’s tendency to minimize the utilitarian influ-
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ence on Jevons (see R. D. C. Black, 1972a, 123)39. Indeed, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, Jevons’s economic theory involved a self-interested agent 
maximizing pleasure. Jevons himself asserted in the Theory that he had “no 
hesitation in accepting the Utilitarian theory of morals which does uphold the 
effect upon the happiness of mankind as the criterion of what is right and 
wrong” (Jevons, 1871, 27). 
As argued above, Jevons was a moral individualist. His position was con-
sistent with the utilitarian theory of morals. However, the ultimate utilitarian 
goal was far from being the happiness of the individual person, as Bentham had 
explained well (see Bentham, [1823] 1996, 12-13). Bentham had clarified that 
the principle of utility was nothing but an expression designating the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number (see Bentham, [1823] 1996, 14, n. d). Hence, 
Bentham’s utilitarianism was founded on a form of moral individualism, but 
wasn’t selfish from a political point of view. 
Jevons agreed with Bentham completely, as is shown in The State in Rela-
tion to Labour, a text in which Jevons’s allegiance to the utilitarian political 
theory was evident. As Jevons wrote, paraphrasing Bentham’s Introduction, 
“the State is justified in passing any law, or even in doing any single act which, 
without ulterior consequences, adds to the sum total of happiness” (Jevons, 
[1882] 1910, 13)40. The supreme law was the salus populi, the well-being of 
the community (see Jevons, [1882] 1910, 17). Jevons took a practical – or ex-
perimental – point of view, arguing that no abstract principle could survive ful-
ly intact into social legislation. In his mind, the latter was “a complex calculus 
 
39 Wolfe Mays has denied that Jevons’s position had been informed by Bentham too. 
According to Mays, “Jevons’s statement that economics deals with pleasures and 
pains would then seem little else but a façon de parler” (see Mays, 1962, 240). As for 
Ross Robertson’s thesis, see R. Robertson, 1951, 233-234. 
40 It is worth mentioning that Bentham encouraged understanding government’s 
measures in the light of the greatest happiness principle: “a measure of government 
[…] may be said to be conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when […] 
the tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than 
any which it has to diminish it” (Bentham, (1823) 1996, 13). 
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of good and evil” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 16). Nonetheless, every social decision 
had to be evaluated in accordance with the principle of the greatest happiness. 
Thus, we can easily understand how for Jevons free trade wasn’t a dogma. Free 
trade is an abstract rule, and as such it ought to be ignored if its application 
seems to entail more evil than good (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 17). 
 
The spectre of selfishness 
 
Neither Bentham nor Jevons were advocating individualism in the sense of 
political egoism. Indeed, Jevons was constantly worried that his perspective 
might entail an egoistic view of individual behaviour. The harsh connotation of 
self-interest as egoism haunted him from his youth. If human action was trig-
gered by seeking for pleasure, this wouldn’t itself be grounds for saying hu-
mans are selfish. This utilitarian agent “is not necessarily what we should call 
an avaricious, interested or in fact in its full sense a selfish man” (Jevons, 1972-
1981, Vol. I, 133). As Jevons explained, 
 
it is by the quality of those pleasures which he is continually seeking 
and by the causes of pain he equally flies from that he is to be judged. It 
is quite possible that one of his chief pleasures may be to see another 
person happy, or that he may have a friend connected to him by such in-
timacy, similarity of feelings, and in short complete sympathy, that pain 
to the friend is pain to himself (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 133). 
 
And yet this statement couldn’t jeopardize the main assumption, namely the 
self-interested character of the individual. The moral agent was bound to the 
research of pleasure. As for what we call ‘selfishness’ in its proper sense, 
 
it is in the nature & spontaneous impulses of the soul itself and its rela-
tion, by sympathetic feelings to other souls, that what we shall call, un-
selfishness, disinterestedness or benevolence consist. […] The truly 
selfish man will be he who has no such connections with the souls of 
others, and whose enjoyments are completely or material or perhaps 
misanthropical (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 133). 
 
Collini, in Public Moralists, has highlighted how strongly many Victorians 
were concerned with the egoistic implications of their moral theories. They de-
165 
 
nied that self-interest necessarily implied egoism. A self-interested agent could 
also have altruistic feelings; on the contrary, his actions ought to take into ac-
count the good of others (see Collini, 1991, 60-90). Jevons fitted perfectly into 
this cultural atmosphere. Once he admitted our main motives to be self-
interested, he had to avoid reducing the moral agent to a dangerous, selfish in-
dividual. While Jevons was coping with the poor reception of his A Serious 
Fall in the Value of Gold Ascertained, he was also struggling to understand the 
nature of his own motives, and determine whether they were selfish. Thus, he 
wrote: “faulty as I am in so many ways – I yet feel that my inmost motives are 
hardly selfish” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 191). He believed that his role as a 
writer on political economy was to give a service to society (Jevons, 1972-
1981, Vol. I, 191-192)41. Now, what is important here is that Jevons considered 
analysing his own feelings in order to escape from the charge of being selfish. 
He tackled the problem of selfishness in a very interesting way in his re-
flections on My Novel, by Bulwler-Lytton. Jevons wrote about the difference of 
the two main characters, Leonard and Randal: “I cannot quite understand the 
exact difference which lies perhaps under the same mystery as selfishness does 
in my mind” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 130). Apparently, the question was 
linked to ambition. Is it acceptable to pursue one’s own ends for one’s own sat-
isfaction, regardless of the purity of the prompting motives? Jevons implicitly 
answered negatively. Indeed this was the difference between the characters: 
Leonard, the positive character, was in Jevons’s mind “prompted & urged on 
by an inward, perhaps innate sense of the Good & Great, an idea which work-
ing within him, leads him, without any positive view to his own or others mere 
happiness & comfort” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 130). Leonard didn’t im-
prove himself for the sake of glory or power. He did it in a disinterested man-
 
41 Here we read: “sometimes I even feel that I should not care for reputation wealth, 
comfort or even life itself if I could feel that all my efforts were not without their use. 
Could I do it all anonymously, I perhaps might consent to it. And yet the condemna-




ner, while Randal didn’t have “the slightest appreciation of the meaning of 
Good or Great” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 131). Therefore, whenever he 
could, Randal was always “ready to take a short cut in which he thinks he will 
be unobserved though it be by a dishonourable step” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. 
I, 131). 
According to Jevons’s interpretation of My Novel, the unselfish man keeps 
true to his principles and acts in a disinterested way, whereas the selfish one 
only cares for his reputation. The difference between the two of them lies in the 
integrity of their motives: 
 
Leonard & Randal are indeed something like two men setting off to cir-
cumnavigate the Globe for instance one with the genuine love of travel 
& improvement, the other for the sake of the name he will obtain on his 
return; each might visit the identical same places, yet the one find eve-
rywhere gratification and interest whereas the other perhaps detests 
each place he comes to counts up the stages of travel still remaining, 
and arriving home again, gains a suitable reward by being discovered 
and his superficialness exposed (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 131). 
 
Jevons considered thus that investigating the notion of selfishness required an 
exploration of inwardness, that is, intention. One could be blamed on the basis 
of the motives underlying their actions, like Randal. 
Jevons didn’t fail to condemn selfish motives as well as actions. For in-
stance, in his paper The Rationale of Free Public Libraries (1881), Jevons re-
proached those who possessed beautiful artworks and kept them in their private 
rooms, away from the eyes of the world: “if a beautiful picture be hung in the 
dining room of a private house it may perhaps be gazed at by a few guests a 
score or two of times in the year. Its real utility is too often that of ministering 
to the selfish pride of its owner” (Jevons, 1883, 29, emphasis added). Had that 
artwork its place in a museum instead, it would be admired by many, increas-
ing the amount of happiness, i.e. utility, of the community. Selfishness de-
prived the community of happiness: nothing could be worse in the eyes of a 
utilitarian philosopher. 
It is important to note that this position marked a difference between Jev-
ons and Bentham. The moral theory of the latter was only concerned with con-
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sequences42, whereas the former’s brought inner motives into moral thought. 
Ellen Frankel Paul has highlighted this point with respect to Jevons’s distinc-
tion between morality and legislation in The State in Relation to Labour (see 
Paul, 1979, 279). For Bentham, humans were certainly endowed with ‘extra-
regarding’, or altruistic feelings (see Bentham, 1983, 154; [1815] 1983, 16-18). 
Utilitarian orthodoxy admitted then that we could feel sympathy for others. 
And yet what really mattered was the outcome of one’s actions: as long as the 
agent doesn’t harm anyone, he cannot be blamed on the grounds of his mo-
tives. Moreover, according to Bentham, the agent was the best judge of his own 
welfare. Nobody should be encouraged to relinquish self-regarding motives in 
favour of extra-regarding ones. This would be, from Bentham’s point of view, 
an unacceptable abuse of the individual, and contrary to the increase of general 
happiness (see Bentham, 1983, 121). 
Jevons’s account was quite different. One could and should be blamed for 
having selfish motives. Scrutiny of people’s motives not only distanced Jev-
ons’s position from Bentham’s; it also brought Jevons closer to James Marti-
neau’s moral account. The utilitarian tradition of Bentham and Paley valued the 
material consequences of actions, whereas Martineau considered that moral 
behaviour couldn’t be such in the absence of a sincere moral conscience. 
Hence, Jevons’s attention to motives was more consistent with Martineau’s 
thought than with the utilitarian tradition. Jevons felt the spectre of selfishness 
lingering on his moral theory. We can now see that Jevons was placed in a 
complicated conundrum: how could a society based on moral individualism be 
imagined? I now turn to this problem as it was tackled by Jevons, Bentham and 






42 Concerning consequentialism, see Bentham, (1823) 1996, 74. 
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2.5. A sum of number ones 
 
We can now see that Jevons was placed in a complicated conundrum: how 
could a society based on moral individualism be imagined? I now turn to this 
problem as it was tackled by Jevons, Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 
 
Number one, the magic number 
 
As I have argued, Jevons was persuaded that selfishness, properly so 
called, was unacceptable and did great harm to society. He was aware that the 
line between selfishness and self-interest was thin. Nonetheless, Jevons’s ac-
count inherited an old and thorny problem, which had long been haunting the 
utilitarian philosophers and many others: how a society composed of self-
interested individuals is unified? 
This difficulty was all the more relevant considering that it had an ontolog-
ical foundation. From the ontological point of view, we could ask: how a socie-
ty where the fundamental unity is the singular individual does not disintegrate? 
That is, how a society resulting from a sum of number ones is unified? Such 
was Bentham’s definition of the community: 
 
The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons 
who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest 
of the community then, is what? – the sum of the interests of the several 
members who compose it (Bentham, [1823] 1996, 12). 
 
Society was a fictitious body, that is, it didn’t have an ontological foundation43. 
‘Community’ was a conventional term indicating the sum of individuals. 
Hence, society was the result of the sum one plus one, plus one, plus one, and 
so on. Consequently, the interest of such a community was reduced to the sum 
of its members’ interests. 
The risk was letting society fall apart in such a count: one by one, the in-
terest of the whole may never be composed. On the basis of these theoretical 
 
43 For the notion of fiction, see Bentham, 1838-1843, 195-213. 
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foundations, there would be no such thing as social unity, but only the tempo-
rary appearance of it. Let us now take into account a passage of Oliver Twist, 
where the same problem is tackled. Fagin, who heads a criminal group in East 
London, explained to one of his accomplices his view of how their community 
could stick together:  
 
“Some conjurers say that number three is the magic number, and some 
say number seven. It’s neither, my friend, neither. It’s number one”. 
“Ha! ha!” cried Mr. Bolter. ‘Number one for ever’. 
“In a little community like ours, my dear”, said Fagin, who felt it neces-
sary to qualify this position, “we have a general number one; that is, 
you can’t consider yourself as number one, without considering me too 
as the same, and all the other young people”. 
“Oh, the devil!” exclaimed Mr. Bolter. 
“You see”, pursued Fagin, affecting to disregard this interruption, “we 
are so mixed up together, and identified in our interests, that it must be 
so. For instance, it’s your object to take care of number one – meaning 
yourself”. 
“Certainly”, replied Mr. Bolter. “Yer about right there”. 
“Well! You can’t take care of yourself, number one, without taking care 
of me, number one”. 
“Number two, you mean”, said Mr. Bolter, who was largely endowed 
with the quality of selfishness. 
“No, I don’t!” retorted Fagin. “I’m of the same importance to you, as 
you are to yourself” (Dickens, 1968, 327). 
 
The little community of criminals was bound by the same interests, and 
nonetheless every member was caring for himself exclusively. Each of them 
was a ‘number one’, namely a self-interested individual endowed with the 
quality of selfishness, like Bolter. That was why taking care of the other mem-
bers didn’t make the count go on: everyone, by looking after the interests of the 
others, was really minding their own interest. The interest of the individual is 
the only unity of measure for one’s behaviour. Though describing a group of 
criminals, Dickens’s picture applied to every community of self-interested in-
dividuals. Such a society couldn’t but be skating on thin ice: it was harmonious 
so far as the interests of the others coincided with one’s own. Once these for-
tuitous circumstances failed, the agreement among the members of the com-
munity would crumble to dust. Jevons feared that such would be the fate of the 
170 
 
society he depicted, due to the dangerous similarity between self-interest and 
selfishness. 
 
The need for direct intervention 
 
Jevons discovered a first answer to this conundrum in the social instinct, as 
Whately described it. The social instinct bound humans together, so that the 
pursuit of one’s own good turned out to benefit everyone else. In Jevons’s 
mind, Whately explained this mechanism, as: 
 
That hidden and seldom noticed principle in the nature of masses of as-
sociated men, which leads each to labour on ceaselessly in that very 
pursuit which will most benefit the whole body though himself seeking 
all the while his own exclusive advancement (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. 
I, 157). 
 
Social instinct, a divine endowment, had a pivotal role in the world. If individ-
ual competition was the basic principle regulating human behaviour, and if 
human action was driven by a social instinct, the two principles taken together 
explained 
 
how a number of men all really and entirely selfish might yet, by means 
of the advantageous & equitable arrangements which fair & free Com-
petition always ensures work together unconsciously or at least uninten-
tionally each for the good of all (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 158). 
 
In Jevons’s mind, society was indeed a sum of number ones, as his en-
dorsement of Whately’s account shows. However, Jevons wasn’t always so 
confident that those interests harmonized spontaneously. He became more and 
more persuaded that some conflicts in society needed strategies to find ap-
peasement. This was the case of the conflict between ‘masters and men’: we 
could hardly imagine that such conflict would vanish spontaneously. Hence, 
Jevons favoured the decision of Parliament to institute the so-called Boards of 
Conciliation, or Arbitration (Jevons, 1883, 124; [1882] 1910, chap. 7), which 
was given the task to mediate between the two antagonists. Jevons encouraged 
their intervention, so long as they didn’t claim the right to regulate prices and 
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wages. These were, in Jevons’s mind, the necessary result of economic laws, so 
that attempting to modify them would elicit ‘unmeasured evils’ (Jevons, 1883, 
124). However, Jevons admitted there was anyway latitude – and need – for in-
tervention from these boards: 
 
There are many details of trade relating to the hours and conditions of 
labour, the safety, comfort, and welfare of the men, which are rightly 
the subject of regulation; and in respect to such matters I wish to see the 
vigilance and energy of the unions and councils increased rather than 
diminished (Jevons, 1883, 124). 
 
Jevons tackled similar problems in The State in Relation to Labour. Her-
bert Somerton Foxwell, who was appointed Jevons’s successor at University 
College in 1881 (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. V, 136-137), expressed, in the fol-
lowing letter, his hopes concerning this book prior to publication: 
 
I hope to find that you have taken up – well I wont say a Socialistic po-
sition, because some dislike the word: but at all events a position from 
which you recognize the obligation of the individual to society, and the 
necessity for some control, in the public interest, of his endeavours to 
secure his private gain. The more I read about the condition of labour, 
the more convinced I am of the necessity and advantage of organisation 
and control (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. V, 186). 
 
According to Jevons’s answer to this letter, Foxwell’s wishes would be ful-
filled: “judging from what you say”, observed Jevons, “I fancy the new book 
will almost exactly meet your views” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. V, 187). 
In this book Jevons dealt with the problem of labour regulation, with re-
spect to the limits and functions of legislation (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 1). From a 
theoretical point of view, every individual was his own master, free to choose 
whatever they preferred in accordance with their interest. However, the matter 
was more complicated: in the presence of indisputable calamities, the state 
ought to implement some measures. Jevons gave the example of a worker us-
ing dangerous machinery. The labourer may expose himself to considerable 
risk of death and mutilation, neglecting his own well-being in pursuit of wages. 
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Once we found that the individual could not act in their own best interest, we 
would turn our regard to the employer. “We might”, argued Jevons, 
 
assume that the owner of dangerous machinery would fence it from mo-
tives of mere humanity, if not from those of self-interest. But here again 
experience proves the existence of unaccountable thoughtlessness, if 
not heartlessness. Before the legislature began to intervene, hardly any 
owner of machinery thought of incurring the small additional percent-
age of cost requisite to render the machinery safe to the operatives (Jev-
ons, [1882] 1910, 3). 
 
In case of patent need such as this, we could not rely on the alleged humanity 
of people, nor could we wait for the person concerned to learn from their er-
rors. 
This topic is evidently connected to the problem mentioned above: the risk 
of social breakdown when everyone is only pursuing their own interest. The 
employers who didn’t care for the welfare of their employees were the perfect 
examples of the selfish subject. Jevons was interested in the question of how 
the social damage that such behaviour might entail could be controlled. He no-
ticed that we couldn’t depend on the humanity of those people. Perhaps hu-
mans were provided with a social instinct, yet it wasn’t enough to prevent them 
from harming their fellow citizens. The parts of society were not willing or 
able to take care of everything needful for the whole – in some cases not even 
of their own needs. Whenever this was the case, Jevons suggested, state inter-
vention was required. As for dangerous machinery, for instance, “the law may 
command that dangerous machinery shall be fenced, and the executive gov-
ernment may appoint inspectors to go round and prosecute such owners as dis-
obey the law” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 4). The state had the responsibility to in-
tervene whenever private individuals lacked sympathetic feelings and social in-
stinct. State intervention was meant to put together the number ones composing 
society. 
Moreover, the state had to protect the interest of its members. It was simp-
ly unrealistic to think that everyone would, in every situation, be the best judge 
of their own good. As Jevons remarked, citizens often lacked some specialistic 
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competencies which were the necessary requisite to choose properly. Certain 
commodities, for example, had to be checked by government inspectors. This 
measure was far from being a violent intrusion of the state in the private affairs 
of its citizens: “those who examine such things as herrings, butter, gun-barrels, 
coffee, tea, pepper, butcher’-meat, and the like, cannot be charged with indif-
ference or opposition to the good of the common people” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 
42). Jevons justified the enforcement of those inspections by explaining that 
the commodities were divided into two categories, “according as the purchaser 
is or is not the best judge of what he wants” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 42). If one 
was purchasing a house, they would need the opinion of an expert to certify 
that its well was free from “deadly sewage poison” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 43). 
As Jevons concluded, “Laisser faire policy might still be maintained if every-
body understood his interest. But the very point of the matter is that ignorant 
people cannot take precautions against dangers of which they are ignorant” 
(Jevons, [1882] 1910, 43). Consequently, “there are many cases where the ex-
pert is a far better judge than the individual purchaser” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 
43). 
 
Protecting the individual: John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty 
 
As Sidgwick would argue, political and moral individualism didn’t ex-
clude state intervention: the government could – and should – protect children, 
control public health, enforce professional standards and so on (see Collini, 
1979, 20-21). Jevons’s position in The State in Relation to Labour was certain-
ly consistent with this thought. These investigations evidently touched a topic 
of great theoretical moment: the question of liberty. The concept of liberty 
plays a preponderant role in the theoretical framework of individualism. In a 
society where the fundamental element is the individual, individuals must be 
granted the right to freely pursue their own desires. This argument was also at 
the basis of free trade, since every limitation to freedom in the market was seen 
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as a limitation to the very freedom of the subject44. This intertwining set of no-
tions was at the core of John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty. Jevons couldn’t 
but think of Mill’s work while writing on these topics. Therefore, let us take 
into consideration Mill’s text. 
John Stuart Mill’s perspective was consistent with Bentham’s definition of 
society as a sum of individuals. Society was reduced to what Mill considered to 
be its basic elements: the individuals. Hence, according to Mill, “the worth of a 
State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it” (Mill, 
[1859] 1977, Vol. XVIII, 310). It follows that for Mill individuality was the 
main principle of society, its engine and its real substance. As Mill stated, “In-
dividuality is the same thing with development, and […] it is only the cultiva-
tion of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human 
beings” (Mill, [1859] 1977, Vol. XVIII, 267). The development of one’s own 
character and faculties was at the basis not only of personal improvement, but 
of social progress as well: “where, not the person’s own character, but the tra-
ditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one 
of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient 
of individual and social progress” (Mill, [1859] 1977, Vol. XVIII, 261). Thus, 
the subject ought to be free to express his own individuality, according to his 
character, without any constraint from others or society itself. 
Nonetheless, this account did imply some restrictions. Qua members of the 
same community, individuals often found themselves fighting one another. 
Living together multiplied the occasions of conflict: “all that makes existence 
valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions 
of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed” (Mill, 
[1859] 1977, Vol. XVIII, 226). Hence Mill’s well-known limitation of the ex-
ercise of liberty, according to what is currently often called “the Harm Princi-
ple” (see Macleod, Miller 2017, 409): “the liberty of the individual must be 
thus far limited: he must not make himself a nuisance to other people” (Mill, 
 
44 Concerning the relation between political, moral and economic individualism, see 
Collini, 1979, 23-25. 
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[1859] 1977, Vol. XVIII, 260). Underlying this theory, we can distinguish the 
same difficulty that Bentham and Jevons had: once we have given primacy to 
individuality, how can the action of the individual be reconciled with respectful 
social behaviour? Mill had to cope with the same conundrum, that is, prevent 
society from dissolving because of the conflict of radically independent indi-
viduals. Consequently, he admitted free action on the part of the individual on-
ly in so far as this action didn’t injure others. 
Mill’s concern, however, was not to prevent conflict in society, as much as 
to protect the singular person from society’s impositions and violence. Mill 
warned us against “the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling” (Mill, 
[1859] 1977, Vol. XVIII, 220), which hindered dissent and free self-
development. Mill was eager to put strict boundaries on the exercise of power 
by society. He thus stated that 
 
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collec-
tively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is 
self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightful 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others (Mill, [1859] 1977, Vol. XVIII, 223). 
 
No one could claim the right to interfere with somebody else, justifying his ac-
tion under the pretence that he understood the individual’s good better than the 
individual himself. As Mill concluded, “over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign” (Mill, [1859] 1977, Vol. XVIII, 224). By 
drawing a clear line on the interference of society, Mill attempted to respect the 
peculiar differences of everyone. In his view, “free scope should be given to 
varieties of character, short of injury to others” (Mill, [1859] 1977, Vol. XVIII, 
261). 
 
“The dry old Jeremy” 
 
Jevons was an admirer of Mill’s essay On Liberty. In a letter to the editor 
of the Manchester Examiner and Times, published in 1866 following his con-
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troversial Cobden Lecture45, Jevons asserted that he wished “to see cherished 
and developed in England such liberalism as Mr. Mill has deliberately de-
scribed in his brief but great essay on liberty” (Jevons, 1972-1981,Vol. III, 
132). As we have seen, Jevons was often very critical of Mill’s work. Howev-
er, their views on individuality were in harmony. Both considered, following 
Bentham’s account, that the singular subject was the core of society. In Jev-
ons’s mind too, individual development was the only path towards social pro-
gress. Furthermore, he endorsed Mill’s liberalism: in Jevons’s mind, the indi-
vidual had the right to freely pursue his own desires. 
How then did their accounts differ? It is a question of priority. On the one 
hand, Mill subordinated every decision to the principle of liberty: each individ-
ual was their own master. Provided they didn’t harm others in their pursuits, 
individuals had absolute liberty. On the other hand, Jevons’s attention was di-
rected towards a different end. In The State in Relation to Labour, where this 
problem was specifically addressed, Jevons considered, as noted above, that 
the salus populi had absolute primacy: “the State is justified in passing any 
law, or even in doing any single act which, without ulterior consequences, adds 
to the sum total of happiness” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 13). With respect to this 
principle, which was nothing but a reformulation of the old utility principle, 
even liberty was of secondary importance46. Thus, Jevons launched an attack 
on the advocates of the so-called “principle of equal freedom” (Jevons, [1882] 
1910, 14). Given that the section was entitled The Evolutionist Doctrine of 
Freedom, Jevons’s criticism was probably directed at Spencer’s Social Statics. 
The principle, as defined in that work, was that: “every man has freedom to do 
all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man” 
(Spencer, [1851] 1868, 121). Given that this definition was almost identical to 
 
45 Concerning this episode, see the fourth section of the second chapter, as well as the 
last section of the third chapter. 
46 This tension between the principle of utility and liberty of action has already been 
highlighted. See, for example, Bowman, 1989, 1126; Paul, 1979, 280-281. 
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Mill’s concept of liberty, it is likely that Jevons meant to strike Spencer and 
Mill at once. 
As for Jevons’s argument for this attack, he noticed that among the princi-
ples ruling society, “none would seem more sacred than the principle of free-
dom – the right of the individual to pursue his own course towards his own 
ideal end” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 13-14). Nonetheless, he refused to give this 
principle the primacy that Spencer and Mill had accorded to it. He expressed 
his doubts in the following terms: 
 
It would lead me too far to attempt in this place to inquire whether the 
present course of industrial legislation, and the remarks to be made up-
on it in the present volume, are really reconcilable with this principle. I 
am inclined to think that the reconciliation is not impossible; but that, 
when applied to the vast communities of modern society, the principle 
fails to give a sure guiding light. So intricate are the ways, industrial, 
sanitary, or political, in which one class or section of the people affect 
other classes or sections, that there is hardly any limit to the interfer-
ence of the legislator (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 14-15, emphasis added). 
 
As I have shown above, in The State in Relation to Labour Jevons put the prin-
ciple of utility before any other rule. The legislator had every right to restrict 
the liberty of citizens, on condition that they did so in the basis of the welfare 
of the community. Furthermore, Jevons specified how this idea of state inter-
vention wasn’t necessarily in opposition to the principle of freedom: “I do not 
think”, he wrote, 
 
that such interference, applying, as it would, only to the simpler physi-
cal conditions of the body, can be said, in a reasonable point of view, to 
diminish freedom. As physical conditions become more regulated, the 
intellectual and emotional nature of man expands even more freely 
(Jevons, [1882] 1910, 15). 
 
Thus, in The State in Relation to Labour Jevons acknowledged the priority 
of the utility principle over anything else. Ellen Frankel Paul has rightly re-
marked that Mill was more individualist than Jevons: for instance, the latter 
admitted that the legislator could prevent the workers from engaging in a con-
tract if it endangered them. The legislator was justified in restricting the liberty 
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of people when that same liberty implied an unacknowledged limitation of 
their own welfare (see Paul, 1979, 280). Such an interpretation of the legisla-
tor’s role was plainly in line with Bentham’s view. Jevons held fast “to the dry 
old Jeremy” (Jevons, 1890, 286), as he wrote in his Utilitarianism (1877). The 
Benthamite legislator was responsible for their fellow citizens’ happiness: they 
were in charge of maximizing the total utility, even though this task was mostly 
fulfilled assuring advantages such as security or equality47. Similarly, in Jev-
ons’s eyes the state had to assure that people didn’t act against their welfare 
whenever they lacked the capacity to decide autonomously. Hence, he advocat-
ed the intervention of the legislator, or he favoured the intercession of experts 
who could provide the consumer with precious advice48. In some situations, 
Jevons seems to suggest, freedom of choice turns out to be a mere delusion, 
due to the ignorance of the person taking the choice. Therefore, Jevons denied 
that proper state intervention was contrary to the freedom of the individual. It 
rather increased it, since it gave the citizens the means to choose properly. 
It can rightly be argued that Jevons held fast to dry old Jeremy for other 
reasons as well. What Jevons ultimately refused of Mill’s perspective was the 
assumption of rules trumping the utility principle. Thus Jevons took a position 
in a debate dividing the field of nineteenth-century Utilitarianism: the debate 
concerning secondary rules guiding the application of the utility principle (see 
Schneewind, 1977, 169-188). Mill favoured the implementation of “secondary 
or middle principles, capable of serving as premises for a body of ethical doc-
trine not derived from existing opinions” (Mill, [1852] 1969, Vol. X, 173). 
Moreover, Mill attributed this position to Bentham himself (Mill, [1852] 1969, 
 
47 See, for example, Bentham, Introduction, (1823) 1996, 282-283, where the art of 
government is defined as the art of directing human actions towards the greatest hap-
piness. See Bentham, (1823) 1996, 158. Some scholars have argued that Bentham re-
lied on other universal human interests (security, abundance, subsistence and equality) 
in the attempt to produce the maximization of the total happiness. In this regard, see: 
Kelly, 1990; Rosen, 2003, chap. 13; Postema, 2006; Quinn, 2008. 
48 The legislator’s role has also been pointed out by Richiardi and Sigot; see Richiardi, 
Sigot 2013, 238-239. 
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Vol. X, 173). As for Jevons, in his mind the only goal was the salus populi. 
However, this principle didn’t need any additional rule to be applied. It solely 
required a practical scrutiny, situation by situation, to be properly implement-
ed. 
It is worth mentioning that this position wasn’t so far from Mill’s account 
as Jevons thought. Isaiah Berlin has shown how Mill was committed to an em-
pirical criterion of probability: all opinion may turn out to be false, so each sit-
uation requires a different treatment (Berlin, [1959] 2002, 231-232). However, 
Jevons was willing to detach his attitude from Mill’s one, ruling out the appeal 
to any other principle than the greatest happiness one. Jevons tried thus to ac-
complish this end by assuming an eminently practical attitude49: “in social phi-
losophy, or rather in practical legislation, the first step is to throw aside all sup-
posed absolute rights or inflexible principles” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 9). That 
was because legislation “is not a science at all. […] It is a matter of practical 
work, creating human institutions” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 9, emphasis added). 
We could rely on no strict rules in the attempt to realize the greatest happi-
ness, since “before we can bring the principles down to practice they run into 
infinite complications, and break up into all kinds of exceptions and apparent 
anomalies” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 10). As we know from his logical work, Jev-
ons was strongly persuaded that any reasoning required deduction, i.e. general 
principles. Legislation was no exception. However, this belief didn’t make 
Jevons more willing to accept Mill’s appeal to secondary rules. In Jevons’s 
words, “legislation must be Baconian” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 23). According to 
Jevons, we always use general arguments, 
 
but there may be all degrees of proximateness or remoteness between 
our real premises of fact and our ultimate conclusion. What I venture to 
maintain is that Baconian legislation will always proceed by reasoning 
from the most nearly proximate and analogous experience which is 
available (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 24). 
 
 




Harmonizing the interests within society 
 
It is important to notice that Jevons’s allegiance to the principle of utility 
brings us back to the puzzle: how can conflict among the self-interested mem-
bers of society be avoided and thereby increase the total happiness? Bentham 
was well aware of the problem. He constantly strove to find a way to reconcile 
the interest of the community with that of the individual, without sacrificing 
any of them50. He attributed this task to the legislator. The latter would create 
the conditions under which the interest of the singular person would coincide 
with the common interest (see Bentham, [1815] 1983, 66). The legislator guid-
ed individual behaviour, by means of laws and penalties. Thus, new occasions 
of pleasure and pain are crafted by means of sanctions, which enter into the in-
dividual’s decision-making51. 
John Stuart Mill focused on a similar problem in On Liberty, though he 
saw it from a different point of view. He treated the risk of conflict in the 
community, but he was mainly concerned about the possibility that society 
would annihilate individuality. As Isaiah Berlin has pointed out, Mill, together 
with many Victorians, dreaded claustrophobia, a society suffocating personal 
pursuits (see Berlin, [1959] 2002, 243). For Mill, the individual was prior to 
everything else, since, in Mill’s view, only a society of fulfilled and developed 
subjects could progress. Mill considered the free expression of different opin-
ions, characters and identities as the very foundation of a happy society. His 
view was of inspiration to many contributors to contemporary liberalism52. It is 
worth mentioning that Mill’s attitude towards individuality was correlated to 
his reinterpretation of the utilitarian tradition, and notably his desertion of the 
 
50 See, for example, Bentham, (1815) 1983, 50, where we read: “Per Utilitarianism: 
‘Cause duty and interest to coincide […]’”. 
51 A sanction, as Bentham had defined it in the Introduction, is a source of pleasure 
and pain (see Bentham, [1823] 1996, 34). The legislator made use of the political 
sanction, which was notably the legal punishment, to influence the subject’s conduct. 
52 See: Young, 1990; C. Taylor, 1994. For a treatment of Mill’s individuality with re-
spect to its influence on these sources, see Macleod, Miller 2017, 431-434. 
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utility principle as a maximization of the total happiness53. The principle of 
utility persisted in Mill’s thought as a criterion of the end, relying on secondary 
rules to provide for the means to reach it. Hence, the attempt of maximising the 
happiness was no longer the foundation of his moral theory. As Brown has 
clarified, “the principle of utility itself approves as the best set of rules, in the 
desirable enterprise of securing happiness to all, not rules coercing maximally 
expedient conduct, but rules maintaining the basic social conditions in which 
individual development can flourish” (Brown, 2010, 14). 
As we have seen, Jevons found himself facing the same difficulties. He 
admitted that the agent had sympathetic feelings and he endeavoured to distin-
guish self-interest from selfishness. Notwithstanding these efforts, he couldn’t 
deny that society included conflicting, selfish individuals. Some conflicts simp-
ly didn’t harmonize by themselves, as the conflict between ‘masters and men’. 
Thus, Jevons couldn’t but prescribe unselfish behaviour. As I have highlighted 
above, Jevons thought that there were lower and higher motives. If there was a 
conflict between these two kinds of motives, the higher motives (for instance 
the duty towards the offspring or the nation), ought to guide one’s behaviour. 
The question is evidently the same as the one presented in the last sec-
tion: what are the conditions of possibility for such a prescription? How could 
an agent whose fuel is self-interest renounce his own good in favour of some-
one else’s? What latitude is there for altruism in a context of moral individual-
ism? If each of us is a number one, how can a common good ever be attained, 
for won’t the sum of all interests always be in contrast with the interest of soci-
ety? As I will argue, Jevons tried to solve this problem by combining Spencer’s 
evolutionary perspective and the utilitarian moral theory; a perspective that, in 
Jevons’s view, both Bentham and Mill lacked. We shall see that Spencer’s the-
ory also provided him with a way to cope with the gap between ‘is’ and 
 
53 This is what the Revisionist scholarly interpretation has argued. For an exposition of 
this interpretative stream see Brown, 2010; as for Mill’s reading of the utility princi-
ple, see Brown, 2010, 7-15. 
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‘ought’, in the attempt to reconcile the individual happiness with the welfare of 
society. 
 
2.6. The prescriptive fallacy  
 
As I have argued above, the utilitarian definition of the subject in terms of 
moral individualism entailed a challenge: how such a subject can be reconciled 
with society? This difficulty was magnified by the definition of society as a 
sum of individuals. Jevons, who followed the utilitarian line of thought, had to 
face this problem too. My contention here is that Jevons found a satisfying an-
swer in the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Jevons expressed his appreciation 
for Spencer’s theory at various times. However, Spencer’s role in the develop-
ment of Jevons’s moral thought went beyond a faint appreciation. Spencer de-
scribed evolution as a path towards a harmonious society, where the individu-
al’s interest was at one with the interest of the whole society. According to 
Spencer, the individual spontaneously develops a sympathetic and altruistic 
sentiments in the course of the evolutive process. Jevons couldn’t but find this 
conception appealing, given his struggle to secure at once the individual’s wel-
fare and the welfare of the community. 
Moreover, such a view is related to another topic to which I devoted con-
siderable attention: the relation between prescription and description, or 
‘ought’ and ‘is’. Both Spencer and Jevons had a deterministic account of the 
individual’s behaviour, i.e. a deterministic theory of morals: the subject was 
necessarily bound to follow his self-interest, to seek pleasure and avoid pain. 
Given this framework, two questions arise. First, how could one prescribe, to 
an egoistic individual, renouncing his own welfare in favour of society’s one, if 
they are bound by self-interest? Second, how can we reconcile such an individ-
ual with society without implying the sacrifice of the individual’s good? 
I shall argue that Spencer provided an answer to both these questions in 
the context of his evolutionist thought. Spencer claimed that evolution shaped 
the subject as follows: starting from a selfish attitude, humans developed an al-
truistic nature. Therefore, what they saw before as a sacrifice of their interest 
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wouldn’t be such anymore. They naturally incorporated what once was seen as 
a moral prescription. They followed these prescriptions spontaneously, so that 
strictly speaking these moral rules weren’t such anymore. If a prescription is 
automatically complied with, it cannot be reasonably called a prescription. It 
becomes natural. In other terms, the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ eventually overlap in 
Spencer’s evolutionist theory. 
However, evolution had to come to its limit for this transformation to be 
complete. In the long run, society would at once entail no sacrifice of the indi-
vidual good and be perfectly pacific. Nonetheless, the moral code of a perfect 
harmonious society, which was meant to become second nature to humans, 
acted as a driver of present evolution in Spencer’s eyes. Hence, I shall here 
suggest a reinterpretation of George Edward Moore’s statement, namely that 
Spencer fell into a ‘naturalistic fallacy’. I argue that Spencer never fell into this 
fallacy, but he did fall into its converse. Spencer never deduced his ethics from 
nature, but he did deduce nature from his ethics. This is what I shall call a ‘pre-
scriptive fallacy’. Such a fallacy consists in deducing the ‘is’ from the ‘ought’, 
postulating that in an unspecified lapse of time what is now prescribed will be-
come spontaneous. 
My argument is as follows. First I elaborate Spencer’s definition of the in-
dividual and his political individualism. After that, I will address the problem 
of the relation between altruism and egoism, showing how Spencer conceived 
their relationship in the final stage of evolution. Then, I explain how Spencer’s 
argument was founded on a relevant assumption, namely the teleological drive 
of evolution. Finally, I elucidate what I consider to be Spencer’s fallacy and 
explain how the Spencerian account influenced Jevons. 
 
The individual according to Spencer 
 
In order to investigate Spencer’s position concerning individualism, let us 
start by recalling his definition of the ‘individual’. In the Principles of Biology 
(1864-1867), Spencer stated that the individual was to be defined on the basis 
of self-sufficiency, as: “any organised mass which is capable of independently 
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carrying on that continuous adjustment of inner to outer relations which consti-
tutes Life” (Spencer, [1864-1867] 1898-1899, Vol. I, § 74, 251). Despite the 
alleged clarity of this definition, Spencer warned that this solution resulted 
from a compromise. He observed that no definition of an individual would ever 
be unobjectionable (Spencer, [1864-1867] 1898-1899, Vol. I, § 74, 249). How-
ever, whenever we can acknowledge that an organism was able to survive in-
dependently, we could reasonably call it an individual. In Spencer’s eyes, this 
definition of the individual from a biological point of view embrace human in-
dividuals too. Such definition sheds light on the constitution of humans as in-
dividuals. For instance Spencer argued that, for someone’s individuality to be 
fully expressed in a social context, it is essential for the individual to be “that 
which he naturally is – to do just what he would spontaneously do” (Spencer, 
[1851] 1868, 474). Hence, the individual was described as a self-sufficient and 
self-developing entity. 
However, Spencer’s individual was not such an isolated being, shaping it-
self solely according to its own inner nature. Spencer clearly ruled out this in-
terpretation by stressing that a biological individual had to “continuously adjust 
its internal relations to external relations, so as to maintain the equilibrium of 
its functions” (Spencer, [1864-1867] 1898-1899, Vol. I, § 74, 249). The indi-
vidual may be distinguished by virtue of its self-sufficiency, but it was none-
theless shaped by the natural and social environment. Furthermore, this exter-
nal influence exceeded the boundaries of the single individual, who resulted 
from the evolution of the whole species or race (Spencer, [1860] 1891a, Vol. I, 
256). Thus, the hereditary characteristics of the species constituted the starting 
point of the subject, showing that Spencer was at odds with the representation 
of the human mind as a tabula rasa. 
To better understand the nature of Spencer’s individualism, I turn to his 
paper “The Social Organism” (1860). Here Spencer made a parallel between 
biological organisms and society. The latter, just like a natural organism, was 
compounded of several mutually dependent parts. However, despite the simi-
larities, social and natural organisms presented some relevant dissimilarities 
too. Vis-à-vis the present argument, this deserves attention. 
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This discrepancy concerned the concept of perception: in a biological or-
ganism, no part was capable of independent perception, while in a social organ-
ism each individual had the capacity to perceive independently from the whole. 
(Spencer, [1860] 1891b, Vol. I, 276). This difference had an important conse-
quence. In a political body each part was endowed with an autonomous con-
sciousness, but the body as a whole had none. Hence, it was unacceptable to 
demand a sacrifice for the sake of the whole. Spencer asserted this principle as 
follows: 
 
It is well that the lives of all parts of an animal should be merged in the 
life of the whole, because the whole has a corporate consciousness ca-
pable of happiness or misery. But it is not so with society; since its liv-
ing units do not and cannot lose individual consciousness, and since the 
community as a whole has no corporate consciousness. This is an ever-
lasting reason why the welfare of the citizens cannot be sacrificed to 
some supposed benefit of the State, and why, on the other hand, the 
State is to be maintained solely to the benefit of the citizens. The corpo-
rate life must here be subservient to the lives of the parts, instead of the 
lives of the parts being subservient to the corporate life (Spencer, 
[1860] 1891b, Vol. I, 276-277, emphasis added). 
 
According to Spencer, the political body’s raison d’être was to favour the 
happiness of its components. As a matter of fact, Spencer was a partisan of the 
utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, which 
was at once the community’s aim and the ultimate aim of evolution54. Howev-
er, this aim never implied the sacrifice of individuals. Such a sacrifice would 
even be absurd, considering that society as a whole didn’t have a conscience of 
its own55. Spencer did state that society was a real entity, namely that we 
 
54 Concerning the peculiar characters of Spencer’s utilitarianism, see Weinstein, 1998. 
55 The connection between the utilitarian principles of the greatest happiness and the 
refusal to sacrifice the individual welfare has also been noticed by Mark Francis; see 
Francis, 2007, 7. Michael Taylor has rightly pointed out that such a refusal implied a 
criticism of Comte’s sociology, according to which society had interests transcending 
the individual’s scope; see M. Taylor, 2007, 97. 
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shouldn’t consider it as a mere sum of individuals56. Nonetheless he considered 
society to be a result of individual characters. He thus observed in his Autobi-
ography that the individual character was the original factor, whereas the char-
acter of society was a derived one (see Spencer, 1904, Vol. II, 465-466). That 
was why, as Tim S. Gray highlighted, every social reform had to take root in 
the prior reform of individual character (see Gray, 1996, 19). 
This interpretation, which highlights Spencer’s political individualism, is 
in clear opposition to Gray’s reading of Spencer’s as reconciling organicism 
and individualism (see Gray, 1985; 1996). I acknowledge that organicism and 
individualism were theoretically bound to each other in Spencer’s thought, 
since the individual was the result of a back and forth with the environment 
(see Gray, 1985, 245-253). However, although the reference to society and ex-
ternal environment was unavoidable to understand the individual constitution, 
the crucial question is: in case of conflict between the society and the individu-
al, which entity had to be put first? As I have shown, Spencer never admitted 
the possibility of sacrificing the individual welfare to an alleged welfare of so-
ciety. On the contrary, I argue that organicist thought necessarily entails the 
representation of the whole as something going beyond the sum of its parts. 
According to organicism, the whole – in this case society – has primacy over 
the parts – i.e. individuals. Consequently, political organicism wouldn’t be 
such without the recognition that the single individual had to renounce – at 
least partially – his own welfare for the sake of the community. In the absence 
of this condition, no political organicism is conceivable57. 
 
56 See Wiltshire, 1978, 234; this position was probably meant to criticize Bentham’s 
definition of the community as a fiction, namely an artificial entity. Moreover, Spen-
cer also assumed this definition of the social organism to oppose the endorsement of 
social engineering typical of some utilitarian philosophers. 
57 My argument in favour of Spencer’s political individualism is far from being isolat-
ed. In this regard, see: Peel, 1992, 187-191; M. Taylor, 1992, 165; McCann, 2004, 
125. However, this topic has triggered a great debate. Apart from the Gray’s interpre-
tation, Mark Francis has argued that Spencer was neither individualist nor organicist, 
since Spencer’s interest laid in the concept of individuation: see Francis, 2007, 11-13. 
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Spencer advocated the safeguarding of single units in the body politic, so 
that his ideal society could be the shelter for the individual to flourish. Now, 
given that Spencer was unwilling to sacrifice individual’s welfare in favour of 
society’s, another question arises: how could Spencer at once secure the indi-
vidual from the pain inflicted by society and provide for the attainment of the 
greatest happiness of all? This problem was made more acute in consideration 
of the fact that his individual was firstly described as egoistic. 
 
Egoism and altruism 
 
In Data of Ethics (1879) Spencer depicted the individual in the way that 
Stefan Collini would refer to as expressing a “moral individualism” (see Col-
lini, 1979, 18)58. It is self-evident, Spencer argued, that individuals first and 
foremost had to survive. In his own words, “the acts by which each [creature] 
maintains his own life must, speaking generally, precede in imperativeness all 
other acts of which he is capable” (Spencer, 1879, § 68, 187). As Spencer con-
cluded, therefore “Ethics has to recognize the truth, recognized in unethical 
thought, that egoism comes before altruism” (Spencer, 1879, § 68, 187). Spen-
cer did temper this view by admitting that altruism was a natural feeling too. 
Altruism was thus firstly defined as the inclination to preserve one’s offspring: 
“self-sacrifice, then, is no less primordial than self-preservation” (Spencer, 
1879, § 75, 203). During the course of evolution, this habit of self-sacrifice in 
favour of one’s offspring became more and more conscious, while before it 
was automatic and unconscious. Moreover, this altruistic behaviour was meant 
to propagate the social body. Indeed egoistic parents, who didn’t take care for 
their offspring, automatically ruled out the chances of their offspring’s surviv-
 
In his turn, Weinstein has highlighted the tension between the greatest happiness prin-
ciple and the individual welfare: see Weinstein, 1998, 8. Furthermore, David Wiltshire 
made a quite interesting claim, stating that Spencer’s individualism entailed the anni-
hilation of individualism itself: see Wiltshire, 1978, 2. 
58 For this concept, see also the fourth section of the second chapter. 
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al, so that “every species is continually purifying itself from the unduly egoistic 
individuals” (Spencer, 1879, § 75, 204). 
Spencer’s position, then, begins from unavoidable egoistic behaviour. Liv-
ing together, the individuals eventually acknowledged that a peaceful society 
couldn’t but benefit everyone, themselves included (see Spencer, 1879, § 77, 
207). Thus the single person recognized that in a community “the well-being of 
each rises and falls with the well-being of all” (Spencer, 1879, § 78, 208). The 
sentiment of sympathy played a crucial role in the passage from egoism to al-
truism in the social body. As Spencer explained in The Principles of Psycholo-
gy (1855), “intelligent creatures that live in presence of one another, and are 
exposed to like causes of pleasure and pain, acquire capacities for participating 
in one another’s pleasures and pains” (Spencer, [1855] 1881, § 526, 610). Al-
truistic feelings were originally “sympathetic excitements of egoistic feelings” 
(Spencer, [1855] 1881, § 527, 612). Such sympathetic dispositions towards 
others would eventually produce genuine altruistic feelings. These latter were 
such only if they involved a representation – and consequently a consideration 
– for the feelings of the other. That was why, as Charles R. McCann has ob-
served, an altruistic act necessarily included an unselfish component (see 
McCann, 2004, 108). Such altruistic sentiments would then become more and 
more complex, culminating in the sentiment of justice, i.e. the most refined of 
all altruistic sentiments (Spencer, [1855] 1881, § 530, 616). 
The Lamarckian concept of use-inheritance has been used to explain this 
process59. Spencer, in “The Factors of Organic Evolution” (1886), clearly elab-
orated how important the inheritance of acquired characteristics was:  
 
Though mental phenomena of many kinds, and especially of the simple 
kinds, are explicable only as resulting from the natural selection of fa-
vourable variations; yet there are, I believe, still more numerous mental 
phenomena, including all those of any considerable complexity, which 
cannot be explained otherwise that as results of the inheritance of func-
tionally-produced modifications (Spencer, [1886] 1891, Vol. I, 464). 
 
59 Concerning use-inheritance in Spencer’s thought, see especially: Peel, 1992, 152; 




Thus, in Spencer’s eyes the mental phenomena, such as altruistic feelings, was 
a product of evolution and in particular of use-inheritance. 
As he claimed in Data of Ethics, it was rational to believe that human so-
ciety moved towards civilization (see Spencer, 1879, § 67, 185). The key con-
cept of this process is adaptation. According to Spencer’s definition, conduct is 
“adjustment of acts to ends” (Spencer, 1879, § 2, 5). Moreover, “acts are called 
good or bad, according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends” (Spencer, 1879, 
§ 8, 25). Since in his mind the “good is universally the pleasurable” (Spencer, 
1879, § 10, 30), it follows that for Spencer well adapted acts were sources of 
pleasure. The evolutionary meaning of good conduct was also clearly estab-
lished by Spencer, since he explained that good or well-adapted acts were sub-
servient to life (see Spencer, 1879, § 10, 30). The intertwinement of adaptation, 
pleasure and good conduct triggered the drive toward increasing forms of civi-
lization. In Spencer’s own words, “there is no kind of activity which will not 
become a source of pleasure if continued; and that therefore pleasure will even-
tually accompany every mode of action demanded by social conditions” (Spen-
cer, 1879, § 67, 186). 
By living in society, humans would understand that aggressive acts were 
more easily productive of pain than pleasure (see Spencer, 1879, § 6, 18). They 
would abstain from such actions. In Spencer’s eyes, evolution was an arrow 
tending towards the reconciliation of the individuals in society. The most 
evolved conduct, the limit of evolution, he described as follows: 
 
Evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simultane-
ously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring and in fel-
low men; so here we see that the conduct called good rises to the con-
duct conceived as best, when it fulfils all three classes of ends at the 
same time (Spencer, 1879, § 8, 25-26). 
 
The evolution of the moral conduct, being subordinated to the same laws of 
evolution in general, turned out to be an equilibration of the forces within soci-
ety: the more evolved the conduct, the greater the balance of external and in-
ternal energies would be. “The man who thus reaches the limit of evolution”, 
190 
 
Spencer argued, “exists in a society congruous with his nature – is a man 
among men similarly constituted, who are severally in harmony with that social 
environment which they have formed” (Spencer, 1879, § 28, 73). 
The highest form of evolution then entailed a reconciliation between altru-
ism and egoism. As we read in Data of Ethics, “the individual will not have to 
balance between self-regarding impulses and other-regarding impulses” (Spen-
cer, 1879, § 97, 255-256). This would be a condition of a wide-spread happi-
ness, where even self-sacrifice would be gladly chosen and would provide an 
altruistic pleasure. The occasions of drawing pleasure from living together 
would be multiplied, given that everyone would take sympathetic gratification 
from the pleasure of others. In such a condition, “as the altruistic gratification 
is egoistically expressed, egoism and altruism coalesce” (Spencer, 1892-1893, 
Vol. I, Appendix, 292). “Eventually, then”, as Spencer explained, 
 
along with the approximately-complete adaptation of man to the social 
state, along with the evolution of a society complete in its adjustments, 
[…] which must come with the highest type of human life, there will 
come also a state in which egoism and altruism are so conciliated that 
the one merges in the other (Spencer, 1892-1893, Vol. I, Appendix, 
300). 
 
Let us now consider further the condition of possibility of such a result, namely 
the teleological nature of evolution. 
 
The teleological character of evolution 
 
As we have seen, Spencer was persuaded that with the advancement of 
civilization egoism and altruism would become the same. Where did he draw 
this conclusion from? What was the condition of possibility in his system for 
such a statement? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to focus on 
the features of Spencer’s evolutionary thought. My contention here is the fol-
lowing: Spencer found a basis for this statement in the teleological character of 
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evolution60. Spencer clearly explained that evolution had a teleological charac-
ter in his paper “Progress: Its Law and Cause” (1857). Here we read as follows: 
“progress is not an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent 
necessity” (Spencer, [1857] 1891, Vol. I, 60). In Spencer’s eyes, the course of 
evolution was caused by the laws of nature. It is not surprising then that he 
considered the evolution towards progress as a necessity: it was as necessary as 
the effects of any other natural law. 
According to Spencer’s well-known definition, as he gave it in First Prin-
ciples, 
 
Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of 
motion; during which the matter passes from a relatively indefinite, in-
coherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity; 
and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transfor-
mation (Spencer, [1862] 1887, 396). 
 
Michael Taylor has rightly pointed out that Spencer thought of evolution in the 
terms of his contemporary physics (see M. Taylor, 1992, 75-76). For our pur-
poses here, it is important to notice that Spencer conferred on evolution the 
same necessity as physical law. 
Evolution wasn’t only necessary, it was also oriented towards an end, i.e. a 
definite and coherent heterogeneity. Mark Francis has argued against this the-
sis, holding that Spencer had abandoned the teleological interpretation of evo-
lution. There are, however, rival interpretations. Taylor for instance has argued 
that one of the reasons why Spencer’s evolutionary theory was at odds with 
Darwin’s lay in Spencer’s interpretation of evolution as goal-directed. Where-
as, Gray has held that over the years Spencer had lost his faith in the progres-
sive movement of evolution (see Gray, 1996, 24-25). Gray’s contention is but-
tressed by Spencer’s decision to remove from the new edition of First Princi-
ples the famous passage where he described happiness as the ultimate result of 
evolution (see Gray, 1996, 24-25). Nonetheless, this teleological feature was 
 




still strong in Spencer’s mature thought. Taylor has highlighted this persistence 
in Spencer’s theory, in regard to his moral thought61. Indeed, in Data of Ethics, 
morality was thought to conform to “certain principles which, in the nature of 
things, causally determine welfare” (Spencer, 1879, § 60, 162). This progres-
sion towards a general increase of happiness through the course of evolution 
characterized biological evolution as well. In the Principles of Biology, Spen-
cer claimed that, at the limit evolution, creatures would avoid harming each 
other, taking the species to a state of harmonic coexistence (Spencer, [1864-
1867] 1898-1899, Vol. I, § 120, 438-439). 
In Spencer’s eyes, every form of evolution was goal-directed, at the bio-
logical as well as at sociological and moral level. A passage from Spencer’s 
“Education” (1861) elaborates this idea: 
 
By accumulated experiences the man of Science acquires a thorough 
belief in the unchanging relations of phenomena – in the invariable 
connexion of cause and consequence – in the necessity of good or evil 
results. Instead of the rewards and punishments of traditional belief, 
which people vaguely hope they may gain, or escape, in spite of their 
disobedience; he finds that there are rewards and punishments in the or-
dained constitution of things; and that the evil results of disobedience 
are inevitable. He sees that in conforming to them, the process of things 
is ever towards a greater perfection and a higher happiness (Spencer, 
[1861] 1911, 41-42). 
 
Evolution would take all creatures through increasing degrees of perfection. It 
would result in the highest possible happiness. Even if this ultimate point may 
be relegated to a supposedly ideal time, perhaps never to be reached, the path 
of evolution was so directed. 
What are the implications of this account? First of all, since evolution re-
sulted from the natural laws regulating the whole nature, it was spontaneous 
and necessary. Its course wasn’t a straight line towards the end, as there was a 
 
61 Michael Taylor, in his most recent study, has interpreted Spencer’s philosophy in 
the light of the tension between the positivist and deistic thought. The teleological fea-
ture of Spencer’s evolution would thus proceed from the implicit deistic framework he 
assumed. For this thesis, see M. Taylor, 2007, 7-8. 
193 
 
rhythmic oscillation between regression and progress62. However, the process 
was irrevocable. Moreover, evolution was a natural development, requiring 
thus no conscious action on the part of individuals. It wasn’t individuals that 
determined the direction of evolution, but rather evolution that determined the 
nature of individuals. Consequently, the above mentioned outcomes, including 
the overlapping of altruism and egoism or the development of sympathetic 
feelings, would become natural. 
Given this framework, it isn’t surprising that Spencer was so dismissive of 
social engineering (see M. Taylor, 1992, 50, 132; 2007, 96-102). For him evo-
lution would have naturally taken us to a happy and coherent society. Political 
regulation would have been nothing but a hindrance in these conditions, as 
Spencer explained at various times (see, especially, Spencer, [1871] 1891, Vol. 
III). As a consequence of this, Spencer’s thought married organicism and indi-
vidualism, despite the alleged impossibility of such a union (see M. Taylor, 
1992, 50). By means of evolution, individuals would have achieved their com-
plete fulfilment, in a harmonious society where no sacrifice would be demand-
ed of anyone. Spencer fancied a society of spontaneous cooperation, naturally 




Let us now address the main conclusion of this paper, namely the nature of 
Spencer’s fallacy. We have seen that Spencer’s evolution was oriented towards 
an ultimate end. Reaching its very limit, evolution would have turned moral 
prescriptions into spontaneous attitudes. As we read in Data of Ethics, “the 
sense of duty and moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as 
moralization increases” (Spencer, 1879, § 46, 127). The recursive performance 
of duty, Spencer argued, made duty pleasurable (see Spencer, 1879, § 46, 127-
 
62 Spencer elucidated this character of evolution at length in the First Principles; see 
Spencer, 1862, for instance 334, even if the concept is explained in more than one 
chapter (see chap. 11-13). 
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128). All the coercive and restrictive elements of moral conduct as we know it 
would thus fade away. As he writes: 
 
With complete adaptation to the social state, that element in the moral 
consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation, will disap-
pear. The higher actions required for the harmonious carrying on of life, 
will be as such matters of course as are lower actions which the simple 
desires prompt (Spencer, 1879, § 46, 128-129). 
 
Indeed Spencer clarified that “Ethics has for its subject-matter, that form 
which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution” (Spen-
cer, Data, § 7, 20). In the concluding part of Data of Ethics, Spencer so depict-
ed Absolute Ethics, namely the moral behaviour of the perfect human in the 
perfect state of evolution (see Spencer, 1879, § 99-106, 258-280). Absolute 
Ethics didn’t imply any suffering (see Spencer, 1879, § 101, 261). Its actions 
would provide pleasure alone, and therefore didn’t imply any prescription. 
What was the main character of Absolute Ethics, though? It was its social con-
gruity: the ideal human would be so well-adapted to their social environment 
that there would be a “correspondence between all the promptings of his nature 
and all the requirements of his life as carried on in society” (Spencer, 1879, § 
104, 275). The attainment of this correspondence was secured by three princi-
ples, the core of Absolute Ethics: justice, negative beneficence and positive be-
neficence. 
Justice was, as we have remarked, the most refined of all altruistic feel-
ings, as Spencer explained in Justice (1891), which he conceived as the fourth 
part of the Principles of Ethics. It had a positive and a negative sense. Accord-
ing to the first, “each individual ought to receive the benefits and the evils of 
his own nature and consequent conduct” (Spencer, 1891, § 12, 17)63. The nega-
tive sense related to the law of equal freedom, stating that “each can be allowed 
to act only under the restraint imposed by the presence of others having like 
claims to act” (Spencer, 1891, § 27, 46). For moral conduct to suit properly the 
perfect human in the perfect society, justice had to come along with negative 
 
63 Spencer presented the duplicity of justice also in § 27, 46. 
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and positive beneficence. Negative beneficence prescribed individuals to avoid 
inflicting pain or unhappiness on their fellow-beings, whereas the positive be-
neficence made people capable of rejoicing in the happiness of others (see 
Spencer, [1851] 1868, 83-84). 
Having explained the main features of Spencer’s ethics, we can draw some 
conclusions. What Spencer described as the actual ethics of humans at the 
highest state of evolution was avowedly a moral criterion for his own society 
as well, so much so that his negative justice echoed Mill’s principle of negative 
freedom. A quick look at the list of rights enumerated in Justice is enough to 
ascertain that Spencer’s Absolute Ethics was emblematic of Victorian moral 
thought. Indeed Spencer included the rights of free exchange and contract, of 
free belief, speech and publication, and of free movement. Spencer contented 
that these rights would have been spontaneously observed in the highest state 
of evolution. This was the moral code of his own time, that is, the moral rules 
which still had to be prescribed to individuals. 
Consequently, I would like to restate Moore’s well-known criticism of 
Spencer. According to Moore, Spencer fell into a naturalistic fallacy. Spencer 
was inclined to use the expression ‘more evolved’ as equivalent to ‘higher’, i.e. 
‘better’ (see Moore, [1903] 1993, 99). Spencer thought that evolution showed 
us the natural course of our development. However, according to Moore, Spen-
cer did not only believe that we were developing in such a way, but also that 
we ought to be developing in this way (see Moore, [1903] 1993, 97). Moore 
has argued that Spencer replaced the good with a natural object – the results of 
evolution – and ethics with a natural science – the evolutionary theory. There-
fore, as Moore has held, Spencer fell into a naturalistic fallacy, since he be-
lieved that evolution was good simply because it was natural64. 
Moore, I argued, misjudged Spencer’s fallacy. Spencer did not commit a 
naturalistic fallacy thus understood. He didn’t draw an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. Ra-
ther, he made the opposite move. He had a picture of what humans ought to be 
and what the social body ought to be. In order to imagine this perfect person in 
 
64 For Moore’s elaboration of the naturalistic fallacy, see Moore, (1903) 1993, 89-93. 
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a perfect society he couldn’t but take inspiration from the moral prescriptions 
of his own society. Thus he assumed that in the long run we would become 
what we ought to be. Spencer depicted a perfect human consistent with his con-
temporary moral code and postulated that evolution would create such a hu-
man. Hence, he didn’t draw an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, but an ‘is’ from an ‘ought’, 
falling into what I would call a prescriptive fallacy. Spencer did not draw his 
idea of the good from a consideration of the course of evolution, but he did 
draw his idea of evolution from the moral prescriptions of Victorian age. Such 
a fallacy primarily depends on Spencer’s tendency to mix facts and values, a 
view that many scholars have noticed65. We shall now see how Spencer’s posi-
tion, problematic as it was, was absorbed in the theoretical framework of Jev-
ons. 
 
The Spencerian influence on Jevons 
 
As I have already remarked, Jevons expressed his agreement with Spen-
cer’s account at various times66. For instance, Jevons endorsed Spencer’s defi-
 
65 This ambiguous overlapping between facts and values has already been pointed out 
by some scholars (see M. Taylor, 1992, 205-206; 2007, 123; Wiltshire, 1978, 192-
193). Weinstein counters this argument, stating that Spencer’s conception of evolution 
is merely descriptive, excluding any value-laden implication (see Weinstein, 1998, 
150-151). Gray claimed that the problem of the overlapping between facts and values 
was solved by Spencer’s account of evolution as oriented towards Absolute Ethics 
(see Gray, 1996, 194). I would rather argue the opposite: due to this overlapping of 
facts and values, Spencer assumed that evolution tended to produce a naturalization of 
ethical behaviour. 
66 Mosselmans has already addressed this topic, that is, Jevons’s debt to Spencer (see 
Mosselmans, 2007, 76-77). In particular, Mosselmans has argued that Jevons relied on 
Spencer in showing that there was no conflict between science and religion. Jevons’s 
concern for bridging science and religion has been crucial in the first chapter. 
Mosselmans’s argument is surely insightful and correct: Spencer’s thought played a 
role in Jevons’s struggle to reconcile religion and science. However, Mosselmans has 
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nition of evolution as a course towards growing complexity67. A clear example 
of Jevons’s endorsement of evolution as Spencer conceived it can be found in 
The State in Relation to Labour. Jevons favoured the choice of appointing gov-
ernmental officers who could provide private citizens with technical 
knowledge. These figures were but an example of the subdivision of labour. 
The subdivision of labour, in turn, “is but a case of Mr. Herbert Spencer doc-
trine of evolution” (Jevons, [1882] 1910), 44), since it involved a passage from 
incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, in accordance with Spen-
cer’s definition of evolution. Moreover, Jevons agreed with Spencer in consid-
ering that evolution increased the amount of happiness: “Evolution is a striving 
ever towards the better and the happier. There may be almost infinite powers 
against us, but at least there is a deep-laid scheme working towards goodness 
and happiness” (Jevons, 1890, 293). In this regard, Jevons highlighted the simi-
larity between Spencer’s and Paley’s account, displaying once more his own 
endorsement of natural theology (see Jevons, 1890, 293). 
Another feature of Spencer’s thought which Jevons admired was the idea 
of the human mind and character as shaped by the environment through use-
inheritance. According to Jevons, such an idea discarded the erroneous concep-
tion of the human being as a tabula rasa. Jevons claimed that this idea was in-
consistent from the biological point of view. The cultural differences among 
human beings proved that they were shaped by their environment. Generation 
after generation, individuals developed their biological structure, which Jevons 
and Spencer interpreted as the result of the Lamarckian use-inheritance. In their 
view, these characteristics disproved the depiction of the individual as a tabula 
rasa. As Jevons wrote in Utilitarianism, “if the moral, not to speak of the phys-
ical characteristics of the lower animals, are so distinct, why should there not 
be moral and mental differences among ourselves, descending, as we obviously 
 
not underlined the influence of Spencer’s ethics on Jevons’s conception of the rela-
tionship between the individual and society, missing thus a crucial point in this matter. 
67 Bowman has not failed to highlight this point (see Bowman, 1989, 1124). 
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do, from different stocks with different physical characteristics?” (Jevons, 
1890, 292)68. 
However, as I have already argued, Jevons’s interest in Spencer’s philoso-
phy went beyond a simple appreciation. Jevons saw in Spencer’s thought a way 
to solve the problem embedded in the utilitarian tradition, namely the problem 
of how to reconcile self-interested individuals with the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number. The answer lay in the spontaneous development of the 
moral sense over the course of evolution (see Jevons, 1875, 504). As we read 
in Utilitarianism, “the moral sense doctrine, so rudely treated by Bentham, is 
no longer incapable of reconciliation with the greatest happiness principle, only 
it now becomes a moving and developable moral sense” (Jevons, 1890, 291). 
Spencer, highlighted Jevons, explained that moral sense was developing 
through the different stages of evolution. Moreover, the moral sense differed 
according to the idiosyncrasies of customs and individuals. And yet, “the best 
is ascertained by eventual success” (Jevons, 1890, 291). Evolution would even-
tually produce a perfect moral sense, i.e. the Spencerian Absolute Ethics. As 
we know, this was perfectly adapted moral behaviour, capable of producing the 
minimisation of pain and the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For 
both Jevons and Spencer, the solution that the utilitarian philosophers had 
longed for was found in the spontaneous course of nature. 
In sum, Jevons married Spencer’s theory of morals, according to which the 
moral sense developed naturally over the course of evolution. Moreover, Spen-
cer’s theory touched on a very delicate point in Jevons’s reflection: the relation 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. As I have explained, the relation between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’, description and prescription, was a delicate point for Jevons, as well as 
a long-lasting problem, based on his Unitarian allegiance and his endorsement 
of a deterministic account of human nature. Jevons did not acquire the problem 
of the relationship between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ through Spencer, but Spencer pro-
 
68 Jevons expressed the same conclusions in another paper, published in Nature: see 
Jevons, 1875, 504. As Michael White has pointed out, Spencer’s conception but-
tressed Jevons’s tendency to think in terms of races (see M. White, 1993, 82). 
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vided Jevons with a solution to the problem related to ‘is’ and ‘ought’: how 
should prescriptions be understood in a theoretical framework based on a de-
terministic theory of morals, as Jevons’s one was? Once Jevons embraced 
Spencer’s position, the solution came quite easily. Prescriptions were needed 
only until nature intervened, turning the moral prescription into spontaneous 
behaviour. What was once ‘ought’ would eventually be absorbed into the realm 
of ‘is’. 
As we have seen, Jevons and Spencer shared the same view, according to 
which evolution was oriented towards happiness and the good. Such a move-
ment would eventually produce a change in the moral behaviour of the human 
species, turning moral prescriptions into a natural behaviour. Thus, it is worth 
noticing that Jevons fell into the same fallacy as Spencer, since this fallacy was  
the solution Jevons found to the problematic relation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’. They 
both considered that in the long run the ‘ought’ would become part of a new 
human nature. What I called the ‘prescriptive fallacy’ consisted in projecting a 
fantastic future ‘is’, from what in the Victorian age was the ‘ought’. This was 
the case for Spencer, as I have contented. As for Jevons, he accepted this falla-
cy, which ensured that every prescribed behaviour will become natural, provid-
ing a solution to the contradictory coexistence of determinism and moral re-
form in Jevons’s thought. 
Now, what is the cause of this fallacy and what are its consequences? In 
Spencer’s case, its cause is to be found in the conjunction of political individu-
alism, moral individualism and liberalism. Given that these elements played an 
important role in Jevons’s thought as well, we can easily comprehend Jevons’s 
fascination for Spencer’s account. As we have seen, Spencer denied that the 
individual had to sacrifice his own welfare for the good of society. Moreover, 
in Spencer’s eyes the individual was an egoistic one. Given these premises, 
how could a pacific society composed by self-interested individuals be imag-
ined? For other philosophers, Bentham for instance, the answer lay in social 
engineering: the legislator was in charge of orienting individual behaviour. 




Thus, how to attain social harmony while dismissing any political inter-
vention aimed at that end? Spencer solution to this conundrum was to postulate 
that the natural course of evolution would itself create these conditions. How-
ever, one could ask if Spencer’s thesis wasn’t a way to escape the problem by 
denying it. Is it enough to postulate that the passage from the moral prescrip-
tions to their actual application would happen spontaneously? This problem 
was exacerbated by the fact that Spencer admitted that this passage would take 
place in a fantastic future, i.e. in the final stage of evolution. Thus, Spencer and 
Jevons were inclined to dismiss too easily the problem of how to create a har-









THE LANGUAGE AND HOPES OF A POLITICAL ECONOMIST 






3.1. The individual as the centre of economic theory 
 
In 1935, on the occasion of the centenary of Jevons’s birth, the economist 
Benjamin Higgins published a paper in The Manchester School in order to cel-
ebrate the work of the great Victorian polymath. Higgins took into account 
Jevons’s Theory of Political Economy, explaining its novelty with respect to 
the classical school. Higgins used the expression “psychological attack” (Hig-
gins, 1935, 103) to characterize the shift that occurred between the classical 
school and marginalist theory, focusing on Jevons in particular but mentioning 
Menger and Walras too as exponents of this turn. According to Higgins, Jev-
ons’s new conception of economics had a different starting point, i.e. providing 
a psychological foundation for economic investigation. Jevons found such a 
psychological foundation in the Benthamite calculus of pleasures and pains. 
Jevons elaborated an economic theory, conceived as an elucidation of the me-
chanics of human interest (see Jevons, 1871, 24). Consequently, Higgins held 
that the subjective approach was the hallmark of the novelty of Jevons’s eco-
nomic theory, even more than introducing mathematics into political economy 
(see Higgins, 1953, 103-105). 
Many other eminent economists and scholars have argued that what first 
and foremost distinguished Jevons’s economic theory from the classical econ-
omists was this change of emphasis. Lionel Robbins, in a paper read before the 
Manchester Statistical Society in 1936, stated that Jevons put “the individual – 
the economic subject – in the centre of the analytical picture” (Robbins, 1936, 
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5). Such a change of focus, according to Robbins, implied giving a new rele-
vance to the demand side in economic theory and consequently providing a 
new theory of value as determined by subjective evaluations. Robert Collison 
Black, the great historian of the economic thought, made similar remarks. The 
marginalists carried out a reconstruction of political economy. This reconstruc-
tion, which will contribute to shape modern economics, could be seen “as in-
volving a shift from mainly macroeconomic to mainly microeconomic studies” 
(R. D. C. Black, 1972b, 365). In this new microeconomic account, the econo-
mizing behaviour of the individual played a pre-eminent role, never to return to 
the backstage of economic theory1. 
Mark Blaug, the historian of economic ideas, asked the following question: 
“a change of emphasis as drastic as the marginal revolution […] must surely 
have been associated with changes in the institutional structure of society and 
with the emergence of new practical problems?” (Blaug, [1962] 1985, 4). In his 
Economic Theory in Retrospect, Blaug presented his subject matter from a 
point of view internal to the discipline, and so leaving aside the social and 
practical question he raises (see Blaug, [1962] 1985, Introduction). In his turn, 
Robert Collison Black also took into account the question Blaug had raised, 
and provided an answer along the lines of Blaug. Black argued that, in Jevons’s 
case, such radical changes in the structure of society are not easily found and, 
more importantly, that it would be unnecessary to look for them. “For”, contin-
ued Black, “a thought system which is based upon concepts by postulation is 
much more likely to be impervious to extraneous influences than one which is 
based on concept by intuition” (R. D. C. Black, 1972b, 373). As Black has re-
marked, Jevons did create a system based upon axiomatic premises. 
 
1 See R. D. C. Black, 1972b, 372, where we read as follows: “Few economists today 
would question that the concept of economizing behavior is an essential part of the 
core of their subject, but with the classical economists this was not so”. For other ap-
preciations of the shift from Classical political economy to marginalism in terms of a 
stress of the individual’s role, see: Winch, 1972, 327-328; De Marchi, 1972, 354; R. 
D. C. Black, 1972c, 5. 
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My perspective here is different from both Black’s and Blaug’s. The ques-
tion I would like to ask is: what pushed Jevons to change the focus of political 
economy and accordingly to look at individual behaviour as the fulcrum of his 
studies? I do not intend to shine a light on this problem by investigating the 
historical conditions of Jevons’s time, thus assuming what Mark Blaug called a 
relativistic approach (see Blaug, [1962] 1985, 2). Although I do not deny the 
interest and value of this kind of research, it would demand a different work 
and a different point of view. I do not agree with Black’s view either: that Jev-
ons’s system is likely to be closed to external influences. A theory founded on 
axiomatic premises is nonetheless liable to influences from other spheres of 
thought, in so far as such premises take root in more general – and perhaps 
unacknowledged – beliefs. Consequently, here I would like to explain Jevons’s 
economic theories on the basis of his broader system of thought, and in particu-
lar of the anthropological premises of his thought, in relation to his conception 
of society and human nature. 
Indeed I have already answered this question implicitly: let us now answer 
it explicitly. As I have explained in the second chapter, Jevons’s view of socie-
ty and humans was individualistic. Human mental faculties were the driving 
force behind progress and history. For Jevons, humans were moved by self-
interest, and by seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Hence, Jevons could be 
numbered among the supporters of moral individualism. Jevons’s moral indi-
vidualism had a counterpart in his conception of society. Having entered socie-
ty, individuals remained, for the most part, independent of each other. Accord-
ing to this account, individuals are ontologically fundamental, whereas society 
was not. The latter was rather a sum of numbers one, i.e. individuals. Given 
Jevons’s tendency to reduce society to individuals, it is not surprising that he 
conceived political economy as centred on the study of individual choices and 
behaviour. Thus Jevons’s economic theory faithfully mirrored his picture of 
human being and society. I shall now focus on three aspects of Jevons’s eco-
nomic theory, in order to make its individualistic foundation apparent. First, I 
examine his theory of value and utility. Then I take into account the theory of 




Jevons’s theory of value 
 
 
While presenting his theory of exchange in The Theory of Political Econ-
omy Jevons started by warning against the ambiguous and unscientific use of 
the word ‘value’ (see Jevons, 1871, 81). People commonly use this term to de-
note an alleged intrinsic quality of some objects. For example, they may state 
that gold have an intrinsic value. However, in Jevons’s mind, they were mis-
taken in considering value to be a quality pertaining of the object itself. “If 
there is any fact certain about value”, argued Jevons, “it is, that it means not an 
object at all, but a quality, attribute, or rather a circumstance of an object” 
(Jevons, 1871, 81-82, emphasis added). Jevons considered value to be deter-
mined by circumstances, that is, a relational quality (Jevons, 1871, 82). 
Jevons clarified what these circumstances were: the value of a thing was 
given by “the circumstance of its exchanging in a certain ratio for some other 
substance” (Jevons, 1871, 82). The value of an exchanged commodity was de-
termined by the circumstances in which the exchange took place. Jevons de-
scribed a situation involving two people, one possessing only corn and the oth-
er only beef. In such a situation, they might be inclined to make an exchange. 
In Jevons’s eyes, the reason why they might undertake this exchange was sim-
ple: they found it useful. “It is certain that”, he explained, “under these circum-
stances, a portion of the corn may be given in exchange for a portion of the 
beef with a considerable increase of utility” (Jevons, 1871, 96). Such exchange 
would continue as far as the people involved found it useful. As Jevons held, 
“exchange will thus go on till each party has obtained all the benefit that is 
possible, and loss of utility would result if more were exchanged” (Jevons, 
1871, 96-97). 
Even on the basis of such a concise account one can easily see that Jevons 
approached economic matters from the subject’s point of view. Subjective 
evaluations were the very bedrock of his economic thought. His focus was the 
individual’s behaviour, or what in modern terms we would call ‘maximizing 
behaviour’. Jevons explicitly stated that this was his scope. He wrote that his 
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theory “is entirely based on a calculus of pleasure and pain; and the object of 
Economy is to maximise happiness by purchasing pleasure, as it were, at the 
lowest cost of pain” (Jevons, 1871, 27). This inquiry required an understanding 
of the psychological laws governing pleasure and pain, since in Jevons’s mind 
political economy rested “upon the laws of human enjoyment” (Jevons, 1871, 
47). I have already pointed out that the notion of value was connected to the 
concept of utility; and, as we shall see, with the concept of the final degree of 
utility in particular. Now I shall show how Jevons related utility to the senti-
ments of pleasure and pain, and consequently how his theory of value rested on 
the laws of human enjoyment. 
According to Jevons, the word ‘utility’ denoted an “abstract quality there-
by any object serves our purposes” (Jevons, 1871, 45). Thus, “whatever can 
produce pleasure or prevent pain may possess utility” (Jevons, 1871, 45). 
Moreover, a ‘commodity’, in Jevons’s eyes, was anything possessing utility 
(see Jevons, 1871, 45). We can therefore appreciate the relevance of this notion 
to political economy. Political economy “must be founded upon a full and ac-
curate investigation of the condition of utility” (Jevons, 1871, 46), since the no-
tion of utility is an expression of the sentiments of pleasure and pain. 
Now, it is not difficult to see why the economic subject was the pivot of 
Jevons’s theory. Utility is subjective: a thing could only be useful to someone. 
Jevons made this point clear, stating that “utility, though a quality of things, is 
no inherent quality” (Jevons, 1871, 52). “It might be more accurately de-
scribed, perhaps”, he continued, “as a circumstance of things arising out of 
their relation to man’s requirements” (Jevons, 1871, 52, second emphasis add-
ed). According to Jevons, what happened to be useful changed depending on 
the situation. The more one is in need of something, the more it will be useful 
to him. A very thirsty person would find water very useful. Furthermore, Jev-
ons drew an important conclusion from this reasoning: not all portions of the 
same commodity possessed the same utility (Jevons, 1871, 52). Jevons took 




Water, for instance, may be roughly described as the most useful of all 
substances. A quart of water per day has the high utility of saving a per-
son from dying in a most distressing manner. Several gallons a day may 
possess much utility for such purposes as cooking and washing; but af-
ter an adequate supply is secured for these uses, any additional quantity 
is a matter of indifference. All that we can say, then, is, that water, up to 
a certain quantity, is indispensable; that further quantities will have var-
ious degrees of utility; but that beyond a certain point the utility appears 
to cease (Jevons, 1871, 52-53). 
 
Jevons’s concluded that “utility is not proportional to commodity: the very 
same articles vary in utility according as we already possess more or less of the 
same article” (Jevons, 1871, 53). 
It is probably not by chance that Jevons took water as an example. Indeed 
his approach gave him a new perspective on the renowned diamond-water par-
adox, also known as the paradox of value. This paradox, going back as far as 
Adam Smith at least (Adam Smith, [1776] 1937, 28), could be expressed in the 
following terms: how is it possible that water, the most useful of things, has 
almost no value, whereas some luxurious but superfluous good such as dia-
monds are enormously expensive? Considering the nature of utility enabled 
Jevons to show that this paradox was illusory. An object didn’t possess utility 
by itself: utility depended on the circumstances. One of the circumstances de-
termining the utility of a commodity was its quantity. Economising behaviour 
is required only as far as the resources are scarce. If we have much more than 
we need, the problem of economising does not arise. 
This logical thread led Jevons to another fundamental idea: the concept of 
diminishing marginal utility. This was one of Jevons’s fundamental contribu-
tions to economic theory, though the credit for it had been shared with Carl 
Menger and Léon Walras. Hence the name of this school of thought – a school 
whose theories and works emerged independently of one another: marginalism. 
I will present this ground-breaking theory with reference to Jevons’s Theory of 
Political Economy. 
Here Jevons described the law of the variation of utility. Utility was a 
quantity of two dimensions, “one dimension consisting in the quantity of the 
commodity, and another in the intensity of the effect produced upon the con-
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sumer” (Jevons, 1871, 56). As it is well known, Jevons used mathematical lan-
guage to express the relation between the quantity of a commodity and its utili-
ty, stating that the intensity of utility (or 𝑢) was a function of its quantity (or 𝑥) 
(see Jevons, 1871, 57). Jevons distinguished between the total utility provided 
by a commodity and the utility belonging to each portion of it (see Jevons, 
1871, 54). He elucidated the concept of degree of utility, namely the variation 
of utility’s intensity (∆𝑢) associated with a small increment of the commodity’s 




being thus the “differential coefficient of 𝑢 considered as a function of 𝑥” (Jev-
ons, 1871, 61). 
However, what really aroused Jevons’s interest was the final degree of 
utility, namely the degree of utility associated with the last increment of the 
quantity of a commodity (see Jevons, 1871, 61). Jevons didn’t hesitate to stress 
the importance of this concept. In his own words, “the variation of the function 
expressing the final degree of utility is the all-important point in all economical 
problems” (Jevons, 1871, 62). He enunciated the law of its variation: 
 
We may state, as a general law, that it [utility] varies with the quantity 
of commodity, and ultimately decreases as that quantity decreases. No 
commodity can be named which we continue to desire with the same 
force, whatever be the quantity already in use or possession. All our ap-
petites are capable of satisfaction or satiety, sooner or later (Jevons, 
1871, 62). 
 
Going back to the diamond-water paradox, Jevons used the concept of dimin-
ishing marginal utility to explain why we did not attach much value to water: 
 
We cannot live a day without water, and yet in ordinary circumstances 
we set no value on it. Why is this? Simply because we usually have so 
much of it that its final degree of utility is reduced nearly to zero (Jev-
ons, 1871, 62). 
 
Therefore, if we want to determine the value of a commodity, we are to look to 
its final degree of utility. 
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The subjective character of Jevons’s position has been made quite apparent 
through the exposition of his theory of utility. However, this could be all the 
more evident if we take into account what he wrote concerning the measure-
ment of feelings. This was a problematic point in Jevons’s theory, especially 
considering that one of the two dimensions of utility was intensity. How could 
we possibly provide a measure for the intensity of the pleasure or pain experi-
enced by the individual? 
Jevons was aware of this difficulty. He observed that providing a measure 
of a unit of pleasure was not an easy task (see Jevons, 1871, 19). However, 
from his point of view it wasn’t necessary to measure these units. He rather re-
lied on what he called a ‘direct measurement’. According to Jevons, the indi-
vidual was the seat of such direct measurements. As he stated, “the mind of an 
individual is the balance which makes its own comparisons and is the final 
judge of quantities of feeling” (Jevons, 1871, 19). The individual mind is capa-
ble of weighing the experienced feelings, comparing pleasures with pains, and 
deciding how to act in accordance with these estimations. Hence, the human 
mind could be seen as a ‘balance’ (a scale) of feelings. 
Thus, Jevons appealed to introspection in order to overcome the difficulty 
of providing measures of the experienced feelings at the individual level. The 
estimation of feelings took place in the subject’s mind. We must rely on these 
estimations for considering subjective feelings. As we read in the Theory, 
“pleasures, in short, are, for the time being, as the mind estimates them; so that 
we cannot make a choice, or manifest the will in any way, without indicating 
thereby an excess of pleasure in some direction” (Jevons, 1871, 19). 
Moreover, the problem of measuring the subjective feelings was of sec-
ondary importance for the actual functioning of political economy. As Jevons 
explained, 
 
though the theory presumes to investigate the condition of a mind, and ba-
ses upon this investigation the whole of Political Economy, practically it is 




Providing an exact measure of the unit of pleasure and pain at level of the indi-
vidual mind may by difficult or even unconceivable, but it is, more important-
ly, unnecessary. Even though, as Jevons stated, economic laws are the same at 
the individual and at the aggregate level, political economists observe the oper-
ating of these laws only at the levels of aggregates. The actions resulting from 
individual behaviour have the appearance of caprice, and “are beyond the anal-
ysis and prediction of science” (Jevons, 1871, 22), while the interfering causes 
are balanced at the level of the aggregates. 
By situating their analysis at the aggregates’ level, economists could use 
the measuring tools which, in Jevons’s eyes, would make political economy 
veritably scientific. Jevons’s stress on the measuring process was at odds with 
other methodological approaches, such as Mill’s or Cairnes’s. For Jevons, 
Mill’s method, based on the introspective inquiry revealing the basic laws of 
political economy, was unscientific. In Jevons’s eyes, scientific inquiry was 
meant to provide quantitative measurements, at least in those domains which 
were themselves quantitative, and to correct measuring errors by means of av-
erages (see Maas, 2005, 172-174). 
Jevons, who stressed the importance of measurement and scientific exper-
imentation, was far from taking on Mill’s introspective method. Nonetheless, 
introspection played a role in Jevons’s economic theory. Such a role needs to 
be considered in accordance with the level where Jevons’s analysis situates it-
self. At the level of aggregates, introspection didn’t enter economic inquiry, 
since at that level the amount of data made it possible to identify the general 
laws through averages or mean values. However, the laws of political economy 
were the same for the aggregate as well as for the individual. Moreover, they 
were founded at the individual level. The behaviour of aggregates was, in Jev-
ons’s eyes, no different from the individual’s, inasmuch as they were governed 
by the same laws. These laws could only be observed at the aggregate level, 
but they were the condition of the individual mind. Therefore, at the level of 
the individual, we are at a loss as to how identify those laws, and we could only 
rely on the immediate comprehension that the individual’s mind has on itself. 
Hence, introspection, albeit refused as a specific scientific method, has a role to 
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play in Jevons’s thought, providing a foundation of political economy at the 
level of individuals. 
Jevons rooted his theory in the psychological faculties, notably in the men-
tal capacity of measuring feelings within the individual’s mind. Margaret 
Schabas has stressed this point very clearly, stating that in Jevons’s account 
“economic phenomena were […] reducible to mental states and ultimately to 
the laws of psychology” (Schabas, 1984, 142). Sandra Peart has also noted that 
much of Jevons’s economic theory was founded on introspection. According to 
Peart, not only did Jevons’s theory of value rely on introspective data (see 
Peart, 1996, 66), but it also depended on introspection for some of its other 
significant claims, such as that human desires are rapidly satiated (see Peart, 
1996, 71). According to Peart, introspection played a foundational role in Jev-
ons’s methodology too (see Peart, 1996, 77). There are rival interpretations, 
though. Harro Maas, echoing White (see M. White, 1994a), has argued that 
Jevons dissociated himself from the introspective method, and consequently 
from John Stuart Mill’s account (see Maas, 2005, 152-154 and 174-175). 
As I have already noted, I take it that Peart is right in describing Jevons’s 
recourse to psychological data in terms of introspection. Jevons was satisfied 
with treating mental processes to be self-evident, and didn’t provide further 
justification for how they functioned. The human mind may be inscrutable to 
others’ eyes, as Jevons asserted (see Jevons, 1871, 21), but it did have a grasp 
on itself. As I have shown in the first chapter, in his logical writings, Jevons 
held that mental processes were self-evident. Hence, it is not surprising that he 
grounded his economic theory on introspection. 
 
Commercial crises as a mental phenomenon 
 
Let us now focus on Jevons’s interpretation of commercial crises. I con-
sider this topic in the light of the present subject matter, emphasising the role 
played by individual behaviour and psychological processes. Peart has elabo-
rated an attentive analysis of this aspect of Jevons’s work, comparing it with 
that of others, especially of John Mills, who had become President of the Man-
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chester Statistical Society after Jevons (see Peart, 1996, 41-63). John Mills had 
suggested that the causes of commercial crises were to be found in the human 
mind. Thus the cyclical appearance of crises depended on the alteration in the 
mood of investors, their speculative manias, their surplus of energy. In Mills’s 
mind, these characteristics were but a natural tendency of English businessmen 
(see Peart, 1996, 44-45). 
On the one hand, Jevons was inspired by Mills analysis. On the other, he 
was unsatisfied with his explanation, which in Jevons’s opinion failed to rec-
ognise an additional cause of commercial crises. Jevons found this cause in the 
variations of solar activity connected to sunspots, which influenced the harvest 
and consequently commercial flows. Jevons argued that in India there were re-
curring famines, at intervals of ten or eleven years, caused by the variations of 
solar activity. In their turn, these famines raised the price of food and resulted 
in lowering the demand for British exports, thus bringing about a commercial 
crisis in Britain2. 
Jevons’s hypothesis of a connection between commercial crises and sun-
spots elicited much criticism (see MacLennan, 1972, 64; S. M. Stigler, 1982, 
362-364; Aldrich, 1987, 241-247). Nevertheless, his remarks concerning the 
psychological features of commercial crises are important for the present study. 
Since 1863, when he first examined the phenomenon of commercial fluctua-
tions in A Serious Fall in the Value of Gold Ascertained, Jevons had underlined 
the relevance of private initiative in these events. Whenever investors had a 
large amount capital at their disposal, they sought a proper way to invest it. 
These investments were followed by a rise in prices. However, the gains 
weren’t always up to expectations. The quantity of prior investment was so 
 
2 In this regard, see the paper “The Solar Period and the Price of Corn”, first published 
in 1875 (Jevons, 1884, 194-205), where Jevons first mentioned the sunspots; also see 
the paper “The Periodicity of Commercial Crises and its Physical Explanation, with 
Postscript”, published in 1878 and the completed with the postscript in 1882 (Jevons, 
1884, 206-220), where the argument concerning the relationship between the Indian 
famines and commercial crises can also be found; then see “Commercial Crises and 
Sun-Spots”, published between 1878 and 1879 (Jevons, 1884, 221-243). 
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great, that it led to a lack of capital. The situation could be worsened by some 
other factors, like a bad harvest. Consequently, the commodities could not be 
sold for the expected price. Merchants might be constrained to sell at loss, and 
so face ruin. Eventually, as Jevons stated, “comes the panic and the collapse of 
credit” (Jevons, 1884, 30). 
Jevons described the businessman’s demeanour with psychological and 
emotional vocabulary, as we can see from the following passage from A Seri-
ous Fall: 
 
When capital is abundant its owners look out anxiously for some mode 
of profitable employment. Any new discovery or fresh employment for 
money is eagerly taken up. Hope of gain is a most contagious emotion 
among business men, and presently hundreds set themselves to carry 
out this new discovery upon a most extended scale. […] Further de-
scription is needless: it is well known that nothing is so difficult to re-
strain with prudent bounds as these manias for speculative investment 
(Jevons, 1884, 28-29, emphases added). 
 
In this passage a considerable emphasis is put on psychological elements. In-
deed the individual’s promptings and choices played a fundamental role in 
commercial crises. The process, albeit far from being the only cause, was trig-
gered by the investor’s anxiety to employ his capital in excess. Moreover, 
businessmen were open to be influenced by other investors, and not only by 
their choices: they felt each other’s feelings – feelings which spread among 
them and reached a point where they cannot be controlled anymore. This led to 
a mania, together with reckless behaviour. 
In The Solar Period and the Price of Corn (1875), Jevons credited Mills 
with understanding that commercial fluctuations were “really mental in their 
nature, depending upon variation of despondency, hopefulness, excitement, 
disappointment and panic” (Jevons, 1884, 203). However, notwithstanding the 
mental nature of the phenomenon, these waves of moods must be triggered by 
something. Jevons suggested that their cause wasn’t endogenous, but rather ex-
ogenous. In Jevons’s opinion, their main cause was the condition of harvests. 
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The interaction between the triggering factors of crises, where some were 
exogenous and others endogenous to the human mind, was complex. “It may 
be”, as Jevons argued, 
 
that the commercial classes of the English nation, as at present consti-
tuted, form a body, suited by mental and other conditions, to go through 
a complete oscillation in a period nearly corresponding to that of the 
sun-spots. In such conditions a comparatively slight variation of the 
prices of food, repeated in a similar manner, at corresponding points of 
the oscillation, would suffice to produce violent effects. […] If, then, 
the English money market is naturally fitted to swing or roll in periods 
of ten or eleven years, comparatively small variations in the goodness 
of harvests repeated at like interval would suffice in produce those al-
ternations of depression, activity, excitement and collapse which un-
doubtedly recur in well-marked succession (Jevons, 1884, 203). 
 
The triggering event may be external, but its fuel was the condition of the hu-
man mind. Jevons suggested that these conditions could be of various kinds, 
and yet, among these kinds, he only mentioned mental conditions, as if these 
were the sole relevant category. His reasoning shows thus the cruciality of psy-
chological factors in commercial crises. Moreover, the scale of the external 
cause didn’t matter, since the crucial element was the ground where it took 
root, i.e. the individual mind. The latter had its own laws and it reacted on their 
basis. Consequently, the slightest variation may produce the most violent ef-
fect. It was needed a casus belli (the exogenous factor), but then the subject 
was responsible for determining the strength of the effect. 
This interpretation of Jevons’s remarks on commercial fluctuations evi-
dently puts the emphasis on the individual. Indeed this conclusion was but-
tressed by Jevons himself. In a letter published in The Times, on the 19th of 
April 1879, he argued that the extent of commercial mania wasn’t necessarily 
proportionate to its triggering cause (see Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. V, 48). Jev-
ons suggested that this event was, in his own words, “the match which fires the 
inflammable spirits of the speculative classes” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. V, 





The history of many bubbles shows that there is no proportion between 
the stimulating cause and the height of folly to which the inflation of 
credit and prices may be carried. A mania is, in short, a kind of explo-
sion of commercial folly followed by the natural collapse. The difficul-
ty is to explain why this collapse so often comes at intervals of ten or 
eleven years, and I feel sure the explanation will be found in the cessa-
tion of demand from India and China occasioned by the failure of har-
vests there, ultimately due to changes of solar activity (Jevons, 1972-
1981, Vol. V, 48). 
 
Whatever the extent of the external circumstances may be, what did make a 
difference was the psychological features of the businessmen, whose spirits 
were ‘inflammable’. 
As Peart has pointed out, Jevons’s analysis of commercial fluctuations im-
plied understanding the economic agents’ capacity of foreseeing – or failing to 
foresee – these variations. Peart has observed that Jevons’s economic agent 
was constantly mistaken in his predictions: “merchants, bankers and producers 
are myopic, since they are not able to foresee and plan for the course of the ag-
ricultural cycle. In fact throughout the cycle investors’ expectations are persis-
tently incorrect” (Peart, 1996, 54). Peart has also remarked that in Jevons’s ac-
count the deficiency of foresight crossed the boundaries of social classes. Mak-
ing intertemporal decisions was a difficult task for anyone, for the labourer as 
much as for the capitalist. 
 
Labour: an individual effort and choice 
 
I now turn to Jevons’s theory of labour, elucidating how Jevons’s subjec-
tivism shaped this theory too. According to Jevons’s definition, “labour is the 
painful exertion which we undergo to ward off pains of greater amount, or to 
procure pleasures which leave a balance in our favour” (Jevons, 1871, 162). 
Such definition clearly describes labour in the terms of a Benthamian calculus 
of pleasures and pains. Thus Jevons’s subjectivist approach to the theory of la-
bour turns out to be quite apparent: the all-important element is the pain per-
ceived by the individual while attending this effort (Jevons, 1871, 191-192). 
While presenting his theory, Jevons explained that labour had two dimensions: 
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duration and intensity. One could work for a given time, but the effort through 
this time could be more or less intense. However, Jevons chose to focus on the 
subjective element of intensity rather than on duration, which could be easily 
expressed in objective terms. The difference between these two dimensions and 
the subjectivist feature of intensity has been highlighted by Margaret Schabas, 
who has asserted that “although the duration of labor may be readily measured, 
the intensity, as in the case of positive utility, can only be known subjectively” 
(Schabas, 1990, 45). 
The refusal to take the duration as the crucial element defining labour was 
also a mark of Jevons’s difference with respect to classical economic thought, 
especially David Ricardo’s theory. Ricardo had founded his theory of labour on 
duration. Jevons took Ricardo’s point of view into consideration and clearly 
expressed his disagreement with him: 
 
Labour is in itself of unequal value. Ricardo, by a violent assumption, 
founded his theory of value on quantities of labour considered as one 
uniform thing. He was aware that labour differs infinitely in quality and 
efficiency, so that each kind is more or less scarce, and is consequently 
paid at a higher or lower rate of wages. He regarded these differences as 
disturbing circumstances which would have to be allowed for; but his 
theory rests on the assumed equality of labour. […] I hold it to be im-
possible to compare à priori the productive powers of a navvy, a car-
penter, an iron-puddler, a schoolmaster, and a barrister (Jevons, 1871, 
160). 
 
In Jevons’s eyes, Ricardo’s account had an ‘objectivist’ flaw: it reduced labour 
to its quantitative element, i.e. its duration, regardless of its qualitative charac-
ter. In contrast, Jevons conceived labour as essentially variable (see Jevons, 
1871, 160). Consequently, the value of labour could not be uniformly deter-
mined on the basis of duration. 
As stated above, Jevons’s theory of labour was consistent with his view of 
economy as a calculus of pleasures and pains. Therefore, he looked at labour as 
a subjective experience: “the discussion”, as George Stigler has remarked, “is 
entirely in the terms of an individual and, primarily, his labor in one occupa-
tion” (G. Stigler, 1941, 29). Jevons focused on the individual’s motivations and 
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perceptions: “labour, I should say, is any painful exertion of body or mind un-
dergone with the view to future good” (Jevons, 1871, 164). The individual en-
gaged in the effort of working by reason of the future good that could repay it. 
In Jevons’s mind, labour was a matter of individual choice. “When a la-
bourer is inclined to stop”, explained Jevons, “he clearly feels something that is 
irksome, and our theory will only involve the point where the exertion has be-
come so painful as to nearly balance all other considerations” (Jevons, 1871, 
164). When one is working, one is  comparing the advantages and disad-
vantages of one’s efforts. In line with his utility theory, Jevons stated that his 
theory of labour concerned the turning points, the moment where the decision 
to stop was taken. In terms of his utility theory, the states were represented by 
the final degrees of utility. At each moment, the labourer implicitly wondered 
whether the gain drawn from the work was worth the effort or not. Jevons’s 
question was the following: at what point will the worker decide to stop? He 
provided an answer in the Theory: 
 
A free labourer endures the irksomeness of work because the pleasure 
he receives, or the pain he wards off by means of the produce, exceeds 
the pain of exertion. When labour itself is a worse evil than what it 
saves him from, there can be no motive for further exertion, and he 
ceases. Therefore he will cease to labour just at that point when the pain 
exactly equals for a moment the corresponding pleasure acquired (Jev-
ons, 1871, 172-173). 
 
Jevons’s theory of labour mirrored his conception of society as a sum of 
individuals, where each labourer was alone face to face with the choice of 
working or not. Many scholars have stressed that Jevons’s labour theory was 
unsatisfactory, since it did not entail a study of the wages’ distribution. As 
George Stigler has noticed, Jevons considered 
 
the factors determining the supply of labor in an economy, but in the 
absence of a general investigation of the interrelations of costs and val-
ue no light is shed on the problem of the laborer’s reward in an enter-




Robert Collison Black has made a similar remark, stating that what Jevons’s 
analysis “affords is not a theory of wages, but a theory of cost of production in 
terms of disutility” (R. D. C. Black, 1970, 19)3. Ugo Pagano has also tackled 
the same problem by putting a particular emphasis on Jevons’s subjectivism: 
 
Labour is considered by Jevons as a ‘subjective feeling’. Therefore, on-
ly the ‘subjects’ (i.e., the workers) can decide how much to work, how 
to organise and how to allocate their labour, for the very reason that 
they are the only ones who can know anything about their own subjec-
tive feelings (Pagano, 1985, 80-81). 
 
Motohiro Okada, who has investigated Jevons’s theory of labour, treated 
this topic at length. Okada has argued that “Jevons makes no reference to de-
mand for labour or the employer […]. Hence, it may safely be said that the 
model is not so much of an enterprise economy as of a Crusonian life” (Okada, 
2012, 26). According to Okada, the hallmark – and uniqueness – of Jevons’s 
theory of labour turns out to be its subjectivism. The classical and neoclassical 
schools are alike in that they both strive to understand how the market deter-
mined work conditions, and, with them, wages. “The wage fund theory of the 
former”, as Okada has explained, 
 
represented it in the terms of determination of the wage level by the 
proportion of the aggregate of the capitalists’ advance on means of liv-
ing to the labour population. Yet, this theory failed to take into consid-
eration the labour supply and the worker’s motivation for it at a micro 
level. Jevons cast light on this neglected issue (Okada, 2012, 27). 
 
Jevons’s individualistic account of society as divisible into his basic units, 
namely individuals, worked its way through his theory of labour as much as in 
his economic theory in general. 
 
 
3 Disutility was the opposite of utility, i.e. the quality possessed by an object which 
gives pain. As such, from the mathematical point of view, it corresponded to a nega-
tive quantity. For the definition of this concept, see Jevons, [1871] 1879, 62-63. 
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3.2. Mathematics and the world 
 
As we have seen, marginalism entailed a change of point of view, putting 
the individual in the centre of the picture. However, it also implemented anoth-
er relevant shift in the domain of political economy: Jevons and Walras applied 
mathematics to economics. In this section I tackle a set of questions deriving 
from this shift. First, I show how Jevons had always believed that mathematics 
was the soundest instrument to treat economic concepts. Then, I examine Jev-
ons’s justifications in support of the use of mathematics in the context of polit-
ical economy. After stressing briefly that Jevons still conceived mathematics to 
be founded on logic, I examine some issues related to the conditions of possi-
bility of the application of mathematics to political economy in the context of 
Jevons’s epistemology. Then, I come to the centre of my analysis, where Jev-
ons’s conception of what he called ‘the series of reality’ will be examined 
through the concept of metaphor. It is worth noticing that I have no pretension 
of pursuing a novel study of the notion of metaphor. My purpose is quite dif-
ferent: I refer to the interactive theory of metaphor in order to display the con-
sequences of applying mathematics to political economy in Jevons’s thought. 
My primary reference is Deirdre McCloskey’s study of metaphors in the eco-
nomic context. Lastly, I argue that Jevons’s view about the mathematical na-
ture of the described object – economic issues – depended on the language he 
applied. 
 
Jevons’s commitment to mathematical economics 
 
Since his youth, Jevons had been persuaded that mathematics was to be 
found at the basis of every scientific discipline (see Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 
109). While still in Australia, Jevons began to think that political economy had 
to be mathematical. On the 28th of February 1858, he illustrated to his sister 
Henrietta his conception of the relationship between mathematics and econom-




that Economy, scientifically speaking, is a very contracted science; it is 
in fact a sort of vague mathematics which calculates the causes and ef-
fects of man’s industry, and shows how it may best be applied (Jevons, 
1972-1981, Vol. II, 321). 
 
Political economy was, in the eyes of the young Stanley, a mathematics applied 
to the study of man’s industry. 
Jevons envisioned a clearer shape to this ‘vague mathematics’ two years 
later. In a letter dated 1st June 1860, Jevons confided to his brother Herbert the 
very core of what would become his economic theory: 
 
During the last session I have worked a great deal at Pol. Economy; in 
the last few months I have fortunately struck out what I have no doubt 
is the true theory of Economy so thorough-going and consistent, that I 
cannot now read other books on the subject without indignation. While 
the theory is entirely mathematical in principle, I show at the same time 
how the data of calculation are so complicated as to be for the present 
hopeless. Nevertheless I obtain from the mathematical principles all the 
chief laws at which Pol. Econts have previously arrived only arranged in 
a series of Definitions Axioms and Theorems almost as rigorous and 
connected as if they were so many geometrical problems. One of the 
most important axioms is that as the quantity of any commodity, for in-
stance plain food, which a man has to consume increases, so the utility 
or benefit derived from the last portion used decreases in degree. […] 
And I assume that on an average the ratio of utility is some continuous 
mathematical function of the quantity of commodity (Jevons, 1972-
1981, Vol. II, 410). 
 
This passage is very famous, and the scholarly study on Jevons has seen in it 
the germ of utility theory and of the law of decreasing marginal utility (see, for 
instance, La Nauze, 1953). Jevons pictured his theory as a system of axioms, 
from which the basic economic laws could be drawn. Not long after, Jevons 
expressed the same idea in another letter to Herbert. Indeed, on the 28th No-
vember 1860, he stated that his theory of political economy assumed “the form 
of a complicated mathematical problem, from which all the common laws with 
due limitations flow” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. II, 422). 
In the following years Jevons became more and more persuaded that 
mathematics and economics belonged together. On the 28th February 1879 he 




I have for some time past been inquiring into the history of the mathe-
matical treatment of Economics, and the truth gradually dawns upon me 
that the mathematical method is as old as the science of Economics it-
self (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. V, 24). 
 
Jevons devoted considerable attention to this subject. In the years between the 
publication of the first (1871) and the second edition (1879) of the Theory, 
Jevons discovered that the attempts of applying mathematics to political econ-
omy had been far more abundant than he thought. As Jevons explained in the 
preface to the second edition of the Theory, he made an exhaustive list of all 
the works in which mathematics had been fruitfully wedded to political econ-
omy (see Jevons, [1871] 1879, XX-XXI)4. On the basis of such list, Jevons 
eventually concluded that “the notion that there is any novelty or originality in 
the application of mathematical method or symbols must be dismissed alto-
gether” (Jevons, [1871] 1879, XLVI-XLVII). 
Notwithstanding the number of these attempts, Jevons pointed out that this 
path was far from being mainstream. He also admitted that the purpose of his 
list was to make such works known. As a matter of fact, Jevons made consider-
able efforts to foster the idea that economics had to be a mathematical disci-
pline. Together with Walras, he was committed to spreading the knowledge of 
their works, so that mathematical economy would be recognised5. By this list, 
Jevons aimed at showing that applying mathematics to political economy was 
 
4 Here Jevons specified that the list had been included in the second edition of the 
Theory, as an appendix. 
5 Jevons’s eagerness to spread his theory clearly emerges in some letters to D’Aulnis 
and Walras. D’Aulnis de Bourouil was a young student of law, at the University of 
Leyden. He held Walras’s and Jevons’s theory in high esteem. As a matter of fact, it 
was D’Aulnis who first put in contact the two marginalists (see Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. IV, 45, where Walras explained that he wrote to Jevons under D’Aulnis’s sugges-
tion). Concerning Jevons’s endeavours to diffuse his mathematical theory, see Jevons, 
1972-1981, Vol. IV, 62 and 72-74, for the correspondence with D’Aulnis in regard to 
this topic; see also Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. IV, 67-68, where Walras expressed to 
Jevons his doubts concerning the possibilities of disseminating their theories. 
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perfectly reasonable. Making this point was significant, given that Jevons faced 
harsh criticism for choosing to apply mathematics to this subject matter6. First 
and foremost, he had to convince his readers that the path he had chosen was 
the right one. As for him, his conviction never seemed to waver. 
 
 
The conditions of possibility 
 
My inquiry is not focused on the reception of Jevons’s mathematical theo-
ry by his contemporaries, nor on his efforts to persuade them of its soundness. 
My investigation starts by examining the foundations of Jevons’s account and 
the consequences of his decision to apply mathematics to political economy. 
Let us consider the first point, namely the foundations of Jevons’s account. My 
question is: how did Jevons justify, from a theoretical point of view, the choice 
of applying mathematics to political economy? This question could also be 
formulated in the following terms: what were the conditions of possibility 
which founded Jevons’s application of mathematics to political economy? 
Jevons provided a justification for his mathematical theory in his main 
works on this subject matter. He presented his mathematical theory of economy 
for the first time in 1862, at the Section F of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science7. This short paper already conveyed what would be-
come, nine years later, the core of his Theory. There, Jevons began by elucidat-
ing why political economy needed to be expressed in a mathematical language. 
“The following paper”, he explained,  
 
 
6 For a detailed account of the responses to Jevons’s theory, see Schabas, 1990, chap. 
6. 
7 This paper had been printed in the Journal of the Statistical Society of London in 
1866, under the title “A Brief Account of a General Mathematical Theory of Political 




briefly describes the nature of a Theory of Economy which will reduce 
the main problem of this science to a mathematical form. Economy, in-
deed, being concerned with quantities, has always of necessity been 
mathematical in its subject, but the strict and general statement, and the 
easy comprehension of its quantitative laws has been prevented by a 
neglect of those powerful methods of expression which have been ap-
plied to most other sciences with so much success (Jevons, 1866, 282). 
 
Jevons restated this point once again, in a paper read to the Manchester 
Statistical Society in 1864. This paper was concerned with Walras’s theory, 
which, as it is well-known, was also mathematical and displayed various simi-
larities with Jevons’s. In order to buttress at once his own theory and Walras’s, 
Jevons asserted that “the laws of political economy must be mathematical for 
the most part, because they deal with quantities and the relations of quantities” 
(Jevons, 1874, 480). 
However, the work where this justification had been better articulated was, 
naturally enough, the Theory of Political Economy. Here Jevons dedicated a 
paragraph to an explanation of the mathematical character of political econo-
my. “It seems perfectly clear”, he stated, “that Economy, if it is to be a science 
at all, must be a mathematical science” (Jevons, 1871, 3). Jevons argued that 
the so-called moral and physical sciences were united by a common method – 
an argument which would be crucial in the Principles. As I have shown in the 
first chapter, in the Principles of Science Jevons encouraged taking the physical 
sciences as a paradigm, due to their extraordinary accomplishments: “the phys-
ical sciences may therefore be properly made the practice-ground of the rea-
soning powers, because they furnish us with a great body of precise and suc-
cessful investigations” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, XXVII-XXVIII)8. Jevons provid-
ed thus a first justification in the Theory for his willingness to apply mathemat-
ics to political economy. If we wish to make political economy truly scientific, 
we had to embrace the method of the hard sciences – which was a mathemati-
cal one. 
 
8 This issue has already been investigated in the first chapter. 
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Notwithstanding the significance of such a methodological argument, in 
the Theory Jevons’s main point in favour of mathematical economy was anoth-
er. These statements were much like those he had already made in 1862: 
 
our science [political economy] must be mathematical, simply because 
it deals with quantities. Wherever the things treated are capable of being 
more or less in magnitude, there the laws and relations must be mathe-
matical in nature (Jevons, 1871, 4). 
 
Jevons clarified that mathematics wasn’t just a language in which we may 
choose to express economic laws. Rather, these laws were in themselves math-
ematical. According to him, given their quantitative character, “the laws [of po-
litical economy] are mathematical: Economists cannot deprive them of their 
nature by denying them the name; they might as well try to alter red light by 
calling it blue” (Jevons, 1871, 4-5). 
The dismissal of mathematics by political economists entailed a mis-
judgement of the nature of economic laws. As we shall see in third section of 
the present chapter, this refusal of mathematics, like any other attempt to dis-
card the natural laws, was, for Jevons, pointless. We could only find ourselves 
impoverishing our comprehension, without escaping the natural mathematical 
character of our subject matter: 
 
If […] in Political Economy we have to deal with quantities and com-
plicated relations of quantities, we must reason mathematically; we do 
not render the science less mathematical by avoiding the symbols of al-
gebra, – we merely refuse to employ, in a very imperfect science, much 
needing every kind of assistance, that apparatus of signs which is found 
indispensable in other sciences (Jevons, 1871, 6). 
 
Jevons was positive that all the pivotal concepts of political economy – like la-
bour, money, capital, as well as pleasure and pain – were quantitative notions. 
The basic notions and laws of political economy had a mathematical nature. 
Jevons appealed to a powerful ally in defence of his theory – i.e. nature. 
 




In Jevons’s eyes, mathematical language wasn’t only a means of expres-
sion: it was the language of the economic laws themselves. It was their natural 
language. Jevons’s statement turns out to have an ontological implication. 
Mathematics wasn’t the chosen language because it was more suitable to ex-
press economic relations than other languages. It was rather the only suitable 
language, since it was ‘spoken’ by nature itself. Hence, any other way of ex-
pressing the economic laws wouldn’t be as faithful to the world. Jevons’s ar-
gument was thus founded in an isomorphism between the world and mathemat-
ical language. We could – and must – use mathematics in political economy, 
due to the natural character of the objects involved in economic reasoning. 
This wasn’t the only occasion in which the term ‘isomorphism’ was used 
to describe the relation between things and signs in Jevons’s thought. In the 
first chapter, I have argued that Jevons’s Logical Alphabet could represent nat-
ural phenomena thanks to an isomorphism between the world and the laws of 
logic. Logic mirrored the world because it shared its structure, being the laws 
at once of thought and of things. 
It is worth mentioning here that Jevons’s belief that the economic laws 
were mathematical didn’t contradict his depiction of the world as regulated by 
the laws of logic. Jevons left no doubt concerning the hierarchy of logic and 
mathematics (see Jevons, 1890, 3-6). Indeed, in the Principles of Science, Jev-
ons wrote that 
 
in no region of thought can a reasoner cast himself free from the prior 
conditions of logical correctness. The mathematician is only strong and 
true as long as he is logical, and if number rules the world, it is logic 
which rules number (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 154). 
 
This sentence, which Margaret Schabas has put in the centre of her study (see 
Schabas, 1990, especially chap. 4 and 5), shows perfectly well how mathemat-
ics depended on logic for truth and reliability. Without the guidance of logic, 
mathematics would be lost: “in fact we no sooner leave the simple logical con-
ditions of number, than we find ourselves involved in a mazy and mysterious 
science of symbols” (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 154). 
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Jevons emphasised this point in the Theory of Political Economy. Here he 
expressed the pre-eminence of logic over mathematics: 
 
There can be but two classes of sciences – those which are simply logi-
cal, and those which, besides being logical, are also mathematical. If 
there be any science which determines merely whether a thing be or be 
not – whether an event will happen, or will not happen – it must be a 
purely logical science; but if the thing may be greater or less, or the 
event may happen sooner or later, nearer or farther, then quantitative 
notions enter, and the science must be mathematical in nature, by what-
ever name we call it (Jevons, 1871, 8). 
 
A scientific discipline could be mathematical, in addition to logical. However, 
the logical nature of every science – and ultimately of everything there is – 
didn’t come into question. Consequently, Jevons’s view of the world as an ar-
ray of combinations wasn’t at odds with his conception of mathematics as the 
natural language of quantitative phenomena. Mathematics had to answer to 
logic. Hence, quantitative phenomena couldn’t but be encompassed in the 
combinatorial order of the world, since the order of combinations was the order 
of logic itself. 
 
The series of signs and things: neither interchangeable, nor parallel 
 
According to Jevons, political economy had to be mathematical due to the 
mathematical nature of its basic notions. It surely was, at the same time, a logi-
cal science, just like any other. However, a proper scientific treatment of eco-
nomic concepts and laws required using mathematical language, in the absence 
of which the object’s nature would be misrepresented. Now, Jevons’s claim 
that the economic laws had a mathematical nature raises some questions. These 
questions are akin to those asked in the first chapter, concerning the epistemo-
logical foundation of Jevons’s theory. On what basis could Jevons argue that 
economy was regulated by natural laws? Moreover, on what basis could he 
hold that these laws were inherently mathematical? 
The first question has already been answered indirectly in the first chapter. 
Jevons’s God was the guarantor of the stability and regularity of nature. The 
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very existence of a benevolent Creator ensured that the world was created ac-
cording to His plan, that it was governed by laws as flawless as their master. In 
the infinite universe depicted by Jevons, God was the anchor of humans. With-
out Him, the finite human intellect would be lost. However, even if God could 
guarantee the existence of such laws, defining the essential characteristics of 
these laws was a more delicate matter. In the first chapter, I have illustrated at 
length Jevons’s epistemology and conception of the universe. In his eyes, na-
ture was a ballot-box. We could see what comes out of it – i.e. the events 
which actually happen – but we could not look into the box itself. Hence, the 
inherent nature of phenomena would never be disclosed to the human intellect. 
Given this view, how could Jevons possibly assert that the economic laws 
were mathematical in themselves? Wouldn’t that imply the possibility of taking 
a glimpse into the depths of the ballot-box? This wasn’t the only occasion on 
which Jevons made claims about the inherent nature of phenomena. For in-
stance, he took the liberty of defining the laws of thought – which regulated the 
human mind as well as nature. However, in identifying the laws of thought, 
Jevons could rely on the self-evidence of the mind to itself. By virtue of such 
self-evidence, the agent could be allowed to make ontological statements con-
cerning his or her mind. In contrast, what could justify Jevons’s assertion about 
the nature of economic laws? How could he identify an isomorphism between 
mathematics and economic laws without suggesting that the nature of the latter 
was known? 
In order to investigate this issue, we have to take into account a passage 
from the Principles of Science: 
 
I need hardly dwell upon the question whether logic treats of language, 
notions, or things. As reasonably might we debate whether a mathema-
tician treats of symbols, quantities, or things. A mathematician certainly 
does treat of symbols, but only as the instruments whereby to facilitate 
his reasoning concerning quantities; and as the axioms and rules of 
mathematical science must be verified in concrete objects in order that 
the calculations founded upon them may have any validity or utility, it 
follows that the ultimate objects of mathematical science are the things 
themselves. In like manner I conceive that the logician treats of lan-
guage so far as it is essential for the embodiment and exhibition of 
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thought. Even if reasoning can take place in the inner consciousness of 
man without the use of any signs, which is doubtful, at any rate it can-
not become the subject of discussion until by some system of material 
signs it is manifested to other persons. The logician then uses words and 
symbols as instruments of reasoning, and leaves the nature and peculi-
arities of language to the grammarian. But signs again must correspond 
to the thoughts and things expressed, in order that they shall serve their 
intended purpose. We may therefore say that logic treats ultimately of 
thoughts and things, and immediately of the signs which stand for them. 
Signs, thoughts, and exterior objects may be regarded as parallel and 
analogous series of phenomena, and to treat any one of the three series 
is equivalent to treating either of the other series (Jevons, [1874] 1877, 
8-9). 
 
After considering Jevons’s explanation of the series of reality, the question 
I have asked above could be reformulated in the following terms: on the basis 
on what series did Jevons decide that mathematics was the natural language of 
economics? Jevons did provide an implicit answer while justifying his choice 
of applying mathematics to political economy. He argued that political econo-
my necessarily required the use of mathematical language due to its own quan-
titative nature. In his eyes, mathematics was the only one in which the econom-
ic objects could be properly expressed – being the only language suited to their 
nature. Jevons was implying that his reasoning started from the series of things 
and then was expressed in mathematical language, reaching thus the series of 
signs. 
As I have highlighted, Jevons claimed that mathematical signs displayed 
the very nature of economic laws and concepts, thus being the only natural lan-
guage of political economy. On closer inspection, this statement depends on a 
basic assumption: the interchangeability of the series of things and the one of 
signs. For mathematical language to properly express the nature of economic 
laws and notions, we have to admit that treating of mathematical signs is no 
different from treating of the economic objects themselves. In other terms, we 
have to admit that we can indifferently treat of the things (economic objects) 
and of the signs (the mathematical language). Hence, we have to admit the in-
terchangeability of the series of things and of signs. 
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Jevons did argue that the two series were interchangeable. And yet the in-
terchangeability of the two series depends on another condition. This condition 
relates to the relationship between signs and things. For the two series to be in-
terchangeable, we have to admit that our signs are a faithful mirror of things. 
Therefore, it is crucial to ask whether Jevons believed in the faithfulness of 
signs or not. I have already touched on this point in the first chapter, where I 
have elucidated Jevons’s view of the sign at length. As I stated there, in Jev-
ons’s mind the symbols were surely not the things themselves, even though 
their use was based on a similarity of nature with the things denoted by them. 
This similarity enabled the speaker to acknowledge the existence of analogies 
between things and signs. The whole system of expression was founded on 
such analogies. Nevertheless, signs were not all-powerful. Their grasp on 
things was lessened by the infiniteness of nature: indeed “there is no branch of 
science in which our symbols can cope with the complexity of Nature” (Jev-
ons, [1874] 1877, 216), as Jevons observed. 
On the basis of these considerations, we couldn’t but conclude that Jevons 
did not believe that signs were faithful mirrors of things. As a consequence of 
this, the condition on which the interchangeability of the series of things and 
signs lay is not fulfilled. In the absence of this condition, the series of things 
and the series of signs could not be considered as interchangeable. Ruling out 
the interchangeability of the two series has enormous consequences for Jev-
ons’s theory, since it denies him the possibility of claiming that mathematics 
could express the very nature of economic laws. Jevons’s account of the rela-
tionship between signs and things prevents him from claiming that any sign 
could show the inner nature of the denoted thing. No sign could exhaust the 
complexity of nature. Therefore, no sign, even a mathematical one, could per-
fectly express the nature of economic relationships. 
Our signs may be crippled, imperfect; and yet, we cannot dispense with 
them. As Jevons explained in the passage concerning the series of reality, the 
only thing that could allow knowledge to be communicated was language. We 
may have all the same inner impressions, but, until such impressions were 
touched by linguistic symbols, they could not be communicated. That was why 
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we could not dispense with signs. Jevons seems thus to walk on thin ice: on the 
hand, he couldn’t admit that his signs were suited to express the inherent nature 
of things; on the other, for us to have an interpersonal knowledge of things, we 
couldn’t but rely on these imperfect and dim signs. 
Everything we know of the series of things and thoughts was meant to pass 
through the filter of linguistic symbols. And this filter was far from being neu-
tral. Signs provided a representation of the world, not the world itself. Not that 
I intend to deny that Jevons’s epistemological system made knowledge of reali-
ty unattainable. Signs may be faint images, but they still had some gnoseologi-
cal significance in Jevons’s eyes, by virtue of the analogies binding them with 
things. My contention, as I shall explain, is rather that Jevons neglected the 
consequences which expressing an object in a given system of signs had on the 
representation we can give of the object itself. 
As we have seen, Jevons had the pretension that the mathematical signs 
could reveal the essence of economic objects and laws. However, this would be 
possible only provided that the series of reality were endowed with two funda-
mental characters: the series of things and signs had to be interchangeable and 
parallel. On the contrary, we have to admit that Jevons’s account of signs de-
nied the series both of these characters. 
First, the series could not be interchangeable, because signs were not the 
exact copy of things. Moreover, if we accept such an account, no sign could be 
literal. No sign could exhaust the nature of the denoted object. Used literally, 
words denote precisely and unambiguously the object to which they refer. Jev-
ons’s account, however, does not admit this unambiguous system of reference. 
Therefore, no sign could be literal. 
Of course we may be content with considering a word as ‘literal’ when it is 
conventionally believed to be such, and in this sense words could surely be lit-
eral for Jevons as well. Nonetheless, this view of literality would not be con-
sistent with Jevons’s epistemology. In his logical works, as we have seen in the 
first chapter9, there was an effort to describe the world as it is. Therefore, in 
 
9 See first chapter, the section “ars combinatoria”. 
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reference to Jevons’s view, the term ‘literal’ would have a stronger sense than 
‘conventional’. It would rather call to mind the intention of grasping the essen-
tial characters of the denoted things. It is this kind of literality which is unat-
tainable, because of the deprived nature of signs. 
Second, the series were not parallel. The task of signs was notably to ex-
press our knowledge of things. Were they a faithful mirror of things, they could 
really provide a perfect representation of them. But this was not the case. Due 
to their finite nature, signs could only represent things in accordance with their 
own inherent characters, influencing the image of the denoted object. Hence, 
the series of reality were neither interchangeable nor parallel, despite what Jev-
ons argued. 
 
Speaking in metaphors 
 
In this section, I cast further light on these statements using the concept of 
metaphor, paying particular attention to Deirdre McCloskey’s analysis of met-
aphors in the context of economic theory. The most common definition of met-
aphor’s functioning is the following one: metaphor entails a process “by means 
of which one thing is made to stand in for another thing” (Punter, 2007, 2). 
This definition is in line with the one suggested by Aristotle in the Poetics, 
where we read that a metaphor “consists in giving the thing a name that be-
longs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or 
from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy” 
(Aristotle, 1946, Vol. XI, 345-346 [1457b, 7-11]). Rather than referring to the 
object with what Aristotle calls the ‘ordinary’ word, a metaphor evokes another 
object which could reasonably stand for the original object. Thus, metaphors 
do not use the language in a ‘literal’ way: metaphors are supposed to break the 
codes of conventional language10. 
 
10 The idea that metaphors use language in a non-literal way is commonly associated 
with the concept of metaphor. See, for example, M. Black, 1962; Searle, (1979) 1993; 
Camp, 2007, Vol. III, 21. In contrast, some scholars have put into question the differ-
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Metaphorical language contrasts with the ordinary code of literality. 
Therefore, looking at Jevons’s application of mathematics to political economy 
in the light of metaphorical language is particularly appropriate, given that in 
his epistemological system no sign could be literal. We may ask ourselves a 
fundamental question: is it acceptable to use the notion of metaphor to repre-
sent a system of language, like Jevons’s one, in which no literality is possible? 
Provided that the metaphorical language consists in breaking the code of liter-
ality, a reference to metaphor where literality is lacking would be nonsensical. 
However, I suggest that in Jevons’s epistemology there was still a notion 
of literality, in the form of a nostalgia for things. I have used this expression in 
the first chapter, where I argued that Jevons was unwilling to abandon the idea 
that language could grasp things. Jevons’s nostalgia for things could be consid-
ered, from the linguistic point of view, as a nostalgia for literality. Jevons’s ac-
count of signs downgraded them to the rank of allusions. And yet, if signs were 
imperfect, it was because Jevons was still attached to the idea that signs should 
be perfect – because he had a nostalgia for things and literal signs. Jevons’s 
signs were prevented from being literal, and thus literality for him became an 
unattainable ideal of perfection. Consequently, I argue that the concept of met-
aphor is an appropriate notion with which to explore Jevons’s economic 
thought.  
Thanks to the notion of metaphor, I can now provide an answer to the 
question asked at the beginning of this section: on the basis of what series did 
Jevons claim that mathematical language was the only language suited to polit-
ical economy? I argue that Jevons did not draw this conclusion from the series 
of things, but from the series of signs. It was the nature of mathematical signs 
which prompted him to consider that the represented object had a mathematical 
nature. However, Jevons did not realise that moving from the series of things to 
that of signs also entailed a movement in the opposite direction. The represen-
tation of the natural object is not independent of the nature of the signs used to 
 
ence between literal and metaphorical language: see JSadock, (1979) 1993; Ru-
melhart, (1979) 1993.  
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express it. Thus, I contend that it was the quantitative character of the mathe-
matical language which led Jevons to look at the represented object – economic 
basic notions and laws – in accordance with this language. 
Let us now consider the concept of metaphor11, first from an etymological 
point of view. The term ‘metaphor’ derives from two Greek words: the prepo-
sition ‘meta’ and the verb ‘phero’. Meta could be translated with ‘through’ and 
phero with ‘bringing’. Using a metaphor would thus mean to take something – 
a word, a concept, or an entire subject – through a process of transformation. 
The metaphor aims at taking its object from one context to another, assuming 
that this would help to elucidate the original notion. The represented object is 
seen in the light of the metaphorical one. As Max Black has remarked in his 
seminal study of metaphors, “the new context (the ‘frame’ of the metaphor 
[…]) imposes extension of meaning upon the focal word” (M. Black, 1962, 
39). Metaphors, in accordance with the word’s etymon, shift the object from  
one context to another. In Black’s terms, metaphors create an interaction be-
tween the focal word and the metaphorical frame (see M. Black, 1962, 38-
44)12. 
By applying mathematics to political economy, Jevons reasoned meta-
phorically: the use of mathematical symbols takes the represented object, i.e. 
economic notions, to a new level of expression, with the assumption that on 
such level the object could be better understood. This contention is buttressed 
by Jevons’s conception of the series of reality, where things must be taken to 
the level of signs for them to be expressible to others. Every inner knowledge 
of the world required a symbolic expression, that is, to pass from the series of 
things to that of signs. It follows that in the context of Jevons’s thought every 
 
11 I shall follow in the footsteps of Deirdre McCloskey, who has tackled the problem 
of the use of metaphors in the context of economic theory (see McCloskey, [1985] 
1998, 40-51). 
12 Here Black has presented his well-known theory of interaction, according to which 
a metaphor makes two different systems of commonplaces interact. For a criticism of 
Black’s theory, see Davidson, 1978; Fogelin, (1988) 2011, chap. 5 in particular. 
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language is metaphorical. Moving from the series of things to the series of 
signs could be properly seen as using a metaphor. 
Moreover, the idea that using a mathematical language in the context of 
economics is using a metaphor is in line with Deirdre McCloskey’s analysis. In 
the Rhetoric of Economics, she has claimed that economists cannot dispose of 
metaphors. As she has argued, 
 
the most important example of economic rhetoric […] is metaphor. 
Economists calls them ‘models’. To say that markets can be represented 
by supply and demand ‘curves’ is no less a metaphor than to say that 
the west wind is “the breath of autumn’s being” (McCloskey, [1985] 
1998, 40). 
 
So mathematical reasoning isn’t devoid of metaphors either. McCloskey didn’t 
fail to emphasise the metaphors dwelling in mathematical economics too: 
 
Mathematical theorizing in economics is metaphorical, and literary. 
Consider, for example, a relatively simple case, the theory of produc-
tion functions. Its vocabulary is intrinsically metaphorical. ‘Aggregate 
capital’ involves an analogy of ‘capital’ (itself analogical) with some-
thing – sand, bricks, shmoos – that can be ‘added’ in a meaningful way; 
so does ‘aggregate labor’, with the additional peculiarity that the thing 
added is no thing, but hours of conscientious attentiveness. The very 
idea of a ‘production function’ involves the astonishing analogy of the 
subject (the fabrication of things, about which it is appropriate to think 
in terms of ingenuity, discipline, and planning) with the modifier (a 
mathematical function, about which it is appropriate to think in terms of 
height, shape, and single-valuedness) (McCloskey, [1985] 1998, 44). 
 
McCloskey has shown that mathematical economics used a metaphorical 
language, just as non-mathematical reasoning does. The expression ‘aggregate 
labour’ suggests that the production hours of various individuals can be rea-
sonably added to one another and be considered as a single entity. This is the 
metaphor’s power: the properties of the object situated at the metaphoric level 
cast light on the represented object. However, McCloskey’s has not only sug-
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gested that economists may use metaphors13. According to her, we shouldn’t 
take metaphors to enter the economic domain only when economists use them 
to illustrate some specific concepts, like Gary Becker did by comparing chil-
dren to durable-goods (McCloskey, [1985] 1998, 43). McCloskey has argued 
that we have to dispose of the very idea that behind the metaphors there is a 
plain language, describing the things in a literal sense. Metaphors are not mere 
ornaments which distract from an alleged plain description of reality. In her 
own words, “the very idea of ‘removing’ an ‘ornament’ to ‘reveal’ a ‘plain’ 
meaning is itself a metaphor […]. Perhaps thinking is metaphorical. Perhaps to 
remove metaphor is to remove thought” (McCloskey, [1985] 1998, 41). 
Such account is consistent with the conclusions I have drawn from Jev-
ons’s description of the series of reality. Once admitted that signs didn’t pro-
vide a faithful representation of the denoted things, Jevons had to relinquish the 
idea that any system of language could be literal. He did believe that we had an 
immediate knowledge of the world: we can trust our perceptive knowledge. 
However, our basic experience of reality would be silent if it wasn’t for lan-
guage and its signs: things could not speak for themselves. Hence, every form 
of symbolic expression couldn’t but put our knowledge of the world through a 
transformation. Thus, every symbolic expression would be metaphorical, as 
McCloskey has suggested. 
These reflections display another aspect of the relationship between things 
and their linguistic expression. As I have highlighted, no sign could be literal 
given Jevons’s assumptions. Consequently, we have to admit that mathematical 
economics is no more metaphorical than any other treatment of economic is-
sues. A representation of the same subject matter in the terms of natural lan-
guage would be equally metaphorical, since it involves the same movement 
from the series of things to that of signs. If no linguistic expression is literal, 
 
13 McCloskey’s view broadens the concept of metaphor considerably. In this regard, 
her position contrasts with those studies which identify metaphors in the economic 




every speech is metaphorical. However, it does not follow that every system of 
signs is the same. On the contrary, since no linguistic system is literal, the 
choice of which to apply would be all the more important. Thinking of every 
discipline in the light of metaphors shows how each kind of sign has its specif-
ic features and power.  Jevons was aware that the choice of a particular system 
of symbolic expression marked a difference in the study of the subject matter. 
He argued that mathematics was suited to express economic concepts because 
they both had a quantitative nature. In the next section, I examine some pas-
sages of the Theory making use of the notion of metaphor. Then, I investigate 
the relationship between mathematics and political economy in Jevons’s 
thought. 
 
The power of selection 
 
Let us focus on the consequences of applying mathematics to political 
economy in accordance with the concept of metaphor. If mathematical lan-
guage is metaphoric, how do the features of the metaphor affect the representa-
tion of economic issues? This question could be answered by appealing to 
McCloskey’s analysis, which is inspired by the work of Owen Barfield. Ac-
cording to McCloskey, when a metaphor is particularly apt to describe an ob-
ject, it could lead us to think that it is the only suitable way to represent the ob-
ject. As McCloskey has explained, 
 
What is successful in economic metaphor is what is successful in poet-
ry, and the success is analyzable in similar terms. Concerning the best 
metaphors in the best poetry, comparing thee to a summer’s day or 
comparing A to B, argued Owen Barfield, “We feel that B, which is ac-
tually said, ought to be necessary, even inevitable in some way. It ought 
to be in some sense the best, if not the only way, of expressing A satis-
factorily. The mind should dwell on it as well as on A and thus the two 
should be somehow inevitably fused together into one simple meaning” 
[…]. If the modifier B (a summer’s day, a refrigerator, a piece of capi-
tal) were trite […] it would become, as it were, detached from A, a me-
chanical and unilluminating correspondence. If essential, though, it fus-
es with A to become a master metaphor of the science, the idea of ‘hu-
man capital’, the idea of ‘equilibrium’, the idea of ‘entry and exit’, the 
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idea of ‘competition’. The metaphor, said a poet, is the “consummation 
of identity” (McCloskey, [1985] 1998, 43). 
 
An effective metaphor has the power of selecting the essential properties 
of the object to which the metaphor applies14. Thus, it could result in consum-
mating its identity: the metaphorical object is identified with the represented 
one. This process gives us the impression that we can speak of the two objects 
in the same terms. The represented object becomes the metaphorical one. 
The metaphor’s power of selecting the essential characteristics of the rep-
resented object can be observed through Jevons’s application of mathematics to 
political economy. I will elucidate the effect of the power of metaphor in Jev-
ons’s mathematical economics, with reference to his Theory of Political Econ-
omy. In this work, Jevons attempted to express the feelings of pleasure and 
pain experienced by individuals in mathematical terms. In order to do so, Jev-
ons took these feelings to be magnitudes (see Jevons, 1871, 33). These magni-
tudes were thus constituted: “a feeling, whether of pleasure or of pain, may be 
regarded as having essentially two dimensions” (Jevons, 1871, 34), these di-
mensions being duration and intensity. After specifying the nature of these 
feelings, Jevons presented an analogy which has a foundational character for 
his mathematization of pleasures and pains. In his own words, “pleasure and 
pain […] are magnitudes possessing two dimensions, just as an area or superfi-
cies possesses the two dimensions of length and breadth” (Jevons, 1871, 35). 
This analogy is the ground on which the mathematical metaphor takes 
root. As for the mathematical tool suited to represent feelings, it was the differ-
 
14 Max Black has stressed this mechanism of metaphor too; see M. Black, 1962, 39, 
where we read as follows: “in its metaphorical use a word or expression must connote 
only a selection from the characteristics connoted in its literal uses”; see M. Black, 
1962, 44-45, where Black has observed that “the metaphor selects, emphasizes, sup-
presses, and organizes features of the principal subject by implying statements about it 
that normally apply to the subsidiary subject”. 
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ential calculus15. Its suitability was justified on the basis of an inherent quality 
of these feelings, naming their incessant variation. Consequently, provided that 
pleasure and pain are in continuous variation, Jevons held that the differential 
calculus was the appropriate tool to treat these feelings mathematically (see 
Jevons, 1871, 35-36). In the Theory, Jevons constructed a graph composed of 
small rectangles, where each rectangle’s base stands for an interval of time (a 
minute) and their height measures intensity: 
 
 
Figure 6: Fig. I from the Theory of Political Economy (Jevons, 1871, 36). 
 
Jevons elucidated this graph as follows: 
 
Along the line 𝑜𝑥 we measure time, and along a parallel to the perpen-
dicular line 𝑜𝑦 we measure intensity. Each of the rectangles between 
𝑝𝑚 and 𝑞𝑛 represents the feeling of one minute, or of any other small 
portion of time assumed. The aggregate quantity of feeling generated 
during the time mn will then be represented by the aggregate area of the 
rectangles between 𝑝𝑚 and 𝑞𝑛. In this case the intensity of the feeling 
is supposed to be gradually declining (Jevons, 1871, 36). 
 
 
15 Neil De Marchi and Robert Collison Black have stated that the differential calculus 
was the ‘obvious’ tool for elaborating a study of maximizing behaviour; see R. D. C. 
Black, 1972c, 5; De Marchi, 1972, 357. I will take this statement into account in the 
last part of this section. 
238 
 
Nevertheless, this is not the final result of Jevons’s metaphor. Indeed Jev-
ons assumed that feelings vary by “sudden steps and regular intervals” (Jevons, 
1871, 36-37). “To avoid all error”, he continued, “we may imagine the inter-
vals of time infinitely short; that is, we must treat the intensity as constantly 
and continuously varying” (Jevons, 1871, 37). Jevons thus took advantage of 
the way of reasoning typical of differential calculus to construct this graph: 
 
 
Figure 7: Fig. II from the Theory of Political Economy (Jevons, 1871, 37). 
 
Jevons provided an explanation of this graph: 
 
Thus the proper representation of the variation of feeling is found in a 
curve of more or less simple character. In Fig. II the height of each 
point of the curve 𝑝𝑞, above the horizontal line 𝑜𝑥, indicates the inten-
sity of feeling in an indivisible moment of time; and the whole quantity 
of feeling generated in the time mn is measured by the area of the curve 
between the lines 𝑝𝑚, 𝑞𝑛, 𝑚𝑛, and 𝑝𝑞. The feeling belonging to any 
other time, 𝑚𝑎, will be measured by the space 𝑚𝑎𝑏𝑝, cut off by the 
perpendicular line 𝑎𝑏 (Jevons, 1871, 37-38). 
 
This curve represented the variation of the intensity of feeling over time. 
These considerations were also at the basis of Jevons’s theory of utility. The 
variation of utility’s degrees with respect to the quantity of a commodity was 
represented as a continuous curve too, with the degree of utility on the vertical 
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axis and the quantity of commodity on the horizontal axis, as Jevons showed 
by means of this figure: 
 
 
Figure 8: Fig. IV from the Theory of Political Economy (Jevons, 1871, 58). 
 
As Jevons wrote in explanation to this graph, 
 
when the quantity 𝑜𝑎 has been consumed, the degree of utility corre-
sponds to the length of the line 𝑎𝑏; for if we take a very little more 
food, 𝑎𝑎′, its utility will be the product of 𝑎𝑎′and 𝑎𝑏 very nearly, and 
more nearly the less is the magnitude of 𝑎𝑎′. The degree of utility is 
thus properly measured by the height of a very narrow rectangle corre-
sponding to a very small quantity of food, which theoretically ought to 
be infinitely small (Jevons, 1871, 58). 
 
Jevons constructed a metaphorical object to represent the experience of 
pleasure and pain. How does this metaphor act on the represented object 
through its power of selection? At the beginning of his mathematical treatment 
of pleasure and pain, Jevons stated that these phenomena were considered as 
magnitudes. His whole reasoning is founded on the assumption that feelings 
can be properly seen as magnitudes. This statement displays the metaphor’s 
power of selecting the essential features of the represented object. In this case, 
the essential characters are the quantitative ones. The graph aims at determin-
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ing and displaying the variation of feeling, i.e. at defining whether at a given 
moment this feeling is more or less intense than at the previous or following 
moment. Thus, by means of Jevons’s function, the object can be studied in 
some ways. We can ask how the intensity of feeling varies over time or with 
respect to the object consumed, namely what degree of feeling or utility is as-
sociated with a moment or a unit of a commodity. This is the power of selec-
tion: we can ask some questions, but not any possible question. We are directed 
to focus on the features selected by the metaphor. 
In order to offer a further clarification of the power of selection, let us take 
into consideration the represented object, i.e. the feeling. As I have highlighted 
above, Jevons considered the feeling as a magnitude. This statement defines 
the point of view assumed in looking at the object, thus selecting its essential 
characters. This is certainly not the only way to look at the object. For instance, 
we could be inclined to consider the feeling from a religious point of view. 
From this perspective, the relevant characteristics of the feeling may be its 
origin. A feeling can be bestowed on humans by God. Another relevant feature 
could be the feeling’s purpose: human beings had been endowed with pleasure 
so that they can develop sympathetic inclinations towards their fellow-beings. 
Another example of a different account of feeling could be a relational one. 
From this point of view, a feeling of pleasure or of pain may be profitably con-
sidered in the terms of the social relations which had elicited it. 
Each way of representing the given object depicts it under a different light. 
Each system of expression can be seen as a metaphorical way of representing 
the object. The object can be described in potentially infinite ways: pleasure is 
a function of time; pleasure is the instrument that God gave us to live in har-
mony with our fellow-beings; pleasure is the result of a healthy relation with 
other people in the social context. Each level of expression, namely each meta-
phor we use, selects its relevant characteristics. It is unlikely that in a religious 
context the most relevant aspect of a feeling would be its variation over time, 
or its quantity with respect to the object which causes pleasure. Rather, we may 
be willing to consider how we could honour God’s gift through our behaviour. 
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The original object is the same, but the metaphors are countless. Every meta-
phor opens certain possibilities while precluding others. 
There is another important illustration of the possibilities of looking at the 
same object in terms of different linguistic systems. Such an example is to be 
found in the context of the marginal revolution itself. As it is well-known, the 
triad of marginalists includes an economist who willingly refused to use math-
ematics in his theory: Carl Menger. Menger’s starting point was very close to 
Walras’s and Jevons’s: he focused on maximizing behaviour and the concept 
of utility. However, Menger did not believe that mathematics was a suitable 
tool in his theory. Menger’s argument in favour of the dismissal of mathemat-
ics is consistent with the description of metaphor’s power of selection. As he 
explained in a letter to Walras (see Walras, 1965, Vol. I, 768-770; Vol. II, 2-6), 
Menger was concerned with seeking the basic causes of economic phenomena. 
In his mind, such a task would never be accomplished in a mathematical 
framework. What was required to achieve this purpose, was rather, as William 
Jaffé has described it, “a method of process analysis tracing the complex phe-
nomena of the social economy to the underlying atomistic forces at work” 
(Jaffé, 1976, 521)16. Thus, Menger did not use mathematical language to repre-
sent the economic laws. Menger’s metaphors are different from Jevons’s and 
consequently they select different essential characteristics of the object at issue. 
Each level on which the object is taken by the metaphor displays certain 
characteristics of the object, excluding others. As I have argued, Jevons’s met-
aphors displayed the quantitative character of feelings. I do not intend to deny 
that a feeling could be properly considered as a quantitative phenomenon. On 
the contrary, Jevons’s metaphors were suited to elucidate this aspect of the na-
ture of this phenomenon. The problem lies in the consummation of identity. As 
 
16 Jaffé’s paper has come to the attention of several scholars. Their responses have 
been published in the same edition of the American Journal of Economics and Sociol-
ogy, and they all aim at reconsidering the relationship between the three founders of 




Deirdre McCloskey has underlined, some metaphors are so powerful that they 
consume the identity of the represented object. Thus the metaphorical object 
substitutes the represented one, making us believe that there is only one object 
– the metaphorical. When the identity of the metaphorical object is seen as ex-
hausting the identity of the represented one, we may be inclined to think that 
speaking of the metaphorical or of the represented object makes no difference. 
In terms of Jevons’s series of reality, the relationship between the series of 
things and that of signs becomes exclusive: an object becomes expressible by a 
single system of signs. 
Nevertheless, an object is always liable to be represented in several ways. 
No metaphor could show every possible feature of the object. If this were the 
case, the metaphor would be the object itself, and there would be no distance 
between the series of things and that of signs. Consequently, we have to admit 
that a metaphor always excludes other relevant characteristics, and could never 
exhaust the nature of the object. 
A powerful metaphor could make us fall into a trap: thinking that it is the 
only appropriate way of representing the object, suggesting that it completely 
displays its nature. Jevons seems to have fallen into this trap: he claimed that 
mathematical language was not just one suitable language among others, but 
the only suitable language to express economic issues. Its exclusivity was due 
to the nature of the object, which in his mind was in itself mathematical. How-
ever, as Jevons himself admitted, no sign can offer us the things themselves. 
Consequently, we should be willing to multiply the metaphors instead of limit-
ing our possibilities of linguistic expression. By stating that mathematical lan-
guage is the only one apt to describe economic objects, Jevons turns out to be 
seduced by the power of his own metaphor. 
 
The power of redefinition 
 
The power of consummating the identity of an object is not the only one 
pertaining to metaphorical language. Let us explore another power that we 
could attribute to metaphor: the power of redefinition. As I have argued, in ac-
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cordance with McCloskey’s analysis, a metaphor is able to select some charac-
teristics of an object, making all its other features irrelevant. However, a meta-
phor could also redefine the object’s identity. This is a different process from 
the one of selection, since selection works by subtraction, whereas redefinition 
works by addition. Through the power of selection, some of the object’s essen-
tial qualities are highlighted, at the exclusion of others: the metaphor deprives 
– subtracts – the other qualities of the object. In contrast, by means of the pow-
er of redefinition, new essential features are added to the denoted object. A 
persuasive metaphor could prompt us to attribute the characteristics of the met-
aphorical object to the represented one, even though such qualities didn’t seem 
to belong to the represented object at first. Thus the original object would be 
seen in light of the metaphorical object. 
This process of redefinition of the represented object can be discerned in 
Jevons’s mathematization of feelings and utility. The crucial concept where 
this mechanism shows itself is connected to Jevons’s assertion that feelings and 
utility are in continuous variation. For a continuous curve to be envisioned, the 
quantity expressed by the independent variable has to be subject to continuous 
variation. Moreover, such variable needs to show a continuous variation with 
respect to the independent variable for the curve to have a simple and regular 
character. 
In the passages I have quoted from the Theory, Jevons seemed to assume 
that the feelings of pleasure and pain, as well as utility, varied in such a way. 
He implied that these feelings could be reasonably represented as a variable 
having a continuous variation with respect to the independent variable. We can 
easily understand how important this assumption was for Jevons’s analysis. 
Were utility and feelings not thus constituted, we couldn’t differentiate the util-
ity function. Thus, for Jevons it was essential to assume that he could represent 
the variation of feelings and of utility through a continuous curve, to widen the 
range of the mathematical tools at his disposal. 
Jevons took for granted that the feelings which entered the mathematiza-
tion process had these characteristics. He never justified this assumption on the 
basis of a psychological study or any other analysis of the nature of these ob-
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jects. He was content with stating that feelings and utility were in continuous 
variation. In the introduction to the Theory, Jevons wrote as follows: 
 
Finding that the quantities with which we have to deal are subject to 
continuous variation, I do not hesitate to use the appropriate branch of 
mathematical science, involving though it does the fearless considera-
tion of infinitely small quantities. The theory consists in applying the 
differential calculus to the familiar notions of wealth, utility, value, de-
mand, supply, capital, interest, labour, and all the other notions belong-
ing to the daily operations of industry (Jevons, 1871, 4). 
 
Jevons claimed that the quantities considered are subject to a continuous varia-
tion, but he did not explain how he came to such a conclusion. His statement 
cannot be considered as resulting from a study of the object. It has rather the 
appearance of an axiom, a necessary assumption to elaborate a mathematical 
theory of utility and feelings. If anything, the source of Jevons’s conviction 
may be introspection, even though he never argued in this way. 
As a matter of fact, it would be perfectly acceptable to assume axiomati-
cally that feelings and utility have a continuous character. But Jevons did not 
take this path. Instead, he attributed these characteristics to the object itself, 
without justifying his statement on the basis of prior analyses. In order to un-
derstand Jevons’s position, a consideration of metaphor’s power of redefinition 
is required. Jevons didn’t state that his theory treated the feelings and utility as 
if they were continuous quantities. He implied that they were continuous in 
themselves, thus attributing to them the same nature as the mathematical object 
used to represent them. My contention is: Jevons was inclined to look at feel-
ings and utility in terms of continuous quantities because of the mathematical 
tool he used. The mathematical metaphor he had chosen prompted him to look 
at the represented object in the metaphor’s light. In this way, he ended by at-
tributing a characteristic typical of the metaphorical object to the represented 
one, thus adding a property to the represented object. 
Such phenomenon calls to mind Black’s notion of catachresis. According 
to Black, metaphors might fill a gap in the literal language. Where something 
does not have a corresponding term acknowledged as referring to it literally, a 
245 
 
metaphor can introduce a new form of expression. In Black’s terms, “so 
viewed, metaphor is a species of catachresis, which I shall define as the use of 
a word in some new sense in order to remedy a gap in the vocabulary; cata-
chresis is the putting of new senses into old words” (M. Black, 1962, 32-33). 
However, the process of catachresis might continue, yielding further results: “if 
a catachresis serves a genuine need, the new sense introduced will quickly be-
come part of the literal sense” (M. Black, 1962, 33). The redefinition of identi-
ty could be conceived as an ultimate result of the catachresis. When the meta-
phorical framework is transferred to the literal sense of the object, the repre-
sented object can assume new characters, which at a first glance did not pertain 
to the representation of the object. 
Moreover, focusing on the metaphor’s power of redefinition sheds light on 
Jevons’s account of the relationship between the series of reality. As I have 
stated, Jevons saw the feelings of pleasure and pain, as well as utility, in the 
light of the differential calculus. I have argued above that Jevons underestimat-
ed the effects of a given system of language on the denoted things. He did not 
acknowledge that moving from the series of things to that of signs also implied 
a movement in the opposite direction. The object’s representation is not inde-
pendent of the signs used to express it. My argument concerning the power of 
redefinition can be seen as an example of such back-and-forth movement. Jev-
ons’s statement about the mathematical nature of economic laws and objects 
could be interpreted as resulting from the metaphor’s power of redefinition. 
I have also highlighted that Jevons’s epistemology wouldn’t allow him to 
make a statement concerning the essential characteristics of phenomena. How-
ever, if we take into consideration the metaphor’s power of redefinition, the 
fact that Jevons attributed a mathematical nature to economic phenomena takes 
on a different meaning. It is not surprising that Jevons considering economic 
laws and concepts to have a mathematical character in themselves: this results 
from applying mathematics to political economy. Mathematical language, 
which in Jevons’s eyes was quantitative, projected quantitative characteristics 
on the represented object, in accordance with the metaphor’s power of redefini-
tion. I argue that Jevons’s account of economic phenomena as inherently quan-
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titative was not born out of the series of things, but came from the series of 
signs. Jevons’s metaphors showed him the world in the light of quantity. 
Robert Collison Black and Neil De Marchi have argued that the differen-
tial calculus was the obvious tool for Jevons’s purposes17. Notwithstanding the 
appropriateness of such a tool to analyse maximizing individual’s behaviour, a 
question could be asked: in whose eyes is this tool so obvious? If an object is 
always liable to be represented in several ways, as I have remarked, the ‘obvi-
ous’ tools could be several as well. Moreover, their use might seem obvious 
depending on the features we are willing to emphasize. After a given metaphor 
has selected the essential characteristics of the object, and after the power of 
redefinition has exercised itself on the represented object, what we consider 
obvious regarding such object may change. The represented object metamor-
phoses into the metaphorical one, so that we might be unable to consider it in 
the light of another metaphor. This could be why this tool was obvious in the 
eyes of Black and De Marchi, so accustomed as they were to consider the dif-
ferential calculus to be the only suitable instrument to treat that subject matter. 
The credit goes to Jevons’s metaphor: it is such a persuasive metaphor that its 
powers of selection and redefinition has operated in an admirable way. 
Above I have asked the following question: how could Jevons state that 
economic laws had a mathematical nature? This question finds an answer now, 
thanks to the inquiry concerning metaphor’s power of redefinition. It wasn’t 
the study of the economic notions which prompted Jevons to argue that eco-
nomic laws had a mathematical nature. Indeed the series of things was not the 
basis of this idea. Jevons has always considered mathematics to be the most 
appropriate language for political economy. Thus mathematical language pro-
jected its form on the represented object. This is the case with the above men-
tioned curve, where the study of variation became crucial because of its rele-
vance for the differential calculus. 
Jevons justified his choice of applying mathematics to political economy 
by appealing to the very nature of the subject matter. He relied on an alleged 
 
17 See the n. 15 in the third chapter. 
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isomorphism between the world and the mathematical language. However, 
such isomorphism turns out to be a result of the metaphor’s power of selection 
and redefinition. The world presented itself under a mathematical form to Jev-
ons’s eyes, since mathematics was the lens through which he observed the 
world. Jevons’s mathematical metaphors selected the relevant aspects of the 
denoted object and then redefined their identity in accordance with these char-
acteristics. 
If the mathematical character of political economy is a projection of math-
ematical language, another question arises: why did Jevons choose to apply 
mathematics to political economy in the first place? In order to answer this, a 
reconsideration of the justifications which Jevons gave for his choice is needed. 
As we have seen, Jevons was eager to extend the methodology of the natural 
sciences to the social sciences as well. When we have before our eyes the re-
markable successes of the natural science, argued Jevons, how could we be in-
clined to seek another method for less successful domains? Roy Weintraub, in 
his illuminating work on the history of mathematics in political economy, has 
elucidated how strong the attraction of mathematics was to social scientists. As 
he has stated, “by the late nineteenth century the linking of mathematics to 
economics was seen as a means of establishing economics as a science” (Wein-
traub, 2002, 167). 
Weintraub’s statement displays a remarkable continuity with Jevons’s own 
argument in favour of the extension of the natural sciences’ method to political 
economy. In the mind of a Victorian such as Jevons, a science, to be such, had 
to be mathematical. For the Victorians, mathematics was the queen of sciences. 
It is then not surprising that Jevons considered mathematical language as the 
optimal tool, thanks to which political economy, as well as other social scienc-
es, could eventually become established scientific disciplines18. 
 
18 With regard to the pre-eminent role of mathematics in the context of Victorian sci-
ence, see Pickstone, 2005, 46-47. Jevons’s willingness to apply mathematics to politi-
cal economy could obviously be traced back to some authors who influenced him dur-
ing his studies, rather than to his cultural background. Robert Collison Black has very 
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Jevons was positive that mathematics was the most powerful tool in the 
struggle for making social sciences scientific. However, I do not deny that Jev-
ons was also persuaded that economic laws and notions were inherently math-
ematical. Jevons’s conviction of the mathematical character of political econ-
omy had deep roots, resulting from the power of selection and redefinition of 
the metaphors he used. Mathematical metaphors charmed Jevons, pushing him 
to treat mathematics as the only language suited to political economy. 
This does not however imply that Jevons’s choice to apply mathematics to 
political economy was incongruous. The application of mathematics to political 
economy is apt, since, if we draw a conclusion from Jevons’s view of sign, 
every linguistic expression is metaphorical. No sign is exhaustive of the object 
it represents, and nevertheless we cannot dispose of signs. Therefore, the solu-
tion to the ambiguity of signs does not lie in using a literal system of expres-
sion instead of a metaphorical one. What marks a difference between a proper 
and an incongruous use of signs is the awareness in handling them. Things 
need signs to be expressed and discussed, but we must always remember that 
no sign is literal, and therefore no sign could exhaust the nature of the denoted 
thing. Such an awareness opens to the plurality of symbolic expressions, rather 
than reducing the complexity of the represented thing to one system of signs. 
Jevons saw the risks involved in seeing political economy from a single 
point of view, using a single methodology. In The Future of Political Economy, 
he stood up against what he called ‘the fallacy of exclusiveness’. The one who 
falls under the fallacy of exclusiveness argues, “more or less consciously, that 
because a certain thing is true or useful, therefore other things are not true or 
not useful” (Jevons, 1905, 165). Jevons explained that it was this fallacy which 
 
persuasively argued that Augustus De Morgan had a profound influence on Jevons in 
this regard. Jevons did not only take from De Morgan the indispensables instruments 
of calculus. He also benefited from De Morgan’s treatment of probability and 
knowledge of logic (see R. D. C. Black, 1972a, 127-134). In his turn, Harro Maas has 
claimed that Jevons’s idea of constructing a mathematical function of pleasure and 
pain went back to Richard Jennings (see Maas, 2005, 172). 
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prompted some economists to treat the historical study of political economy as 
worthless (see Jevons, 1905, 166). Thus, in this text as well as in others19, Jev-
ons defended the necessity of studying political economy from several points 
of view. In turn, this implied the use of several linguistic systems to investigate 
political economy, since the historical school did not use mathematics. 
However, Jevons himself seemed to fall into the fallacy of exclusiveness 
when he stated that mathematics was the only appropriate language to develop 
an economic theory. As he wrote in the Future of Political Economy, there 
were some basic and general laws of political economy (Jevons, 1905, 167-
168). And these laws, according to the Theory, were inherently mathematical, 
so that any symbolic system other than mathematics would misrepresent them. 
Were Jevons really committed to avoiding the fallacy of exclusiveness, he 
would have had to remember the finiteness of signs and admit that other lin-
guistic system could be fit to express the economic laws. Jevons’s inclination 
to reduce the expressive possibilities of signs to mathematics resulted from 
what I have called the nostalgia for literality. The pursuit of the perfect sign, 
namely of a sign which could express the very nature of things, prompted Jev-
ons to worship mathematics and to forget its metaphorical character. 
 
3.3. A dual nature 
 
After analysing the reasons for, and consequences of, applying mathemat-
ics to political economy, I focus on Jevons’s economic agent. This investiga-
tion will entail once again a reference to the relationship between prescription 
and description in Jevons’s thought. 
As we have seen, Jevons’s thought is rich with speculations concerning the 
nature of humans, and in particular their mental faculties. Let us now recon-
struct Jevons’s view of human nature as I presented it in the second chapter, 
before proceeding with an analysis of his economic subject. I have already 
 
19 See, for example, Jevons, 1872-1981, Vol. VII, 100, where Jevons discussed Luigi 
Cossa’s work and praised the advantages of the historical method.  
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treated this topic at length in the second chapter, so that we only need to recall 
the main features of Jevons’s portrait of the human being. First, some of Jev-
ons’s statements concerning human nature display his commitment to a deter-
ministic philosophy of morals: he described the human being as a “complicated 
piece of machinery” (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 133), bound by self-interest 
and the pursuit of pleasure. Such a description stressed the deterministic and 
endogenous character of the forces regulating human action. According to him, 
humans were forced by their inner nature to follow their self-interest, avoid 
pain, and look for pleasure. Jevons thus suggested that humans couldn’t but 
comply with the demands of such impulses. 
However, not all Jevons’s statements went in the same direction. In con-
trast with this account, he asserted that the human being was no automaton. 
Some mental faculties revealed the direct intervention of the Primary Cause, 
namely God. By virtue of these faculties, such as geniality or reason, human 
beings were enabled to break the course of history. That was why the human 
mind would always remain unfathomable to scientific investigation. Further-
more, these faculties endowed the subject with the possibility to mould his own 
nature, giving latitude for self-improvement. Even the thrust towards self-
improvement had, in Jevons’s mind, a divine origin, since humans felt an inner 
call inviting them to nurture higher sentiments and do good deeds. As I have 
argued in the second chapter, these divine attributes created the necessary con-
ditions to choose between good and evil, to follow the right path – the path that 
ought to be taken. Were humans deprived of these faculties, they would be ma-
chines, and for Jevons this was not the case. 
Not only were human beings shaped by endogenous forces, but also by 
exogenous factors. I have already shown that Spencer had a considerable influ-
ence on Jevons’s thought. Indeed Jevons gave Spencer the credit for discarding 
the depiction of human mind as a tabula rasa. Individuals were shaped by their 
environment, just like the ‘lower animals’. Moreover, these modifications in 
the body and mind of human beings weren’t limited to the individual. They 
were passed down, generation by generation, informing thus the character of 
individuals in accordance with their social group. 
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Jevons expressed his view of human nature through many writings, private 
and unpublished as well as in his published works. Here I focus on the eco-
nomic agent as described in The Theory of Political Economy, addressing three 
relevant topics: the individual’s mind depicted as a balance of feelings; the idea 
that human feelings were hierarchically ordered; and the axioms of the human 
mind which constituted the foundation of Jevons’s economic theory. 
 
The balance of feelings 
 
I have already taken into account the first topic, the individual’s power of 
measuring his feelings, in the first section of this chapter. However, this de-
scription needs to be completed and connected with Jevons’s picture of the 
economic agent. As I have noted, for Jevons the subject was endowed with the 
capacity to inspect his own mind: he was transparent to himself. This capacity 
turned out to be very important for Jevons’s economic theory. As we know, his 
political economy was founded on the individual’s calculus of pleasure and 
pain, in accordance with the utilitarian moral theory. Moreover, Jevons was 
positive that the individual’s mind was closed to scrutiny of others. Jevons ex-
cluded the possibility of inspecting the depths of human thought: “far be it 
from me to say”, he clarified, “that we ever shall have the means of measuring 
directly the feelings of the human heart” (Jevons, 1871, 13). 
However, fortunately for them, economists weren’t constrained to follow 
the thread of the individual’s reasoning. Though private, this calculus had visi-
ble effects. The feelings perceived by the subject may be invisible, but “it is the 
amount of these feelings which is continually prompting us to buying and sell-
ing, borrowing and lending, labouring and resting, producing and consuming” 
(Jevons, 1871, 13). Furthermore, not only were these effects manifest, but they 
were also quantifiable. It was not on the basis of the feelings themselves, but of 
their quantitative effects that an observation and measurement of these feelings 
could be accomplished (see Jevons, 1871, 14). According to Jevons, just as we 
can observe the effects of gravity on the motion of a pendulum, so we can find 
visible signs expressing the unfathomable feelings of the mind: “the will is our 
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pendulum, and its oscillations are minutely registered in all the price lists of the 
markets” (Jevons, 1871, 14). 
I have already highlighted the relevance of introspection for Jevons’s eco-
nomic theory. Let us now add a few remarks, to better appreciate its pivotal 
role. In Jevons’s eyes, the feelings of the mind were manifested by the individ-
ual’s behaviour in the market. Thus, the price at which one is willing to pur-
chase a product indicated the pleasure that is expected to be drawn from this 
act of exchange. In this situation, the decision on how to act would be based on 
one’s own pleasure and pain. Therefore, the pivotal role of introspection is easy 
to see. Were humans incapable of correctly observing their own feelings, the 
prices standing for them could not amount to their reliable expression. This is 
why Jevons couldn’t but hold that “the mind of an individual is the balance 
which makes its own comparison and is the final judge of quantities feelings” 
(Jevons, 1871, 19). 
 
The hierarchy of feelings 
 
I now focus on the second feature of Jevons’s economic agent, analysing 
what he called the hierarchy of feelings. In accordance with utilitarian philoso-
phy, Jevons considered humans as governed by two supreme masters, i.e. 
pleasure and pain. And yet not all pleasures and pains were the same20. “Mo-
tives and feelings”, wrote Jevons, “are certainly of the same kind to the extent 
 
20 This issue is related to Jevons’s criticism of Mill’s argument concerning the qualita-
tive character of pleasures. In contrast with Mill, Jevons held that pleasures could only 
be distinguished quantitatively, in accordance with Bentham’s account. NathHowever, 
in his paper Utilitarianism, Jevons also stated that he wasn’t denying the moral supe-
riority of certain pleasures over others (Jevons, 1890, 285), in a quite contradictory 
manner with respect to his own observations. In Jevons’s treatment of the hierarchy of 
feelings, it is this last statement – that certain pleasures are endowed of moral superi-
ority – which prevailed. On this topic, see Jevons, 1890, 274-285. For a discussion of 




that we are able to weigh them against each other; but they are, nevertheless, 
almost incomparable in power and authority” (Jevons, 1871, 31-32). Therefore, 
according to Jevons, the motives were hierarchically ordered. As Jevons admit-
ted, 
 
the feelings of which a man is capable are of various grades. He is al-
ways subject to mere physical pleasure or pain, necessarily arising from 
his bodily wants and susceptibilities. He is capable also of mental and 
moral feelings of several degrees of elevation (Jevons, 1871, 29). 
 
At the lowest stage, we can find the self-oriented motives, like the impulse to-
wards self-preservation and the satisfaction of his own desires. One step above, 
we find the inclination to take care of one’s family, even at the price of re-
nouncing one’s own good. At a still higher level, Jevons put the duty to secure 
the safety of the nation.  
We can thus appreciate the ambiguity of Jevons’s view in describing the 
so-called hierarchy of feelings. On the one hand, Jevons suggested that these 
motives were natural inclinations of the individual: they were feelings, namely 
an amount of pleasure or pain perceived, causing the individual to act accord-
ingly. On the other hand, Jevons spoke of these feelings in terms of duty. In 
Jevons’s words, “it is a man’s duty, as it is his natural inclination, to earn suffi-
cient food and whatever else may best satisfy his proper and moderate desires” 
(Jevons, 1871, 30). Likewise, it is one’s duty to renounce the satisfaction of 
one’s desires whenever a higher motive intervenes, such as when they are 
faced with the needs of one’s family or nation. 
The ambiguity was profound indeed, since Jevons spoke of the higher mo-
tives too in terms of feelings (see Jevons, 1871, 31). According to him, acting 
in view of the nation’s good gave the individual a higher pleasure than minding 
his own good exclusively. However, Jevons’s language suggested that choos-
ing between these pleasures wasn’t only a matter of deciding which feeling was 
the strongest. “If the claims of a family or of friends fall upon him”, as Jevons 
explained, “it may become desirable that he [the subject] should deny his own 
desires and even his physical needs their customary gratification” (Jevons, 
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1871, 30, emphasis added). The subject had to do what ought to be done, fol-
lowing the rules of morality. 
Therefore, we can conclude that perceived feelings did not overwhelm the 
individual. Jevons envisaged the possibility that one could deny the prompting 
towards pleasure in order to answer the call of a higher duty. This ambiguity in 
presenting the hierarchy of feelings calls to mind a topic which I have exam-
ined at various times, namely the tension between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, description 
and prescription. As I have argued in the second chapter, there was much lati-
tude for prescription in Jevons’s thought. Humans could overcome their egois-
tic feelings and pursue a higher good. They were not controlled by a tyrannical 
nature. Instead, they were ready to do what they ought. 
After analysing these passages of the Theory, a question may arise: what 
did the hierarchy of feelings have to do with economics? Jevons answered this 
question, explaining why he presented this subject matter in his main work on 
political economy: 
 
My present purpose is accomplished in pointing out this hierarchy of 
feeling, and assigning a proper place to the pleasures and pains with 
which Economy deals. It is the lowest rank of feelings which we here 
treat. The calculus of Utility aims at supplying the ordinary wants of 
man at the least cost of labour. Each labourer, in the absence of other 
motives, is supposed to devote his energy to the accumulation of 
wealth. A higher calculus of moral right and wrong would be needed to 
show how he may best employ that wealth for the good of others as 
well as himself. But when that higher calculus gives no prohibition, we 
need the lower calculus to gain us the utmost good in matters of moral 
indifference (Jevons, 1871, 32). 
 
Thus, Jevons defined the scope of political economy. He confined it to the 
lowest stage of feelings: the economic calculus only takes into account the self-
oriented pleasures and wants. However, these motives were far from being 
immoral. By following the desire for acquiring wealth and supplying their 
wants, one was accomplishing the duty towards themselves, as pointed out 
above. The lowest rank of feelings was not synonymous with immorality, but, 
if anything, with amorality. It was perfectly acceptable behaviour so long as 




The axioms of the human mind 
 
 
These considerations concerning self-interest are deeply connected with 
another characteristic of Jevons’s economic agent. Jevons established three ax-
ioms on which economic analysis was founded. Jevons thought, in accordance 
with his logic, that political economy had to proceed deductively (see Jevons, 
1871, 23)21. Political economy had to be founded on basic assumptions. These 
assumptions had an anthropological character, since they identified fundamen-
tal features of the human mind: “a few of the simplest principles or axioms 
concerning the nature of the human mind must be taken as its first starting-
point” (Jevons, 1871, 24). 
Even though Jevons did not claim that the three axioms he mentioned were 
the only ones that could be found, he numbered only three: “every person will 
choose the greater apparent good; […] human wants are more or less quickly 
satiated; […] prolonged labour becomes more and more painful” (Jevons, 
1871, 24). According to Jevons, these axioms were the foundation of his eco-
nomic theory, which, as we know, he described as “a mechanics of self-
interest” (Jevons, 1871, 24). Starting from these axioms, it is possible to devel-
op a complete deductive mathematical theory and to deduce the economic laws 
of supply and demand, the concept of value, and the laws regulating labour and 
production (see Jevons, 1871, 24). Jevons suggested that, in absence of a prior 
knowledge of the key features of the human mind, no political economy is pos-
sible. 
Jevons’s economic agent presented the following characteristics: he was 
transparent to himself and consequently able to weigh his own feelings; he 
knew when he ought to apply a self-interested calculus and when he ought to 
count on higher moral principles instead; he was pushed, by his own nature to 
acquire the greatest possible good for himself. These features are obviously re-
 
21 Concerning Jevons’s deductive method in the context of his economic theory, see: 
Mays, 1962, 233-236; Schabas, 1990, chap. 5 especially. 
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lated to Jevons’s image of human nature. My purpose here is to look at this pic-
ture from the point of view of the tension between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. 
 
A perfectly wise economic agent 
 
As I have argued, Jevons’s economic agent was transparent to himself. We 
know that this faculty didn’t pertain to the economic subject exclusively. In-
stead, in Jevons’s eyes, it was typical of the human mind in general, by virtue 
of the self-evidence of the laws of thought. As I have argued in the first chap-
ter, humans had an immediate grasp on their own mind. They had a compre-
hension of how their reasoning proceeded. This understanding gave them a for-
tress of certainty in a world where their knowledge was only probable22. Thus 
it is not surprising that in Jevons’s eyes our weighing of feelings, in the eco-
nomic context, was provided with the same self-evidence. 
However, together with its self-evidence, the process of weighing the feel-
ings inherited the paradoxes of Jevons’s logic too. As stated above, these para-
doxes were related to the tension between description and prescription. How 
did Jevons conceive the capacity of weighing one’s feelings? Was it a descrip-
tion of the mind’s actual functioning or rather a prescriptive ideal? Indeed, 
while depicting the process of weighing the feelings within the individual’s 
mind, Jevons didn’t seem to raise any doubt concerning the reality of this pro-
cess. He wrote that “the mind of an individual is the balance which makes its 
own comparisons and is the final judge of quantities of feelings” (Jevons, 1871, 
19, emphasis added). The use of the indicative verbal mood suggests that this 
was no advice on how to behave properly, but rather a description of a real 
mental faculty. 
The matter was more complicated, though. Several passages of the Theory 
show that Jevons questioned the consumer’s choices or doubted their sound-
 
22 In this regard, see the first chapter, section 1.2., 1.3. and 1.4. 
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ness23. To a certain extent, the individual will always be erratic. This was why 
Jevons stated that, although the economic laws were the same both at the indi-
vidual and national level, in practice we can only observe them at the level of 
the aggregates of individuals (see Jevons, 1871, 21-22). “It is quite impossi-
ble”, as Jevons argued, 
 
to detect the operation of general laws of this kind in the actions of one 
or a few individuals. The motives and conditions are so numerous and 
complicated, that the resulting actions have the appearance of caprice, 
and are beyond the analysis and prediction of science (Jevons, 1871, 
22). 
 
The individual is the ground where several desires, impulses, and motives 
meet. The mental act of weighing the feelings could be compromised by an in-
tervening cause. This would result in a distortion of consumer decisions: 
 
With every increase in the price of such a commodity as sugar, we 
ought, theoretically speaking, to find every person reducing his con-
sumption by a small amount, and according to some regular law. In re-
ality, many persons would make no change at all; a few, probably, 
would go to the extent of dispensing with the use of sugar altogether 
while its cost was excessive (Jevons, 1871, 22). 
 
The economic agent was supposed to maximize utility by means of a clear 
and sound balancing of the pleasures involved in the choice. And yet, as we 
can see from this quotation, Jevons allowed that the consumer judgements 
might contradict the laws of economy and thus fail to maximize utility. Hence, 
the laws of economy could only be true on the aggregate, where the deviation 
from the law balanced out (see Jevons, 1871, 22-23). In The State in Relation 
to Labour, Jevons held that people could reason well or ill, but they usually 
reasoned ill (see Jevons, [1882] 1910, 19). The economic agent was no less 
prone to reasoning errors. 
 
23 This point has already been discussed by some scholars. See: Peart, 1996, 207-210; 
M. White, 1994b, 439-441. 
258 
 
The balance of feelings was liable to the influence of intervening causes 
which might prevent the individual from properly weighing their own feelings. 
Furthermore, in Jevons’s opinion, in some circumstances the mind was led to 
systematic errors. This is the case with intertemporal decision-making, when 
the use of a commodity had to be distributed over a given lapse of time. Ac-
cording to Jevons’s example, the commodity might be perishable, so that the 
subject also needed to estimate the probability of it going wasted. In principle, 
the agent should be able to calculate this probability and act accordingly. In 
Jevons’s theory, the higher the probability of the commodity expiring, the less 
should we postpone its use. 
This should be the most rational distribution, but the subject may be una-
ble to reason correctly. A present and a remote event produced very different 
impressions on the mind. Considering a remote event affected the calculus 
negatively (see Jevons, 1871, 74-75). Thus Jevons clearly acknowledged that 
he wasn’t describing the actual behaviour of the agent, but rather the best way 
to make a decision concerning a remote event: 
 
The distribution of commodity described is that which should be made 
and would be made by a being of perfect good sense and foresight. To 
secure a maximum of benefit in life, all future events, all future pleas-
ures or pains, should act upon us with the same force as if they were 
present, allowance being made for their uncertainty. […] But no human 
mind is constituted in this perfect way: a future feeling is always less 
influential than a present one (Jevons, 1871, 76). 
 
As remarked above, Jevons mistrusted in particular the labouring classes’ ca-
pacity of making wise decisions for the future. He believed that they lacked 
thrift and providence, which they could learn by taking the middle classes as an 
example24. 
The picture has certainly become more complex. At first, Jevons suggested 
that the individual was capable of weighing their feelings correctly. In contrast 
with this idea, he then observed that their calculations were not always correct. 
 
24 In this regard, see the second chapter, “The commitment to social reform” and “So-
cial reform as moral reform”. 
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He didn’t hesitate to make some suggestions as to how these calculations 
should be done too, counterposing the figure of a perfectly wise economic 
agent to the unwise and improvident one. Consequently, when presenting the 
individual’s mind as a balance of feelings, Jevons passed from the territory of 
description to the one of prescription. What at first seemed a description of the 
actual functioning of the human mind was in fact an indication of how the eco-
nomic agent ought to behave25. 
 
The laws of economy as natural laws 
 
Let us now focus on the axioms of the human mind that Jevons enumerat-
ed. As we have seen, the depiction of the individual as self-interested and max-
imising his own good characterised Jevons’s economic theory as well as his 
conception of the human nature. Consistent with his theory of morals, for Jev-
ons those axioms expressed some of the key features of the human being, and 
he put them at the foundations of the economic theory. Hence, if we asked 
whether these axioms were connected to the domain of ‘is’ or the domain of 
‘ought’, the answer would come quite naturally: Jevons believed that the axi-
oms described how humans actually are. Indeed, for him these axioms were 
known by the means of induction, extrapolating the general rule from observa-
tion. In the Theory, Jevons wrote: “in the science of Economy we treat men not 
as they ought to be, but as they are” (Jevons, 1871, 45-46). Here Jevons wanted 
to prevent moral judgements being applied to the concept of utility: the theory 
of economics was interested in tracing the laws of utility aside from the moral 
acceptability of desires. 
The above mentioned passage suggested that the economic theory wasn’t 
concerned with defining a correct code of behaviour. It aimed at inferring the 
laws of economy, starting from the axioms of the human mind. Such axioms 
applied to human beings in general. Moreover, the laws based on them would 
 
25 In regard to this issue, see Peart, 1996, 209-210 in particular, where the topic is put 
in connection with Jevons’s writings on policy. 
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also be highly general. Jevons underlined this character in The Future of Politi-
cal Economy (1876): 
 
The laws of political economy treat of the relations between human 
wants and the available natural objects and human labour by which they 
may be satisfied. These laws are so simple in their foundation that they 
would apply, more or less completely, to all human beings of whom we 
have any knowledge (Jevons, 1905, 196). 
 
In Jevons’s eyes these laws were universally true, concerning every society at 
every time. 
The conclusion followed naturally: that the laws of economy took root in 
human nature itself. In Jevons’s own words, “the first principles of political 
economy are so widely true and applicable that they may be considered univer-
sally true as regards human nature” (Jevons, 1905, 197). Their functioning may 
be subjected to the influence of intervening causes, or causes external to eco-
nomic reasoning. Yet, the laws were always the same: it was with these basic 
and universal laws that political economy was concerned. Economic theory 
“consists of those general laws which are so simple in nature, and so deeply 
grounded in the constitution of man and the outer world, that they remain the 
same throughout all those ages which are within our consideration” (Jevons, 
1905, 198). 
The laws of economy were grounded in human nature. Consequently, in 
order to investigate the relation between prescription and description in Jev-
ons’s economic theory, an examination of his conception of economic law is 
needed. As I have stated in the first chapter, Jevons believed that the laws of 
nature were necessary and flawless26. Could the same be argued for the laws of 
political economy? Were they laws of nature, as perfect and binding as the 
laws governing matter? Jevons’s statements leave little doubt in this regard. In 
his works on economics, he often made clear that he considered the laws of 
economy to be natural laws. In The Coal Question, for instance, Jevons wrote a 
chapter entitled On the Natural Law of Social Growth, in which he analysed 
 
26 See the first chapter, section 1.4. 
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the growth of population. Basing his views on Malthus’s theory of population, 
Jevons held that the population tended to increase in a uniform geometrical ra-
tio, stating that “the law is as true and necessary as a mathematical law” (Jev-
ons, [1865] 1906, 193). He wrote The Coal Question in 1865, when he still was 
a young man striving to find his place in the domain of political economy. He 
held to the conviction that the laws of economy were natural laws throughout 
his career as a professor of political economy. Indeed, similar remarks could 
also be found in the Theory of Political Economy. Here Jevons wrote that, to 
attain an exact conception of value, we had “to trace out carefully the natural 
laws of the variation of utility” (Jevons, 1871, 2)27. 
Jevons developed this topic at length in a lecture given at Owens College 
in 1866. As I have already remarked in the second chapter, it was the opening 
session of the Cobden lectures – a course of lectures instituted with the aim of 
spreading the knowledge of political economy through the labouring classes 
(see Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 207-208; Vol II, 132-138)28. Jevons started 
with a reminder of the importance of knowing oneself. Moreover, a lack of un-
derstanding of the natural laws on which we depend would cause great evil: 
 
A mistake as to our own nature and powers leads pretty surely to failure 
and ruin. It is indispensable that in every thing we do we should obey 
the natural laws under which we are placed, and we cannot be sure we 
obey them unless we know them (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. VII, 39). 
 
Jevons used this argument to touch on quite a delicate point, namely the trade 
unions’ struggle for a rise in wages. In Jevons’s opinion, trade unions were not 
per se to blame. On the contrary, any form of cooperation and association had 
to be encouraged. What Jevons reproached them for was the attempt to in-
crease wages, which went against the laws of economics regulating wages. 
Trade unions committed a crime against nature, as Jevons stated quite 
clearly: 
 
27 For a similar statement, see also Jevons, 1871, 13. 





When they pass from these matters in which an employer should con-
sult the welfare of his men collectively, to regulate or raise the rate of 
wages, to enforce equality of work and wages, they bring their own and 
others’ welfare into peril; and what I want you especially to see is, that, 
with the increasing intelligence and habit of co-operation among la-
bourers, there is the more urgent need of a knowledge of economy, that 
they may restrain their power within natural laws – that they may, in 
short, know themselves (Jevons, 1972-1981, 49). 
 
Trade unions’ intervention was valuable, unless they intended to regulate wag-
es. For Jevons, this effort was useless and – more importantly – harmful to 
workers as well as to employers. The trade unions’ attempts would only create 
social conflict, blocking production and progress29. They couldn’t succeed in 
raising wages, because wages were governed by a greater power: nature itself. 
This was just a meaningless rebellion against the laws of nature, resulting from 
a misapprehension of the nature of humans – of what they can do and cannot 
do. In Jevons’s eyes, no violation of the laws of economy was ultimately pos-
sible. We could try to oppose them, but it was pointless to do so, and it would 
only inflict pain on ourselves and others. As Jevons concluded, 
 
advancing intelligence and freedom may but lead our operatives into 
loss and disaster unless they are furnished with appropriate knowledge 
of natural laws which they cannot escape from, and must ultimately 
obey. Men think that by the repealing of human laws they become free 
to act as they like. They must learn that there are natural laws even of 
human nature which they cannot break, but against which they can easi-
ly, through ignorance, throw themselves to their own destruction (Jev-
ons, 1972-1981, Vol. VII, 50-51). 
 
Jevons’s account of the economic laws as laws of nature seems to suggest 
that, in such context, prescription had no legitimate place. Jevons state that one 
must obey the laws of nature. However, by prescribing to follow the laws, he 
didn’t imply that these laws could be broken. Knowing and obeying them was 
profitable, for opposing them was futile, and as pointless as it was harmful. 
 
29 For Jevons’s argument concerning the futility of strikes, see Jevons, 1972-1981, 
Vol. VII, 49-50; (1882) 1910, 96-101. 
263 
 
These laws being necessary, human beings couldn’t but follow them. Hence, 
wasn’t it better to adjust one’s behaviour to them from the beginning? 
 
Opposing the laws or not 
 
As we have seen, Jevons was utterly persuaded that the laws of economy 
were natural laws, as inescapable as the laws regulating matter. However, an-
other difficulty arises from this account, laying further emphasis on the opposi-
tion between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. The laws of economy, qua laws of nature, are a 
set of rules to which humans were subject. Moreover, these laws took root in 
the natural constitution of human beings: obeying them was the same as obey-
ing one’s own nature. However, as I have argued in the second chapter, Jevons 
still preserved the difference between matter and spirit: humans were no mere 
automatons, but dual creatures – creatures of both matter and spirit. Given the 
duality of their nature, what kind of relation did human beings have with the 
laws of economy? As we shall see, this question casts further light on the di-
chotomy between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. 
Jevons was positive that humans couldn’t escape the natural laws of eco-
nomics. Every attempt to break them was fated to failure. However, when he 
urged us to follow these natural laws, Jevons accounted for the particular posi-
tion that humans had vis-à-vis these laws: human beings could oppose them or 
not. Opposing them would be pointless, since the natural laws always prevailed 
in the end. However, human behaviour produced an effect on the economic 
mechanism, if only in that human actions could disturb the laws’ functioning, 
hindering the progress of society and causing much pain. This is where pre-
scription enters the domain of economic theory, in the form of a warning 
against the dangers of opposing the natural laws of economy. Indeed Jevons, in 
his lecture at Owens College, was eager to persuade his audience that the laws 
of nature ought to be followed. Hence, humans had the possibility of opposing 
them. 
Jevons also stressed the importance of favouring the course of the econom-
ic laws in other texts. For instance, when analysing fluctuations in the money 
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market, he suggested that crises could be avoided by studying the functioning 
of the market. In such a way, “we should learn to discriminate what is usual 
and normal in the changes of the Bank accounts, from what is irregular and ab-
normal” (Jevons, 1884, 181). The language that Jevons used puts us into the 
dimension of prescription. He stated that we should comprehend the conditions 
of the money market in order to prevent the crises. Whenever the balance of 
market was shaken by the intervention of some external causes, such as exces-
sive investments or unexpected changes of supply and demand, we ought to 
comply with the natural order more than ever. In Jevons’s own words, “in such 
matters of high uncertainty it is desirable to trust as little to discretion and to 
commit as much to the operation of the natural laws as possible” (Jevons, 
1884, 181). 
As Jevons concluded, “under the present system the English currency is 
governed by the natural laws of supply and demand of a metallic currency, and 
not by merely artificial regulations” (Jevons, 1884, 181). The individuals’ va-
garies negatively affected the natural mechanisms of the market, engendering 
abnormal and critical conditions. So did attempts of imposing an artificial regu-
lation on the money market, since artificial regulations opposed the natural 
laws of the market. That was why individuals ought to know the natural laws 
of currency. Only in this way could crises be avoided. 
This passage clearly shows that, in Jevons’s mind, humans could oppose 
their own artificial rules to the natural laws of economy. They were no ma-
chines, and consequently they were able to go against their nature and the na-
ture of the market. Due to this possibility, knowing the laws of economy and 
choosing to comply with them was all the more essential. 
It is worth noticing that, on the one hand, the duality of human nature was 
a liability, but, on the other, it was an asset. Humans could disturb the natural 
equilibrium or favour it. In his paper Married Women in Factories, Jevons stat-
ed that human beings might make good use of their understanding of the natu-
ral laws by aiding its course. Here he explained that we could limit the negative 
effects of industrialisation on society by administering the conditions of work 
in factories. Industrialisation was indeed a result of evolution, a sign of pro-
265 
 
gress. However, once we understood the laws of this process, we could take 
some decisions to mitigate its destructive social effects, provided that our ac-
tion didn’t hinder the course of nature. As we read in Married Women in Fac-
tories, 
 
[the Factory Laws] were absolutely necessary to guard the population 
against the dangers of a novel state of things, as to which evolution had 
not had time to work out its spontaneous cure. No doubt, in the course 
of generations, the manufacturing population would become fitted to its 
environment, but only through suffering and death illimitable. We can 
help evolution by the aid of its own highest and latest product – science 
(Jevons, 1883, 177). 
 
The economic laws could be fostered in many ways, for instance by im-
plementing them whenever they were neglected. This was the case with the 
opposition between employers and workers. In such a situation, the terms of 
the conflict were not economic, but rather political. The labourers were ready 
to discard their own economic advantage to fight against social injustice. The 
laws of economics did not apply in that scenario: as Jevons wrote, “pecuniary 
losses are of little account to those who are prepared to endure starvation rather 
than submit to what they esteem be ‘injustice’” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 159). “It 
is obvious, then”, continued Jevons, “that a trade dispute, especially when it 
has reached the acute phase of a strike, has little or nothing to do with econom-
ics” (Jevons, [1882] 1910, 159). 
For his part, Jevons advocated that in similar circumstances a mediator – 
or, as he wrote, ‘conciliator’ – ought to intervene, being an impartial figure 
who could resolve an otherwise unresolvable conflict. What this mediator did 
was make the voice of economics heard when it went unheeded: 
 
In many cases the work of such conciliators will consist in little more 
than inquiring into the real facts of the case, and impartially and author-
itatively making them known to both parties. If either party than con-
fesses to misapprehension, it is clear that the conciliator imports rather 
than ousts political economy. He acts the part of an economic and sta-




Hence, their comprehension of the natural laws of economics allowed media-
tors to speak in their name, and to apply them whenever they were needed. 
 
The hierarchy of feelings and the ‘ought’ 
 
Humans could cause their own ruin as well as their own salvation. They 
were subject to the natural laws, and among them to the laws of economy, but 
were nonetheless able to acknowledge their subjection. Hence, they could 
make profitable use of the situation in which they found themselves. Upon 
closer inspection, the peculiar position of the human being within nature turns 
out to be founded on a religious argument. I have already argued that, in Jev-
ons’s epistemology, God guaranteed nature’s stability and our own faculty to 
investigate nature. The understanding of economic laws, on which economic 
theory itself was based, was no exception: as any other branch of knowledge, it 
demanded a divine guarantor. 
Jevons explicitly highlighted these religious foundations in his lecture at 
Owens College: 
 
We have been endowed at our creation with powers of observation and 
reasoning which seem capable of penetrating by degrees all the secrets 
of nature. When we are suffering under or are threatened with any evil 
we should not content ourselves with hoping or praying for its removal 
only, but we should set in action all our faculties, and by first acquiring 
and then diffusing all the knowledge we can gain of its nature and caus-
es, we should place in the hands of men the means of averting it. It is 
not our own power we use, it is the Divine power of knowledge (Jev-
ons, 1972-1981, Vol. VII, 40). 
 
In the second chapter I argued that some human faculties exceeded the natural 
order. This capacity of exceeding the boundaries of nature did not enable hu-
mans to break the natural laws, but it did enable them to understand them and 
act in accordance with such understanding. 
By virtue of this divine power – knowledge – human beings could acquire 
a satisfactory comprehension of the natural laws of economics. A knowledge of 
these laws and of their own nature was also essential to discriminate the situa-
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tions where these laws should be applied and those were they should not. As 
shown above, Jevons clearly defined the boundaries of political economy when 
he described the hierarchy of feelings. I have already pointed out that his illus-
tration of the latter entailed an ambiguity between ‘is’ and ‘ought’: the subject 
had to know their own feelings and decide whether the situation demanded the 
use of a higher calculus or not. 
What I would like to highlight now is that the pivotal element of the hier-
archy of feelings is not the ‘is’, but the ‘ought’. Human beings were certainly 
subjected to an array of impulses. They were a part of nature themselves and 
thus they inhabited the realm of ‘is’: their feelings were what they were, and as 
such they had to take them into account. However, the Creator gifted humans 
with intellect. The gift of reason enabled them to recognize the superiority of 
certain motives over others. As they could choose whether to comply with the 
laws of nature or not, they could also choose a higher duty over a lower one: 
they could choose to do what ought to be done. Hence the pivotal function of 
the ‘ought’ in the hierarchy of feelings: being able to deny the lower feelings 
their proper satisfaction and follow the demands of the ‘ought’, human beings 
could move up and down the hierarchy of feelings. 
The interaction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in the hierarchy of feelings also 
casts new light on the relationship between political economy and morality in 
Jevons’ thought. As we have seen, by classifying feelings by rank, Jevons 
strove to find a proper place for morality and political economy at once, pre-
venting them from meddling with one another (see Sigot, 2002, 273-275). It 
would be inexact, though, to conclude that morality was entirely expelled by 
the domain of economics. Rather, morality had the privilege of standing at the 
borders of economic calculus. Morality was endowed with an enormous power: 
the power of determining whether a matter entered the scope of economics or 
demanded a higher calculus. We decide whether a subject matter had to be in-
vestigated from an economic point of view based on the kind of motives in-
volved. The desire for wealth, the inclination to seek pleasure, or one’s own 
good – these are all feelings belonging to the lower rank. According to Jevons, 
whenever the individual acted with only these feelings in mind, his decisions 
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could be properly treated in the context of political economy. However, if a 
higher calculus – a moral calculus – was needed, the subject ought to relinquish 
his own satisfaction to follow moral duty. 
 
An economic theory caught between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ 
 
As Jevons held, human beings had to know their nature in order to know 
what their options were. They could follow their nature or not, could oppose 
the natural laws or not, could reason well or not. The options were available 
because of the duality of human nature. Humans were creatures of matter and 
spirit, that is, of both ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Hence, they should not ignore their con-
stitution and the forces binding them. However, after acquiring a knowledge of 
their own nature and of natural laws, they had the privilege – and the responsi-
bility – of choosing. 
Therefore, there was still a place for free will in Jevons’s thought, given 
that in the absence of the latter any prescription would be absurd. We cannot 
order a stone not to fall when we drop it, but we can instruct humans to know 
themselves and to choose properly. They had to choose which allocation of 
utility was the best for their future, which criteria to apply in each situation, or 
what was the most appropriate behaviour when dealing with natural laws. The 
possibility of relinquishing the ‘is’ in favour of the ‘ought’ was a result of the 
place humans had in the order of creation: the only creatures endowed with 
reason, humans had both the burden and honour of choice. Thus, Jevons’s reli-
gious beliefs entered the domain of economics by means of his conception of 
the human nature. 
Jevons asserted that political economy was concerned with the individual 
as it was, and not as it ought to be. However, in the light of the previous con-
siderations, we can conclude that this statement is only partly true. In the con-
text of economic theory, Jevons treated the basic characteristics of the human 
mind, i.e. the axioms of his theory, as well as the representation of the laws of 
economy qua natural laws, as if they pertained to the sphere of the ‘is’. From 
that point of view, they were what they were, and the only thing we could do 
269 
 
was to cope with them in the best possible way. Nonetheless, Jevons was far 
from excluding prescription from his economic theory. As a matter of fact, he 
didn’t hesitate to picture the perfect rational agent: an agent capable of weigh-
ing his feelings and of applying his knowledge of economic laws in the proper 
way and situation. As Jevons himself admitted, such a perfectly rational agent 
wasn’t real. Instead, he was the beacon towards correct behaviour, the guiding 
light of the ‘ought’. 
These considerations call into question the problem of value judgements in 
the context of economic theory. The question whether Jevons’s economic theo-
ry was value-laden or not have already given rise to considerable attention 
among scholars. This issue has been expressed in terms of the relationship be-
tween Jevons’s economic theory and his economic policy. Robert Collison 
Black has argued that in the Theory Jevons developed a system of positive 
economy, from which policy recommendations were excluded. As Black has 
asserted, “it was an exercise in what today would be called positive economics, 
concerned to analyze and not to prescribe, to bring light rather than bear fruit” 
(R. D. C. Black, 1970, 37-38)30. Michael White has challenged this view. Ac-
cording to him, the Theory could not be considered a work in positive econom-
ics, since it involved normative statements. Moreover, White has argued that 
the opposition between positive and normative economics is anachronistic 
when applied to Jevons’s theory. What defined the domain of scientific eco-
nomics, as Jevons conceived it, wasn’t the absence of normative statements, 
but rather the nature of the feelings involved (see M. White, 1994b, 430-433). 
However, in the present study my focus is not on the distinction between 
economic theory and policy measures. What I have referred to in terms of 
 
30 Pelin Sekerler Richiardi and Nathalie Sigot held a similar thesis, based on Jevons’s 
distinction between pure economic theory (positive economics, in Black’s terms) and 
practical economics (normative economics). Pure economic theory, or positive eco-
nomics, was deprived of value judgements, while practical economics was concerned 
with social reform and consequently produced policy recommendations and normative 
statements (see Richiardi, Sigot 2013). 
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‘ought’ doesn’t correspond with the normative statements of policy. The matter 
is quite different and could be expressed in the following terms: did Jevons’s 
economic theory entail recommendations concerning how people ought to be-
have? Did Jevons provide, in his economic theory, a model of right behaviour, 
or was his theory a mere description of actual behaviour? As I have argued, 
Jevons did provide such a model, for example the model of a perfectly rational 
agent. He also warned people against the danger of opposing the laws of politi-
cal economy, thus prescribing them not to do so. From this point of view, Jev-
ons’s economic theory was far from being devoid of normative statements: he 
was concerned with what people ought to do. 
Hence, the ‘ought’ claimed a space which went beyond his works on poli-
cy, including the theoretical domain too. From the perspective of modern eco-
nomic theory this would look like an inexcusable ambiguity, and a failure to 
distinguish positive and normative economics. However, if we want to under-
stand Jevons’s thought, rather than judge it uncharitably, we have to ask our-
selves the following question: why did his thought display such an ambiguity? 
Why was he inclined to grant a place for both prescription and description 
within his economic theory? 
My contention here is: Jevons wished for an economic theory which could 
at once explain reality and modify it. On the one hand, he wanted his economic 
theory to be scientific, being thus able to account for human behaviour as well 
as for the functioning of economic laws. On the other hand, providing a science 
of economics shouldn’t imply imprisoning human beings into a deterministic 
structure. This was not acceptable for Jevons, whose concerns included moral 
and social reform. Therefore, his economic theory did not exclude normative 
statements. As I have argued in the second chapter, humans received from their 
Creator both the longing and the opportunity for self-improvement. The path 
towards the enhancement of moral and intellectual faculties was shown by the 
social sciences (see Jevons, 1883, 196). The economist, qua social scientist, 




The most perfect of all societies 
 
It is thus not surprising that, in Jevons’s eyes, the economist had to address 
especially those people who most needed such an education, i.e. the labouring 
class. It is no coincidence that Jevons insisted so much that the laws of nature 
must be obeyed at Owens College, in his opening address as Cobden lecturer. 
As I have already explained, these classes had been expressly instituted with 
the purpose of educating labourers. By focusing on the necessity of obeying the 
economic laws, Jevons was fulfilling his obligation to society, by educating 
those who in his eyes were its most improvident and unwise members. Like the 
Unitarian reformers in Manchester and Boston31, Jevons believed that the mid-
dle-class was the most virtuous of all: the economist had to take this class as a 
model and persuade the recalcitrant classes that this model was the best one32. 
In pursuing this task, the economist had to take into account the nature of 
the people addressed. As I have already explained, Jevons considered that hu-
mans weren’t only shaped by their endogenous impulses, but were also affect-
ed by the external environment. The features resulting from environmental in-
fluence were inherited through the generations, in accordance with the La-
marckian concept of use-inheritance.  
As we know, Spencer interpreted the development of moral faculties in 
terms of Lamarckian use-inheritance, and Jevons endorsed Spencer’s position. 
White has shown that in the Theory of Political Economy Jevons used the Vic-
torian language of character and race while discussing the propensity to work 
of diverse individuals (M. White, 1994b, 437). According to Jevons, 
 
a man of lower race, a negro for instance, enjoys possession less, and 
loathes labour more; his exertions, therefore, soon stop. A poor savage 
would be content to gather the almost gratuitous fruits of nature, if they 
were sufficient to give sustenance (Jevons, 1871, 177-178). 
 
 
31 See the second chapter, the section “The commitment to social reform”. 




Considering that the economic laws could be meaningfully applied only to ag-
gregates, and not to the real individual, Jevons needed a way to make these 
laws significant for individuals as well. As White has argued, the language of 
character was the bridge that enabled Jevons to apply his economic theory to 
actual individuals (M. White, 1994b, 440)33. In Jevons’s mind, the economist 
could not ignore the constitution of the different social groups if he wanted his 
prescriptions to be effective. 
While recognising that the earth hosted human beings of a variety of kinds, 
Jevons nonetheless asserted the superiority of some over others. As we have 
seen by analysing Spencer’s thought, evolution was teleologically oriented to-
wards higher and higher forms of civilisation. Likewise, Jevons believed that 
the course of evolution had produced a gap between different social groups. As 
Jevons stated in “A Deduction from Darwin’s Theory”, the highest forms of 
civilisation were those dwelling in temperate climates, such as the Europeans 
(see Jevons, 1869, 231). “It is no doubt true”, asserted Jevons, “that man dis-
plays his utmost vigour and perfection, both in body and in mind, in the regions 
intermediate between extreme heat and extreme cold” (Jevons, 1869, 231). 
These civilisations exceeded the others in their physical and intellectual facul-
ties. There were different characters even within the highest forms of civilisa-
tion. Jevons often reproached the Irish people for their intemperance34. As ar-
gued above, he addressed a similar reproach to labourers. The English middle 
class was for Jevons the symbol of the success of evolution, the highest level of 
civilisation ever attained. 
In the second chapter, I have argued that Spencer fell into a prescriptive 
fallacy – the fallacy of deducing the ‘is’ from the ‘ought’. Spencer believed 
 
33 Bert Mosselmans has agreed with White, showing also the influence of Adolphe 
Quetelet’s concept of ‘homme moyen’ in Jevons (see Mosselmans, 2007, chap. 3 and 
35 in particular). 
34 With respect to this subject matter, see M. White, 1993. White’s paper has aroused 
Terence Hutchison’s criticism, triggering a discussion which continued over several 
papers. In this regard, see: Hutchison, 1994a,; M. White, 1994c; Hutchison, 1994b. 
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that what people ought to do would become, thanks to evolution, their sponta-
neous behaviour. In turn, Jevons endorsed Spencer’s position while discussing 
the development of our moral faculties. Jevons fell thus into the same fallacy as 
Spencer. 
It is worth noticing that this fallacy can be found in Jevons’s economic 
theory too. He fell into the prescriptive fallacy while elucidating the basic laws 
of political economy. As we know, Jevons took the laws of property as an ex-
ample of these primary laws of human nature and economics: 
 
The laws of property are very different in different countries and states 
of society. They seem to be in a very rudimentary state among the Es-
kimo. […] If one Eskimo man has two boats and another has none, the 
latter has a right to borrow one of the two boats; and it is further said 
that it is not the custom among the Eskimo to return borrowed articles.  
Now this is, of course, a very different state of things from what obtains 
among us. Nevertheless we can trace in this transaction of the borrowed 
boat the simple principles which are at the basis of economy (Jevons, 
1905, 196). 
 
Thus Jevons suggested that the same laws which characterised the economics 
of his society could also be observed in allegedly less developed societies. 
These laws may take an incomplete form in such populations. Nevertheless, 
this inchoate stage was just the starting point of a process which would result in 
the same economic laws of Jevons’s society. “One boat”, continued Jevons, 
 
is very useful, if not essential, to an Eskimo; a second boat is much less 
useful to a man who has already one boat, but it is highly useful if 
passed into the hands of a boatless neighbour. The elements of value are 
present here as in the most complicated operations of our corn or stock 
exchanges economy (Jevons, 1905, 196-197). 
 
Jevons was positive that those societies, which in his eyes were ‘primi-
tive’, displayed in an elementary form the same laws he identified in his eco-
nomic theory. However, we know that for Jevons evolution was hierarchical: 
the most perfect example of human society was his own society. This is where 
the prescriptive fallacy can be discovered. Jevons believed his society to be the 
most developed and its economic system the most complex and refined. Con-
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sequently, he conceived human nature in general in accordance with the social 
structure which in his mind was the most desirable. Hence, Jevons urged eve-
ryone to follow what he considered to be the code of proper behaviour, taking 
such behaviour to be a description of the ultimate nature of humans in general. 
As Mazlish has observed, “men are being told how they should be in the guise 
of a mere description of how they are” (Mazlish, 1986, 141). Jevons, like 
Spencer before him, fell into the prescriptive fallacy, disguising the ‘ought’ as 
the ‘is’. 
According to Jevons, evolution would eventually attain its higher stage, 
which was embodied in English society, and, within it, by the middle class. 
Given these considerations, it is not surprising that Jevons suggested taking the 
middle class as a model of behaviour. He prescribed imitating the middle class, 
so that habits of temperance and providence could be developed within the oth-
er classes too. Moreover, Jevons argued that economic laws were grounded in 
human nature. Oppose the principles of political economy would be oppose 
one’s own nature – which, in Jevons’s eyes, was a futile opposition. Therefore, 
Jevons’s prescription of imitating the middle classes couldn’t go unheeded, 
since those economic laws, which the middle classes symbolised, were embed-
ded in the very nature of human beings. The prescriptive fallacy granted thus 
that Jevons’s urgings had a sound basis. 
 
The dual nature of Jevons’s theory 
 
As I have argued in the second chapter, both Spencer and Jevons con-
ceived the evolution of moral qualities as a natural process. Egoistic and self-
interested behaviour would metamorphose into altruistic behaviour. The course 
of evolution would lead the population to develop a more refined character. 
However, notwithstanding Jevons’s faith in the course of evolution, in his eco-
nomic theory there still was latitude for prescription. Evolution will perhaps 
spontaneously produce higher forms of disposition, but in the meantime econ-
omists had to do whatever they could to aid its course. Similarly, even if in 
Jevons’s mind the laws of political economy characterized human nature, he 
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nonetheless encouraged to obey them. The social scientist’s task was to show 
how to follow the laws of political economy, so that the economic system 
could reach its perfect stage of development. 
Jevons’s economic theory thus had a dual nature too, just like the individ-
ual as he conceived him. On the one hand, this theory pertained to the ‘is’: a 
science able to explain human constitution. On the other hand, it pertained to 
the ‘ought’: it showed people how they should behave and improve themselves. 
As I have illustrated, at some points these two spheres overlap. The economic 
laws guiding human nature were shaped by what Jevons found profitable, for 
his society as well as humanity as a whole. Jevons conceived the economic 
agent’s faculty of weighing his feelings as a normative statement and a descrip-
tion at once. These ambiguities rested on the dual nature of Jevons’s theory in-
deed – a theory which claimed at once the right to describe reality and to shape 
it. The endeavour of describing reality as it is was concomitant with providing 
an image of what it ought to be. The spheres of description and prescriptions 
shows thus not only their opposition, but their connection as well: a compre-
hension of reality is essential to conceive how we could possibly ameliorate it. 
In this way, Jevons followed in the footsteps of Jeremy Bentham, who held that 















While I was reading Jevons’s journal, I once found some passages in 
which quite a different atmosphere could be found, compared with the previous 
pages. The reason why this passage produces this kind of effect – a bewilder-
ment mixed with curiosity, the impression of being in presence of something 
requiring a keener attention – is due to the journal’s timeline. Indeed these two 
entries (Jevons, 1972-1981, Vol. I, 98-101)1 had been written in 1862, but they 
deal with an earlier period, precisely eight years earlier. Here Jevons goes back 
to this moment of his life, and even farther in his memories, telling us of his 
childhood. 
Through this autobiographical inquiry, Jevons reveals something related to 
his personality and his then hopes. He writes that, while still a child, his uncle 
gave him some bookbinding tools. “I am yet partial to bookbinding”, he ex-
plains, 
 
& shall some time perhaps begin it again. I used to think I should like to 
be a bookbinder or book seller. It seemed to me a most delightful trade, 
& I wished or thought of nothing better. More lately I thought I should 
be a minister – It seemed so serious, & useful, a profession and I en-
tered but little into the merits of religion, & the duties of a minister. 
Every one dissuaded me from the notion – & before I had arrived at any 
age to require a real decision science had claimed me (Jevons, 1972-
1981, Vol. I, 99). 
 
This is just a small extract from this fascinating entry. Yet, it has a striking 
power: in just a few lines, it gives the reader a glimpse of Jevons’s character. 
We can imagine him observing the bindings of books, with the same intensity 
 
1 The problem of collocating the entry in the edition of Jevons’s papers is treated by 
the editors on the same page.  
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that he will later give to his logical machines. We can also imagine him medi-
tating on his future, considering what place all his different concerns and tal-
ents should have in his life. In the present work, my intention has been to pay 
justice to the personality that we can glimpse here. I have looked at Jevons not 
only as the great scientist and thinker that he was, but also as a man living in 
his time, leading a life full of different and perhaps contradictory concerns. 
The first chapter focuses on Jevons’s religious beliefs, in relation to his 
logic and epistemology. It starts with a historical investigation of the relation-
ship between science and religion in the Victorian age. The progress of scien-
tific knowledge seemed to imply a rejection of every religious faith. It is not 
surprising, thus, that Jevons was concerned with reconciling science and reli-
gion, trying to prove that they were not in opposition. The historical inquiry of 
the first chapter shows that Jevons’s concern for reconciling science and reli-
gion – what I have called the ‘bridge-making concern’ – is typical of his times. 
As I explain in the first chapter, Jevons believed that all branches of sci-
ence were rooted in a common ground: logic. All sciences had to rely on logic 
to produce knowledge. An extreme specialisation of the separate branches of 
knowledge only resulted in a loss of consistency and insight. In Jevons’s eyes, 
logic was indeed the foundation of all knowledge, since the laws of logic were 
the same as the laws of thought. Jevons thus embraced logical psychologism: 
he identified the laws of logic with mental faculties. Such an analysis of Jev-
ons’s logic investigates this topic from the point of view of the anthropological 
foundations of his thought: describing the laws of logic, Jevons gave an ac-
count of the conditions of possibility of human knowledge. 
The investigation of Jevons’s logical psychologism led me to consider the 
so-called ‘is-ought question’: the tension between the prescriptive and descrip-
tive perspectives. In Jevons’s view, logic expressed the natural functioning of 
the human mind. Hence, his purpose was to describe the laws of logic from a 
scientific, unbiased point of view. However, Jevons also thought that logic 
could correct the faults of ordinary reasoning, so taking on a prescriptive role. 
Therefore, his account of logic showed a remarkable ambiguity between his 
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scientific attitude and his commitment to establishing a code of proper reason-
ing. 
As I have argued, Jevons’s ambiguity concerning the character of logic 
rested on something profounder than negligence – and I believe that it 
shouldn’t be treated as such. He wavered between a simple, natural logic – a 
logic which could be eligible for no prescription – and a logic capable of cor-
recting the mistakes of ordinary reasoning. He seemed to wish that his logic 
could be both of these things, even if this meant contradicting himself. Why 
such an attachment to a self-contradictory account of logic? It is surely possible 
that Jevons did not acknowledge the contradictory character of his position. 
However, my contention is different: Jevons wanted his logic to be self-evident 
enough to serve as a proper foundation of human knowledge, while still being 
able to use it as a guide for ordinary reasoning. He also had good reason to 
think that logic is founded in the laws of thought. As we have seen, Jevons’s 
idea was informed by George Boole, who argued so in his work, The Laws of 
Logic. Moreover, the natural and spontaneous character of logic, that is, its 
identity with mental faculties, ensured that human knowledge had a sound ba-
sis. 
After considering the nature of Jevons’s logic, I focus on his reflections on 
the scientific method. Here I argue that his account of probability and natural 
laws had a theological foundation. In Jevons’s mind, the ontological gulf be-
tween the infinite Creator’s mind and His human creation confined human 
knowledge to finiteness. Therefore, in Jevons’s eyes human knowledge was 
never certain, but only probable. By showing the religious basis of Jevons’s 
thought about probability, which had thus far been neglected, this study takes 
the literature in a new direction and pursues the investigation of the anthropo-
logical foundations of his thought. 
As I have explained in the Introduction, Jevons’s views on probability 
have been addressed in many contributions, but they haven’t been related to his 
religious beliefs. Highlighting the religious character of his scientific reflec-
tions is of the utmost importance, since it helps depict an in-depth portrait of 
Jevons. Like many Victorians, Jevons was at once a godly man and a scientist. 
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Moreover, he strove to bring science and religion together. Hence, these differ-
ent aspects of his life have to be seen as intertwined. It is such entanglement 
which I underlined in the first chapter. 
In the last section of the first chapter I compare Jevons’s logic with the 
tradition of the ars combinatoria, arguing that he could rightfully be numbered 
among the thinkers in this tradition. By means of this inquiry, several relevant 
features of Jevons’s thought can be noted. First, it provides further proof of the 
importance of religion in his thought. In Jevons’s eyes, natural phenomena 
were articulated in a series of combinations and permutations, in accordance 
with the natural laws – and these laws were nothing but the order that God 
gave to nature. Hence, Jevons’s conception of the universe was informed by his 
faith in God as the supreme and benevolent contriver of nature. Second, the 
study of Jevons’s logic in terms of the art of combinations underscored logic’s 
ontological nature. For him, logic defined the rules with which not only our 
reasoning, but the world itself had to comply. Third, the comparison with the 
theorizers of the ars combinatoria helps outline Jevons’s conception of the re-
lationship between signs and things. In his opinion, signs were finite, just like 
human knowledge. As such, they could never exhaust the complexity of uni-
verse, which was infinite. Jevons’s account of the nature of signs is useful in 
order to tackle the problem of the use of mathematics in political economy, as I 
show in the third chapter. 
The second chapter focuses on Jevons’s moral and political thought. I start 
by again considering Jevons’s religious beliefs, but under a different perspec-
tive, i.e. with reference to Unitarianism. Here I present the main features of 
nineteen-century Unitarianism, with particular attention to the debate between 
the so-called ‘new’ and ‘old school’. The purpose of this study is to outline the 
historical background of Jevons’s religious confession. This historical inquiry 
accounts for the context in which Jevons lived and the positions which he con-
fronted. In order to deliver this, a detailed outline of Unitarianism as it was ar-
ticulated in the nineteenth century was essential. 
This study helps understand two features of Jevons’s work and life which 
were related to his Unitarian background: his commitment to social reform and 
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his ideas about free will. These two topics are also seen in terms of the main 
thesis of my analysis, i.e. as the anthropological views founding Jevons’s re-
flections on social reform and his work at large. Jevons’s engagement in social 
reform bears the traces of his education as a Unitarian, in addition to being 
connected to his acquaintances in the Unitarian circles in Manchester. Jevons’s 
ideas concerning free will were also connected with his Unitarian background 
through the figure of James Martineau. Jevons’s position displays a strong sim-
ilarity to Martineau’s. It is reasonable to think that his personal acquaintance 
with the Unitarian minister made Jevons inclined to meditate on the same top-
ics as Martineau. 
Moreover, Jevons’s ideas concerning free will elicited further investigation 
of the ‘is-ought question’. He believed that social reform had to be founded on 
the reform of individual moral habits. A subject deprived of free will would be 
prevented from pursuing such moral reform. However, several of his state-
ments suggest that he had a deterministic conception of human behaviour. If 
humans were inescapably bound by their natural impulses, no prescription 
could be meaningfully addressed to them, and no moral reform would be prac-
ticable. Thus, Jevons had to guarantee that there still was space for free will – 
and thus for moral prescription – in his account of human nature. This space 
was provided by those human faculties with which God endowed human be-
ings, especially by reason. By virtue of these faculties, humans could never ut-
terly be at the mercy of their natural impulses. 
I then focus on Jevons’s political thought, paying particular attention to his 
conception of society and its relation to the individuals composing it. Such an 
inquiry of Jevons’s political thought also requires focusing on his representa-
tion of human nature in relation to society, consistent with my attention for the 
anthropological foundations of his thought. Jevons considered individuals to be 
the driving force of social progress. Individuals, as he depicted them, were also 
primarily concerned with their own welfare, consistent with the utilitarian theo-
ry of morals. Thus, a question arises: how could a society of  such self-
interested individuals be a harmonious one? I tackle this question by compar-
ing Jevons’s position with two relevant utilitarian philosophers: Jeremy Ben-
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tham and John Stuart Mill. This study provides insight of the tradition from 
which Jevons’s thought came. It also reveals that he inherited a conundrum 
from this tradition: how to envision a society guaranteeing at once the common 
good and its members’ welfare? 
In the last section of the second chapter, I argue that Jevons found an an-
swer to this problem in the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Spencer had 
claimed that mental and moral faculties were the result of the process of human 
evolution. According to Spencer, humans would spontaneously develop altruis-
tic feelings in the course of evolution. Jevons was a supporter of Spencer’s po-
sition; indeed Jevons’s endorsement of Spencer’s theory of moral faculties con-
tributed to Jevons’s political thought. Jevons found  here a solution to the con-
flict between individual desire and the need to secure the welfare of society. 
The final stage of evolution would cause a spontaneous metamorphosis of ego-
istic feelings into altruistic feelings. Both Spencer and Jevons considered that 
eventually the welfare of the individual and of the community would overlap. 
What in their own times was a prescribed behaviour – namely altruistic action 
– would become second nature to us. 
Thus, the analysis of Spencer’s thought and the comparison with Jevons 
brings once again the ‘is-ought question’ to attention: Jevons and Spencer be-
lieved that prescriptions (the injunctions of ‘ought’) will not be needed at the 
highest stage of development of humankind. At such level, what we ought to 
do was simply what men are naturally inclined to do. Here I argue that this rea-
soning implies a fallacy, which I called ‘the prescriptive fallacy’. Spencer and 
Jevons drew their representation of the human nature at the highest stage of 
evolution from what in their times was the prescribed moral behaviour. They 
conceived of humans at the highest stage of evolution in accordance with the 
Victorian moral code, projecting their idea of the ‘ought’ on the (future) ‘is’. 
However, assuming this perspective did not allow them to solve the problem of 
conflicting interests within society. They only argued that nature would spon-
taneously lead humans to the highest stage of evolution, that is, to spontaneous-
ly comply with the ‘ought’. Both Spencer and Jevons were loath to impose 
some compulsory behaviour on individuals. Thus, they delegated this task to 
282 
 
nature, claiming that the evolution would, in the long run, spontaneously pro-
duce the sorts of altruistic behaviour they endorsed. 
In the third chapter, I consider Jevons’s economic theory. I argue that Jev-
ons’s economic theory has to be linked with the other spheres of his thought, 
and specifically to the anthropological foundations of his investigation, to be 
properly understood. His conception of society and of human nature informed 
his way of thinking of the economic agent. Hence, in the first part of the third 
chapter, I show how Jevons’s theory of value, of labour, and his views on 
commercial crises were based on his moral individualism. His theory, as it has 
been noted, puts the individual in the centre of the picture. This emphasis on 
the economic agent’s behaviour mirrored his individualistic account of society, 
so vindicating the importance of an approach addressing the problem of the an-
thropological foundations. 
In the second section of the third chapter, I address the topic of the math-
ematics in Jevons’s economic works. My contention is: Jevons’s application of 
mathematics to economics has to be seen in the light of his representation of 
the finiteness of human knowledge. I argue that Jevons’s translation of eco-
nomic issues into mathematics could be compared to the use of a metaphoric 
language. This thesis is based on Jevons’s view of human knowledge as finite, 
which prevented any system of language from exhausting the complexity of the 
natural objects. Due to the ambiguity of signs, in Jevons’s account no sign 
could be literal. Since metaphorical language is a non-literal system of expres-
sion, the study of Jevons’s mathematical economics in the light of the notion of 
metaphor turns out to be productive. 
In the last section of the third chapter, I present Jevons’s representation of 
the economic subject. The image of this subject was shaped by Jevons’s ac-
count of human nature. According to his views, the economic agent was able to 
weigh pleasures and pains and to take proper decisions on the basis of these es-
timations. The economic agent was self-interested, concerned with maximising 
pleasure. Such an account, for which he was indebted to Bentham, lay at the 
foundation of Jevons’s economic theory. Nonetheless, the economic agent was 
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capable of relinquishing their own good when the call of higher motive ap-
peared. 
Jevons’s picture of the economic agent is investigated in the light of the 
‘is-ought question’, consistent with the fil rouge of the present study. Jevons 
aimed at defining the laws regulating human economic behaviour, showing a 
descriptive tendency. However, through his economic theory, Jevons estab-
lished rules of correct behaviour. He developed a value-laden and prescriptive 
account, which was at odds with his descriptive perspective. The economic 
agent, as Jevons depicted him, had a dual nature: he was bound by exact and 
inescapable laws, and he thus did not seem to be eligible for prescription; but 
he also he had the right to choose whether to oppose those laws or foster them. 
Thus, the economic agent was a creature of both ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Moreover, 
Jevons’s economic theory displays a dual nature too, being at once concerned 
with developing a scientific description of economic laws and the agent’s be-
haviour, while it still identifies and prescribes a code of right behaviour. 
As I have shown in the present work, Jevons was indeed a polymath. His 
work explored many subject matters, while displaying a continuity of thought 
throughout all these domains. Vis-à-vis such thought, what can we learn and 
which way of approaching it seems the most profitable? Jevons’s interests were 
diverse, ranging from meteorology, chemistry and geology to religion, morality 
and social policy. We have seen that Jevons believed the over-specialization of 
the branches of knowledge to diminish the power of our understanding2. Con-
sistent with this view, Jevons made very different domains interact in his work, 
even when such domains seemed impossible to reconcile. 
The connections which Jevons instituted between such different spheres of 
thought could perhaps appear inconceivable in the eyes of the modern reader. 
We could be tempted to ignore them or to relegate some of his concerns – like 
the religious one – to the private sphere. We could be tempted to consider some 
of his concerns to be unscientific, and, as such, to set them aside. I do not as-
sume a priori that any of Jevons’s concern can be neglectable, even if from the 
 
2 See the section “The tyranny of specialism”, in the first chapter. 
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perspective of our modern knowledge we may think that some topics should be 
neglected. Thanks to the study of Jevons’s thought, we can thus learn not to re-
duce a different way of thinking to ours. In the present work, historical re-
search and philosophical reflection is thus conceived as a means to think differ-
ently. 
Historical research is meant to help us think differently from what we con-
sider to be normal, obvious, taken for granted. This is why I have often chosen 
to underline the differences rather the similarities between our way of thinking 
and Jevons’s – those features of his thought which are in our eyes old-
fashioned and even obsolete. The inquiry into Jevons’s thought has therefore 
another relevant effect: it displays how some concepts which are familiar to us 
originated from a completely different ground. 
Indeed many examples could be given. For instance, we have seen how the 
theory of probability, which is nowadays of crucial importance for many 
branches of economy and scientific inquiry, was connected to theological and 
ontological views. What is for us now indisputably secular sprung from reli-
gious ideas. This is also the case with Jevons’s picture of the economic agent, 
which has been so influential for the development of modern economic theory 
(see Morgan, 2012, chap. 4). Unscientific as this may seem, Jevons’s represen-
tation of the economic subject resulted from many inputs which had nothing to 
do with pure economic theory, being rather connected to the anthropological 
foundations of his thought. It was informed by his belief in God as guarantor of 
nature’s stability, by the moral code of Victorian age, by his moral individual-
ism and account of society as centred on the individual. 
What kind of attitude should we take in studying Jevons’s thought, provid-
ed that we want to understand it and learn from it? As I have already remarked 
in the third chapter, I have no interest in judging Jevons, or accusing him of in-
consistency and negligence. I would like to quote Spinoza’s words to express 
what I believe to be a profitable attitude in analysing a thinker’s work: “hu-
manas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere” (Spi-
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noza, 2016, Vol. II, 505 [chap. I, § IV])3. Some features of Jevons’s thought 
led undoubtedly to self-contradiction; this is the case with his treatment of top-
ics involving the ‘is-ought question’. However, we can hardly understand Jev-
ons by marking him as an inconsistent or superficial thinker, passing thus a 
rushed judgement on him. To understand him, we could more profitably ask: 
why did Jevons think so? What led him to this inconsistency? 
I answer this in relation to the ‘is-ought question’. This topic is the very 
core of the present work, and one of the most problematic Jevons’s thought. As 
I have shown, the tension between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ runs through all of Jevons’s 
oeuvre. The reference to these two aspects came with many intricacies, which I 
have elucidated in several parts of this study. The crucial question is: why did 
this ambiguity dwell in Jevons’s thought? The problematic entanglement of 
these two concepts seems to have escaped Jevons’s attention entirely. My con-
tention is: this intricacy is not to be seen as a simple logical error. Rather, it had 
deeper roots. It related to Jevons’s aspirations as a man of science as well as a 
political thinker. 
Jevons was torn between two contrasting wishes: on the one hand, he 
wanted to provide a scientific, objective description of reality; on the other, he 
wanted to provide the means for improving it. This division within his mind 
was mirrored by his attitude towards specialization in political economy. On 
the one hand, he wanted political economy to become a scientific and inde-
pendent branch of knowledge. As such, he encouraged the development of dif-
ferent independent branches of political economy and of the professionaliza-
tion of the economist (see Jevons, 1905, 200-201)4. On the other hand, he 
urged that all sciences shared a common method and sprung from a common 
source, i.e. logic. 
 
3 In English translation: “I took great pains not to laugh at human actions, or mourn 
them, or curse them, but only to understand them” (translated part emphasized). 
4 Jevons favoured indeed a development towards specialization in political economy, 
as Peart has shown (see Peart, 1996). However, Jevons was also persuaded that the 
different branches of scientific inquiry should meet on the ground of logic. Economic 
inquiry, qua scientific investigation, was no exception. 
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These two contrasting thoughts triggered a tension between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’. Jevons was positive that every branch of knowledge should rely on 
scientific methodology. For him, every topic could be treated in scientific 
terms, the social sciences no less than the physical. Moreover, as we have seen, 
Jevons’s conception of the human nature was in a high degree deterministic: 
humans were bound by the impulse to search for pleasure and avoid pain. Con-
sistent with such views, the task of the social scientist seemed to be reduced to 
describing the world as it was. If humans are bound by their nature to behave in 
certain ways, they are not eligible for prescription. Their actions would be as 
necessary as the falling of a dropped stone. Jevons’s willingness to extend the 
power of scientific explanation to the social sciences ensued from the desire to 
explain reality as it is, that is, the first of the two contrasting wishes. In Jev-
ons’s eyes, scientific knowledge was the best candidate for providing an exact 
and reliable explanation of the world. This desire finds its most suitable ex-
pression in the idea of a value-free scientific investigation – an inquiry which 
would be solely concerned with what is, instead with what ought to be. 
However, when Jevons’s analysis touched the sphere of human action the 
matter became more complicated, since the other wish made its voice clear. A 
deterministic account of human nature, so fitting for scientific description, 
gives hardly any latitude for envisaging an improvement of the described state 
of things. Jevons could not renounce this possibility of improvement. He also 
believed that, as a social scientist, he was responsible for fostering this im-
provement in society. Hence, the ‘ought’ demanded its rightful place in Jev-
ons’s thought. Without the possibility of giving prescriptions to humans no im-
provement of our condition could be conceivable, and this scenario was unac-
ceptable for Jevons. 
Both description and prescription, ‘ought’ and ‘is’, could be found in Jev-
ons’s thought, even when assuming these perspectives at once entailed a lack 
of consistency. However, inconsistency was the price to be paid for complying 
at the same time with the call of ‘is’ and of ‘ought’. In Jevons’s eyes, humans 
were governed by exact and flawless natural laws. They seemed to be beyond 
the reach of prescription. However, Jevons could not conceive a society de-
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prived of the possibility of self-improvement, and in order to make self-
improvement possible prescription was needed. This complicated relationship 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ gives a dual nature to Jevons’s thought: it is a scien-
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